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This DISSERTATION seeks to strengthen international law by incorporating and integrating 
multinational corporations more fully into the international legal system. It argues that the 
undeniable role of multinational corporations as primary players in the global economy and 
international politics necessitates or demands adequate acknowledgement in the international 
legal structure. Accordingly, due recognition should be accorded the rights and privileges of 
multinationals. Concomitant to that, corresponding duties and responsibilities should be 
attached to these corporate entities in international law. 
Many far-reaching advantages will flow from such development. The corporations will enjoy 
de jure protection, which would enhance their business operations across countries. Their 
integration into the international scheme of things will also ensure that contrary to what 
obtains within the extant legal landscape, corporations are held accountable for their actions 
that have huge social, economic and environmental impact on the communities in which they 
operate and the globe as a whole. Finally, the triple problems of implementation, compliance 
and enforcement that have hung on the neck of international law as an albatross will be 
brought under control, as multinational corporations which contribute to the present 
unpalatable scenario in some form or the other, would be placed in a position that is 
antithetical to the current state of affairs. 
Thus, this work, using the oil industry and existing international agreements and domestic 
instruments in that area, takes the innovative track of linking the compliance problem in 
international law with the corporate accountability question. Addressing the latter is 
tantamount to removing some of the obstacles that impede the achievement of the former, 
making imperative an approach that considers this linkage as an important issue. 
11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
DIVISION I: INTERNATIONAL OIL TRADE AND SHIPPING 
CHAPTER 1: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL TRADE 
AND SHIPPING 
I: INTRODUCTION 
II: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
III: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 
A. OILPOL 




CHAPTER 2: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
III. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
A. Flag State Jurisdiction 
1. Application of Flag State Jurisdiction 



























d j " ,:, 
III" 
~ I I • 
) I I' 
3. Nationality of Ships, Registration of Ships, and Flags of Convenience 
a. Nationality of Ships 
b. Registration of Ships 
c. Flags of Convenience Practice 
i. Preliminary Matters 
ii. Reasons for the Open Registry Practice 
iii. Flags of Convenience and Environmental Issues 
iv. Control of Open Registries 
d. Observations 
B. Coastal State Jurisdiction 
C. Port State Jurisdiction 
1. International Legal Provisions on Port State Jurisdiction 
2. Regional Port State Control Efforts 
3. Assessments 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Role of Oil and Shipping Companies 
B. Changes in Multinational Corporate Behavior 
V. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 























A. Realism 114 
B. Regime Theory 122 
III. ECONOMIC ISSUES 134 
A. International Economic Cooperation 135 
B. Fundraising and Management 146 
1. User Fees 146 
2. Funds Management 154 
IV. CONCLUSION 160 
DIVISION 2: OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 164 
CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE ABUSES AND REGULATION 165 
I. INTRODUCTION 165 
II. THE CONCEPT OF CODES OF CONDUCT 169 
III: CONTENT OF CODES OF CONDUCT 173 
A. Internal Codes 173 
B. External Codes 176 
C. Government Initiatives 177 
D. Intergovernmental Codes 181 
IV: CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CORPORATE CODES 188 
A. Utility of Codes 188 
B. Limits of Codes 195 





























A. Domestic Judicial Remedies 209 
B. International Regulation 213 
VI. CONCLUSION 223 






RECENT INTERNATIONAL TRENDS ON CORPORATE 
CONTROL 
UN Global Compact 
UN Sub-Commission On Huma,n Rights 












Home Country Litigation 
Litigation Under The Alien Tort Claims Act 
The Problem: Corporate Practices and Absence of Accountability 
The Alien Tort Claims Act 



























CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
A. Theories of Legal Personality 
B. Corporations and International Legal Personality 
III. NEED FORAN ENHANCED LEGAL STATUS FORMNCs 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
V. CONCLUSION 






















: i~ ~ •• 
" 
I r ~ , I, 
'I' '" 
~ I: I j, I 
1:1 III, 
j I '1'1 
I I Iii 
INTRODUCTION 
By any standards, oil is the world's 
leading industry in size; it is probably 
the only international industry that 
concerns every country in the world; and 
as a result of the geographical separation 
of major production from regions of high 
consumption, it is of first importance in 
its contribution to the world's tonnage of 
international trade and shipping.! 
Multinational corporations2 are major actors and important players in the 
international field today, occupying a key role as the leading drivers of international 
trade and investment. 3 Of particular significance is the position of multinational 
corporations in the oil and gas sector. Big oil corporations are conspicuous in the list 
of the world's leading multinationals. According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its World Investment Report, 2002, Exxon 
Mobil (the world's largest oil company), RoyallDutch Shell, BP, Chevron Texaco and 
1 PETER R. ODELL, OIL AND WORLD POWER (7th ed) 11 (1983). 
2 The term multinational corporation is used interchangeably here with such other terms as 
transnational corporations and multinational enterprises. Different defmitions have been provided in 
respect of these corporations. E.g., Peter Muchlinski defines a multinational corporation as an entity 
that "owns (in whole or in part), controls and manages income generating assets in more than one 
country." See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12 
(1995); Phillip I. Blumberg, views these corporations as affiliated corporations that are incorporated 
in different jurisdictions but which are conducting a common enterprise under common control. See 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: 
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993). However, there is no 
universally accepted definition. See William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations, Chapter 67. Foreign Corporations I. Definition, Nature and Status; General 
Considerations, § 8296.10. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. Database updated July 2002. 
Suffice it to say that the term is used here for a large corporation having business operations in one or 
two countries besides the country of its incorporation either directly or through subsidiaries and 
affiliates. 






Total Fina SA are among the world's top 25 multinational corporations in terms of 
foreign assets.4 
The significance of petroleum in today's society and the global economy 
cannot be overemphasized.s Oil is currently the,primary energy source in the world. It 
comprises more than 40 per cent of the total energy consumption globally.6 Existing 
projections indicate a continued increase in the demand for oil, growing from 65 
million barrels per day to 90 million barrels per day in less than twenty years.7 
The world holds significant oil reserves, which are expected to meet this rise 
in demand in the foreseeable future, or at least for the next few decades. 8 Enormous 
oil reserves exist in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is believed to have up to 262 
billion barrels of oil in reserve.9 Iraq's reserves amount to about 112.5 billion barrels 
of oil. IO United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iran each hold more than 90 billion 
barrels of oil in reserve. I I Oil reserves in North America, Africa and China are 
estimated to be about 55, 53, and 34 billion barrels respectively.12 The Caspian 
4 Actually, the oil corporations mentioned above fall within the top 20. See UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, Table 2. 
5 See Daniel Yergin, Oil Supplies Key to World Economy, USA TODAY Op/Ed. September 17, 2002; 
available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/opinionleditorialsI2002-09-17-oplede_x.htm. Last visited 
September 18, 2002 (stating that "[o]il is the commodity that makes the world go round.") 
6 United Nations Report on Energy and Transport, E/CN. 1712001lPC20, UN Economic and Social 
Council (2001), at 2. 
7 See Leighton, supra note 3, at 25. 
8 See !d., at 26. Production at the current rate without new discoveries would still provide enough oil to 
meet demands for forty more years. 
9 Ken Moritsugu, Saddam-less Iraq could be key player in oil market, KnightRidder Newspapers, 
September 15, 2002. 
10 !d. See also US Energy Information Administration, March 2002 Report, available at 
www.eia.doe.gov!emeulcabs/irag.btml. Last visited October 24, 2002. 
II Moritsugu, supra note 9. 
12 US Energy Information Administration, June 2000 Report. 
2 
region, a newer entrant into the oil arena, is also believed to hold huge prospects, with 
some estimates putting potential reserves at about 250 billion barrels. 13 
The prominence, prevalence and importance of oil in the global SOClO-
economic sphere are underscored by the fact that the 20th century was labelled "the 
age of oil.,,14 It is quite within the realm of possibility that a combination of factors in 
the future (including resource limits, ecological constraints and better conservation) 
could reduce the consumption of oil in the years ahead. IS However, until a transition 
is made to renewable sources of energy, oil will continue to affect our lives in a great 
measure and therefore deserves considerable attention. 
World oil development, for decades now, has been dominated by 
multinational oil corporations and government owned oil enterprises. 16 Almost since 
the inception of commercial oil production in 1859 in the United States, through the 
period after the two world wars, and even up to the present times, the overarching 
role of multinational corporations in this area has been consistently characterized by 
its ubiquity.17 
\3 Leighton, supra note 3, at 26. 
14 See Christopher Flavin & Seth Dunn, A New Energy Paradigm for the 21st Century, 53: 1 1. Int'l Aff. 
167 (1999). 
15 Id., at 169, 170. 
16 Leighton, supra note 3, at 26. 
17 Id., at 26-28 (detailing the role of Standard Oil before its dissolution in 1911, the strategic 
partnerships negotiated by the governments of France, UK and US to gain access to Middle East oil 
reserves, the post-World War II dominance of the "Seven Sisters" (Exxon, Mobil, Standard Oil of 
California, Texaco, Gulf, British Petroleum and RoyallDutch Shell), the formation of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the emergence of smaller and independent oil 





The petroleum industry is broadly divided into two subheads namely the 
upstream and downstream sectors. I8 Exploration and production are part of the 
upstream sector, while refining, marketing and distribution belong to the downstream 
sector. I9 Virtually each of these sub-sectors has a tremendous capacity to inflict 
social, economic and environmental costs on humanity. A number of oil producing 
countries are in "profound economic and political crisis" despite their enormous 
resources, a fact that is quite puzzling.2o Human rights abuses and environmental 
disasters have become increasingly associated with the oil industry. There is no 
gainsaying the fact that: 
Oil development has contributed to problems of 
pollution, biodiversity, and habitat loss, rising poverty 
and disease, human and labor rights violations, and, 
more recently, escalation of conflict and violence in oil-
producing regions. Many of these problems are most 
evident in developing countries, but human health and 
environmental justice issues are also significant in the 
21 [developed world]. 
The international community has not completely turned a blind eye to some of 
these social, economic and environmental concerns. A large body of rules exists in 
international law to address the environmental consequences of oil trade and 
transportation.22 This is a clear recognition of the impact of international oil trade. 
18 For a discussion of the structure of the oil industry, see PAUL FRANKEL, THE ESSENTIALS OF 
PETROLEUM: A KEY TO OIL ECONOMICS (1969). 
19 Edward L. Morse, A NewPolitical Economy of Oil? 53:1 J.Int'! Aff. 1,2 (1999). 
20 Terry Lynn Karl, The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty, 53 J. Int'l Aff. 
31,32-33 (1999). 
21 Leighton, supra note 3, at 23. 
22 They include the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
327 D.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, I.M.C.O. 
Doc. MP/CONFIWP 35 (Nov. 2, 1973) reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319, and the Protocol relating thereto, 
I.M.C.O. Doc. TSPP/CONFI11, (Feb. 16, 1978) reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 546 [jointly referred to as 
MARPOL 73178] and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982. 
4 
There is no doubt that international oil trade is a significant aspect of global economic 
activity. More than three thousand oil tankers traverse the oceans every day, each 
carrying its own portion of the 1.7 billion gallons of crude oil and oil products 
shipped each year by sea.23 It is projected that the volume of this trade will increase in 
the future24 as a result of growing demand for this resource by the industrialized 
world.25 
This development, however, has phenomenal implications and ramifications 
for the environment and economy of the coastal communities, the oceans and the 
resources contained in them, and the well being of humanity as a whole. This is 
because oil itself is a polluting agent, and joins other major pollutants such as refuse 
and hazardous wastes as the principal causes of marine pollution. Marine pollution is 
a product of three major sources namely, land-based, atmospheric, and vessel-source. 
There is disparity in the accounts on the extent of marine pollution traceable to ships. 
Most estimates however, place ship-source pollution as contributing roughly from 
between 40% and 50% of the total pollution on a worldwide basis.26 
Pollution of the sea by oil could take any of any of the following forms: 
(i) . deliberate pumping of oil into the ocean by seagoing vessels; 
(ii) unintended spilling of oil into the ocean by vessels; 
23 Stephen Darrnody, The Oil Pollution Acts Criminal Penalties: On a Collision Course with the Law 
of the Sea, 21 B.C. Envtl Aff. L. Rev. 89,92 (1993). 
24 Current figures indicate that 3,000 tankers over 10,000 dwt pass through the oceans everyday, 
carrying 15,549,000,000 barrels or 653,058,000,000 representing an increase on previous numbers. 
(Email communication with Erik Ranheim, Manager, Research and Project Section, INTERTANKO, 
Oslo, Norway, October 29, 2002.) 
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(iii) oil spills arising from shipping accidents and casualties; 
(iv) oil spills due to accidents or negligence at onshore oil installations; 
(v) oil spills due to accidents or negligence at offshore drilling stations; 
and 
(vi) miscellaneous spillage. 27 
The main attention of this dissertation, as touching international regulations, 
will be on marine oil pollution arising from the activities of ships.28 Operational 
discharges of oil and accidental spills that have almost become inevitable in the 
course of maritime transportation have tremendous impact on all.29 For coastal 
communities, this translates to a negative impact on coastal resort areas including 
beaches and other places of tourist attraction. 30 Considering the revenue loss that this 
occasions, oil pollution, to these communities, is therefore something to be dreaded. 
26 D. BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1993). 
27 E. Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. Marit. L. & 
Comm. 13, 15 (1972). 
28 The terms "vessel" and "ship" will be used interchangeably here and refer to any structure capable of 
transportation on navigable waters. 
29 The recent incident involving the Bahamian-flagged oil tanker, Prestige, sank off the coast of Spain. 
It had a cargo of about 20 million gallons of fuel oil, which could potentially lead to the worst oil spill 
disaster in history. See Emma Daly & Andrew Revkin, Oil Tanker Splits Apart Off Spain, Threatening 
Coast, New York Times, November 20, 2002 , at A6; Bhushan Bahree, Carita Vitzthun and Erik 
Portanger, Clash of Politics, Economics Sealed A Tanker's Fate, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
November 25,2002, at AI. 
30 David Iyalornhe, Environmental Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: Lessons from 
Alberta's Experience 42 (Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, 1998) (On file with the University of Alberta 
Library) 
6 
Aquatic life is also affected by the entry of oil into the oceans. Birds have 
been killed in large numbers due to suffocation and poisoning.31 Shellfish, fish and 
large marine mammals have also suffered a similar fate. 32 This imports the loss of a 
source of livelihood to local fishermen and huge revenue losses to nations and their 
citizens that are involved in commercial fishing. 33 The fact that this affects 
humanity'S protein needs is almost too trite to be specially mentioned. Health hazards 
also flow from the presence of oil in the oceans. Thus, it is not only marine life that is 
imperilled, as human beings also contend with the dangers inherent in an 
environmentally-disastrous use of the oceans. 
The planetary system is not spared. Tiny ocean plants known as 
phytoplankton participate actively in the invaluable oxygen and carbon cycles. These 
unicellular life forms annually expel a massive pulse of oxygen estimated at 300 
million metric tons into the earth's atmosphere.34 Unlike land plants, which 
proportionately use the oxygen they produce, these plants are net producers of 
oxygen. The human respiratory system is closely linked to these activities thus 
making the oceans "as important to planetary life as human lungs are to our 
individuallives.,,35 
31 P. Dempsey and L. Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels - Environmental Tragedy: The Legal 
Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions, and Coastal States, 10 Denv. J. Int'l L & 
Pol'y 37,45 (1980). 
32 !d., at 46. 
33 On the implications, generally, of transnational shipment on marine life, fishing and tourism, see 
R.P. Cote, The Health of Canada's Marine Environment: Problems and Opportunities in CANADIAN 
OCEAN LAW AND POLICY 317, 333 (D. VanderZwaag, ed., 1992). 
34 M.O. Andreae, The Oceans as a Source of Biogenic Gases, (1986) 29 Oceanus 27-35, cited in Davis, 
infra note 12, at 168. 
35 W. Jackson Davis, The Need for a New Global Oceans Governance System, in FREEDOM FOR 





Equally important is the fact that phytoplankton is a net consumer of carbon 
and, accordingly, contributes to reducing the pace of accumulation of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere. As the scourge of ozone depletion and global climatic change have 
been associated with the presence in unwanted quantities of some "green house" 
gases including carbon dioxide/6 the significance of the role played by these plants in 
the preservation of the planet earth cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, a healthy 
ocean stands between us and a climatic catastrophe.37 Unfortunately, these plants also 
bear the brunt of oil pollution. One writer summarizes the impact of oil on water as 
follows: 
Oil ... coats the seaweed causing it to be easily tom free 
by wave action, resulting in beach erosion. At the same 
time, some oil begins to biodegrade, reducing the life 
supporting dissolved oxygen in the water available to 
living organisms . . . The slick itself interferes with 
phytoplankton photosynthesis, the food source for much 
of the world's protein and a source of oxygen for the 
atmosphere. Interference with water evaporation may 
cause reduced water vapor in the air with a proportionate 
decrease in rainfall. 
In addition to genetic changes and deformities, observers 
have reported increasing cancerous lesions of fish in 
areas of high oil pollution, raising the specter that oil 
pollution may induce cancer in man.38 
While the above problems could emanate either from shipping accidents or 
operational discharges, the focus here will be on the latter which is unarguably the 
dominant form of ship-source oil pollution. The dangers posed by operational 
36 See Allan Chambers, The global warming storm: making sense of the science and politics of climate 
change, Edmonton Journal, January 18 1998, at Fl. 
37 D . aVIS, supra note 35, at 149. 
38 Andrew W. Anderson, National and International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil 
Pol/ution, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 985, at 992 - 993 (1976). Citations omitted. 
8 
discharges of oil consequent to the international commerce in the commodity have 
elicited the reaction of States, primarily through domestic legislation. 
However, ship-source oil pollution is bedevilled with complexities, which 
emasculate national governments and hamstring virtually every national effort to deal 
with it. It has long been recognized that only concerted international measures can 
arrest the hydra-headed monster, due to such factors as the ambulatory character of 
oil, the cross-national characteristic of shipping, and the enormity of the problem. 
It is in the light of these facts that the environmental dangers posed by 
. international oil trade has (as earlier stated) attracted international attention 
culminating in the conclusion of a number of treaties on the subject.39 However, 
dealing with the pollution problems caused by spills is further complicated by the 
jurisdictional issues inherent in the international law on the subject. Primacy over the 
regulation of the activities of ships is given to the State of the ship's nationality or 
registry. This privilege enjoyed by these States (also known as flag States) has not 
been totally acceptable to the coastal States who usually suffer the consequences of 
the activities of these ships. Some flag States also encourage ship owners to use their 
registry by the application of generally lax standards and reluctance to exercise 
effective control over the vessels. This has conferred on them a comparative 
advantage over other shipping nations. 
The effectiveness of the international regulations has also been weakened by 
the fact that the vast majority of the members of the international communit; are not 
parties to many of the conventions. Thus, the problems of implementation, 
compliance, and enforcement that have plagued virtually every facet of international 
9 
law are also present here. It becomes imperative therefore to fashion a system that 
aims, not just at the conclusion of more treaties, but the implementation of existing 
ones. One of the central questions that this work intends to address centers on how to 
improve and enhance implementation, compliance and enforcement of international 
law, and in tum facilitate the success of national policy initiatives. 
In addressing the question raised, a salient observation is that two major 
reasons account for the present state of affairs in relation to the effectiveness of 
international law. First is the fact that States are expected to implement and comply 
with the stipulations of the international conventions, with little consideration for 
their capacity to do so. Developing countries are also expected to forego their 
development aspirations and refrain from economic activities that their counterparts 
in the developed world enjoyed without inhibition, yet it is not considered appropriate 
to compensate them for the lost opportunities. 
Developed countries, whose unbridled quest for development without regard 
to the environmental impact contributed to the current state of affairs, have also not 
deemed it appropriate to step out and remedy the effect of their international oil 
trading activities. Instead, efforts have been concentrated in developing a strong port 
State control regime, whereby substandard vessels are turned away from their ports. 
But the problem persists because these ships can trade in other States with less 
stringent requirements, and considering the ambulatory character of oil, any oil spill 
will impact even States far removed from the incident. 
The second problem with the current international legal framework is that it is 
States-centric, focusing attention on the efforts of States to control international oil 
39 S ee note 8, supra 
10 
pollution. Thus, the flag State is exp.ected to ensure that its ships abide by 
international rules. The State whose port a ship visits - the port state - has also been 
given a supplementary role. Some flag States, however, have not been alive to their 
responsibilities while port States may be lackadaisical with regard to pollution 
incidents that do not impact them directly. The humble contention of this research 
work is that the issues of compliance and enforcement will be pushed to the 
background if oil and shipping companies, the primary players in international oil 
trade, were to conduct their businesses ethically and with due consideration for the 
interest of the society and the environment. This is in sharp contrast to the inordinate 
desire for profit maximization that defines their current attitude. 
It is instructive to note that while there has been an elaboration of 
international rules on the environmental aspects of international oil trade and 
shipping, the same cannot be said of the social, economic and environmental costs of 
the other aspects of the petroleum industry.4o In areas such as exploration and 
extraction, which international law has essentially left under the domain of national 
governments, corporate activities that are inimical to the environment or have 
enormous social and economic costs on the society have not received adequate 
attention.41 It is not the intendment of this study to undervalue or ignore the positive 
aspects of multinational corporate activity such as job creation42 and introduction of 
40 See Leighton, et aI., supra note 3 at 47 
41 ' • 
[d. 
42 Job creation internationally has added to the power and influence of MNCs. See Scott G th d 
Th M; /t. ( l d h "M S k h rea ea , e u ma zona s an t e lVew ta e older": Examining the Business Case for Human Rights 35 
Vand. !. Transnat'l L. 7.19, 722 (2?02) arguing that the leaders of the People's Republic of China' are 
more hkely to place a higher ~rermum on the opinion of the CEOs of multinational corporations who 
ha~e tens of thousands of Chmese workers in their employ, than the views of the President of the 
Umted States, from whom they may not expect much both from political and practical standpoints. 
11 
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new technologies.43 At the same time, one would be remiss to discount the concern 
that has continued to mount regarding the negative consequences of economic 
globalization. Multinational corporations operating in countries other than their home 
countries have been implicated in, or associated with human rights violations,44 
environmental pollution and degradation,45 escalation of poverty conditions,46 and an 
increase in social vices in their host communities.47 
The international legal system has made some effort to address a number of 
these issues. However, a lot still needs to be done to address some of these cases of 
corporate misbehavior. Taking human rights abuses as an example, it is true that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights enjoins not only States, but also "every 
individual and every organ of society" to participate in the promotion and protection 
43 Thomas Donaldson, Can Multinationals Stage a Universal Morality Play? 29 Bus. & Soc. Rev. 51, 
52 (1992). "Third World representatives increasingly acknowledge the role multinationals playas a 
conduit of technological know-how to host cultures, and most have accepted a promultinational 
position .... " 
44 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbj0rn Eide, Helge Ole Bergesen and Pia 
Rudolfson Goyer eds, 2000). See also Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: 
Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 183 (2002). 
45 See for instance, JUDITH KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE (1991). 
46 See Emeka Duruigbo, Oil Development in Nigeria: A Critical Investigation of Chevron 
Corporation's Performance in the Niger River Delta (Natural Heritage Institute, 2001). According to 
surveys conducted by Nigeria's Federal office of Statistics, while 28% of Nigerians lived in poverty in 
198~, ~he number has risen astronomically over the years, with 66% of Nigerians living in poverty, 
subsIstlng on less than $1.40 a day in 1996. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Integrated Regional information Network, Nigeria: Focus on the Scourge of Poverty, June 11, 
2002; available at http://www.iriIUlews.Of!2:/report.asp?ReportID=28258. Last visited September 18, 
2002. This is pathetic, considering that between 1970 and 1999, Nigeria'S earnings from crude oil 
exports were estimated to be $320 billion. !d. 
47 Such vices include prostitution and criminal activities by unemployed youths. See Henry Clark, et 
aI., O~l For Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in 
the NIger Delta, January 25, 2000, available at http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/report/. Last 
visited September 12, 2002. 
12 
of human rights.48 However, while this has been widely interpreted to include 
corporations, the fact still remains that "a company is not legally obliged under 
internationa11aw to comply with these standards,,49 and thus can conduct its business 
operations negatively without inviting internationa11ega1 sanctions. 
International law seems to depend on States to address these concerns 
domestically, 50 while the evidence on the ground abundantly shows that many States 
are incapable of handling some of these unsavory effects of international business.51 
In the absence of clear international regulations, and with weak national 
standards in many countries to guide corporate behavior and direct industry 
performance vis-a-vis the detrimental effects of international business operations on 
the society, corporations have chosen to embrace self-regulation. Consequently, the 
past few years have witnessed a proliferation of corporate codes and voluntary 
. .. . 52 
Imtlatlves to regulate corporate conduct. Corporate self-regulation, however, has not 
proven to be a very adequate tool, leaving countless victims of corporate abuses 
without sufficient remedies in either domestic or internationa11aw. 
To ensure that some of these problems are addressed and resulting injuries 
redressed is the second major assignment that this dissertation undertakes. Thus, this 
work is intended to accomplish a number of objectives: 
48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No.3, at 71, 
U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948). 
49 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & THE PRINCE OF WALES BUSINESS LEADERS FORUM 
HUMAN RIGHTS: IS IT ANY OF YOUR BUSINESS? 23 (2000). ' 
50 See Michelle Leighton Schwarz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse 
18 Yale. J. Int'! L. (1995). ' 
51 See Okechukwu Ibeanu, Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger 
Delt~, Nigeri~, 6: ENV~RONMENAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT 19, 32 (2000) 
(statmg that 011 compames operating in Nigeria have evaded accountability.) 
52 Pro~e~t a~ong these a~e t~e OECD Guidelines, the Sullivan Principles, the US-UK Agreement on 
Secunty PrmcIples and myrIad mternal codes of conduct designed by multinational corporations. 
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(1) Promote international cooperation and mutual interest as a recipe to 
increase the effectiveness of international rules and regulations. 
(2) Suggest ways of improving implementation, compliance and 
enforcement of international law by integrating and economically empowering 
developing countries. 
(3) Extend the role of corporations in ensuring a better world by holding them 
accountable for their actions that have international implications, and making them 
have due consideration for sound business practices as opposed to considerations only 
of profit maximization. 
In addressing the demands placed by this task, this work has undertaken, in 
the following chapters, to identify, analyze, organize and synthesize international 
conventi~ns and protocols, statutes, judicial decisions and commentary as well as 
domestic legislation on the subjects traversed herein. This is aimed at assisting in 
laying the foundation by stating the law as it is and involves the following: 
(a) a consideration of the environmental 8 resulting from 
international oil trade and shipping and E~~~~~~l?E~~ej~~ relating thereto in 
terms of the contribution it ma~~!()_!ht! l"eIl1~clY gf th~pl"oblenl. 
(b) 
(c) 
setting forth~ systematicexposition ofth~'d~velop~~~t~fthat law. 
IA .II ;~' 
'I, ~J c! 
examining, where possible, ~;p~a~t1ce of those involved--in the 
administration or working of that l~w, especially the International Maritime 
Organization. 
(d) suggesting, where appropriate, r th~--~i~ direction! in which further 
--,,-------'---- ------
development should take place. 
_-____ ._~ __ r _____ ·~·~ __ ~.--.----'~ 
14 
(e) Undertaking a review of voluntary initiatives from non-governmental, 
governmental and inter-governmental quarters to control the activities 
of multinational corporations. 
(f) evaluating the import and impact of corporate self-regulation in the 
promotion of corporate accountability. 
(g) examining the current activities of the United Nations and its 
component parts in fashioning new initiatives and rules to control or 
curtail the negative consequences of international business 
transactions. 
Chapter 1 discusses international regulations relating to the environmental .,,--------.. -...... " .... - plle'~fM..e 
aspects of oil trade and shipping. It involves an exposition of the international law on 
------.~- --. - -_.. --_.-_._._---_.. . 
the subject, the basis for it, and its impact in addressing the problems posed. 
In Chapter 2, the concepts of implementation, compliance, and enforcement of 
international law are defined. This chapter also includes a discussion of the practical 
approaches adopted by the international system in ensuring that those involved in 
international oil transactions abide by international requirements relating to the 
environment. Since the primary players here are oil and shipping companies, this 
thesis considers the possibility of an alternative approach in the form of a binding 
international norm on corporate behavior. 
In chapter 3, the work examines the problem of compliance from an 
interdisciplinary perspective, drawing from the thinking of scholars in the fields of 
international relations and economics. The argument is that States will continue to 
!:.~e:?-e in their duties or refrain from assuming obligations if they lack the capacity to 
) '" 171 L-QrL.. 
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do so or face circumstances inimical to their interest. Suggestions are made herein 
---------------@) 'b~3.9.! 
for the construction of a system based on an identification and realization of States' 
interests in this area as a means of bringing States to assent to or comply with treaties. 
This will generally take the form of financial and technical assistance organized under 
the auspices of an international fund. 
Chapter 4 ~eroes in oil) corporate abuses and self-regulation in relation to 
T~~~~W-J'\ 
multinational corporations. In view of the fact that international rules are largely non-
existent regarding some of the activities of multinational corporations that hold 
enormous social, economic and environmental costs on the society, the place of self-
regulation cannot be over-emphasized. Thus, various voluntary initiatives in the form 
of corporate codes of conduct are examined and the adequacy or otherwise discussed. 
In Chapter 5, the premise is that voluntary initiatives are inadequate and that 
what is needed is the elaboration and introduction of rules under the auspices of the 
United Nations. In that connection, a look at the current efforts of the United Nations 
is warranted. This entails a discussion of the Secretary General's Global Compact 
Initiative and the on-going work of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Not 
entirely satisfied with the above, unless there is a binding mechanism incorporated 
into them, this chapter also draws attention to the use of domestic judicial systems in 
a number of countries to promote accountability, and recommends a similar approach 
to international policy makers. 
Chapter 6 considers one major obstacle to a direct or quasi-direct regulation of 
multinational corporations in international law, that is, the never-ending dispute about 
the subjects of international law. For corporations to be repositories of rights and 
16 
duties in the international legal system, .the question of their legal status must be 
considered and clarified. Thus, in discussing international legal personality relating to 
the multinational corporation, this chapter seeks to lay the foundation for far-reaching 
policy changes in this area. 
Chapter 7 consists of recommendations and conclusions that logically follow 
from the foregoing. While the recommendations and the ideas explored in this work 
essentially focus on corporate accountability in the petroleum industry and improving 
implementation, compliance and enforcement of international rules in respect of 
environmental regulations pertaining to oil trade and shipping, it is expected that the 









ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL TRADE AND SHIPPING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The quality of the marine environment and the rational utilization of its 
resources is a national and international policy issue. Policy-makers have essentially 
relied on regulations and standards to protect the environment from oil pollution 
arising from ships. This chapter focuses on !he,applicat!on of these instruments at the 
trJ.!erIlationClL level in ~llvironmelltal PJQtE:Gti9J1ClIldQc,e;:nun~n.ag~n:t~m. The choice of 
the international perspective ~anch~~ed in the severe limitations surrounding, and the:J\i'd
1
v r VI' 
gross inadequacies that have characterized, national solutions to the problem. 
The second part of this chapter goes on to illustrate how the complexitit::~_~f 
the problem of s~=-~_~r.£~_~il poll~ion hamstring national efforts to address the ho'WI s+r-\\\ d-
v~. e.\lr>:v ~Q\"" 
issue, thus establishing a strong basis for the international legal control of the area. 
place in international law to combat the scourge of ship-source oil pollution. An SCOII"f-
Vi ~~I~ 
asses§.m~IJLqf,llOw.l'!!:.Jhes_e,h::ga)_p!"<?y~sio,Il~gQ in enhancing the ecology of the ~ ~~, ?.:!.~'V 
oceans and the lot of the vast majority of humanity that has a stake in them (or is 
affected by their degradation) is undertaken in the fourth part. The fifth part 
19 
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II: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
National measures aimed at limiting, eliminating, or preventing oil pollution 
occasioned by shipping activities are commendable and should be encouraged. Some 
of these measures have ranged from the adoption of provisions of international 
conventions into local legislation to unilateral measures aimed at protecting the 
particular state's interests. In such events, there is usually the perception that common 
action in that aspect is inadequate, unclear, or simply nonexistent. While in some of 
these cases, States might have acted within the confines of their international 
obligations, or believed they were doing so, in others questions have been raised as to 
the international legal validity of the acts involved. 1 
The common thread that runs through all such laws -- irrespective of the 
presence or absence of their legal validity -- is the revelation that national law and 
policy present a substantially inadequate tool for maritime oil pollution control. The 
truth is that the best national efforts would still face an uphill task in passing, the 
adequacy test because the scope and implications of marine pollution in general,2 and 
ship-source oil pollution in particular, are wide and transcend national boundaries 
I The furor that surrounded the enactment of the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(now R.S.C. 1985, c. A12) clearly illustrates this. Concerned by the danger posed to the arctic 
environment, the Government of Canada in April1970 introduced into Parliament the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Bill. The object was to assert Canadian jurisdiction for pollution prevention in all 
waters up to 100 nautical miles from every point of Canadian land above the 60th parallel of north 
latitude. This action was swiftly challenged as being at variance with international law. In a formal 
note issued on April 15, 1970, the United States Department of State objected to Canada's plan, stating 
that international law provided no basis for the proposed unilateral extension of jurisdiction on the high 
seas, and that it would neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction. In justification 
of its action, the Canadian Government responded that it was based on, among others, the international 
right of self-defense, arguing that a danger to the environment of a State constitutes a threat to its 
security. See further Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View, 
3 1. Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1972); Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian 
Perspective, 3 1. Mar. L. & Com. 13 (1972); Neuman, Oil in Troubled Waters: The International 
Control of Marine Pollution, 2 1. Mar. L. & Com. 349 (1971). 
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and solutions. The pollutant oil, when emitted into the oceans through the activities of 
a ship, may be carried for hundreds of miles, damaging the environment in one or 
more other countries or in areas beyond national jurisdiction.3 "The problem of 
maritime oil pollution defies solutions based on the assertion or allocation of national 
jurisdictions. Too many elements of the situation are transnational. ,,4 These include 
the fact that the polluting agent itself -- oil and other hydrocarbons -- has a tendency 
to spread quickly over the surface of the sea; thus, a spill may rapidly disperse over 
an enormous area, forming a slick only a few molecular layers thick. Currents and 
winds join in conducting the spill in an unpredictable fashion. 5 This ambulatory 
character can frustrate efforts to deal with the problem in view of the jurisdictional 
barriers to acquiring control over its sources.6 A legal scholar has painted a graphic 
picture of the scenario in this light: 
A ship may strand on the high seas and cause pollution 
in two neighbouring states, i.e., France and England (as 
with the Torrey Canyon in 1967). She may be owned 
by a Liberian company, bareboat chartered to a 
Bermuda company, managed by an English company, 
time chartered to a Greek company and voyage 
chartered to an American company. Her cargo may 
have been sold during the voyage by the American 
company to a Japanese one. The officers may be 
English and the crew Indian. The international nature of 
2 The international character and implications of marine pollution has been given judicial imprimatur 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. See R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401. 
3 See Linda Reif, International Environmental Law, in Environmental Law and Business in Canada 71 
(G. Thompson et al. eds. 1993). 
4 Neuman, supra note 1, at 351. 
5 Id. at 351-52. 
6 Ayorinde, Inconsistencies Between OPA '90 and MARPOL 73178: What is the Effect on Legal Rights 
and Obligations of the United States and Other Parties to MARPOL 73178? 251. Mar. L. & Com. 55 
(1994). 
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the shipping business creates such diversity of interests, 
with potential conflicts of law and jurisdiction. 7 
Even if a State by unilateral action could eliminate pollution within its 
jurisdiction, it is well known that without international controls the State would 
be powerless to protect itself from discharges of oil occurring just beyond its 
territorial waters, as can be seen from cases of oil tankers sinking and affecting 
a number of countries who ordinarily would be insulted from such ships.8 At 
the same time, a single ship visiting ports in various countries over the course 
of a year would be hard pressed to comply with a multiplicity of opposing, 
potentially conflicting, and disparate standards imposed by each port State.9 
Moreover, the present dispensation has witnessed an increasing recognition 
that concern for the marine environment must transcend narrow individual 
national interests to include concern for those areas of the seas falling outside 
the jurisdiction of any State. 1O The major conclusion drawn therefore is that 
only massive and urgent international action, on an unprecedented scale, can 
alleviate the steadily deteriorating situation. I I This has been the basis for the 
7 Abecassis, Marine Oil Pollution Laws: The View of Shell International Marine Limited, 8 Int'l Bus. 
Law 3 (1980). This is not merely hypothetical, as illustrated by past tanker accidents. See Sweeney, Oil 
Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Fordham 1. Rev. 115, 156 (1968). 
8 Alcock, "Ecology Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to Require Double 
Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19 Ecology 1.Q. 97, 126 (1992). This point is underscored by the recent case of 
the Bahamian-flagged tanker, Prestige, which sank off the coast of Spain, with the oil spilling from the 
ship most likely to affect neighboring countries. Besides, Spain had tried to protect itself, to little 
avail. See Juliette Jowit, Spain 'could have saved tanker,' Financial Times (London), November 20, 
2002, at 12. 
9 Sally Meese, When Jurisdictional Interests Collide: International, Domestic, and State Efforts to 
Prevent Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 12 Ocean Dev. & Int'l 1. 71, 86 (1982). 
10 Mensah, International Environmental Law: International Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at 
Sea, 8 Case W. Res. 1. Int'l 1. 110, 111 (1976). 
11 Gold, supra note 1, at 44. 
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development of international arrangements for the protection of the manne 
environment and the continued march toward the elaboration of an international 
order that will protect and preserve the planet Earth for the better use and 
greater enjoyment of all. 
III: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 
Within the main corpus of international law exists an appreciable volume 
of rules and regulations on oil pollution from ships. These are contained in the 
new notion of "soft" law,12 and, more importantly, in the traditional sources13 
of international law, namely, custom, conventions, and general principles of 
law recognized by "civilized" nations. 14 The focus of this part of the 
dissertation, however, will be on international conventions, commonly referred 
to as treaties. An impressive array of treaties regarding the subject (or related 
issues) exists, the outcome of the collaborative efforts of the world's nations 
with their differences in motivation and divergence of interests. IS Starting in 
1926, when the first attempt was made to internationally regulate maritime oil 
pollution, 16 up to recent times, the regulation of this area has come a long way, 
thereby making it one of the most highly regulated areas at the international 
12 See A. KISS & D. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 109 (1991). 
13 See art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945). 
14 The use of the word "civilized" has been condemned by developing states who regard it as offensive 
and exclusive. See Christian Okeke, International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, 27 Cal. W. Int'l 
1.J. 311, 315 (1997). The term is now considered obsolete. See Reif, supra note 3, at 73. 
15 Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and 
Beyond, 18 Ecology 1.Q. 719,726 (1991). 
16 Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, T.S. No. 736-A (1926). The effort 
was not a success. See further C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 430-31 
(6th ed. 1967), and Sweeney, supra note 7, at 187-89. 
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level. 17 This thesis, however, will concentrate on those treaties that are most 
relevant to the issue of operational discharges of oil by ships, namely, the 1954 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
(OILPOL),18 the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships,19 and its 1978 Protocol (collectively known as MARPOL 73178),20 
and the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (LOSC).21 
A.OILPOL 
This Convention, which came into effect in 1958 for a small number of 
States,22 was a product of a conference held in London in 1954. Proceeding from 
the premise that prohibiting all discharges of oily waste was impossible, it created 
room for the discharge of oil without restriction in an area outside a prohibited 
zone of 50 miles from the coasts of States parties to the treaty. Within the 
prohibited zone, however, only discharges with an oil content of less than 100 
parts per million (ppm) were permitted.23 Any contravention was declared an 
offense punishable under the laws of the territory in which the ship was 
registered.24 
OILPOL also included prOVlSlons requiring (within three years of the 
coming into force of the Convention) ships registered in the territory of 
contracting States to be fitted with certain pollution prevention facilities and the 
17D 
18 . BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1993) 
19 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.LA.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (1954). . 
20 IMCO Doc. MP/CONFIWP.35, Nov. 2,1973, reprinted at 12 LL.M. 1319 (1973). 
!he Protocol of 1978 Relatmg to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
~hIPS, IMCO Doc. TSPP/CONFI11, Feb. 16, 1978, reprinted at 17 LL.M. 546 (1978). 
22 U.N. Doc. NCONF.621122, Oct. 7, 1982, reprinted at 21 LL.M. 1261 (1982). 
Gold, supra note 1 at 19. 
23 ' See art. III. 
24 See art. III(3). 
24 
main ports of contracting States to install facilities for the disposal of oily 
substances. It also ordered ships to carry an oil record book, in which entries 
had to be made concerning the details of oily discharges, and which authorities 
of a contracting State could inspect within that state's ports. 
OILPOL attracted severe criticisms from scholars, who described it as 
S· fi 1 lit th"25 db' . d 26 d . posses mg very ew rea ee an emg ma equate an unenforceable m 
practice.27 Most significantly, the 100 ppm rule was fraught with detection 
problems. Because it was possible to leave a visible film behind a ship even 
though the oil content of the effluent was well below 100 ppm, breaches could 
not be proved through observation.28 
Although OILPOL provided a not-too-effective toof9 for pollution 
prevention and control, sight should not be lost of the fact that it was the first 
real attempt to address a multi-pronged problem. Thus, like any other first 
effort, it could not help but exhibit its own share of naivete and rough edges. 
25 Gold, supra note 1, at 19. 
26 R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
TANKERS AT SEA 219 (1979). See also Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1,34 (1970) (arguing that OILPOL adopted 
a method that has been proven to be "ineffective"). 
27 Wulf: C~ntiguous Zones for Pollution Control, 3 1. Mar. L. & Com. 537, 541 (1972). The author's 
conte~tIOn IS base~ ?n the dif~culties associated with proving in a court of law that a given discharge 
contamed the reqUISIte proportIOn of oil. 
28 Kirby, The Clean Seas Code: A Practical Cure of Operational Pollution in International Conference 
~9n Oil P?llution of the Sea,. held in Rome on Oct. 7-9, 1968, at 201,209. 
Especially by concentratmg enforcement powers in the flag State. Indeed, OILPOL also failed in its 
lack of appreciation of t~e ~act that pol~u~ants legally discharged outside the designated prohibited 
z?nes could afterwards ~Ift mto the. prohIbIted zones. It could then be said to approbate and reprobate 




Subsequent efforts 30 to strengthen 01LPOL resulted in a senes of 
amendments in 1962.31 Unfortunately, these did not have much effect.32 Further 
amendments were therefore made in 1969 and 1971. A salient feature of the 
1969 amendment was the adoption and legitimization of the load-on-top (LOT) 
system.
33 
This system, however, presented a mere camouflage to effective 
pollution prevention, ironically promoting a diversion from, and not a prelude 
to, attaining more effective port and tanker recovery techniques. 34 It also 
proved difficult to use efficiently. 
B.MARPOL 73178 
Arguably influenced by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, MARPOL 73178 is without a doubt the main convention on 
1 11 . 35 . vesse -source po utlOn today. MARPOL contams far-reaching provisions lodged 
within five annexes, the first two of which became compulsory with the 
ratification of the convention.36 
Ann 137 . . ex . IS concerned WIth the regulation of oil pollution, while Annex 
n38 deals with noxious liquid substances. 39 Under Annex I, operational discharges 
30 Th' I~ w~s an a~termath of the formation. in 1958 of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
~rgalllZat10n (whIch later metamorphosed mto the International Maritime Organization (IMO)) 
600 U.N.T.S. 332 (1962). . 
32 M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 26 at 222 
33 ' • 
In the LOT syst~m, a speCial. tank in. the vessel is used to collect the oily mixture that ordinarily 
would have been dIscharged. ThIS materIal goes through a separation process and the water is drained 
f~om. the bottom. Consequently, new cargo can be loaded on top of the residue of oil. 
35 Pntchard, Load on Top -- From the Sublime to the Absurd, 9 J. Mar. L. & Com. 185 187 (1978) 
36 B~b~ker, supra n?t~ 17, at 122. ' . 
WIthm ~he~e proVISIOns, MA~~POL presc~ibe~ rules, technical standards and specific requirements 
whose objectives are the redu~tIOn and eradIcatIon of marine pollution arising from shipping activities. 
Fr~nz Xaver Perrez, The Efficzency a/Cooperation: A Functional Analysis a/Sovereignty 15 Ar' J 
~~t 1& Compo L. 515, at 534 n.97 (1998). ' 12 .. 
38 IMCO Doc. MP/CONFIWP.21 of Oct. 31, 1973. 
IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/WP.211Add.1 of Oct. 31,1973. 
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of oil are permitted outside the special areas40 or beyond 50 nautical miles from 
land.41 Outside the special areas, certain standards are specified for tankers42 that 
share some similarities with those contained in the 1969 and 1971 amendments to 
01LPOL. However, differences exist in that new43 tankers must not discharge 
more than 1I30,000th of their cargo-carrying capacity, while all other tankers need 
only adhere to a 1I15,000th figure. 
Moreover, discharges are not considered lawful if the tanker does not have 
m operation an oil discharge monitoring and control system and a slop tank 
arrangement (as required by Regulation 15). Furthermore, MARPOL defines oil to 
include non-persistent oil -- a step up from previous conventions, which dealt with 
1 . '1 44 on y perSIstent 01 s. Annex I also requires that all new tank vessels of more than 
70,000 deadweight tons (DWT) have segregated ballast tanks (SBT). 
With respect to enforcement, MARPOL makes three innovations:45 1) it 
introduces International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificates, which State parties 
issue to ships that satisfy the structure, equipment, fittings, arrangements, and 
materials requirements of the Convention,46 and which are accepted by other State 
39 Annex III (IMCO Doc. MP/CONFIWP.211Add.2 of Oct. 31, 1973) deals with harmful substances 
carried by sea in packaged forms or in freight containers, portable tanks, or road and rail tank wagons. 
Annex IV (IMCO Doc. MP/CONFIWP.2l1Add.3 of Oct. 31, 1973) controls sewage. Annex V (1M CO 
Doc. ~P/CONFIWP.211Add.4 of Oct. 31, 1973) applies to garbage. Both the compulsory Annex II and 
the optIOnal Annexes III-V are beyond the scope of this work. 
40 These include the whole of the Mediterranean sea, the Baltic, Black, and Red seas, and the 'Persian 
Gulf. See Regulation 10. 
41 Regulation 9(1)(a)(ii). 
42 Regulation 9(1)(a)(iii)-(vi). 
43 Essentially those ordered after Dec. 31 1975' see Regulation 1 (6) 
44 ".
Regulation I and Appendix I; see generally D. ABECASSIS & R. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION 
FROM SHIPS 29-30 (2d. ed. 1985). 
45 Id. at 73-74. 
46 Regulations 4-6. 
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parties as possessing the same validity as the ones issued by themselves;47 2) it 
obligates State parties to cooperate in the detection of violations;48 and, 3) it 
requires ships to carry an oil discharge and monitoring control system, fitted with 
a recording device to provide a continuous record of discharges in liters per 
nautical mile and total quantity discharged.49 
Despite its good intentions, MARPOL 73 failed to secure ratification , 
mainly because of the provisions of Annex II, which were considered onerous by 
some States parties. This consequently led to the 1978 Protocol Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.50 The 
Protocol made some procedural and substantive changes to MARPOL 73 , 
ostensibly to facilitate its ratification. It also stated that the Protocol and MARPOL 
73 were to be read and interpreted as one instrument (hence the name MARPOL 
73178).51 A basic feature of the 1978 Protocol was new Regulation 13, which now 
requires that all new oil tankers of 20,000 DWT, and new product tankers of 
30,000 DWT, be equipped with SBT and use crude oil washing as a cargo tank 
47 Art. 5(1). 
:: Art. 6; see a~so Regulations 9(3) and 10(6) . 
. See. RegulatIOns .15-16. It was ~hought that such a requirement would help strengthen the evidence of 
VIOlatIOns and o~vIate ~he perceIved pitfalls in the LOT system, which placed heavy reliance on the 
human e.lement ill the Implementation of discharge standards. At the time of the conclusion of the 
ConventIOn, ho~ever, th~re were no commercially-viable monitoring systems available. See Curtis 
Vessel-Source 011 PollutIOn and MARPOL 73/78: An International Success Story? 15 En tl L 679' 
695 (1985). . v.., 
50 
See supra note 20. 
5! The Protocol entered into force in October 1983 following the October 1982 ratification b G 
and Italy, thus fulfilling the require~ents of Art. V, which stated that tlIe Protocol was to :nte::~~ 
force .12 months after the date on whIch not less than 15 states, tlIe combined merchant fleets of which 
con~htuted not less tlIan 50% of tlIe gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping had become 
parties. See 5 Current Reports, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), Oct. 13, 1982, at 432. ' 
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cleaning system. There is also a requirement for inert gas systems in each cargo 
and slop tank, a response to the potential for tank explosions.52 
MARPOL 73178 specifies the scope of responsibilities attaching to flag 
and port States. 53 For instance, while a duty resides in the flag State to initiate 
proceedings for an alleged violation of a provision wherever it occurs,54 it is 
incumbent upon a port State to take proceedings for violations occurring within its 
jurisdiction55 or to furnish information as regards evidence of a violation to the 
flag State. 56 A port State may inspect a ship that enters a port or offshore terminal 
under its jurisdiction if there is enough evidence to establish a violation. 57 It does 
not permit the port State, however, to take any action in cases in which the 
violation occurs outside its territorial waters, other than to forward a report of such 
inspection to the party requesting it, or to the flag State, which in tum is expected 
to take appropriate action. 
Where a port State IS aware of a ship that does not meet equipment 
standards, it can stop it from sailing pending such time that it can proceed without 
constituting an "umeasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. ,,58 The 
Convention, however, also requires States to take every possible measure to avoid 
undue detention of ships and a breach can result in compensation for damages 
52 Regulation 13(b)(3). 
53 For discussions ofMARPOL 73/78, see generally, Richard G. HildretlI, et aI., Evaluation of the New 
Carissa Incidentfor Improvements to State, Federal and International Law, 16 J. EnvtI. L. & Litig. 81, 
101 - 106 (2001); Sean Poltrack, The Maritime Industry and Our Environment: The Delicate Balance 
of Economic and Environmental Concerns, Globally, Nationally and Within the Port of Baltimore, 8 
U. BaIt. J. EnvtI. L. 51,71-73 (2000). 
54 Art. 4(1). 
55 A rt.4(2)(a). 
56 Art. 4(2)(b). 
57 Art. 6(5). 
58 Art. 5(2). 
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suffered. 59 It also places a duty on the master of a ship, which is involved, in an 
actual or probable discharge to prepare a report to the State administering the 
vessel, as well as any other State that could be affected by the incident.6o 
MARPOL underwent major amendments in 1992 regarding the design and 
construction of both new and existing tankers. 61 These amendments, which came 
into force in July 1993,62 require tankers to be fitted with either a double hull or an 
equally effective alternative. The double hull arrangement was chosen because of 
its perceived utility in preventing extensive damage and outflow of oil in the event 
of a grounding or accidental collision (because the outer hull is separated from the 
cargo tanks by a large space that can absorb low speed impacts). This requirement 
has met with a cold reception from shipowners, who question the choice and 
effectiveness of the double hull design and argue that there are other, less costly, 
solutions which should have been favorably considered.63 
One of the principal weaknesses of MARPOL 73178 is its failure to 
provide a satisfactory regime for port and coastal States.64 It happened that "while 
much drastic increases in port state and coastal state enforcement powers were 
discussed during the Conference, they were defeated due to the political power of 
the major flag states. ,,65 This is unfortunate considering the fact that a clear 
59 Art. 7. 
60 Art. 8 and Protocol 1. 
61 S 
62 e~ MARPOL 73178 Amendedfor New and Existing Tankers, [1992] 2 IMO News 3. 
Gnffm, MARPOL 73178 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or HalfEm'Pty? lInd J GI b I 
Legal Stud. 489, 490 (1994). ., " 0 a 
63 Id. 
64 S ee Brubaker, ~upra not~ 17, at 253. (calling for an upgrading of port state inspection and detainment 
P5rocedures for ships showmg substantIal non-compliance with MARPOL 73/78 standards). 
I RO~~ALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA 99 (1994). See also 
M Gorugle & Zacher, supra note 26, at 231-34. The authors are also of the view that some coastal 
~ta~es. tr~ded ~ort state enforcement, a procedural power, for the more substantial coastal state 
JunsdictIon WhICh they hoped to get at the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
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revelation of the 1978 Conference was that maritime States, and the industries they 
represented, continued to have strong incentives to avoid standards that imposed 
costs on those industries, suggesting that they also had strong incentives not to 
implement and enforce existing agreements with vigor. 66 
Mention must also be made of the limitation inherent in Regulation 20, 
which constitutes another weakness of MARPOL 73178. Thereunder, ship 
operators are required to maintain an oil record book, which can be inspected by 
any State party, showing all loading, transferring, and unloading of oil cargo, 
ballasting, cleaning, and discharge of ballast from cargo tanks and discharge of 
water and residues (an exception is granted to discharges from SBT). This 
requirement, while more comprehensive than that under OILPOL, suffers from the 
same failing because compliance is dependent upon the conscientiousness of the 
operators. 67 
These criticisms notwithstanding, some scholars have opined that the rules 
in MARPOL 73178 are sufficient for dealing with ship-source pollution, stating 
that what is needed is compliance68 by the contracting States. This argument fails 
to consider the point, however, that the inability of the Convention to promote a 
mechanism by which compliance with its provisions is ensured is itself an 
66 Mitchell, supra note 63, at 103. 
67 
Brubaker, supra note 17, at 141 n.44. 
68 Indeed, like ~ar1ier conventions, MARPOL 73/78 suffers from lax state enforcement practices and a 
l~ck of complIance by member states in providing reception facilities for vessels carrying their 
dIscharges from port to port. Id. at 249. 
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inadequacy and thus a shortcoming of the Convention.69 Any future effort to 
address ship-source pollution must therefore squarely meet this challenge. The 
present international set up needs restructuring to strengthen it and make it more 
relevant. As one writer sees it: 
[ a] legitimate concern is the ability of the current 
international legal system to implement and monitor 
environmental protection laws. Treaty obligations that 
encroach upon the customary law of freedom on the 
high seas are difficult to enact and enforce. In practice, 
verification of a ship's activity on the high seas is 
impossible, and compliance depends upon the integrity 
of the ship's operators. At this time, economic or legal 
motivations to comply with MARPOL 73/78 do not 
exist.7o 
This article proceeds on the foregoing premise (i.e., that there should be a 
radical departure from the current international legal approach to ship-source oil 
pollution prevention and control). As has been observed, much of the problem is 
not with the structure, content, or quality of the legal stipulations, but lies 
somewhere between the inability to enforce and lack of motivation for 
compliance. It is imperative therefore to create an enabling environment that will 
motivate States to comply. 
CLose 
69 It is conceded that this is a general problem in international law. Thus, another structure to augment 
the extant legal stipulations will be suggested in the course of this work. 
70 Curtis, supra note 48, at 705. 
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LOSC was concluded in 1982 after nine years of deliberations and negotiations 
and came into force after an even longer period,71 thus bringing afore afresh the 
debate on the desirability of the continued use of detailed multilateral treaties as a 
mechanism for espousing principles of international environmental law. It has now 
become axiomatic that such multilateral treaties are "slow to be concluded, slow to 
come into force. ,,72 One model that presents itself as an attractive alternative is the 
new notion of soft law. Its attractiveness lies especially in the fact of its 
characteristic speed.73 Another option may be found in jettisoning the "all-
inclusive treaty" idea represented by LOSC in favor of conventions that address 
specific subjects, also known as the framework convention-protocol approach.74 
This latter technique averts the kind of problem that dogged the entry into force of 
the rest of the LOSC due to disagreements over Part XI (dealing with deep seabed 
mining).75 
LOSC dedicates a whole part (more than 40 articles)76 to the manne 
environment, attempting to create a balance between manne environmental 
71 The Convention came into force in November 1994 (i.e., one year after the deposit of the 60th 
instrument of ratification). See P. BIRNIE & A. BOYLE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 153 (1995). 
72 Chinkin, Remarks, 82 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l 1. 371, 389 (1988). 
73 See Reif, International Environmental and Human Rights Law: The Role of Soft Law in the 
Evolution of Procedural Rights to Information, Participation in Decisionmaking, and Access to 
Domestic Remedies in Environmental Matters, in Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: 
Relevance to Domestic Law and Policy 73, 78 (M. Young & Y. Iwasawa eds. 1996). A contrary 
argument has been presented to the effect that the potential disadvantages of treaties notwithstanding, 
"the reality is that the process of negotiating a soft law instrument can often be as complex and lengthy 
as that for the negotiation of a treaty." Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change 
in International Law, 38 Int'l Compo 1.Q. 850, 860 (1989). 
74 Magraw, International Law and Pollution, in International Law and Pollution 3, 11 (D. Magraw ed. 
1991). 
75 On how Part XI affected the reception and ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, see, e.g., S. 
MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA BED MINING (1987), and Charney, u.s. Provisional 
Application of the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 Am. 1. Int'l 1. 705 (1994). 
76 See Part XII, consisting of arts. 192-237. 
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protection from ship-source pollution and the rights of navigation.77 The 
Convention makes a substantial departure from its precursors by creating a general 
duty to regulate all sources of marine pollution, as opposed to a mere 
empowerment to do so. It establishes a primary obligation to protect and preserve 
the marine environment and to prevent, reduce, and control pollution.78 However , 
the only obligations LOSC imposes to prevent, reduce, and control ship-source 
pollution are placed on flag States; coastal and port States have limited jurisdiction 
to prescribe and enforce environmental standards, but they are not required to do 
SO.79 
On the high seas, LOSC favors the exclusivity of flag State prescriptive 
jurisdiction and the primacy of flag State enforcement jurisdiction.80 In the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 81 lth hIS , a oug coasta tates recorded some 
achievements, LOSC only permits them to adopt legislation that is based on 
international rules and standards (such as those contained in MARPOL 73/78) and 
excludes authority over construction, design, equipment, and manning from their 
domain.
82 
Nevertheless, within their territorial seas, coastal States continue to 
enjoy the power to adopt national, rather than, international rules. This IS, 
77 
Meese, supra note 9, at 89. 
78 Arts. 192, 194. 
79 d 
80 Bo ansky, supra note 15, at 741. 
Arts. 211 and 217; but see McDorman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 
1982 Law of the Sea C~n~ention, 2.8 1. Mar. L. & Com. 305,322 (1997) (arguing that port States are 
rIot estopped from exerclslllg prescnptive jurisdiction on the high seas). 
The EEZ, an area of 200 nautical miles from the continental baselines was created by th LOSC 
Before the Convention came into force however the EEZ had bec' I f e . '. " " orne a ru e 0 customary 
lllt~~at.lO~al law, havlllg. satIsfied the two requirements for such, i.e., widespread state practice and 
opzn~o juns (~ psych~loglcal component ~efllled as a conviction felt by a State that a certain practice is 
r~q~lre~ by llltematlOnal law and which distinguishes common practices motivated by a legal 
o hgatIon from common practices done out of expediency or convenience). See EDITORS OF THE 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 28 N73 
(1992). . 
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however, subject to certain limitations, 'including the obligation not to hamper, 
deny, or impair the right of innocent passage. 83 
One innovation of LOSC is that it grants coastal States, in ice-covered 
areas, a general power to apply national standards to EEZ pollution control, 
provided they have due regard for navigation and are nondiscriminatory.84 Here, 
therefore, the otherwise applicable "innocent passage regime" is superseded by the 
Arctic exception regime according to the canon lex specialis generalis derogat. 85 
This provision was obviously included in recognition of Canada's interests in the 
Arctic Ocean,86 but its limited application does not seriously affect the general 
conclusion that for vessel pollution in the EEZ, LOSC favors the application of 
international, rather than national, rules and standards.87 
On the issue of enforcement, the Convention proceeded with a basic 
understanding that there had been a generally abysmal record of enforcement and 
compliance with marine pollution regulations internationally.88 It is therefore to 
LOSC's credit that it imposes a duty on states to enforce regulations on vessel-
11 ' 89 I . source po utlOn. t mcorporates, in stronger terms than ever before, the flag 
state's obligation to ensure that its vessels comply with applicable pollution 
standards, encompassing such matters as the prohibition of the sailing of 
82 Art. 211(6)(c). 
83 Arts. 24 and 211(4). 
84 Art. 234. 
85 Wang, A Review of the Enforcement Regimefor Vessel-Source Oil Pollution Control 16 Ocean Dev. 
& Int'l L. 305,326 (1986). ' 
:~ M'Gonigle ~ Zacher, .supra note 26, at 246-47. 
88 Boyle, Manne Pollutzon Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 Am. 1. Int" L. 347,362 (1985). 
Id. at 362-63. 




and the investigation and prosecution of alleged violations of 
pollution laws. 
The Convention preserves the coastal State's jurisdiction in respect of 
investigation, arrest, and prosecution of vessels in the territorial sea for violations 
of pollution laws.
91 
This is, however, limited by the right of innocent passage. The 
coastal State is also empowered to arrest and prosecute for pollution which occurs 
in the EEZ and which causes or threatens major damage to the coastal State,92 and 
to inspect the vessel before there is a substantial discharge which causes or 
threatens significant pollution.93 The phrases "major damage," "substantial 
discharge," and "significant pollution" used here are shrouded in uncertainty, and 
this confusion could constitute a fertile ground for potential conflicts. 94 A clear 
definition of these terms is therefore seriously required. 
In the absence of the above, the powers of the coastal State do not go 
beyond requiring information about the identity of the ship, the port of registry, its 
last and next port of call, and other relevant information required to establish 
whether a violation has occurred. 95 
Port States now possess an enhanced jurisdiction not only, as was 
previously the case, to investigate and prosecute any violation of applicable rules 
90 Art. 217(2). 
91 Art. 220(2). 
92 Art. 220(6). 
93 Art. 220(5). 
94 They demonstrate, however, the imprecision with which provisions in international agreements are 
sometimes couched to elicit widespread acceptance where it is perceived that States do not want to 
commit themselves to clearly defined and workable obligations. 
95 Art. 220 (3). 
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in their own territorial seas96 or EEZs, but also to investigate and prosecute 
discharge violations on the high seas or within the jurisdictional zones of other 
States.97 However, where such violations occur in the coastal waters of another 
State, the port State may only exercise this jurisdiction upon the request of the 
concerned coastal State or flag State.98 Commenting on Article 218, one legal 
scholar has noted: 
The innovation of Article 218 is that it permits a port 
State to initiate action even where the offending 
discharge had no effect in the port State. The restriction 
in Article 218 is that irrespective of the polluting effect 
of a discharge violation in the port State, both the flag 
State and the State in which the incident occurred could 
usurp port State jurisdiction.99 
The above innovation therefore appears to be nothing more than a mirage 
and leaves the problem where it was, as a port State may be lackadaisical about 
. 100 . b'd [; acting on pollution that does not affect It at all and flag States, III a 1 to avor 
or protect the interest of their vessels, may be unwilling to allow the port State to 
exercise its jurisdiction. 
Under Article 228(1), the flag State has a right of preemption, entitling it in 
the above cases of coastal State and port State enforcement to insist on taking over 
the proceedings itself, unless major damage had occurred to the coastal State. This 
right is prone to abuse and, if not properly checked, could make "a mockery of 
96 Art. 220(1). 
97 Art. 218. 
98 Art. 218(2). For those occurring on the high seas, no such limitation exists. 
99 McDorman, supra note 78, at 322. . " 
100 See Boehmer-Christiansen, Marine Pollution Control: UNCLOS III as the Partial CodificatIOn of 
International Practice, 7 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 71, 73 (1981). 
37 
port State and coastal State enforcement."lol The preemptive right may be lost, 
however, where the flag State in the exercise of it fails to act in good faith, for 
instance, by repeatedly disregarding its obligations. l02 It should be further noted 
that the right of preemption does not apply to coastal State proceedings for 
territorial sea offenses or port State proceedings for offenses in its own territorial 
sea or EEZ. 
States can continue to intervene beyond the territorial sea in cases of 
maritime casualties.
103 
LOSC even permits intervention where there is merely 
"threatened damage" to the coastline, suggesting the possibility of earlier action 
than might be permissible under the 1969 Intervention Convention. 104 
Complementing the above right is a requirement that flag States adopt regulations 
that place obligations on vessels to promptly notify coastal States likely to be 
affected by incidents, including maritime casualties, involving discharges or the 
probability of discharges. 105 Where there is the likelihood that a State will be 
affected by pollution and another State becomes aware of this fact, the State with 
such knowledge is also required to inform the former State. 106 The Convention 
also affirms the concept of State responsibility for environmental damage caused 
101 Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement 
Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference, 20 Va. 1. Int'l L. 265, 307-08 (1980). 
102 Art. 228(1). 
103 Art. 221. 
104 Boyle, supra note 85, at 369. Under the Intervention Convention (The International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels, Nov. 29, 
1969, reprinted at 9 LL.M. 25 (1970)), which was a direct response to the Torrey Canyon disaster, 
coastal states are permitted to take measures against foreign vessels on the high seas that are in 
imminent danger of causing pollution damage. For a critique of the Intervention Convention, see 
Yoram Dinstein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High Seas, 3 1. Mar. L. & Com. 363 
(1972). 
105 Art. 211 (7). The right to notification applies to all pollution incidents. 
106 Art. 198. 
38 
by marine pollution, I 07 but it lacks 'concrete standards and the means of 
. 108 
implementatIOn. 
LOSC has made some remarkable inroads toward the achievement of 
cleaner and safer seas. Nevertheless, a pertinent question is whether it has gone far 
enough, especially when considered in the light of the immensity of the investment 
made into it (including time and material resources). "From an ideal perspective," 
the Convention is "woefully inadequate.,,109 Nevertheless, one cannot help but 
note its achievements, a major one of which is encapsulated in the fact that in 
"addressing issues of regulation, enforcement and cooperation, it reflects a 
fundamental shift from power to duty as the central controlling principle of the 
legal regime of the marine environment, and a regime based on obligations of 
responsibility for damage to one based on obligations of regulation and control." 110 
IV: ASSESSMENT 
Concerted international efforts at controlling ship-source oil pollution have 
achieved a degree of success. The international regulations, though not without 
their fair share of imperfections, have nonetheless brought a measure of sanity to 
. f h . . 111 In h ocean governance and the Improvement 0 t e manne enVIronment. ot er 
107 Art. 235. 
108 Kiss & Shelton, supra note 12, at 159. 
109 M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 26, at 241-51. 
1\0 Boyle, supra note 85, at 370. 
III See Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas: Report of Lord Donaldson's Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution 
from Merchant Shipping P3.4 (1994), wherein the Committee, relying on data from the 50th Report of 
the Joint Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, sought to illustrate the decline of 
quantities of oil reaching the sea since more stringent regulations were introduced. Friends of the Earth 
International, an environmental group, objected to this conclusion on the ground that the Committee 
had used inconsistent figures. See Wallace, "Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas": The Report of the Donaldson 
Inquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, [1995] LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. 
L.Q 404,405. 
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words, their presence has been justified to an extent and their absence would have 
entailed a far worse scenario. Whatever achievements have been made, however, 
could have been surpassed but for the fact that the regulations have been robbed of 
their full force and influence by the predicament in which States have found 
themselves. 
This predicament is a function of the problems of implementation, 
compliance, and enforcement that have hung like an albatross around the neck of 
'. 112 mternatlOnal law generally. It is a trite fact that international law is chronically 
weak on enforcement. ll3 Speaking in 1924, James Brierly made the following 
observation that reverberates eight decades later and still has relevance: "The 
world regards international law today as in need of rehabilitation . . . a prime 
cause of its weakness is the absence of an effective sanction by which its rules can 
be enforced." 114 
Environmental agreements often share in this common problem, lacking 
the basic mechanisms to ensure their full effectiveness. I IS The norm has been , 
therefore, to have a plethora of rules emasculated by the inability or unwillingness 
of the parties to secure or ensure their compliance. Without a doubt, the greatest 
problem of controlling oil pollution is that of enforcement,116 as it is one thing to 
112 Ibrahim Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement and Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements -- Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience 9 Geo Int'l Envtl L 
Rev. 37 (1997). ,. . . 
113 Elli ~ouka, Cuttin!:! the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only About the 
~~otec:tlOn of the Environment, 10 Temp. Int'l & Compo L.1. 79 (1996). 
Bnerly, The Shortcomings of International Law, in The Basis of Obligation in International Law 
and Other Pa?ers 68 (~. Lauterpacht ~ E. W~ldock eds. 1958), cited in Dempsey, Compliance and 
Enforcement In InternatIOnal Law -- all PollutIOn of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vj l 6 N 
J. Int'l L. & Bus. 459, 526 (1984). esse S,-.JY.:. 
1I5 Shih ata, supra note 110. 
116 S' C r G 327. Ir 0 III oad, fonner IMCO Secretary General, quoted in M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 26, at 
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establish a ban on specified discharges 'of oil, but an entirely different thing to 
ensure that offenders will be detected, identified, and sanctioned. 117 Yet an 
"essential virtue of any worthwhile legislation is the possibility of enforcement." I 18 
Indeed, enforcement, to a reasonable extent, is the crucible of the law. 1l9 
A vivid illustration of the contention that compliance and enforcement are 
the bane of this area of the law is presented by the zeal surrounding the 
foundations of MARPOL 73 and the optimism that prevailed at its conclusion. 
Despite its description by the IMO as "the most ambitious international treaty 
covering maritime pollution ever adopted,,,120 and its drafters' expectation that its 
promulgation would result in "the complete elimination of intentional pollution of 
the marine environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimization 
of accidental discharges of such substances,,,121 the reality 30 years later is a far 
cry from the envisaged achievement ofthe objectives, having failed to elicit States' 
compliance as desired. 122 
The sad story is that the international community has been busy chasing 
shadows while the substance remains unaffected. If there is much the community 
of nations has done, it is to lend its approval to the continued existence of this state 
of affairs. States clearly have been lackadaisical, or have generally refrained from 
enforcing international oil pollution standards, mainly because of their 
preoccupation with what is essentially in their interest without much consideration 
117 
118 E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDRO SPACE 138 (1971). 
119 Ho~dsworth, Co~vention on Oil Pollution Amended, 1 Marine Pollution Bull. 168 (Nov. 1970). 
ReIsman, SanctIOns and Enforcement, in 3 Conflict Management: The Future of the International 
Legal Order 273,275 (c. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971). 
120 [1982] 4 IMO News 10. 
121 
Men~ah, supra note 10, at 117 (quoting the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, fourth preambular paragraph). 
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for the interest of others. The protection of the marine environment has been 
apathetically and appallingly viewed essentially as a "no man's business." The 
rationale appear~ to be anchored in the belief that "the economic 'property of all' 
[should] be the environmental responsibility of none.,,123 This is surely a classic 
reflection of the tragedy of the commons,124 where, as in a Greek drama, an 
unfolding catastrophe is being revealed and, though aware of the consequences, 
everybody watches while the potential ruin of all unfolds. 125 
As such, the time has come to redesign international law to make it more 
relevant. This requires the cooperation of a vast majority of the international 
community. To achieve this, however, we need to build a system that recognizes 
the role states' interests play in the effectiveness of the international legal system 
and accommodate them. This work shares the views of the Editors of the Harvard 
Law Review that "future environmental regimes can succeed only by advancing a 
common locus of states' interests. The challenge for global environmental 
:~: LO.rd Donaldson's report, supra note 109. 
K~d~, The Effect of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS International Marine Pollution 
NegotzatlOns, 20 Va. 1. Int'l L. 313 315 (1980) 
124 . ,.
Hardm, The Tragedy oft~e Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). Professor Hardin's thesis, using the 
exa~ple of.a common gra~I~g gro~nd, i.s that there is a tendency for every herdsman to keep on 
a~d~ng to his herd to maxnruze gams WIthout considering that other herdsmen would also take a 
snrular course, thereby depleting the resources of the commons. 
Id. at 1244. 
Therein is. the ~agedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
c.ompels him to mcrease his herd without limit -- in a world that is 
lImited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men msh each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings min to 
all. 
125 S 
aunders, The Economic Approach, in Environmental Law and Policy 363 373 (2d ed) (E H h 
et al. eds. 1998). ' . ug es 
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The task that this dissertation undertakes is to construct such a system, 
realizing the importance of the compliance equation to the success of any 
international arrangement. While the job appears daunting, it is not necessarily 
impossible. This work does not pretend, however, to have the only solution to the 
problem as there are "dozens of ways in which to strengthen the ability of the 
international legal system to deal with the compliance problem.,,127 
V: CONCLUSION 
The measures designed by the international community to combat the 
problems occasioned by the international commerce in oil, though remarkable, 
have not been very successful in attacking the core problem. This has largely been 
due to the difficulties in getting States to implement, comply with, and enforce the 
standards contained in the various conventions. States have been reluctant to live 
up to their obligations as the cost of compliance seems to far outweigh the benefits 
of noncompliance. Because of the structure of the world community, international 
law lacks the necessary mechanisms to assure respect for its rules. A system 
structured on the basis of States' interests and increased responsibility for the 
corporate sector would go a long way in facilitating compliance and effectuating 
the intention of the existing regulatory framework. The result will be the 
126 Editors of the Harvard Law Review supra note 79 at 17 
127 " • 
ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (1981). 
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coexistence of a qualitative marine environment and a thriving international trade 





IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A major problem of international law, as stated in Chapter 1, is the translation 
of legal provisions into actual practice by States. Over the years, various approaches 
have evolved as mechanisms for ensuring compliance with international oil pollution 
standards. These approaches, described in this dissertation as "traditional" as they 
have been in place for a relatively long period of time, are flag, coastal, and port 
States' jurisdiction. I A flag State is a State in whose registry a ship is registered. 
Although both coastal and port States occupy the seashore, port States possess the 
distinguishing feature that ships visit and use their ports. 
Jurisdiction, whether exercised by the flag, coastal or port State, is of different 
dimensions. It could involve the power to make decisions or rules, known as 
prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction. There is also the power to take executive 
action in pursuance of, or consequent on, the making of decisions or rules, referred to 
as enforcement or prerogative jurisdiction.2 A third category has been identified as 
adjudicative jurisdiction and involves the power of a court or administrative tribunal 
1John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 
571 (1997). 
2IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 301 (5th ed. 1998). 
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to hear a case against a vessel 3 b or a person, ut it appears that this third class is 
encompassed in enforcement jurisdiction. 4 
Although the traditional approaches have been of immense utility in 
addressing the complex problem of ship-source oil pollution, there is still room for 
improvement. This would necessitate consideration of an alternative approach to 
strengthen the existing scheme of things. One such alternat1've IS 
an international 
norm of corporate behavior. Unlike the traditional approaches, which are States-
centric, focusing attention on States, this approach would shift the emphasis to 
corporations. The point being canvassed is that the issues of compliance and 
enforcement would take b k t'f'l a ac sea 1 01 and shipping companies, the primary 
players in international oil trade would conduct their businesses ethically and with 
due consideration for the interest of society, as opposed to the inordinate desire for 
profit maximization that defines their current attitude. 
To do justice to the important issues discussed here, this chapter will be 
divided into three major parts. The first part defines the terms "compliance" and 
"enforcement" as they are used in this work. The second part contains an exposition 
of the traditional methods of compliance and en .... orcement 
II , including their bases , 
scope, strengths and pitfalls. This part IS d1'v1'ded l'nto hr 
t ee sections, each 
3 
See D. Bodansky Protecting the M. . E . 
and Beyond, 18 EC~LOGY L.Q.719, 7~~7~99~).lronment From Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III 
4 
See C. Wang, A Review of the Enforcement R . fi VI I 
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305 (1986) where h eglme or esse -Sour~e. O~l E!0llution Control, 16 
competence to adopt reasonable me~sures to :~:;~s ~h~t enforce~~nt ]UnSdlcn.on "grants a state the 
non-compliance with applicable laws reg 1 t' e , III uce comp lance, ?r to nnpose sanctions, for 
d '. . , u a Ions, or enforceable ]udg t b 
a rrurustratIve or executive action, or judicial proceedings" Id at 309 S l ~en s y means of 
2, and A.V. Lowe The Enforcem if M. . ." . ee a so ROWNLIE, supra note 
(1975), where both'writers settle fo;~~eopres~;:;~::~~;~~c:~:~~~~~~:~~~. SAN DIEGO L. REv. 624 
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concentrating on a single method. The third part discusses an alternative approach of 
a nonn of corporate behavior, emphasizing that ethical principles should be given 
legal teeth in international business and be integrated into the corpus of international 
law. 
The conclusion reached is that a concerted and disinterested application of a 
combination of traditional approaches with the proposed alternative approach will go 
a long way toward improving compliance and enforcement of international 
regulations. 
II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Enhancing or improving compliance with international norms in every given 
area is a topic that currently preoccupies international legal scholars. 5 Since many 
"environmental" treaties now exist,6 the issue of eliciting compliance is apparently 
more prominent in environmental matters: "There are few aspects of international law 
in which issues of compliance are more salient than in the case of international 
environmental obligations.,,7 
5Karin Mickelson, Carrots, Sticks or Stepping Stones: Differing Perspectives on Compliance with 
International Law, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: FROM THEORY 
INTO PRACTICE 35 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, et al. eds., 1998) 
6More than one thousand treaties have been concluded on this topic. See M. E. O'Connell, Enforcing 
the New International Law of the Environment, 35 GER. Y.B. INT'LL. 293, 295-296 (1992). 
7Phillip M. Saunders, Development Cooperation and Compliance With International Environmental 
Law: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ISSUES: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE 89 (Thomas 1. Schoenbaum, et al. eds. 1998). 
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Compliance, in this context, can be defined as "an actor's behavior that 
conforms to a treaty's explicit rules."s It denotes a voluntary acceptance by a State of 
the provisions of an international instrument and a corresponding reflection of this 
acceptance in its conduct. Thus, a State can accept the equipment and discharge 
standards contained in MARPOL 73/789, implement them in local legislation, and 
ensure that its ships abide by them. In view of that, compliance "should be seen as 
something that goes beyond "implementation," a term which tends to be used in a 
technical or procedural sense to mean that a state has taken the necessary steps to 
carry out its obligations under an international agreement." I 0 Implementation 
normally precedes compliance and is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
compliance. II 
Enforcement, on the other hand, refers to measures jointly or unilaterally 
adopted by a competent authority to ensure respect for international commitments 
embodied in agreements if they are not honored voluntarily in practice. 12 The 
distinction, therefore, is that enforcement has to do with "the act of compelling 
conformity with a particular norm or regime ... [and] carries with it the notion of 
outside intervention of one form or another, while "compliance" implies a decision on 
8RONALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY 
COMPLIANCE 30 (1994). 
9International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONFIWP 
35 (Nov. 2, 1973) reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319, and the Protocol relating thereto, I.M.C.O. Doc. 
TSPP/CONFI11, (Feb. 16, 1978) reprinted in 17 I.L.M 546. 
IOMickelson, supra note 5, at 36. 
12Ibrahim Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements - Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L 
REV. 37 (1996). ,. . 
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the part of an actor to conform to a rule of his or her own accord, according to 
whatever calculus he or she might employ.,,13 
Both concepts however, are related. One school of thought holds that the 
possibility of enforcement is a critical factor in the decision to comply. Articulating 
the views of this school, Gunther Handl asserts that "[t]he prospect of at least 
symbolic formal enforcement remains a defining characteristic of any legal regime ... 
,,14 An opposite, but no less valid, view is that the connection between compliance 
and formal enforcement procedures is not that prominent. According to Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "inducing compliance with treaties is not a 
matter of "enforcement" but a process ofnegotiation.,,15 
An eclectic perspective embracing the two opposing views presents a clearer 
picture of the existence and resolution of the compliance-enforcement problem. As 
Oran Young observes, "Enforcement is no doubt a sufficient condition for the 
achievement of compliance in many situations, but [there is] no reason to regard it as 
a necessary condition in most realms of human activity.,,16 International oil pollution 
control has involved a number of negotiations accommodating different interests with 
a view toward ensuring compliance. 17 There is no noticeable harm in exploring the 
13Mickelson, supra note 5, at 36. 
14Gunther Handl, Controlling Implementation of and Compliance With International Environmental 
Agreements: The Rocky Roadfrom Rio, 5 COLO. 1. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 305,330 (1994). 
15 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior 
Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311, 312 (1991). 
160 RAN YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ApPLICATIONS 25 (1979) 
17Mitchell, supra note 8, at 115-117. 
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option of some fonn of enforcement against States to ensure compliance. 18 At the 
moment, the approach adopted by international law is to expect flag States to comply 
with their international obligations by enforcing international rules against their ships. 
There is also room for enforcement by coastal States and port States, especially where 
flag States fail in their duty. Describing the extant system, Wang states as follows: 
Because there is no global or regional organization, 
generally speaking, to enforce international rules and 
standards and/or national laws and regulations 
confonning to and giving effect to these international 
rules and standards . . . the existing enforcement 
scheme is one wherein measures are taken against a 
19 vessel of a state by all or some oth~r states .... 
The next part is devoted to a discussion of the existing enforcement scheme. 
III. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. Flag State Jurisdiction 
AND 
The principle is finnly established in international law that a ship on the high 
seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag state.20 A corollary of the 
concept of the freedom of the high seas, the principle was enunciated in the Lotus 
Case by the Pennanent Court of International Justice as follows: 
18The subject of enforcement against States and inducing State compliance is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The present chapter will concentrate on enforcement against ships or in the actual sense, the 
corporations that own these ships. 
19Wang, supra note 4, at 308. 
2°Moritaka Hayashi, Enforcement by Non-Flag States on the High Seas Under the 1995 Agreement on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L. L. REv. 1 (1996). 
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Vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority 
except that of the state whose flag they fly. In virtue of 
the principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say 
the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high 
seas no state may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over 
, 21 
foreign vessels upon them. 
Since no state has authority over the high seas, this could give rise to a chaotic 
situation. Flag State jurisdiction therefore serves a need for the preservation of order 
h· h 22 on the Ig seas. 
Freedom of the high seas, while not necessarily wrong, has had enonnous 
implications for the oceans, the resources contained in them, and the marine 
environment in general, translating into a case of an: 
uninhibited liberty to transport oil and other goods over 
the common resource, the oceans, with each vessel 
being subject only to the jurisdiction ofthe flag state for 
all purposes on the high seas. Incidents of free 
navigation, such as pollution from ballasting and 
deballasting, [and] oil spills from collisions and 
stranding of ships, [become] a liability to be borne by 
the international community as a whole. 23 
The preference for the flag State in control of its ships is premised basically 
on "territoriality" or "nationality." The territoriality principle posits that a flag State is 
entitled to exercise its jurisdiction over its ships because a ship is an extension of the 
2lCase of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.U. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 25. The law, however, 
recognizes exceptions to the general principle. See art. 92 (1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) reprinted in.21 I.L.M. 1~61 
[hereinafter "LOSC"]. They include cases such as piracy (LOSC, art. 105), unauthonzed broadcastrng 
(LOSC, art. 109), and the right of hot pursuit (LOSC, art. 111). 
22 Bodansky, supra note 3, at 736. 
23David Dzidzomu and B.M. Tsamenyi, Enhancing International Control of Vessel-Source Oil 
Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment, 10 U. TASMANIA. L. REV. 269, 
270 (1991). 
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State's territory, a floating island.24 The territoriality principle has received attention 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence25, although courts have had cause on a number of 
occasions to give cognizance to its perceived limitations.26 The principle received an 
international judicial imprimatur in the Lotus Case 27 where the court held that "what 
occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the 
territory ofthe State whose flag the ship flies." 
According to the nationality principle, states have jurisdiction over their 
nationals even in the case of extraterritorial acts because the national owes allegiance 
to his or her own country. Therefore, the flag state derives the legitimacy to exercise 
jurisdiction over its ships because they are its nationals.28 It should be noted, 
however, that "since the territorial and nationality principles and the incidence of dual 
nationality create parallel jurisdiction and possible double jeopardy, many states place 
limitations on the nationality principle.,,29 
24See United States v. Rogers, 150 U.S. 249 at 264 (1893). 
25S fi . e~, or Instance, Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); McCulloch v. Socied d 
NaclOnal de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). a 
26In Scharrenberg v. Dollar Steamship Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127 (1917) the court said' "It is f 
true that fo f' . d' . . . ,0 course, 
. r purpo~es 0 Juns Ictlon a shIp, even on the high seas, is often said to be part of the 
ternt0I?' of the natIOn whose flag Y flies: But in the physical sense this expression is obviously 
figur~tlve., and to expand t~e doc~Ine ~o th~ e~tent of treating seamen employed on such a ship as 
working In.the country of Its regIstry IS qUIte Impossible." Id. at 127. (footnote omitted.) See also 
Chenng Chz Cheung v. R. [1939] A.C. 160 where Lord Atkin rejected the floating island theory. 
27S upra note 21. 
28S ~e S:s.. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) where the court accepted the nationality rather than the 
terntonahty, theory of flag state jurisdiction. ' 
29 BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 306 (footnote omitted). 
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1. Application of Flag State Jurisdiction 
The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Gi/30, as amended, makes elaborate provisions favoring exclusive flag State 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. It provides that any discharge of oil 
prohibited by the Convention "shall be an offence punishable under the laws of the 
relevant territory in respect of the ship,,,31 the relevant territory being the State in 
which a vessel is registered or whose nationality is possessed by an unregistered 
ship.32 
MARPOL 73/7833 follows in the footsteps of its predecessor and provides, 
among other things, that any party shall furnish to the flag State evidence, if any, that 
a ship has discharged harmful substances in violation of the provisions of the 
regulation.34 The flag State, in tum, shall investigate the matter and if satisfied that 
sufficient evidence is available, shall commence proceedings in accordance with its 
law as soon as possible.35 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention36 ("LOSC") is also emphatic on flag 
State jurisdiction. It provides that unless in exceptional cases provided in international 
3°327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL]. 
310ILPOL, art. VI (1). 
32 d J, . art. II (1). 
33S upra note 9. 
34Td 
11 • art. 6 (3). 
35!d. art. 6 (4). 
36 LOSe, supra note 22. 
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treaties or in LOSC itself, ships shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
flag State on the high seas.37 
2. Problems with Flag State Jurisdiction 
Flag State jurisdiction is not essentially wrong. 38 The problem has had to do 
with flag States discharging their obligations in international law. Flag States appear 
reluctant to enforce standards against their ships.39 A study published in 1989 
showed that of three hundred referrals by North Sea States, flag States had taken 
action on only 17 per cent.40 This attitude could be associated with the fact that it is in 
consonance with patriarchal protection for a flag State to be hesitant about punishing 
its nationals for offenses committed not primarily against it. In any case, some of 
these vessels are owned by multinational corporations who, in real terms, are more 
41 fl S' h . powerful than many flag States. Thus, the government of a ag tate Ignores t elr 
interests at its own peril. Also, since flag States often do not bear the consequences of 
some of the polluting activities of their vessels, they lack the incentive to act.42 
37Id. art. 92. 
38Bodansky, supra note 3, at 737. "In discussions concerning flag state jurisdiction, the question has 
not been its permissibility but rather its adequacy." 
39Lowe, supra note 4, at 624. (noting that: "Flag States are sometimes unable to institute procee~ings 
against their vessels which may not visit their ports for many months, and some states appear unwIlhng 
to do so even when the opportunity arises." 
4°Marie-Jose Stoop, Olieverontreiniging door Schepen op der Noordzee over de Periode 1982 - .198?: 
Opsporing en Vervolging, (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Werkgroep Noordzee, July 1989); cIted In 
Mitchell, supra note 8, at 163. 
41T. DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (1992). 
42Bodansky, supra note 3, at 737. 
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The inability to deal with matters regarding their ships, from a practical 
d I'nt could also affect a flag State's performance. A ship need not visit ports stan po , 
d · 'ts flag State if such ports do not fall within its normal business route. In locate III 1 
. mstance it becomes difficult for flag States to see some of these ships and that Clrcu , 
inspect them to ensure compliance with construction and design standards by such 
vessels.43 The cost of equipping and operating a navy or coast guard large and 
competent enough to police its massive merchant fleet may also militate against a 
. . 11 44 state's desire to enforce mternatlOna aw. 
Some flag States are also involved in "flags of convenience" shipping and this 
has been linked to the pitfalls of flag State jurisdiction. According to Professor 
Dempsey, "[t]he legal fiction of flags of convenience, as well as overriding economic 
considerations, inhibit the effectiveness of a regime of flag state enforcement over 
" f th h' gh ,,45 violations in the "commons 0 e 1 seas. 
The following subsection will discuss this controversial subject. 
3. Nationality of Ships, Registration of Ships, and Flags of Convenience 
One of the fallouts of flag State jurisdiction is the sailing of ships under what 
has come to be known as flags of convenience.46 This issue will be discussed under 
43P.S. Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution of the Marine 
Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 526 (1984). 
44p D and L Helling Oil Pollution bll Ocean Vessels-Environmental Tragedy: The Legal . empsey ., J D J I ' L & 
Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions, and Coastal States, 10 ENV. . NT L . 
POL'y 37,63 (1980). 
45Dempsey, supra note 43, at 557. 
46George Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on th,e Conditions for the Registration of 
Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT L L. 543 (1989). 
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three separate sections: nationality of ships, registration of ships, and flags of 
convenience practice. 
a. Nationality of Ships 
The notion is fundamental in international law that all ships must possess a 
nationalitl
7
, the rationale being that "[t]he registration of ships and the need to fly 
the flag of the country where the ship is registered are . . . essential for the 
maintenance of order on the open sea.,,48 A ship enjoys the nationality of the State 
whose flag it is entitled to fly. 49 
In exercising the right of attributing its nationality to a ship, a State enjoys 
virtually unfettered powers. The only limitation is that the grant must be in 
consonance with internationally respected criteria, which nevertheless are few and 
easy to meet. 50 In general there are only three criteria set by international law to 
determine the validity of the exercise of the right to grant nationality to a ship. First, 
such grants must not impinge upon the rights of other States. For example, a State 
may not impose its nationality upon vessels that already have, and desire to maintain, 
the nationality of another State. Second, a grant of nationality will be invalid if there 
J
47DTavid Matlin, Re-Evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under International Law 23 V AND 
. RANsNAT'LL. 1017, 1021 (1991). ' . 
48 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 21 (1968). 




e a so, ac e oat, romulgation and Enforcement of Minimum Standards for Foreign Flag· Sh· . 
ROOKLYN 1. INT'LL. 54 (1980). zps, 
50J r u Ie. !"1e.rtus, The Nationality of Ships and International Responsibility· The Reflagging of the 
Kuwaztz Gzi Tankers, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 207 (1988). . 
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is reasonable ground for suspicion that the ship will be used in violation of 
international law. Finally, a State· must choose a single nationality for its ships.51 
A ship that does not meet, for instance, the criterion of sailing under the flag 
of one State only, exposes itself to some undesirable consequences. A ship possessing 
dual or multiple nationality is regarded as a ship without nationality, or a Stateless 
vesse1.52 A Stateless vessel enjoys no protection under national and international 
law.53 In United States v. Marino-Garcia, it was stated: "Vessels without nationality 
are international pariahs. They have no internationally recognised right to navigate 
freely on the high seas.,,54 
Apart from the above stated restrictions, every State has the right to grant its 
nationality to a merchant ship under conditions which it deems fit. 55 
b. Registration of Ships 
The usual administrative mechanism through which vessel nationality is 
acquired is registration. Ship registration policies of States could be conveniently 
classified into three types: closed, open, and intermediate. For States operating the 
closed system, registration is generally closed to ships owned by non-nationals. 
Manning and crewing of such vessels are also dominated by their nationals. Other 
stringent conditions for registration also exist. The United States falls into this 
SlId. at 212. 
52L ose, supra note 21, art. 92 (2). 
53Naim-~0Ivan v. Attorney-Generalfor Palestine (1948) A.c. 351. See, however, ships flying the flag 
of the Uruted Nations and its specialized agencies. See also LOSe, supra note 21, art. 93. 
54679 F.2d 1373 at 1382 (1985). 
55~a~ritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 at 584 (1983). See also the Muscat Dhows Case (France v. Great 
Bntam) Hague et. Rep. 93 (Scott) (Penn. et. Arb. 1916). . 
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category, and is described as having "the most stringent registration requirements of 
any maritime nation.,,56 
Open registries, on the other hand, operate an "open door policy" enabling 
natural and legal persons, regardless of their nationality, to register their ships with 
them and sail under their flags. Manning and crewing requirements are relaxed, and 
standards are flexible. 57 Vessels registered in these States are commonly referred to 
"fl f ." h· 58 In as ags 0 convemence s IpS. a 1984 report, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") identified five countries as having major open 
registry fleets: the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia and Panama.59 
The intermediate group is a halfway course combining some of the features of 
the other two systems. A salient example is the Luxembourg registry under which 
registration is allowed if Luxembourg citizens, corporations or a "society anonyme" 
(public limited company) holds more than 50 percent of the ownership of the ships.60 
Similar to the practice in closed registries, but quite unlike the general practice in 
open registries, a company must actually establish a business presence in 
Luxembourg to be registered.61 
56H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and 
Alternatives, 21 TuL. MAR. L.J. 139,151 (1996). 
57The subject of Open Registries is discussed more fully in the next section. 
58The terms "Open Registry" ("OR") and "Flags of Convenience" ("FOC") will be used 
interchangeably here. 
59See Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 547. 
60See Luc Frieden, The New Luxembourg Shipping Register, [1991] LMCLQ 257,257-258. 
61Id. at 258. 
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Whichever policy it adopts, a State's right to admit ships to its registry and 
under whatever conditions it chooses, remains unequivocal62 and other States are 
under an obligation to recognise the exercise of this right, even if unilaterally made.63 
This right is seen as a corollary of the principle of State sovereignty.64 The problem is 
that it tends to elevate FOC States to sovereign positions depicted in Lord 
Ellenborough's rhetorical question: "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the 
rights of the whole world?,,65 
c. Flags of Convenience Practice 
1. Preliminary Matters 
Although open registries enjoy a rich history, it will not be necessary for the 
purposes of this study to undertake an excursion into the archives. Suffice it to say 
;that the practice of using flags other than that of one's nationality has seen better 
days.66 
The expression "flags of convenience" is applied to a phenomenon that defies 
easy definition.67 Nevertheless, in his epic work on the subj ect, Flags of 
62 LOSC, supra note 21, art. 91 (1). 
63B oLEsLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 94 102-
103 (1962). ' 
64Id. at 104. 
65L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience - Does the Present Law Pose 
Special Liability Issues? 3 PACE y.B. INT'LL. 63, 68-69 (1991). (footnote omitted). 
66For an excellent historical account of the evolution of flags of convenience, see RODNEY CARLISLE, 
SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FLAGS OF 
CONVENIENCE (1981). 
67Ebere Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Develo'Pments 73 AM J INT'L L 604 1 
(1979). ' . .. . n 
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Convenience: An International Legal Study,68 Dr. Boleslaw Boczek defines it as "the 
flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign owned and foreign controlled 
vessels under conditions which for whatever the reasons, are convenient and 
opportune for the persons who are registering the vessels.,,69 A strict interpretation of 
this definition would reveal some defects. In the 1980s, the United States registry was 
made available for Kuwaiti-owned and Kuwaiti-controlled vessels for reasons 
convenient and opportune for the persons involved, among which was the facilitation 
of commerce during the Iran - Iraq war. 70 Yet, it would be totally obj ectionable to 
classify the United States as a flag of convenience ("FOC") state. 
A descriptive approach to the concept is preferable. The Rochdale 
e . 71 omlmttee defined such flags by recourse to their salient characteristics including: 
ownership by non-nationals, easy access to the registry, taxes that are low and levied 
abroad, participation mainly by small powers to whom receipts from the business 
might make a difference to national income and balance of payments, manning of the 
ships by non-nationals, and lack ofthe power and administrative machinery to impose 
regulations or the inclination or capability to control the companies themselves. 
68B OCZEK, supra note 63. 
70S ee Margaret Wachenfeld, ReFlagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A u.s. Response in the Persian Gulf, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 174. I~ should be noted that an attack on a ship flying the United States flag is dee~ed an 
attack on the Umted States, an act of aggression which the country is entitled to defend pre-empt 
respond to. ' or 
71Committee ofInquiry into Shipping, Report 51 (London: H.M.S.O., 1970) Cmnd 4337. 
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It is unlikely that a single case wilI.contain all of the above criteria, and all the 
conditions need not apply for a state to be categorized as an open registry.72 Some 
States, such as Gibraltar and Netherland Antilles, offer tax incentives, yet ensure 
control over manning, safety and certification.
73 
11.. Reasons for the Open Registry Practice 
The past forty years have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of merchant 
shipping fleets flying flags of convenience.74 The reason for this is clearly connected 
with the perceived benefits of sailing under such flags. The primary reason why 
multinational corporations involved with shipping and oil interests adopt FOe is the 
maximization of profit. 75 Edward Stettinus, a former United States Secretary of State, 
along with a group of leading American entrepreneurs and multinational corporations, 
masterminded the creation of the Liberian registry with the object of increasing 
profits.76 This is achieved through the benefits which the open registry ("OR") 
practice offers. 77 
72Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 545. 
74R.T. Epstein, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial Application?: A Look at 
the Unique Case a/Flags a/Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT'LBus. L. 653 (1993). 
75Richard Payne, Flags 0/ Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUSTON 
J. INT'LL. 67, 69 (1980). 
76A nderson, supra note 56, at 159-160. 
77Registration in a foreign registry or reflagging for a perceived benefit(s) is not new. U.S. and Latin 
American s.hips in.v0lved in the obnoxious slave trade during the 1800s flew the flags of states that 
we~e not sI~at~nes to a slavery suppression treaty authorizing Britain to board and arrest ships 
regIstered WI~ sIgnatory states. See CARLISLE, supra note 66, at xiii. Also in the 19th century, British 
fishennen regIstered vessels in Norway with a view toward avoiding fishing restrictions. See 
Mortensen v. Peters (1906) 43 SCOT. L. R. 872. 
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One such benefit is easy access to registration. Non-nationals of OR States 
have the opportunity to register their ships under extremely liberallaws78 and without 
necessarily going to the state. For instance, the Liberian registry is administered 
through International Registries Inc., which is headquartered in the United States.79 
Generous tax terms offered by OR~ present yet another attraction to ship 
owners. Generally open registries impose no taxes for income earned from operating 
vessels under their flag while engaged in international trade. 80 They hardly charge 
any fees beyond a registry fee and an annual fee based on tonnage. A guarantee or 
acceptable understanding concerning freedom from future taxation may also be 
given. 81 
Open registries are also favored because they assure a better return on 
investment by minimizing operatl·ng costS.82 By . t· h· h regIS enng t. elf s ips in such 
registries, shipowners are not saddled with the requirements of employing highly 
qualified personnel for manning and crewing purposes, thus reducing their salary 
budgets. The absence of social security requirements, and strong unions constantly 
agitating for worker rights and improvement in working conditions, are also some of 
the "blessings: of an open registry.83 According to Exxon Oil Corporation (now 
78Edith Wittig, Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages, Problems and Dangers 14 TEX 
INT'LL.J.115, 121 (1979). ' ,. 
79 d An erson, supra note 56, at 155. 
80S V· ee ~cent Hubb~rd, Registration of Vessels Under Vanuatu Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 235. 
~1982). \?e Repubbc of Vanuatu levies no income taxes of any kind on either business or personal 
lUcome .... Id. at 241. 
81See Rochdale Committee, supra note 71. 
82Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 565. 
83 Payne, supra note 75, at 71. 
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Exxon Mobil), a tanker with a 28-man crew costing US $560,000 to run if registered 
in the Philippines would cost US $2.5million to run if registered in the United 
84 
States. 
The high standards in closed registries present high hurdles which some ship 
owners find impossible to surmount. Open registries therefore provide a lifeline for 
the businesses of those ships that might not meet some international standards. One 
writer sees this development as an inevitable consequence of tanker economics 
because as ships age they tend to fall into the hands of less scrupulous owners who 
want to earn a precarious living.85 
Further, ship owners have been attracted to these registries by operating on the 
joint assumptions that the existence of anti-pollution conventions ties the hands of the 
maritime nations that honor them and that the structure of open registries permits 
owners of FOC vessels to be loosened from the restrictions of such a regulatory 
system. 86 
Some of the above reasons may have been overemphasized as determinants of 
the decision to patronise an OR. Ship owners would probably insist on FOC shipping 
in the absence of some of these factors or even if some corresponding benefit were 
offered by non-FOC States.87 According to McConnell, many OR fleets are 
84Heneghan, Shipping Guidelines, Reuters North European Service, April 12, 1982, cited in Goldie, 
supra note 65, at 73 n471. 
85Goldie, supra note 65, at 89. 
86Id., at 90 (noting that: "In such a context, of course, a flag-of-convenience state can become a party 
to violation of an anti-pollution convention. It is merely anticipated to fail, conspicuously and 
consistently, if not conscientiously, in performing its treaty obligation to police effectively the 
contaminating proclivities of ships privileged to fly its flag." ) 
87 See UNCTAD, ACTION ON THE QUESTION OF OPEN REGISTRIES 11 (U.N. DOC. NO. TDIBICA1220). 
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composed of modem, well-maintained vessels and many of the OR States have 
commenced enforcing safety standards and inspections in compliance with 
international conventions.88 Ship owners' preference for open registries is more likely 
traceable to the freedom from control which FOC States provide.89 Modem business 
philosophy favors less State intervention and control over business activities, as 
illustrated by the growing significance of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 
and the current campaign for introduction of a multilateral agreement on investment 
("MAI"),9o which (seek to) reduce the influence of individual States over business 
activities taking place in their territories. 
Nevertheless, the underlying reasons behind the genesis and sustenance of FOC 
shipping can be located in at least two areas. One is the economic position of the 
States involved in the practice. A characteristic shared by most of them is that they 
belong to that section of the world community marked by a lack of political power 
and economic c10Ut.91 For them, therefore, the practice exists as a means of keeping 
their sagging economies alive. 
Further, the growing importance of petroleum as an energy resource and a tool 
for industrialization has contributed in no small measure to the fuelling of this 
88Moira McConnell, " ... Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion": The Search 
for the Elusive Genuine Link" 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365, 368 (1985). Cf Ademuni-Odeke, Port State 
Co~trol a~d u..K. Law,. 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657 (1997) maintaining that FOC states are recalcitrant 
or rneffectIve rn enforcrng anti-pollution standards. 
89 McConnell,ld. at 368. 
90S ee Peter C. Newman, MAl: A Time Bomb With a Very Short Fuse," MACLEAN'S (Magazine) M h 
2, 1998 at 51. "We want corporati?llS to be able to make investments overseas without being ;equ~~d 
to take loc~l ?art~~rs, to ~xport a gIv~n percentage of their output, to use local parts, or to meet a dozen 
other restrIctIons. - quotrng Carla HIlls, former U.S. Trade Representative. 
91See Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 547 for a list of open registry states from 1930 to 1986. 
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practice. Since much of the oil needed in the industrialized world is produced 
elsewhere, open registries will subsist to "supply" vessels for oil transportation. It 
therefore follows that oil producing and consuming countries building their 
economies through commerce in oil share in the blame for the genesis and 
continuance of this practice.92 
111. Flags of Convenience and Environmental Issues 
In some quarters, vessels sailing under flags of convenience have become 
nearly synonymous with environmental hazards. While the battle against open 
registries was earlier fought by organized labor,93 more recently "[e]nvironmental and 
conservation groups, which, in the context of domestic industrial activities, have not 
been known to have interests sympathetic with those of the maritime trade unions are 
the new opponents.,,94 
Open registries do not sign on to marine safety and environmental treaties and 
have also been said to be apathetic toward enforcement of internationallaw95 and, by 
so doing, weaken the effectiveness of international regulatory efforts. It becomes a 
seemingly unwise business practice for a ship owner to allow him- or herself to be 
92Thi s argument can be extended to incorporate the point that maritime oil pollution itself is a direct 
consequence of petroleum'S prominence as the economic basis of the industrialized world. See 
Anderson, supra note 56, at 163; Bill Shaw, Brenda Winslett, & Frank Cross A Proposal to Eliminate 
Marine Oil Pollution, 27 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 157 (1987). ' 
93See Goldie, supra note 65, at 63-66. 
94/d. at 67. 
95See A~emuni-Ode~e, supra note 88. It has also been noted that "the modem practice of using flags of 
conve~ence has s~nousl'y' undercut enforcement. Flags of convenience offer ship owners considerable 
fin~~cIaI benefi~, rn ad~~tlOn ,~o aven~es of av~iding otherwise stringent standards on safety, wages, 
trarn~ng, and ship condItIons. See ElIssa SteglIch, Notes, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the Practice 
of HIgh Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction 78 TEX L REv 1323 
l336 (2000). . ' ... , 
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'I 
placed at a competitive disadvantage by a colleague who does not bear the cost of 
complying with international standards. Avoiding the standards wherever the 
opportunity arises becomes almost inevitable, fostering in maritime environmental 
matters, a "Gresham's Law" scenario where, as in precious metal currencies, bad 
practices tend to drive out good ones when external restraints are nonexistent or 
ineffective. 96 
The ineffectiveness of OR states in ensuring compliance stems principally from 
their foundation. They are founded on the philosophy of improving their economic 
base through the attraction of shipping business by lowering standards. Rigid 
enforcement of international law will uproot the practice from the base and rob them 
of attendant benefits. As UNCT AD rightly observed, the enforcement of standards 
and the operation of a registry with the sole aim of making a profit are incompatible.97 
Moreover, OR states generally lack the resources to enforce anti-pollution provisions 
against their vessels.98 
Apparently exasperated and disgusted with FOC shipping and the accompanying 
environmental problems, some scholars have concluded: 
There is but one solution to the problem of oil spills, 
and that i~ th~ abolition of flag of convenience registry. 
The termmatlOn of flags of convenience would put an 
end to the causes of most oil spills - poorly trained 
crews and shoddy ship construction. Elimination of the 
less s~ringent safety standards under flags of 
convemence would greatly enhance a tanker's ability to 
make a voyage without running aground, colliding with 
----------------------
96L.F.E. Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality - A Problem of Flags of Convenience 39 BRIT 
y.B. INT'LL. 220, 221 nl (1963). ' . 
97 UNCTAD, supra note 87. 
98 'h . T. e Channel: Playzng Canute With Pol/ution, ECONOMIST, April 10, 1971, at 77. 
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objects or other ships, or losing oil because of structural 
failure. 99 
The above point is forceful, but still faces formidable opposition. While it is 
undisputed that many of the tanker accidents in the past have involved FOC vessels 
including the Torrey Canyon(1968), Argo Merchant (1976), and Amoco Cadiz 
(1978), it is also on record that the most extensive oil spill so far in terms of 
destruction and costs was that caused by the MV Exxon Valdez, a ship registered in 
the United States, which grounded off the coast of Alaska in 1989. 100 
It must be conceded, however, that while oil spills are not the "exclusive 
preserve" of FOC vessels, the probability of spills being caused by them is higher 
since operational error is a prominent cause of maritime accidents and unqualified 
crews (for which FOC ships are noted), are more likely to commit such errors. lOi 
Furthermore, oil spills account for only a small proportion of the total oil 
discharged at sea. The bulk comes from operational discharges, 1 02 and every ship is 
involved in that, legally or otherwise, or is susceptible to it, regardless of place of 
registry. 
The above argument should not be taken too far, however, since it is more 
consistent with the character of a shipowner who, because of the lure of profit 
99 h Saw, et aI., supra note 92, at 185. 
100S M l' ee at m, supra note 47, at 1052. 
lOlA d' IMO' 0 ccor mg to estlmates, 90 Yo of all marine pollution accidents are due to human error. See 
Bodansky, supra note 3, ~t 730 n42. See also Anderson, supra note 56, at 163; New Ship Safety Code 
Targets Human Element zn an Effort to Prevent Maritime Accidents 33 PETROLEUM GAZETTE 20 21 
(1998). " 
102 D.W. ABECASSIS AND R.L. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 7 (2nd ed. 1985). 
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maximization, IS involved in FOC shipping, to consider reducing operational 
expenses by indulging in illegal discharges. The anonymity of open registries also 
offers an incentive to take such risks and escape punishment. 103 The recent incident 
involving the oil tanker Prestige, which was registered in a FOC State (Liberia) and 
flew the flag of another FOC State (Bahamas) will certainly re-ignite the debate about 
the need to police open registries and their fleets and more adequately enforce 
international rules. 104 
\03UNC TAD, supra note 87. 
104 David Osler, Analysis Oil Shipping: A Saga Of Single Hulls, Double Standards And Too Many 
Flags Of Convenience; Sinking Of The Prestige Off The Spanish Coast Reveals Dangers Of Elderly 
Ships Of Antiquated Design Ferrying Oil Around The World, The Independent (London), November 
20,2002, at 18. 
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iv. Control of Open Registries 
In view of the pitfalls of FOC shipping, various measures have been taken to 
deal with this practice. These include the imposition of a "genuine 
link,,,105confrontation from organized labor,106 and increasing port state control under 
international arrangements. 107 In view of the fact that this portion of the dissertation 
concentrates on international regulations relating to the environmental aspects of oil 
trade and shipping, this section will not address the labor approach, which in the 
author's opinion was not environmentally motivated, but was concerned with 
workers' welfare. The concept of "genuine link" and increasing port state control are 
discussed below. 
The notion of "genuine link" was made applicable to ships for the first time by 
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, although it had been used 
earlier in a case involving the nationality of persons. 108 The article provides as 
follows: 
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of 
nationality to ships for the registration of ships in its 
territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the 
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to 
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State 
and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively 
105See McConnell, supra note 88, at 366. 
I06See Notes, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag of Convenience Fleet: 
Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies against Shores ide Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 
498,502 (1960). 
I07Anderson, supra note 56, at 167. Port State control will be discussed in section C below. 
I08Nottebohm Case (Leichtenstein v. Guatamela) [1955] Le.I. Rep. 4. 
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exerc~se its juris~iction and control in administrative, 
technical and socIal matters over ships flying its flag. 109 
The genuine link concept as applied to ships has been severely criticized.IID 
However, efforts to rationalize or criticize this application are a dissipation of energy, 
since without a clear definition in an international instrument, it is an ineffective tool 
for controlling FOC shipping. Any State can manipulate its open-ended nature and 
claim to be abiding by it. Thus, the concept required definition. In 1986, it was 
proclaimed: "For the first time an international instrument now exists which defines 
the elements of the "genuine link" that should exist between a ship and the state 
whose flag it flies.,,111 This was in reference to the 1986 United Nations Convention 
on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships, 112 ("UNCCORS") also described as 
introducing "new standards of responsibility and accountability for the world 
shipping industry." 113 
The principal provisions of UNCCORS relating to genuine link are contained 
in articles 8, 9 and 10. Article 8 requires a flag State to make provisions in its laws 
regarding the ownership of ships flving its flag 114 S h 1 
J' • uc aws must include 
109 
Geneva Convention on the High Se t 49 . . 
LOSC, supra note 21, arts. 91and 94. as, supra no e ,art 5 (1). This IS substantially replicated in 
1 lOS M tl' ee e.g., a ill, supra note 47, at 1033-1034 From the rich co f 
fee9~~o( ~':8) ~~ panh~S~'The lGenuine .L~nk Doctrine" and Fla:U;/coc:=;~;::Y6~~~ ;~~~~~~ 
S: T ,yres. c .ouga and WIlham Burke, A Footnote, 62 AM. J. INT'L L 943 (1968)' 
Imon ache, The Natzonallty of Ships: The Definitional C " 
Link 16INT'LL 301 (1982)' M' M C 11 ontroversy and Enforcement of the Genuine 
, . , orra c onne ,supra note 88. 
III 
UNCTAD Information Unit, Press Release, U.N. Doc. No. TAD/INF/I770 (7 February 1986). 
112Reprinted in 261.L.M. 1229 (1987) [Hereinafter UNCCORS]. 
113UNCT AD information Unit, supra note 111. 
114 
UNCCORS, supra note 112, art 8 (1). 
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appropriate prOVIsIOns for participation hy the flag State or its nationals in the 
ownership of ships flying its flag and "should be sufficient to permit the flag state to 
exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over [those] ships .... ,,115 Although a 
State can establish its genuine link through ownership, as indicated above, it can also 
do so through manning. I 16 A flag State, therefore, is required to observe the principle 
that a satisfactory part of the complement consisting of officers and crew of ships 
flying its flag be nationals or persons domiciled or lawfully in permanent residence in 
117 the State. 
The problem with the above option on the establishment of genuine link is 
that it suggests that a flag State that chooses to establish its genuine link by recourse 
to the manning option would still be unable to exercise effective jurisdiction and 
control since in real terms, such control is dependent on ownership. I 18 
The role of the flag State in respect to management of ship owning companies 
and ships is covered in article 10. The flag State has a duty to ensure that ship owners 
seeking entry into its register are established or have a principal place of business in 
its territory. 119 In the alternative, the shipowner is required to appoint a representative 
or management person who is a national of the flag State or is domiciled in that 
115 Td 11 . art. 8 (2). 
116Id. art. 7. 
117 d J, . art. 9 (1). 
118S.G. Sturmey, The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1987 
LMCLQ 97, 101. A measure of control is exercisable over crew members by an issuing authority upon 
application for or renewal of licenses to operate or man a ship or seagoing vessel. 
119UN CCORS, supra note 112, art. 10 (1). 
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State.120 The flag State is also directed to ensure that persons accountable for the 
management and operation of a ship flying its flag are in a position to meet the 
financial obligations that may arise from the operation of such a Ship.121 
The above provision is weakened by the use of hortatory language. Sturmey 
derides this and opines that the only valid arguments against open registries are the 
lack of protection to seafarers employed in their ships and the fact that owners can 
escape their liabilities for pollution damage. Therefore, "[i]fthe Convention has only 
recommendatory force in these regards, then perhaps it really was a case of "much 
ado about nothing" as so many commentators have observed.,,122 
It would seem that UNCCORS virtually left the problem unsolved. "It IS 
obvious that the 1986 UNCCORS reaffirmed the flag state's supremacy and 
institutionalized the status quo, leaving the concept of "genuine link" still nebulous 
and controversial.,,123 In general, "it [failed] to achieve its stated objective. It appears 
to have come no closer to truly identifying an enforceable "genuine link" and, rather 
than phasing out open registry practice, its provisions appear to have legitimized the 
f " 124 It b h h· prac Ice . . . . may e wort w lIe to note, however, that while UNCCORS did 
not go far enough, it surely was an improvement on the existing scheme. 125 The fact 
120 d J, . art. 10 (2). The representative could be a natural person or juridical person such as a corporation. 
l2lId. art. 10 (3). This covers insurance, maritime lien and worker-interest protection measures. 
122S turmey, supra note 118, at 106. 
123G EORGE KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION 75 (1993). 
124M. M C 11 HE . 0.u:a c onne, uszness as Usual": An Evaluation of the 1986 United Nations Convention on 
ConditIOns for Registration of Ships, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 435, 449 (1987). (footnote omitted). 
125 See George Kasoulides.' The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the Registration 
of Vessels a~d the QuestIOn of Ope~ Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 543, 566 (1989), asserting 
that the requrrements of the Convention are more onerous than existing national practices. 
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that it has not been ratified by some traditional maritime and FOC States who 
accepted previous Conventions' position on genuine link 126 suggests, at least, their 
recognition that UNCCORS makes inroads into their sphere of authority, a legal 
authority they are not yet ready to surrender. 
d. Observations 
Marine environmental degradation and endangerment of the safety of life at 
sea are matters which are always condernrIed. Operation of a registry that facilitates 
these evils is thus abhorrent. In that connection, any measure aimed at eradicating 
FOC shipping could easily be embraced. In the considered opinion of this author, 
however, whatever is done in this regard, and considering the circumstances that 
surround open registries, the problem could best be solved by an approach that does 
not ignore the economics and equities of the situation. 
A pertinent question may be whether some FOC states can lay legitimate 
claim to equity since they might not come with clean hands. Yet the fact remains that 
most OR states are poor countries involved in the practice mainly to make ends meet. 
Where are the fairness and fraternal bond in an international community interested in 
extinguishing some countries' source of sustenance without assisting in fashioning 
alternative economic bases for them? Where is the equity in targeting OR States 
without requiring oil producing and consuming nations to be accountable for their 
actions, since their inordi?ate desire for economic development at the expense of 
126Treaty status information provided by IUCN and last updated as of March 1, 1997 shows that no 
major maritime power or FOC state is a party to UNCCORS. The treaty has not entered into force as a 
result, being unable to gamer the necessary support in terms of tonnage. The parties at present include 
Alge~ia, Bolivia, Cameroon, CoteD'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, 
MeXICO, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Russian Federation, and Senegal. See 
<http://sedac.ciesin. org/prod/ charlotte>. 
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environmental well-being has substantially led to the creation and sustenance of open 
registries? Where is the justice in allowing oil and shipping companies to go scot-
free, and be free to continue promoting sharp business practices regardless of 
environmental and safety implications, rather than implementing a system that makes 
them legally and socially responsible, and accountable to humanity and the 
environment? 
After all, if justice is done in this area, it will go a long way toward repairing 
past damage, safeguarding the present, and securing the future of the marine 
environment for the benefit of the present generation and generations yet unborn. 
The issues of corporate responsibility and accountability as well as the 
obligation of those that profited from the existing state of affairs will be revisited in 
the course of this work. 127 At the moment, the discussion will continue with an 
examination of the remaining traditional approaches to compliance, commencing with 
coastal States' jurisdiction. 
B. Coastal State Jurisdiction 
The approach of international law toward coastal State jurisdiction, another 
type of jurisdiction mentioned earlier, is to define it in terms of distinct zones of the 
oceans namely, internal waters,128 the territorial sea,129 the contiguous zone130, and 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).l3l 
127 e . '11 b d' 128 orporatlOns WI e Iscussed in Part IV, infra, while States are discussed in Chapter 3. 
These are waters landward of the coastal State's baseline and include bays, river mouths, estuaries 
and ports. See LOSe, supra note 21, art. 8. 
129Thi . h SIS t e band of water seawar.d of the co~stal State's baseline, over which it is sovereign. LOSe, 
supra note 21, art. 2. LOSe establIshes a maXImum breadth of 12 miles for the territorial sea Se Td 
art. 3. . ell. 
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Coastal States have plenary prescriptive and enforcement powers in their 
internal waters, subject only to restrictions accepted by treaty.132 Under MARPOL 
73/78, a coastal State may inspect a vessel in its internal waters or ports to ensure 
compliance with international standards on vessel construction and design,133 or to 
ascertain any violation of international discharge standards. 134 
The coastal State is empowered to regulate pollution in its territorial sea. 
LOSC specifies matters on which the coastal State may legislate, including the safety 
of navigation, the preservation of the coastal State's environment, and the prevention, 
d · d . 135 re uctIOn, an control of pollutIOn. A coastal State is free to adopt its own pollution 
discharge rules for foreign vessels in the territorial sea, as there is no requirement for 
conformity of these rules with internationailawY6 
The above prescriptive jurisdiction is, however, limited by the obligation not 
to hamper, deny, or impair the right of innocent passage. 137 Passage is not innocent, 
130Th' . . . 1~ I.S a narrow band of water seaward of a State's territorial sea in which the State has limited 
J~sdlctIon to protect its territorial sea. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 33. It comprises a breadth of 24 
llllies measured from the baselines of the territorial sea. [d. 
131Thi . b . S IS an area ~yo~d and adjacent to the territorial sea extending up to 200 nautical miles from the 
ba.selIne ?f t~e temtonal sea. LOSe, supra note 21, arts. 55 and 57. In essence, if a State has a 12 -
llllie. temtonal sea; the EEZ would not be more than 188 miles in breadth since its 200 - mile 
maXImum breadth IS measured from the same baseline as the territorial sea. See DAVID ATTARD THE 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNA TIONAL LAW 44 (1987). ' 
132 Bodansky, supra note 3, at 745. 
133 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 9, art. 5. 
134 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 9, art. 6. 
135 Lose, supra note 21, arts. 21 and 211 (4). 
136 See Lose, supra note 21, art 211(4). 
137 Lose, supra note 21, arts 24 and 211(4). 
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however, when a vessel engages in an act of wilful and serious pollution. 138 The fact 
that the pollution must be "wilful and serious" before the right of innocent passage is 
extinguished may likely exclude most typical operational discharges of oil since they 
are rarely "serious," although they may be "wilful.,,139 The second limitation is the 
exclusion of coastal State regulation of the construction, design, equipment, and 
manning ("CDEM") standards in connection with foreign ships unless such rules give 
effect to generally accepted international rules and standards. 140 
Concerning the contiguous zone, the coastal State is permitted to "exercise the 
control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea.,,141 It is doubtful that this 
encompasses measures to prevent or control pollution. 142 
With regard to enforcement, coastal States are empowered to investigate, 
arrest, and prosecute vessels in the territorial sea for contravention of pollution 
laws. 143 Coastal States also have limited jurisdiction to enforce EEZ pollution 
t d d 144 h s an ar s. T ey can only do so when a vessel has committed a discharge violation 
138 0 L se, supra note 21, art. 19 (2) (h). 
139 A.E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention 79 AM J INT'L L 347 359 
(1985). ' . . ., 
140 LOSe, supra note 21, art. 21 (2). 
141 LOSe, supra note 21, art. 33. 
142See Yora~pin~tein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High Seas, 3 1. MAR. L. & COM. 
3~3 .(1972). [~]Ith some . stretch of the imagination, [oil pollution] may be considered as falling 
WIthin the ambIt of the samtary clause." Id. at 367. Footnote omitted. See Lose supra note 21 arts 
219&220(1)&(3). . ' , . 
143 LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (2). 
144 LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (3). 
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of such a nature that results in or threatens major damage to the coastal State. 145 
Otherwise, a coastal State can only require information about the identity of the ship 
and its next port of call and relay the information to the vessel's flag State or next 
port of call, so that either of these States can take appropriate action. A coastal State 
can act also in the event of maritime casualties with actual or potential harmful 
consequences. 146 
The coastal State's powers are further restricted by the requirement that it 
release vessels on bond147 which generally limits available sanctions to monetary 
It' 148 Th fI . . d' pena les. e oregomg m lcates very clearly that coastal State jurisdiction as a 
mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law is not structured to be a 
major tool. The preference of the international community has been the concentration 
of powers in the flag State or a division of powers between the flag and port States. 
The rationale is that enhanced coastal State powers would pose a threat to 
navigation. 149 
145 LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (5) and (6). 
146LOSe, supra note 21, art. 221. 
147LO se, supra note 21, art. 226 (1 ) (b). 
148LO se, supra note 21, art. 230 (1). 
149 Boyle, supra note 139, at 364. 
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c. Port State Jurisdiction 
As the name implies, port State jurisdiction is jurisdiction and control over 
ships by a port State. I50 It is jurisdiction based solely on a ship's presence in port. I51 
Otherwise, a port State whose coastal waters have been affected by a ship's polluting 
activities can exercise jurisdiction as a coastal state. The basis of the policy 
entrenching port state jurisdiction has been well articulated by Professor Bodansky as 
follows: 
From a policy standpoint, port state enforcement 
represents a compromise between coastal and flag state 
~nf~rcement. On the one hand, port states may be more 
mclmed than flag states to enforce environmental 
norms, since port states are themselves coastal states 
and, as such, are at risk from substandard and 
delinquent vessels. Port state jurisdiction therefore 
serves as a useful corrective to inadequate flag state 
enforcement. On the other hand, port state enforcement 
is preferable to coastal state enforcement since it 
interferes much less with freedom of navigation and can 
gener~lly be performed more safely. Stopping and 
boardmg a vessel in transit at sea for inspection 
purposes directly interferes with the vessel's movement 
and can be hazardous, depending on the weather and 
~ocation. ~ co?trast, inspecting a vessel while in port 
Imposes httle If any burden on navigation and can be 
performed safely. 152 
This form of jurisdiction will be examined from the international and regional 
perspectives. 
150 A port State ~s a "s~ate in the territorial waters of which a vessel is at any particular time, provided 
that the vessel IS destmed t~ or has j~st left a port in that state." See Sir Anthony Clarke, Port State 
Control or Sub-Standard ShlPs: Who lS to Blame? What is the Cure? 1994 LMCLQ 202. 
151 Bodansky, supra note 3, at 738. 
152 d Bo ansk'y' supra .note 3, at 739. Moreover, the port State also provides facilities for investigation 
and collectIOn of eVIdence. Boyle, supra note 137, at 364. 
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1. International Legal Provisions on Port State Jurisdiction 
The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 vested port States, for the first time, 
with authority over pollution incidents occurring on the high seas or in another State's 
coastal waters. IS3 The port State may conduct inspections and institute proceedings 
against vessels that have violated "applicable international rules and standards.,,154 It 
may also conduct inspections for discharge violations in another State's coastal 
waters, and may prosecute for such discharges, however, subject to flag State 
preemption for pollution offenses occurring on the high seas. I5S 
Controversy rages as to the scope of jurisdictional competence conferred on 
port States by LOSC. Sally A. MeeseI56 construes a port State's powers to enforce 
international discharge standards against any vessel in a way that presupposes that 
LOSC gives port States prescriptive authority to extend the application of 
international discharge standards to vessels on the high seas. I57 McDorman adopts a 
similar line of reasoning, maintaining that port States have prescriptive jurisdiction on 
the high seas. ISS 
Bodansky seriously questions this reasoning, arguing that article 218 IS m 
section 6 of Part XII, which is devoted to enforcement jurisdiction, rather than in 
153L OSC, supra note 21, art. 218. 
154 LOSC, supra note 21, art. 218 (1). 
155 LOSC, supra note 21, art. 228. 
156Sally A. Meese, When Jurisdictional Interests Collide: International, Domestic and State Efforts to 
Prevent Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 71, 92 (1982). 
157 Bodansky, supra note 3, at 762. 
158 Ted McDorman, Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, 28 J. MARlT. L. & COMM. 305, 315 (1997). 
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section 5, which deals with prescriptive jurisdiction. 159 This scholar is of the view that 
when a port State exercises its enforcement powers by, for instance, inspecting a 
vessel to determine whether the vessel has committed a discharge violation on the 
high seas, "the port state is investigating a violation of another state's law, not its 
own, which it lacks jurisdiction to prescribe.,,160 Support for this view can be found in 
Cheng-Pang Wang's assertion, with respect to article 218, that "[t]he port state has 
been thereby recognized as having the competence to apprehend a foreign ship, which 
is voluntarily within the port ... of that state, for a discharge of oil pollution as 
defined by another State.,,161 
This latter view that a port State's powers for high seas offenses is limited to 
enforcement, certainly has merit. However, it also brings to the fore the difficulties 
that would arise if the position of port States is so limited. For instance, if a ship that 
has been apprehended by the port State for high seas discharge violations is from a 
flag State that either is not a signatory to the relevant international conventions or has 
not implemented the "applicable international standards" in local legislation, the port 
State will be unable to proceed against that ship. 
Other international measures on port State control also exist, an example of 
which is the consolidated port State control measures of the International Maritime 
Organization ("IMO,,).162 The consolidated resolution and its annexures outline and 
159 Bodansky, supra note 3, at 762. 
160B d o ansky, supra note 3, at 740. 
161W ang, supra note 4, at 309. 
162Resoluti~n A787 (19): Procedures for Port State Control; adopted Nov. 23 1995. Full text of this 
document IS reproduced on the University of Cape Town Marine and Shipping Law website 
<http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/portstate.htm>. ' 
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stipulate the procedures for port State, control. Inspections fall into two broad 
categories: initial port State inspections and more detailed inspections. There are also 
guidelines for detention and reporting procedures. 
2. Regional Port State Control Efforts 
Regional efforts relating to port State control are in place in different parts of 
the world, with the West and Central African Region adopting them most recently. 
Until the latter part of 1999, regional measures on port State control did not exist in 
West Africa, notwithstanding the lengthy existence of a legal framework for such a 
cooperative venture. 163 The Abidjan Convention, drafted under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme's Regional Seas Programme, makes 
provisions which enjoin covered countries to embark on individual or joint measures, 
in accordance with the Convention and its protocols, to "prevent,reduce, combat and 
control pollution of the Convention area, and to ensure sound environmental 
management of natural resources [using] the best practicable means at their disposal, 
and in accordance with their capabilities."l64 
These countries must also cooperate with international, regional, and 
subregional organizations to adopt standards and practices that would enable them to 
accomplish these goals. 165 Parties' responsibilities to work toward preventing, 
163That is, the 19,81 Convention for Co-Operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine 
and Coastal En,vlronn:ent of the West and Central African Region, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.2217 (March 
31, ,1981) repnnted In 20 I.L.M. ?~6 [Hereinat~r, the Abidjan Convention]. A few years ago, one 
Afnca~ scho~ar wrote that the ,A~IdJan, Con~entIOn had "yet to elicit even a basic level of political 
cOmmItrn~nt III t~e form of maJonty ratIficatIOn or accession, the equipping of national institutions to 
carry out ItS reqUIrements, or financial support for its implementation." See David Dzidzom H ' 
P II t' C t I' h T,U d u, lYlanne o u IOn on ro In t e rrest an Central African Region, 20 QUEEN'S L.J. 439, 477 (1995). 
164Abidjan Convention, Id, art. 4 (1). See also art. 4 (3). 
165Id. art. 4 (4), 
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reducing, combating, and controlling pollution arising from incidents related to 
shipping are also underscored. 166 
A number of factors, mainly political and economic, accounted for the slow 
pace of translating these provisions into reality in West Africa. For the past fifteen 
years, that region has had various forms of commotion and civil disturbance, 
including guerrilla warfare in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. 167 In such an 
atmosphere, it is wishful thinking to expect much to be accomplished. 
Financial constraints also impede cooperative efforts. A study conducted by 
the United Nations Environment Programme on a West African sub-regional 
arrangement for marine oil pollution control covering Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, was suspended partly due to failure of the 
member States to pay their assessments to a Trust Fund for that purpose. 168 
The economic policies of West African countries also playa role. Because of 
their desire to catch up with the rest of the world, these countries are often unmindful 
of the environmental implications of their development aspirations. Thus, one scholar 
has observed: 
166Id. art. 5. 
Indeed, foundational to the success of marine 
regionalism for purposes of pollution control is the 
chm:a~ter . of the national economic policies of each 
partIcIpatmg State, especially of the coastal States 
African States favour economic development ~v~; 
ecological preservation. 169 
167S 
ee Jackson Urges Liberians to Bury The Hatchet Afrl'caNews 0 <httpllnli e(F bruarYI2,1998). 
: www.africanews.org/usafricalstories/19980212_feat4.html>. 
168S D'dz ee ZI ornu, supra note 163, at 479 n119 and accompanying text. 
I 69ld. at 464. 
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Policy reformulation is necessary in West African countries. It is dangerous 
for developing countries to be obsessed with economic development to the exclusion 
of environmental protection. 17o Moreover, the trend in the global community is 
toward an understanding that economic development and environmental protection 
are not mutually exclusive, as encapsulated in the concept of sustainable 
development, which emphasizes that "environment and development are not only 
interrelated but inseparable.,,171 
Moreover, developed countries are not necessarily more concerned about the 
environment, nor less concerned with economic growth, than developing countries, I 72 
yet some of them were able to fashion a functional regional arrangement on port State 
control long before now. 173 What is required, therefore, is a "comprehensive process 
of resource management, informed by ecosystemic knowledge and progressively 
integrated with economic development planning.,,174 
170See Ambrose Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the Law 
and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 55, 105-106 (1995). 
171 Mickelson, supra note 5, at 42. The Brundtland Report simply defines sustainable development as 
"development that meets the needs for the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
OUR COMMON FUTURE, 43 (1987). It is heartening to note that the 1989 Lome IV Convention betwee~ 
the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States, as well as the 
1991 Treaty signed in Abuja, Nigeria, establishing the African Economic Treaty, "emphasize the 
necessity of integrating environmental concerns with ecologically-rational, economically-sound, and 
socially-acceptable development." Aboubacar Fall, Marine Environmental Protection Under Coastal 
States' Extended Jurisdiction in Africa, 27 J. MAR. L.& COM. 281, 287 (1996). 
172See D. Westbrook, Environmental Policy in the European Community Observations in the 
European Environment Agency, 15 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 257 (1991); O. Lomas, Environmental 
Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 MCGILL L. J. 506, 508-510 (1988). 
173Paris Memorandum of Understanding, infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
174Jaro Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Parameters and 
Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997 (1985). 
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The advantages of a regional arrangement are legion. In the first place, it 
emphasizes a preventive approach to oil pollution, which suits African States since 
they lack the technical resources and equipment to deal with any major maritime 
tt I~ Th . . casua y. e Importance of thIs cannot be overemphasized, considering that West 
Africa is a major tanker route and tanker-handling port facilities are located in all but 
six countries in the region. 176 Thus, the region is at high risk of pollution arising from 
tanker collision, grounding, loading and unloading, and offshore oil and gas 
production accidents. In 
A coordinated system of port State inspection would also go a long way 
toward minimizing financial costs incurred by individual State efforts and addressing 
the problem of substandard vessels. 178 West Africa is a marine-resource-rich zone that 
should be interested in their conservation and revenue through concerted pollution 
tid' 179 con ro an preventIOn measures. The fact that the years between 1991 and 2000 
have been declared the decade for marine and coastal environmental protection, I 80 
made this period an auspicious time to introduce a regional port State regime. This 
175 Fall, supra note 171, at 283. 
176D 'dz Zl omu, supra note 163, at 469-470. 
177Id. at 470. 
178See Kasoulides, supra note 123, at 149. 
179 
. See Fall, supra note 171, at 285. Tuna can be found in abundance here. See also 
DZldzomu, supra nO.te 169 at 465 stating that the West and Central African region contains fifty-five 
per cent of all of Afnca' s fish potential. 
18°Declared by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. See Fall Id at 287 
~he Memoran~um of Unde~standing for West and Central African countries was signed'in ·1999 b; 
~xteen countries. See DaVid Ogah, IMO pleads for implementation of port control treaty THE 
UARDIAN, May 10, 2000; http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/maritime/mr785004 html (Last '. ·t d 
February, 16,2001). . VISI e 
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newly-introduced scheme, like those in other parts of the world, follows in the 
footsteps of the Paris Memorandum ofUnderstandingl81 ("MOU"), discussed below. 
The Paris MOU provides a legal foundation for the cooperative efforts of a 
number of European countries concerning port State control. 182 Under it, certain 
categories of ships are targeted for inspection purposes. These include ships that may 
present a special hazard, for example, oil tankers and gas and chemical carriers as 
well as ships with recent deficiencies. 183 A maritime authority is enjoined to avoid 
inspecting ships which have been inspected by the maritime authority of another State 
within the preceding six months, unless there are clear grounds for inspection. 184 This 
avoids duplication of inspection exercises with the attendant costs on State revenue 
and maritime transport. 
When an inspection reveals deficiencies which are "clearly hazardous to 
safety, health or the environment," the maritime authority must ensure that the ship 
does not proceed to sea and "for this purpose will take appropriate action, which may 
181Done at Paris, January 26, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1. (Hereinafter Paris MOU). The 
Paris MOU binds the maritime authorities of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. 
The Russian Federation became a member on January 1, 1996. "Cooperating authorities" including the 
United States' Coast Guard, Croatia and Japan are also admitted. See IMO News 2 I 96 available at 
<http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/summary.htm>. Port State control has been extended to other 
parts of the world including the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. See Ted L. McDorman, Regional 
Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of International Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 207 
(2000). 
182The MOU format adopted here is ostensibly a reflection of the intention of States involved 
to avoid binding obligations. This is accentuated by the fact that it was concluded among maritime 
authorities and not State governments. See Kasoulides, supra note 123, at 151. 
183Paris MOU, supra note 180, s. 3 (3). 
184Id. s. 3 (4). 
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include detention.,,185 If the port State does not have appropriate repair facilities, it 
should allow the ship to proceed to another port subject to any conditions the 
authority deems appropriate, with a view toward ensuring that the ship can proceed 
without unreasonable danger to safety, health, or the environment. 186 The MOU also 
obliges members to cooperate in the detection of operational discharge violations. 187 
The MOU is supplemented by the 1995 Council Directive of the European 
Union, which went into effect on July 1, 1996. 188 The Directive contains even more 
stringent port State inspection requirements and promotes detailed inspections of 
vessels from countries with an above average detention rate in the MOU database 
housed in Saint Malo, France. 189 The Directive also requires that the ownership of 
detained vessels or vessels that fail inspection be published in its quarterly 
publication. Since one of the major reasons for "flagging under an open registry is the 
ability to conceal ownership," this IS a direct attack on open registries aimed at 
eroding the advantage it confers. 190 
This regional port State regime has come under attack from the International 
Shipowners Association ("INSA") which considered the inspections embarked upon 
. 185 Id. s. 3 (7). Undue detentions may, however, give rise to a claim for compensation 
Kasouhdes, supra note 122, at 158. . 
I 86Id. s. 3 (8). Notification should also be given to the next port of call in the region to the 
flag state and to other mterested authorities. ' 
I 87Id. s. 5. 
188 Anderson, supra note 56, at 168. 
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as an illegal means of delaying vessels· and a detriment to shipping interests. 191 
Doubts have also been raised as to its effectiveness as a tool for eradicating 
substandard shipping and improving the quality of vessels visiting European ports. l92 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, it cannot be denied in good faith that an arrangement 
of this nature is of considerable value in effectuating and enforcing international rules 
and is worth replicating. 193 To substantiate this, it may be noted that it was the 
effectiveness of the Paris MOU that led IMO to pass Resolution A. 682 (17) on 
"Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships and Discharges" and to invite 
governments to form regional initiatives for port State control in cooperation with 
IMO.194 
3. Assessments 
Port State control obviously has advantages as an enforcement tool, some of 
which have been discussed in preceding paragraphs. In summary, port State control 
minimizes the need to detain ships in transit for arrest or inspection, as such actions 
may take place at any port in the vessel's scheduled voyage. It also reduces the 
burden on coastal States to police their adjacent waters, which in the case of 
191L. Buchingham, INSA Sees Inspections as Means of Illegal Delay, Lloyd's List, October 25 1982 
cited in Kasoulides, supra note 123, at 175. ' , 
192K l'd asou 1 es, supra note 123, at 162. 
193Id. at 176 - 177. 
194H are, supra note 1, at 578 n22. See also Shipping Safety in a Changing World, address of the IMO 
Secretary-General, Mr. William A. O'Neill, to the Hong Kong Shipowners Association Luncheon, 
March 27, 2000. In that address, the secretary-general looked at the rationale for the introduction of 
the .port State control regime and its importance. He added: "IMO has encouraged the development of 
:eglOna~ port State control systems as a means of ensuring that ships do in fact comply with the 
mtematlOnally agreed upon rules." Id; http://www.imo.org/imo/speech-llhongkong.htm (Last visited 
August 20, 2000). 
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developing States with wide economic zones may be severe, since coastal States can 
now be assisted by port States. Furthermore, this increases the number of potential 
prosecutors and could thus facilitate pollution control and circumvent the problems 
created by those flag States which are unwilling or unable to effectively exercise 
jurisdiction over their ships. Moreover, by offering increased control over polluters, it 
addresses the basis for the clamor by coastal States for extensive zones of 
fi . . d·· 195 en orcement Juns lctlon. 
Accolades have been heaped on this mechanism, especially III 
contradistinction to the previous regime of exclusive flag State jurisdiction. For 
instance, one writer refers to it as "the most effective cure of the malaise of the 
maritime industry.,,196 In a similar vein, in June 1993, Roger Nixon, formerly 
Chairman of the Joint Hull Committee of the Institute of London Underwriters, said: 
Flag states are just a laugh. You tighten up one flag 
state and another one starts. It is just ludicrous. You 
never get a lasso on all those different flag states. Most 
of the flag states are not serious players, they are just in 
it for the money. But port states have a serious interest 
in the quality of the ships coming in because of their 
local environment and because they do not want ships 
screwing up port facilities. I believe port state control is 
the best answer because ports have no axes to grind, no 
contractual liabilities or contractual obligations to the 
owner. If the port authority does not like [ a] ship, they 
should have no problem about making it pretty damned 
bl· 197 pu IC. 
195 Lowe, supra note 4, at 642-643. 
196Hare, supra note 1. Footnote omitted. 
197Quoted in Clarke, supra note 150, at 204. 
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While the merits of port State control are acknowledged, they should not 
prevent anyone from noticing its pitfalls, a number of which have been addressed 
earlier in this article. Indeed it would be naive to place a premium on port State 
control as a complete panacea to oil pollution problems. Port States are more likely to 
protect the environment by proceeding against polluters when there are incentives to 
act. Therefore, except for pollution incidents that are directly harmful to it, a port 
State or a flag State would be reluctant to take enforcement measures concerning 
pollution on the high seas or in another State's coastal waters. 198 
Developing States obviously lack an incentive to vigorously participate in port 
State enforcement measures since their fragile economies cannot sustain a backlash 
from shipowners by way of a boycott. While a boycott would obviously mean lost 
revenue from shipping, it could actually amount to economic stagnation in the case of 
port States who do not have large shipping fleets and are virtually dependent on 
foreign ships for their exports.199 For a country with a mono-cultural economy 
dependent on oil production and export (an example of which is Nigeria), that would 
be a disguised suicide attempt in broad daylight. 
It has been acknowledged by IMO's Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on several occasions that "full compliance by ships with all MARPOL 
discharge requirements is contingent upon the availability of adequate reception 
1985ee Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, Marine Pollution Control: UNCLOS III as the Partial 
Codification of International Practice, 7 ENVTLPOL'y & L. 71, 73 (1981). 
199R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (1979). The 
authors opine that "[t]he most serious [enforcement problem] has been the lack of interest on the part 
of the oil exporting states to inspect tankers in their ports." 
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f: T" ,,200 aCllties m portS. The need for concerted efforts toward meeting this contingency 
cannot be overemphasized, and until it is met, calling the port state regime a 
phenomenal success would be misleading. 
In recognizing the peculiar problems of developing states and the importance 
of reception facilities to the Convention's success, MARPOL 73/78 included the 
construction of reception facilities on the list of technical assistance projects that it 
urged developed countries to assist in financing. 20 1 A 1992 working group of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") estimated 
that the cost of installing oily waste reception facilities in developing countries would 
be US $560 million for the period between 1993 and 2000?02 This is definitely 
beyond such countries' means, as they are also saddled with other responsibilities and 
debt obligations. A centralized funding mechanism designed to offer such assistance 
would certainly help. It has rightly been pointed out that "whether noncompliance 
[with the requirements on provision of reception facilities] arose from an absence of 
capacity or of incentives, financial mechanisms could have overcome the problem, 
200 MEPC 27/5/3 (? .F.ebruary 1~89). T~nke~ owners have categorically stated that the lack of adequate 
port receptIOn facIhhes necessItates VIOlatIOn of discharge limits. See e.g. MEPC 27 IS (January 17 
1989); MEPC 27/5/4 ( February 15, 1989); MEPC 32/10 ( August 15, 1991); IMO, Tanker Owner; 
Urge Increase in Facilities Accep.ting Oily Wastes, International Environment Reporter, March 8, 
1989, at 130; Tanker Orders Contrzbute to Pol/ution, International Environment Reporter October 10 
1990, at 428. ' , 
201 MARPOL 73/78 supra note 9, art. 17. 
202p C' rep~ratory omnnttee f~r the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
ProtectIOn of O~eans, A~l Kznds of Seas Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, Coastal Areas 
and the ProtectIOn, RatIOnal Use and Development of Their Living Resources U.N. Doc. AlConf. 
151!PC/I00/Add. 21 (New York: United Nations, 1991). 
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but IMO has never established a program to finance facility costs for developing 
. ,,203 
countnes. 
In considering the importance to be placed on port State control, one should 
not lose sight of the fact, as IMO has also observed, that measures by port States 
"should be regarded as complementary to national measures taken by the flag 
States.,,204 Where there are no flag State measures to complement, the efforts of port 
States will amount to nothing. Thus, effective port State control is dependent on 
strong flag State cooperation. This takes us back to the flag State issue and its 
associated problems. Until the world community devises a system that dissuades flag 
States from indulging in activities inimical to the environment and encourages them 
to be actively involved in the fight to save the ocean environment and resources, the 
battle may take longer than anticipated to win, if it is won at all. 
Therefore, in the remaining part of this article, other areas will explored that 
might fine-tune and strengthen the port State regime and to help to induce flag state 
cooperation. In that regard, Part IV below will briefly examine an alternative 
approach. 
203 MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 208. 
204See I.M. Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags ojConvenience, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 103 (1984). 
91 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
The primary players in international oil trade are oil and shipping companies 
involved in the transportation of the resource. The existing rules require States to 
enforce the law against them when they fail to meet the law's demands. However, if 
the companies take it upon themselves to act appropriately, we will not only have 
better laws, but the need for enforcement will be greatly reduced. 
This part of the article will discuss the activities of the business community 
considered inimical to international efforts and how a change in industry behavior can 
change the face of things in this area. To ensure that this change occurs, it may be 
necessary to have a binding legal obligation to do so. This part of the article is 
divided into two sections. Section A will discuss the role of the corporate sector, 
while section B will lay a groundwork for a norm of corporate behavior and its 
applicability to international law. 
A. The Role of Oil and Shipping Companies 
There is no doubt that the industry has made some positive contributions 
toward the control of oil pollution. For instance, it has been at the forefront of 
supplying IMO with information on adequate reception facilities in States. In 1983, 
1985, and 1990, the International Chamber of Shipping ("ICS") carried out a survey 
on ship masters and summarized captains' complaints regarding ports where 
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reception facilities were absent, had limited capacity, were costly to use, or required 
long delays; an undertaking that was successfu1.205 
In general, however, the activities of the industry have been geared toward 
favoring its own cause, even when its course of action might place the overall interest 
of humanity in jeopardy. The activities of the business community founded upon 
profit maximization manifests as an inordinate desire to amass wealth at the expense 
of the health and well being of humanity. To the industry, resistance to any regulation 
that would increase costs is a virtue.206 This is accentuated by the fact that oil and 
shipping interests have been quite visible in coordinating domestic-level lobbying to 
influence positions that governments bring to international oil pollution 
negotiations.207 
It is also this quest for safeguarding their economic interests at the expense of 
everything else that informed the reluctance of the industry to apply adequate 
technologies that would best address the problem of pollution from ships. Contrary to 
the views of an industry spokesperson208 that the industry has made enormous 
contributions to the reduction of operational oil pollution, for instance, by introducing 
technologies, it has been revealed that the industry's attitude had been one of 
frustration of international efforts, acting only when it would suit them. In their 
seminal work, Pollution, Politics, and International Law, R. Michael M'Gonigle and 
Mark Zacher presented the grim picture in the following words: 
205 
MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 129. 
206ld. at 110. 
207ld. at 111. 
208 
DAVID ABECASSIS, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 42 (1978). 
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The entire process of technical standards since 1954 
reflects the constraints imposed by a dependence on 
technologies which have been developed and made 
public by the shipping and oil industries. The 1954 and 
1962 discharge regulations for non-tankers were, in 
effect, emasculated because the necessary technologies 
were supposedly unavailable. Meanwhile, the industry 
kept its own "load-on-top" system for tankers under 
wraps until it - and not governments or IMCO - decided 
to unveil it. This was also to an extent the case with 
crude-oil-washing, a system which had been considered 
as early as 1967 but was rejected as "uneconomical." 
Only when its use became profitable after the OPEC 
price rise was the system touted for its environmental 
advantages. Even then the oil industry supported it as a 
mandatory requirement only as a way to rebut the more 
expensive proposal for the retrofitting of segregated 
ballast tankS.209 
The practice of flags of convenience shipping also owes its genesIs and 
sustenance to multinational oil and shipping companies who see in it an avenue for 
enhancing their business interests. As one writer observes, a "typical group of [open 
registry] firms will include oil and other multinational companies that they manage 
and that operate their tonnage with the pnmary objective of minimizing ocean 
transport costs and maximising profit.,,210 This practice, as already shown in the 
earlier part of this section, is a significant contributor to environniental degradation 
through international oil transactions as well as to the low level of compliance with 
. . I I b 211 mternatlOna ru es y some states. 
In view of the foregoing, this author is of the opinion that if corporations are 
made to readjust their practices and behave in an environmentally desirable way, the' 
209M'GONIGLE & ZACHER supra note 199, at 262. 
210 See George Kasou1ides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the Registration 
of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 565 (1989). 
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problems of ocean pollution and enforcement of laws will belong to the dustbins of 
history. It is with that in mind that a case is stated in the next section for a binding 
international norm of corporate behavior. 
B. Changes in Multinational Corporate Behavior 
A code of multinational corporate behavior should be premised on the 
traditional notion of corporate social responsibility and the progressive movement 
toward corporate accountability. 
The concept of social responsibility demands that the interest of society be 
taken into consideration in a company's decisions, actions and operations.212 This 
implies a duty to incorporate ethical values in business and to contribute positively 
toward the welfare of the general pUblic.213 It refers to "the assumption of 
responsibilities by compames, whether voluntarily or by virtue of statute, m 
discharging socioeconomic obligations in society.,,214 
The traditional notion is that the business of business is to make money and a 
company is a vehicle for profit maximization for its members and does not owe any 
responsibility to other persons including the society as a whole.215 It is thought that 
2llSee Part II, section A above, especially pages 60, 65 - 68. 
2l2Sita C. Amba-Rao, Multinational Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics, Intentions and Third 
World Governments: An Agendafor the 1990s, J. OF Bus. ETHICS 553,554 (1993). 
2l3Moses L. Pava, The Talmudic Concept of "Beyond the Letter of the Law": Relevance to Business 
Social Responsibilities, 15 J. Bus. ETHICS 941 (1996). 
214SALEEM SHEIKH, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1996). 
2l5See generally, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 et seq., (2nd ed 1982) .. 
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, 'I 
through profit maximization, a company makes its optimal contributions to society's 
welfare.216 
This "fundamentalist" approach to the role of the corporation is flawed. It 
emphasizes roles and functions instead of capabilities. If a corporation is able to 
assume other roles in society, it would be wrong to shy away from that simply 
because its function has been compartmentalized into maximizing profits only. When 
every member of society does that which he or she is capable of doing, society 
" 217 receIves optlmal benefits. Moreover, times change and corporate law is not 
immune from the winds of change. The fact that companies were originally created 
for maximizing profits does not impugn the point that their role could be restructured 
to accommodate social objectives. 
Furthermore, in the normal routine of business, a company benefits from 
certain facilities and public goods for which it does not pay, even though they 
enhance its profit-making ability. Examples include good roads, oceans for 
transportation, a stable and peaceful society, and educational institutions funded or 
supported by other segments of society. Schumacher notes that "large amounts of 
public funds have been and are being spent on what is generally called the 
"infrastructure," and the benefits go largely to private enterprise free of charge.',218 
The growing consensus at the moment appears to be that in their economic 
transactions, corporations should act ethically and assume some responsibility for 
216Thi . . s. sentI~ent IS captured in Milton Friedman's often quoted statement: "The Social Responsibilit 
of Busmess IS to Increase Profits," NEW YORK TIMES [Magazine] September l3, 1970, at 32. y 
217LEE PRESTON J P AND AMES OST, PRlVATEMANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 31 (1975). 
218E F S . . . CHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 257 (1973). 
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social welfare.219 This is not only important but inevitable. If companies fail to 
assume non-profit obligations, people will be disenchanted with them
220 
and the 
whole concept of free market economics upon which unrestricted profit maximization 
. Ii d d 221 IS oun e . Writing for the industry, Alfred Farha asserts that a "corporation 
certainly is in business to earn profits for its owners or sh;;treholders in accordance 
with the precepts of the free enterprise system: At the same time, though, a 
corporation can be a responsible and productive member of the society it serves. The 
fact is that a company cannot continue to exist without being profitable, and without 
exercising its responsibilities to society".222 
It is pertinent to note that multinational and other corporations have 
incorporated corporate social responsibility into their policies and practices. These 
have been pursued in some cases through self-regulatory, non-binding codes, 
examples of which include the International Chamber of Commerce's Environmental 
Guidelines for World Business and Business Charter for Sustainable Development, 
the U.S. and Canadian Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible Care 
Program, the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers Federation's Principles 
and Guidelines for the Safe Transfer of Technology, and the Japanese Business 
219A mba-Rao, supra note 212. 
220John Carson and George Steiner, Measuring Social Performance: The Corporate Social Audit, C. E. 
D., 1974 at 16, cited in Howard F. Sohn, Prevailing Rationales in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Debate, 1 J. Bus. ETHICS l39, 144 (1982). 
221 H .. J. c:rlasbeek, The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement - The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save 
Cap,l:alzsm, 11 DALHOUSIE~. J. 363 (1~8.8!. ~rofessor Glasbeek, writin.g from a~ ~deol.ogicalleft wing 
pOSItIon, sees corporate SOCial responsIbIhty s agenda as that of contInued legItImatIOn of capitalist 
liberal democracy. Id. at 368. 
222A lfred S. Farha, The Corporate Conscience and Environmental Issues: Responsibility of the 
Multinational Corporation, 10 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 379, 381 (1989). 
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Council (Keidanren) Global Environmental Charter.223 Numerous internal codes 
formulated by individual companies also exist. 
While these efforts are commendable, their weakness stems from the fact that 
these codes "offer no mechanism for ensuring compliance apart from those which 
exist in any event, such as adverse publicity.,,224 Thus, notwithstanding the 
improvements they have brought to the attitude of multinational companies toward 
the environment, "it is an enormous act of faith to trust almost entirely in self-
regulation . . A legal formulation to back the above policies is therefore 
necessary.226 
At the moment, such a legal framework exists III some measure at the 
domestic level in some countries.227 Because of the nature and structure of 
multinational corporations, it would be more appropriate to bring them under. 
international control. 228 This notion IS premised on the "economic power of 
223See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 
ENVTLL. 1,29 (1995). 
226 Studies conducted by two environmental groups, Friends of the Earth and Public Data Project, 
indicate that American multinational corporations involved in chemical manufacturing in Europe were 
not willing to release data on toxic emissions unless they were legally required to do so, 
notwithstanding that 12 of the companies are members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
which requires its members to subscribe to its Responsible Care Program. See Melissa S. Padgett, 
Environmental Health and Safety - International Standardization of Right-to-Know Legislation in 
Response to Refusal of United States Multinationals to Publish Toxic Emissions Data for the United 
Kingdom Facilities, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 701 (1992). 
227At least 27 states in the United States, including Connecticut, Indiana and Delaware, have legislation 
along those lines. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 (1991). 
228At present, there are about 65,000 multinational corporations, with about 850,000 foreign affiliates 
around the world. While in 1990, foreign affiliates accounted for about 24 million employees, that 
number rose dramatically to 54 million in 2001. They also recorded sales amounting to $19 trillion 
which was more than twice as high as world exports in 2001; in 1990, both were roughly equal. 
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multinationals, the international character of multinational corporations, and the 
limited ability of Third World countries to regulate the activities ofmultinationals.,,229 
These types of companies have grown beyond the control of most national 
governments and operates in a legal and moral vacuum where individualism is the 
d· I I 230 car lila ru e. 
The situation is even worse in the case of developing countries which, in their 
quest and scramble for economic investments of multinational companies, are too 
enfeebled to regulate or control the multinationals. Indeed, the companies are more 
likely to show a preference for those countries with lax regulations over multinational 
business activity.231 The absence in developing countries of the technical expertise 
and legal development necessary to monitor or regulate complex activities such as 
environmental pollution also militates against any efforts by these countries to control 
the activities of multinational corporations. 232 
The closest international law has come to imposing duties akin to social 
responsibility on multinational corporations was through a series of draft codes. 
Efforts by members of the United Nations to agree on a non-binding code of conduct 
Further, over the same period, the stock of outward foreign direct investment increased from $1.7 
trillion to $6.6 trillion. Foreign affiliates of MNCs currently account for one-tenth of world GDP and 
one-third of world exports. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, Overview, at 1. 
229Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and repressive regimes: The Ethical Dilemma, 15 
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 542, 544 (1985). Lippman argues for direct regulation of multinationals by 
intemationallaw. 
230See Fowler, supra note 223, at 2 
231Lippman, supra note 229, at 545. 
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for multinational corporations met with persistent failure until they were abandoned 
in 1993.
233 
The 1988 Draft Code contains the most recent provlSlon relating to 
environmental protection. It provides: 
Transnational corporations shall carry out their 
activities in accordance with national laws, regulations, 
established administrative practices and policies 
relating to the preservation of the environment of the 
countries in which they operate and with due regard to 
relevant international standards. Transnational 
corporations should, in performing their activities, take 
steps to protect the environment and where damaged to 
rehabilitate it and should make efforts to develop and 
apply adequate technologies for this purpose.234 
The danger with provisions couched in such language is that they could 
represent mere moral adjurations honored more in the breach than in the observance. 
One writer has pointed out that the problem with hortatory provisions is that they do 
not "compel business leaders to address the larger problems of our society which 
corporations have either helped to create through their irresponsible conduct or failed 
to ameliorate by any meaningful philanthropic activity.'.235 Writing about Europe, Dr 
Sheikh contends that, for corporate social responsibility to be effective in the 
European Union, it is necessary to create a compulsory regulatory framework 
applicable to all member states rather than relying on companies to undertake social 
responsibilities of their own volition.236 
233F I ower, supra note 223, at 3. 
234U.N. Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 0 S 1988 rg. ess., , 
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 11; U.N. Doc. E/ 39/Add.l (1988). 
235Daniel J. Morissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 SYRACUSE 
L.REv. 1005, 1030 (1989). 
236 
SHEIKH, supra note 212, at 210. 
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Instituting a clearly defined, binding norm on corporate activities would go a 
long way toward ordering corporate behavior so as to facilitate companies' 
compliance with international regulations and reduce the burden on states to enforce 
them. It would also harmonize different individual efforts of corporations to 
contribute to the welfare of society. The thrust of such a norm would be the 
entrenchment of ethical values as a sine qua non in international business and the 
imposition of a responsibility to contribute positively toward societal well-being. 
Such contributions could be put into a common international fund and applied to 
needed areas. In oil pollution matters, this could translate into a mandatory payment 
by oil and shipping companies of a certain percentage of their profits for marine 
environmental issues. 
Two major problems confront this alternative: enforceability and acceptance 
by states, especially those keenly interested in protecting the interests of their 
corporations. On the issue of enforceability, the question arises whether states that 
were less willing or generally ineffective in enforcing international rules would 
suddenly wake up to embrace this idea and enforce it. A possible solution may be 
found in the establishment of an international judicial forum vested with jurisdiction 
to enforce such norms. This forum could serve as an international court for the 
environment.237 Such a court would be able to "judge," not merely "mediate,,,238 and 
would be structured in such a way as to allow individuals and non-state actors in the 
international realm (such as multinational corporations) the opportunity to sue and be 
237Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations 
and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment 15 B.u. INT'L LJ. 261, at 303 (1997). 
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sued. This idea is premised on the point that States, perpetrators of environmental 
abuses themselves, cannot be entrusted with the sole responsibility and privile f : ge 0 . 
enforcing environmental rights.239 
The reality, however, is that only a handful of individuals possess sufficient 
financial resources to institute an action in a foreign land. Considering the fact that' 
many victims of marine pollution are local fishermen and farmers, the envisaged right 
could amount to nothing more than a hole in a doughnut, fanciful and beautiful, but 
useless and ephemeral. A way out could be for public interest law firms and Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") to involve themselves actively and undertake 
prosecutions on behalf of needy individuals. 
For the effective discharge of its functions, the court would be granted powers 
to prevent and remedy injuries through injunction and compensation. A comparable 
standard is that under the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which has 
the power to grant injunctive relief to obviate irreparable damage to individuals.24o 
The major problem with this option is the question of the enforcement of the 
court's decisions. In that regard, it has been suggested that the judgments of the court 
which award damages to an injured party, whether by default or by adjUdication, 
should be enforceable in domestic courtS.241 This idea is merely academic, 
238A d P 'r me .eo ostIg lOne, A Mor~ Efficient International Law on the Environment and Settin U. an 
InternatIOnal Courtfor the Envzronment Within the United Nations, 20 ENVTLL. 321, 325 (19~0).P 
239 Eaton, supra note 237, at 305. 
240 
Scott,~' Cahalan, Rece~t Developments, NIMBY: Not in Mexico's Backyard? A Case or 
Recognztzon of a Human Rzght to Healthy Environment in the American States 23 GA J INT'L
fi
& 
COMPo L. 409, 415 n27 (1993). ' . . 
241 
Eaton, supra note 237, at 305. 
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considering that one of the factors that makes the international court concept 
attractive is the inefficiency of domestic courts in some places. If judgments still have 
to pass through this ineffective system, then the whole process and expense of going 
to the international court would be a huge waste and an empty rigmarole. 
Another way of enforcing decisions would be through an international police 
force. Nevertheless, this idea raises a number of hurdles for, notwithstanding that 
"most reformers in the field of international law have accepted the notion that the 
basic way of enforcing law is by a policeman, and that the way to improve 
compliance with international law is to establish an international police force strong 
enough to impose the law on any country,,,242 the idea is yet to gain the concurrence 
and acceptance of policy makers. Considering states' obsessions with the notion of 
sovereignty, it does not appear that they would embrace the idea any time soon. 
This leaves us with the option of considering enforcement of the proposed 
international norm through domestic courts. This in tum has its own problems. As 
earlier stated, the existence of an efficient judicial system is foreign to some states. 
Moreover, litigants have had unpalatable experiences in the few instances they have 
mustered enough courage to bring actions against multinational corporations III 
domestic courts of some States.243 For instance, corporations are in the habit of 
242 ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1981). 
243See e.g., Allar Irou v. Shell-BP, Suit No. W/89/71, Warri HC 26/11/73 [Unreported] cited in M.A. 
Ajomo, "An Examination of Federal Environmental Laws in Nigeria" in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11, 22 (M.A. Ajomo & O. Adewale, eds., 1994). In that case, the 
plaintiffs application for an injunction to restrain the defendant from polluting its land, fish pond, and 
creek was refused. The court contended that nothing should be done to disturb the operations of a trade 
which serves as the country's main source of revenue. 
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employing the services of expert witnesses whose evidence cannot be contradicted by 
the often poor litigants who cannot afford the services of their own expert witnesses. 
Further, some States may decide not to be parties to the international 
arrangement or refuse to translate its provisions into local legislation. This will 
inevitably deprive their citizens of the opportunity of enforcing the rules against 
delinquent vessels. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to consider couching the nonn in 
such a way as to allow actions against the vessels in any country in which they 
operate or which they visit. This may leave a sour taste in the mouths of the maritime 
powers as it represents an incursion into flag State jurisdiction. This leads us to the 
second major problem confronting an international nonn of corporate social 
responsibility: acceptance by States. 
The international system is structured in such a way that State sovereignty is 
viewed with deference. It is a major paradox of our times that "[i]nternationa1law is 
based upon two apparently contradictory assumptions: first, that the states, being 
sovereign, are basically not subject to any legal restraint; second, that international 
law does pose such restraints.,,244 
Because of the nature and structure of the international system, States choose 
treaty obligations which they assume.245 A State interested in protecting the interests 
of its ships would be less inclined to accede to a treaty that imposes high obligations 
on the shipping industry. This is particularly true, as we have seen earlier, of FOe 
244Gary . L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary 
InternatIOnal Law, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 71 (1996). (quoting JOSEPH FRANKEL, 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 23, (4th ed. 1988». 
245 See G.M. DANILENKO, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 67 (1993). 
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States who are in business basically because they have lower standards and fewer 
restrictions which are attractive to the corporate world. 
It seems that the only solution, therefore, is to substantially restructure the 
international system in relation to the notion of sovereignty. An effective maritime 
pollution regime must involve a cession of a measure of sovereignty by States for the 
common good.246 The port State regime represents a step in that direction, but that 
does not foreclose further consideration of a reduction in flag States' influence and , 
accordingly, sovereignty. Mitchell comments that "[r]emoving these legal barriers 
often requires negotiating redefinitions of the boundaries and definitions of 
sovereignty. The new right of port states to inspect and detain tankers decreased the 
sovereign rights of flag states. Without fundamentally threatening the structure of the 
international system or current core notions of sovereignty, minor modifications can 
significantly improve enforcement in a given issue area.,,247 
It appears that the consensus in the international system at the moment is that 
the era is fast receding when it was thought that membership in the international 
community conferred enonnous rights and virtually no responsibility.248 In the light 
of that understanding, sovereign rights of states have been encroached on when it was 
thought that the States involved had lost the ability or inclination to address actions 
for which they were ordinarily responsible and which impact the global community. 
246 . De~psey, supra note 42, at 561. "The common, long-term interest of humanity must first develop an 
mgen~lty and influence surpassing that of national sovereignty before vessel-source pollution can be 
effectIvely controlled." 
247 MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 323. 
248See John A: ~~rldns, "The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to 
State Responslbllzty, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433 (1997). 
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This provides an explanation for the current scenario in international war crimes249 
and high seas fishing. 
The Osaka Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, concluded in 1995,250 broke new ground as the first global instrument to 
establish a framework procedure allowing non-flag States to board and inspect fishing 
vessels of another State on the high seas. It "constitutes the global legal basis for 
permitting the inspecting state to bring a suspected vessel to a port for further 
investigation in case there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has committed 
a "serious violation," as defined in the agreement.,,251 
The idea behind the above model could be extended to oil pollution matters as 
it would help de-emphasize sovereignty and possibly enable actions to be brought 
against ships in other States to enforce international norms. The added advantage is 
that flag States would be propelled or compelled to live up to their responsibilities if 
they know that their ships would be without their protection and at the mercy of other 
states. Of course, it cannot easily be assumed that the introduction of this idea into 
249I~. at 44~-443. I?e~pite the objections of the United States and others on the ground of sovereignty, 
an mternatIonal cnrmnal court treaty was concluded recently in Rome, Italy. See Mike Trickey, u.s. 
.s,alks as World Court Wins Approval, EDMONTON JOURNAL, July 18, 1998, at A4. The U.S. later 
sI?ned on to the treaty, but did not ratify it. See Clinton's Words: The Right Action, ' New York 
Tlm~s~ Jan~Iary 1~ 2001; http://archives.nytimes.com. Last visited February 26, 2001. The Bush 
administratIOn ~nslgned the treaty, thus leaving the United States out of the treaty regime. See William 
Orme, U.S. QUits Treaty on Global Court, L.A. Times, May 7,2002, at 3. 
250 U.N. Doc. AlConf. 164/37 [Hereinafter Agreement]. 
251H h' ayas 1, supra note 20, at 27. 
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high seas fishing would automatically mean that states would be favorably disposed 
toward introducing it to oil pollution control. 
In the first place, States have greater incentive to protect their fish stocks since 
they are revenue generators, and would consider it to their benefit to interfere with 
illegal fishing. The same cannot be said of pollution, which does not yield any direct 
financial returns, but instead costs money to fight. Nevertheless, the issues can be 
intermingled, an example of which is the involvement of States in anti-pollution 
measures in their territorial seas to protect money-yielding ventures including 
fishing. 252 
The wide powers conferred by the Agreement on non-flag States and the 
reduced powers of flag States are quite feasible with regard to fishing because with 
fishing, cessation of the violation would, in most cases, remove the need for the 
fishing vessel to remain in the area. On the other hand, violations of pollution 
regulations are incidental to the principal purpose of maritime transport, and such 
exercise of authority on the high seas is therefore far less likely to be tolerated by 
maritime States.253 
From another perspective, high seas fishing is unique in the sense that it is an 
area in which there has been a great deal of regional cooperation, including agreement 
on the enforcement of regionally adopted measures?54 Moreover, it enjoys the full 
252E 'd h .g., conSI er t e. case o~ Greece which has strong incentives to prevent pollution in its territorial 
waters because o~ Its fishing and tourist industries which are major contributors to its national 
economy. Accordmgly, Greece has adopted a tough stance favoring port state enforcement. See 
Dempsey, supra note 42, at 499-502. 
253 See Lowe, supra note 4, at 642 n87. 
254H h' ayas 1, supra note 20, at 27. 
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blessings of the Law of the Sea Convention, which encourages and even obligates 
such cooperation, especially with regard to the conservation and management of 
straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks. It was this interplay between regional 
and global agreements that provided an essential basis for the new enforcement 
mechanism.255 As regional efforts intensify in maritime oil pollution matters, the 
prospects of a similar arrangement seem brighter. 
In the meantime, though, judging by current developments in the international 
system, the prospects of acceptance of environmental measures that impinge on 
sovereignty are strengthening. There is an emerging notion that the environment is 
now the common concern of humanity, whose preservation transcends national 
interests. Commenting on this concept, Professor Jutta Brunnee has written: 
The notion describes threats to the well-being of the 
international community as a whole. One might argue 
that, as a result, all states have a legal interest in such 
issues and, in certain situations, an obligation to 
contribute to their solution. Seen in this manner, 
"common concerns" would limit state sovereignty in 
the interest of the international community - ultimately 
even where the cause of the "common concern" IS 
located within the jurisdiction of a given state.256 
The bottom line is that the global community is becoming progressively 
compacted257, and the idea of a global village is becoming increasingly realistic. It is 
256Jutta, Brunnee, A Conceptual Frameworkfor an International Forests Convention: Customary Law 
and Emerging Principles, in GLOBAL FORESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 41,55-56 
(Canadian Council on International Law, ed. 1996). 
257Dr. C. N. Okeke, former Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the Enugu State University of Science and 
Technology, Nigeria, and currently a professor of International and Comparative Law at Golden Gate 
University School of Law, San Francisco, California, in a personal communication with the author. 
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even expected that the global village com;ept will soon give way to a new idea - the 
global family.258 In such circumstances, it is clear that the old concept of State 
sovereignty is now moribund. 
It is therefore with great expectations that this work proposes the enforcement 
of an international norm of corporate behavior through the use of domestic courts in 
States into which ships' operations extend. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Methods of States' compliance with and enforcement of international 
regulations have, for some time now, presented real obstacles to realization of the 
fruits of long deliberations from which international regulations emerge. International 
law has devised various means of surmounting these problems including the 
traditional approaches of flag, coastal, and port States' jurisdiction. These measures 
have been somewhat effective, although some loopholes are noticeable. In recent 
times, modem mechanisms of influencing states' and corporate behavior have also 
emerged. While they may not present a panacea to these multifaceted problems, they 
are likely to contribute substantially to an improved state of affairs, especially if 
merged with traditional methods. 
Nevertheless, the problem of rational beings' inclination to act in their own 
interests remains a major challenge to improving such behavior. Thus, in many cases 
States exhibit an inclination to cooperate only with regimes favorable to them. A 
258Arthur Clarke, quoted in Hans Zimmermann, Emergency Telecommunications: 
Telecommunications in the Service of Humanitarian Assistance, unpublished paper (on file with 
author). 
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realistic approach that considers this inclination while formulating legal rules is 
essential. The next chapter looks into that aspect of life in the global community, 
110 
s CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is believed that States generally comply with the provisions of international 
agreements to which they are parties.! But the existing state of affairs tends to present 
a somewhat different picture,z suggesting that implementation of and compliance 
with international accords are imperfect and often inadequate. 3 A study done in the 
early part of the last decade by the United States General Accounting Office, which 
focused on compliance of governments with international environmental treaties, 
concluded that compliance is poor.4 More particularly, in international oil pollution 
cases, it has been observed that the bane of the legal framework on ship-source oil 
pollution control has not been the content of the applicable law, but enforcement of 
1. LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 48-49 (2d ed. 1979). "In less dramatic 
contexts it is relevant that, despite the continuing temptations in daily intercourse, unnumbered principles of 
customary law and thousands of treaties are regularly observed." Id. at 48; see also HANS 1. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 271 (Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson eds., 
2d ed. 1951). "The great majority of the rules of international law are generally observed by all nations." Id. 
2. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of 
the Montreal Protocol, 3 y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123 (1992). "States often seem to ignore not only their political 
pledges but also the treaties to which they are parties." Id.; see also William Tetley, Uniformity of International 
Private Maritime Law-The Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to International Conventions-How to Adopt an 
International Convention, 24 TuL. MAR. LJ. 775 (2000). "The major defect of international law is not only that 
nations fail to ratify conventions, protocols, and technical amendments, but also that when they do so, they may not 
conform to, and comply with, the law." Id. at 819-20. 
3. See, e.g., ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCORDs, (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998); see also Jennifer L. Ulrich, Note, Confronting 
Gender-Based Violence with International Instruments: Is A Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. 1. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (2000). "Although countries routinely adhere to traditional international law even in the 
absence of a positivist enforcement scheme, non-compliance continues to be a frequent occurrence." Id. at 637. 
4. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, International Environment: International Agreements Are Not Well-
Monitored, GAO/RCED 92-43 (1992). 
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the law. 5 At the moment, the most rigorous effort mounted in the area of enforcement 
of the provisions of marine pollution conventions is through port State control. 6 
However, regardless of whatever modest gains are made through the port State 
scheme, the problems in implementation, compliance, and enforcement will linger for 
a long while, unless efforts are directed at the core of the problem. 
International scholars and observers of international affairs appear to be united in 
the belief that "[ w ]hat is needed now is less the adoption of new instruments than 
more effective implementation of existing ones.,,7 The problems of implementation, 
compliance, and enforcement are linked to the extant system that needs to take into 
consideration relevant matters that will facilitate treaty implementation and 
compliance.8 This chapter examines modalities for improving the effectiveness of 
international agreements relating to marine environmental protection and intentional 
oil pollution by ships. This encompasses not only how parties to the treaties can, and 
could be made to, work toward improved compliance, but also considers ways of 
enhancing States' assent to these treaties. 
This chapter's objectives will be realized by drawing from the ideas of scholars in 
other disciplines, notably international relations and economICS. The purpose of 
5. See Mark W. Wallace, "Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas ": The Report of the Donaldson Inquiry into the 
of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, 1995 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 404. The Donaldson Inquiry 
Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, constituted by the Government of the United Kingdom, in its 
"was of the opinion that the measures currently in force would greatly reduce marine pollution if 
implemented." Id. at 406-07. 
6. See generally Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of Internation~l . 
5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.1. 207 (2000). See also Secretary General of the International Maritime 
William A. O'Neill, Address at the Hong Kong Shipowners Association Luncheon (Mar. 27, 2000), rtJnrlnlep'l 
http://www.imo.org/imo/speech-1/hongkong.htm. Looking at the rationale for introducing the new 
state control and explaining its importance, O'Neill stated: "IMO has encouraged the development H'''.~', ,~-, 
State control systems as a means of ensuring that ships do in fact comply with the internationally agreed upon 
Id. 
7. Koskennierni, supra note 2, at 123. 
8. Steven M. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions to Improve Global Environmental 
Agreement, and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 771 (1995) [hereinafter 
Reforming International Institutions]. "Today the great problems burdening international environmental law 
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considering international relations is to examine the impact of national interest on 
international behavior. Discussions on international relations will, however, be 
restricted to the postulates of the realist school and regime theory. While the realist 
school contends that the self-interest of nation-states propel their behavior in the 
international arena, regime theory argues that there are certain structures in the 
international system which playa key role in how states conduct their international 
affairs. Thereafter, some of the economic issues raised by international oil trade and 
shipping will be discussed. This will lay the foundation for the argument in favor of 
capacity building for developing countries. This entails empowering and equipping 
developing countries with the needed resources, which would facilitate bringing them 
into compliance with, and helping them participate in the implementation of, 
international law. The discussion seeks to show that international oil pollution control 
will possess a brighter position if the position of developing countries, as well as the 
incorporation of their interests in policy formulation in this area, are taken into 
consideration. 
This chapter IS divided into two major parts. Part II exammes international 
relations theories, especially in relation to ship-source oil pollution control. Part III 
involves a discussion of the economic dimension of treaty implementation. In 
particular, the relevance of a fee paying arrangement for use of oceans will be 
examined, basically as a source of revenue for the execution of projects connected to 
the preservation and protection of the marine environment. There will also be an 
exploration of ideas for an international financial mechanism as an appropriate means 
institutions revolve around deficiencies relating to ratification, implementation, coordination, enforcement, and 
monitoring of [international] agreements." Id. at 772. 
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of influencing States' behavior in this area. The Global Environment Facility, 
currently being administered by three international institutions, will be discussed.9 
Thereafter, general conclusions will be drawn, essentially suggesting that an effective 
way of securing the crucial co-operation of developing countries in the maritime oil 
pollution crusade is the introduction of a measure of economic motivation for such 
co-operative ventures. It should be noted that while this discussion is carried on in the 
context of marine oil pollution, the ideas expressed in this work can go beyond this 
focal area and can be replicated in, and applied to, virtually any aspect of 
international law . 
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
A. Realism 
Realism, which developed after the second World War,1O thrives on a "rational-
actor conception of compliance" premised on a Machiavellian perspective: II "A wise 
ruler, therefore, cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance of 
faith would be to his disadvantage and when the reasons which made him promise are 
removed.,,12 The realist's position, therefore, is that States will only keep their 
9. The institutions that constitute the tripartite institutional arrangement of the Global Environment 
the World Bank, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) , and the United Nations 
Programme (UNDP). David Reed, The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental Organizations, 
u.J. INT'LL. & POL'y 191, 193 (1993). 
10. See RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND 
COMPLIANCE 28 (Nazli Choucri ed., 1994). 
11. ABRAM CHA YES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHA YES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) [hereinafter CHA YES & CHA YES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY]· 
12. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 58-59 (Peter Bondanella ed., Peter Bondanella & Mark Musa 
Oxford Univ., Press 1984) (1532); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance 
Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION 1. 311 (1991) [hereinafter 
Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement]. "The still-prevailing realist assumption is that a nation will . 
treaties only so long as they are convenient and, if it has the power, will disregard them when they no longer 
immediate needs." !d. at 312. 
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bargains when it is in their own individ\lal interest. 13 Thus, "[ r] egardless of their 
domestic colors, states in the international realm [are] champions only of their own 
national interest.,,14 
A major contention of the realist school of thought is that the international sphere 
IS "anarchic" and that, combined with "the pursuit and use of power. . . are the 
pnmary determinants of international behavior." I 5 Under this proposition, 
international law does not influence States' behavior but if it does at all, the influence 
is infinitesimal. "[ C]onsiderations of power rather than of law determine compliance" 
in every significant area. 16 Power, of course, is a manifestation of self-interestY 
International rules embodied in treaties serve essentially as instruments in the hands 
of powerful states to accomplish their objective. Identifying one of the major 
conclusions of this instrumentalist view, political science professor Robert O. 
Keohane writes: "States use the rules of international law as instruments to attain 
their interests."18 Treaty making therefore affords a good opportunity for States to 
promote their own national interests to evade legal obligations that might be harmful 
to them. 19 
13. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 535 (citing Sir Winston Churchill's speech to the British House of 
Commons on the likelihood of a war with the Soviet Union on Jan. 23, 1948). 
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 
AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207 (1993). 
15. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 28. 
16. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 272. 
17. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International Law From an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 109 (1995) [hereinafter Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of 
Rules]. "[S]tates act in largely self-interested ways, and that one, if not the primary, way in which they promote their 
self-interest is the application of power." Id. at 112-13 (citation omitted). 
18. Robert Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.1. 487 488 
(1997). ' 
19. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 262-64. 
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A look at a possible scenario in the maritime oil pollution area appears to lend 
credence to the realist theories, both in the negotiation of treaties and in compliance 
with treaty provisions. One writer makes the following observation: 
A government, recognizing its interest in avoiding oil 
pollution of the sea, may desire a rule prohibiting it and 
may believe it to be in its interest to have general 
compliance with the rule. On the other hand, the sa~e 
government might permit its ships, when on the far SIde 
of the globe, to flush their tanks in violation of the rule 
when it would save money to do so. The kind of direct 
self-interest here being considered would tend to cause 
compliance with the antipollution rule only when a 
country's ship was anchored off its own public 
beaches.2o 
The realist position, however, does not accurately describe reality. It is 
unlikely that a State would conduct its international affairs solely on short-sighted 
self-interest. Such an attitude would cost the State a loss of reputation and honor, 
which are vital in international affairs. Other States would find it increasingly 
difficult to enter into bargains, bilaterally or multilaterally, with a State that routinely 
disregards the principle pacta sunt servanda, which states that States are bound to 
keep promises they make, in order to protect its short term interestsY Whatever a 
State had gained by such an approach to international relations might eventually tum 
into a loss in the long run, thus amounting to a pyrrhic victory. 22 
20 ROGER FISHER IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1981). 
21: Pacta sunt se:.vanda is considered a fundamental principle of intemat~o~al l~w: See Abram. 
Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 ~NT'L OR~. 175, 185 (19~3). The prmciple IS m~orporated m 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatles. See VIenna Conventlon on the Law of Treatles, May 23, 1 
U.N.T.S. 331. d 
22. "As with Pyrrhus (who is supposed to ha~e said: .'9ne ~or~ such victory over the. an 
utterly undone'), the costs incurred in gaining a desrred deCISIOn wIll m some mstar:ces outweIgh any 
derived from that decision." FISHER, supra note 20. For more on Pyrrhus of Ep~s (3.19-27? B.c.), 
ancient country in northwest Greece, see Robert Bartley, Andersen; "! Py,rrhzc Vzctory. WALL 
JOURNAL, June 24, 2002, at A17. Pyrrhus name has become synonymous WIth VICtOry at too great a cost. Id. 
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Furthermore the realist assertion that national interest is the ultimate motivator , . 
and that international law does not play any significant role in influencing state 
behavior may not represent an accurate depiction of the dynamics of the international 
arrangement. Opponents argue that there are some fundamental, structural principles 
of international law, which tend to constrain or qualify the self-interested application 
of power by States.23 
A State's self-interest may propel it to act in a certain manner. At the same time, 
its ultimate action is usually taken after considering the probable chain of events that 
such a move may trigger within the international community. Thus, under the 
principle of reciprocity, a State would only act if willing to accord other States the 
right to act in a similar manner. On the other hand, a State might refrain from a 
particular course of action, expecting that in the future other States will reciprocate.24 
The principle of reciprocity, albeit a general concept in social relations, "also finds 
expression in a structural principle of international law, whereby in the context of 
general customary international law any state claiming a right under that law has to 
accord all other States the same right.,,25 
Contrary to realist theories, therefore, the principle of reciprocity in social 
relations and international law discussed above seems to influence State behavior, 
notwithstanding the state's self-interest and position of power. A clear illustration of 
this idea in customary international law is the Truman Proclamation in the 1940s on 
the Continental Shelf.26 In 1945, "the United States proclaimed its continental shelf, 
23: Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 179. 
24. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 3 (Stephen D. Krasner ed. 1983). 
25. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162 (emphasis added). . 
26. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the SubSOIl and 
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which in the case of the eastern seaboard extended to as far as 250 [nautical miles], 
exclusive for its exploration and exploitation and subject to its jurisdiction and 
control.,,27 By so proclaiming, the United States placed itself in a position in which it 
was also bound to recognize the rights of other states to avail themselves of the same 
rule.28 In essence, a "[S]tate will therefore only behave in support of an existing, 
emerging, or potential customary rule if it is prepared to accept the generalization of 
that rule.,,29 
This scenario is not restricted to customary international law; it is also evident in 
treaties. When States enter into treaties, it suggests they believe they are accepting 
significant constraints on their freedom to act in the future and they intend to comply 
with those constraints over a broad range of circumstances. 30 This explains why treaty 
negotiation and assent is not handled lightly by States nor is the responsibility 
assigned to junior officials of the State.3l 
International law not only constrains State behavior, it also influences positive 
action by States. Ship-source oil pollution control presents a clear refutation of the 
Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945),3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948), reprinted in 40 AM. J. 
L. SUPP. 45 (1946); see also Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162. 
27. Mafaniso Hara, Southern African Marine Exclusive Zones: Burdens and Opportunities, Monograph No. 
DIPLOMATS AND DEFENDERS (Feb. 1997) available 
http://www.iss.co.za/PubsIMONOGRAPHSINO%209IHara.html. ' 
28. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 162. 
29. !d. at 162-63. 
30. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 311. 
31. See, e.g., GEORGE C. KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION: EVOLUTION OF PORT 
REGIME 151 (1993) [hereinafter KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL]' 
The [p.a~icular fonn of] d~sig.nation of th~ ~aris MOU ... and the f~ct that it was concluded among 
authontIes and not states mdIcates the wIllmgness of the co-operatmg states to participate in a har:mODW'I 
system of PSC [(Port State Control)] and exchange infonnation but not to enter into new contractual 
binding obligations. 
Id. This revealed that European member countries of the 1982 Paris Memorandum on Port State Control did 
intend it to be binding on them. See generally Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in .UUt"v, ... --.JI 
Ag~eements on Maritime Safety and Protections of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1 
Pans Port State Control MOU]. 
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mainstream realist contention that treaty- rules do not induce compliance.32 At the 
Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention Conference in 1978 (TSPp),33 discussions on 
segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) initially introduced in the 1973 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL )34 resurfaced.35 
During the Conference, the United States proposed that new and existing tankers 
weighing in excess of 20,000 tons should be built with SBTs, contrary to the 
prevailing position that only applied to tankers weighing in excess of 70,000 tons, but 
"[m]ost States saw SBT as hugely expensive [and instead] proposed crude oil 
washing (COW) as an environmentally equivalent but cheaper altemative."36 A 
compromise arrangement emerged in which new tankers weighing over 20,000 tons 
were required to install both SBT and COW, while existing tankers weighing over 
40,000 tons had the option of installing either SBT or COW.37 
Data from a study on tanker fleets world wide at the end of 1991 show that 
compliance with the above-mentioned equipment requirements had been 
impressive.38 "[Approximately] 94 percent of tankers built in 1979 or earlier [had] 
32. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 28. "[R]ealism encourages a bias against assuming that treaties cause 
behavior to change, and provides an essential set of alternative explanations of why nations might take actions that 
confonn to treaty provisions." !d. 
33. The slow pace of ratification of the 1973 Convention Marine Pollution Convention incited correction 
through this convention. See generally Sonia Z. Pritchard, Load on Top-From the Sublime to the Absurd, 9 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 185 (1978). See also Jeff B. Curtis, Comment, Vessel-Source Oil Pollution and MARPOL 73178: An 
International Success Story?, 15 ENVTL. L. 679 (1985), David Ashley Bagwell, Products Liability in Admiralty: 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 62 TuL. L. REv. 433, 462 (1988). 
34. International Conference on Marine Pollution: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 121.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
35. See generally R. MICHAEL M'GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 107-142 (Ernst B. Haas & John Gerard Ruggie eds., 1979). 
36. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 259 (footnote omitted). 
37. Inter-Governmental Maritime Organization, Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Annex 1, Reg. 13, I.M.C.O. Doc. TSPP/CONF/ll (Feb. 16, 1978), reprinted 
in 17 I.L.M. 546. It replaced the existing Annex 1, Reg. 13 in the 1973 Convention. MARPOL, supra note 34. The 
International Maritime Organization replaced IMCO on Mar. 6, 1948. See infra, note 99. "New tankers" means an oil 
tanker "for which the building contract is [drawn up] after 1 June 1979 ... or, in the absence of a building contract, 
the keel of which is laid ... after 1 January 1980 ... or the delivery of which is after 1 June 1982." Id., Annex 1, 
Reg. 1, ~ 26. Both conventions are jointly referred to as MARPOL 73/78. 
38. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 269-70. 
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installed SBT or COW, 98 percent of those built between 1980 and 1982 [had] 
installed SBT, and 98 percent of those built after June 1982 [had] installed both.,,39 
This nearly universal adoption has been linked to the influence of MARPOL. "The 
evidence presented unequivocally demonstrates that governments and private 
corporations have undertaken a variety of actions involving compliance, monitoring, 
and enforcement that they would not have taken in the absence of relevant treaty 
provisions. ,,40 
The levels of compliance were achieved notwithstanding the fact that the SBT 
requirement imposed huge expenses on tanker owners and was of no economic 
benefit to them.41 Moreover, it happened at a period of decreasing oil prices which 
increased pressures to cut costS.42 The fact that "the majority of tankers exempt from 
the equipment requirement have not installed SBT . . . affirm [ s] the conclusion that 
the installations represented treaty-induced compliance.,,43 It is also remarkable that , 
"[a]lthough many tankers were registered in states that [initially] opposed the 
adoption of the SBT requirements and had strong incentives not to comply, all [states] 
required to comply did SO.,,44 
The realist theory, therefore, fails to adequately explain States' behavior. It may 
be pointed out, however, that when regarding assent to a treaty, the realist theory may 
well prove valuable. Thus, while States may realize the value of reputation and 
recognize the "normativity" of international law and conduct themselves accordingly, 
a State is unlikely to assume obligations under a treaty when it will be inimical to its 
39. Id. at 269. 
40. Id. at 299. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
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interests. That apparently explains, for ipstance, the present position of the 1986 
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships.45 The 
Convention occurred in response to the practice of "flags of convenience" shipping, 
by which some States allow substandard and inadequately manned ships to put to sea, 
thus endangering the marine environment.46 Over ten years after its conclusion, no 
major maritime power or flags-of-convenience State has become a party to it, creating 
the impression that the treaty negatively impacts their interests. 
Further, although short-term interest may not dictate a State's general conduct in 
international circles, a State may resort to short-term interest where it is impossible to 
act otherwise. While a State may lose face for reneging on its obligations, it is a well-
known fact that a State may be in non-compliance by reason of its incapacity47 to 
abide by its treaty obligations.48 In such a case, the issue of reputation does not arise 
and, even if it does, a State will certainly express a preference for self-preservation at 
the expense of reputation. It stands to reason, therefore, that developing States, by 
reason of their sagging economies, may be comfortable with non-compliance with 
international oil pollution agreements.49 
43. !d. 
44. Id. at 299-300. 
45. United Nations Convention. on Con~itions for Re~istration of Ships, F~b. 7, 1986, 261.L.M. 1229 (1987). 
M 46.&See S.G. Sturmey, The Unzted Natzons Conventzon on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1987 LLOYD'S 
AR. COM. L.Q. 97. 
47. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
G 48. Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables in 
E OVERNANCE WIT.HOUT GOVERNMENT:. ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160, 183 (James N. Rosena~ & 
~st-Otto Czemplel ed~., ~9~2) [herema~ter Y<?ung, The Effectiveness of International Institutions]. The writer 
fsmes that lack of capaCIty InhibIts or restrIcts abldance to treaty provisions, especially for developing countries. See 
49. See id. 
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B. Regime Theory 
Regime theoretic analysis proceeds from an apparent realization that there are 
"difficulties involved in attempting to explain all relations among states solely on the 
basis of relative power and short-term calculations of self-interest.,,50 Are-evaluation 
of realist thinking became inevitable when some of its basic assumptions started 
faltering. 51 Accordingly, while realists had argued that international institutions had 
no life of their own but existed only as a corollary of dominant United States power, 
this argument could not be sustained in an era that marked the relative strength of 
institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),52 which was 
replaced by the World Trade Organization53 and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF),54 at a period of perceived decline of American hegemony. 55 As a 
consequence, the impossible task before realists was to either deny that American 
power was declining or assert that those institutions "were suddenly tottering."56 
In international relations, consequently, a new line of thinking or a reformulated 
theory was born as a child of necessity57 and centers around regimes, which are "sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
50. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 129. 
51. See id. at218. 
52. General Trade Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. . 
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral.Tr.ade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Fmai 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade NegotIatIOns, Apr. 15, 1994, substantzally reprznted. 
LL.M. 1 (1994), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE O~GANIZATION poseph F. DeIJIllll 
1996). The WTO embodies and expands upon the rules of GATT. See Chns Wold, MultIlateral 
Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 842 (1996). 
54. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 
amended May 31, 1968,20 U.S.T. 2775,726 U.N.T.S. 266, amended Apr. 30? 1976,29 U.S.T: ?203, a~ended 
28, 1990, 31 LL.M. 1307, available at http://www.irnf.org/externaVpubs/ftlaalmdex.htm (last vlSlted Apnl 15, 
55. See Burley, supra note 14, at 218. 
56. Id. 
57. See ROBERT KEOHANE AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 245 (1984) [hereinafter KEO~NE, AFTER HE~E.MONY]. ."Realism should not be discarded, 
insights are fundamental to an understandmg of world pohtIcs, but It does need to be reformulated to 
impact of information-providing institutions on state behavior, even when rational egoism persists." Id. at 
122 
around which actors' expectations converge III a gIven area of international 
relations."58 
Central to the regime theory is the fact that the international system is structured 
in such a way that it creates certain "principles, explicit and implicit norms, and 
written and unwritten rules," which actors in international relations hold in reverence 
and recognize as governing their behavior.59 Viewed from that perspective, regimes 
both constrain and regulate the behavior of States. 60 
Regimes are also believed to "enhance compliance with international agreements 
in a variety of ways, [including] reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the value 
ofreputation.,,61 Discussing the value and raison d'etre of regimes, Keohane asserts: 
(citation omitted). 
They enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing 
the costs of making transactions that are consistent with 
the principles of the regime. They create the conditions 
for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate and 
delegitimate different types of [S]tate action, and 
facilitate linkages among issues within regimes and 
between regimes. They increase the symmetry and 
improve the quality of the information that 
governments receive. By clustering issues together in 
the same forums over a long period of time, they help to 
bring governments into continuing interaction with one 
another, reducing incentives to cheat and enhancing the 
value of reputation. By establishing legitimate 
standards of behavior for states to follow and by 
providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the 
basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the 
principle of reciprocity. 62 
58. Krasner, supra note 24, at 2. 
59. Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 24, at 61,86. 
60. See id. at 62-63. 
61. Burley, supra note 14, at 219. 
62. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 57, at 244-45. 
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Regime theory appears fascinating and interesting, but it has not escaped 
criticism. Critics comment that regimes are merely a formula for obfuscating and 
obscuring the power relationships that are, in their assumption, not only the ultimate, 
but also the proximate, cause of behavior in the international sphere.63 According to 
Susan Strange, an international relations scholar, "[a]ll those international 
arrangements dignified by the label regime are only too easily upset when either the 
balance of bargaining power or the perception of national interest (or both together) 
change among those states who negotiate them."64 
Regime theory has metamorphosed into neo-liberal institutionalism,65 which is a 
more general rubric.66 Keohane perceives the scope of institutions as larger than that 
of regimes and incorporates all "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations.,,67 Institutions, according to Keohane, can be divided into three groups, 
based on their levels of organization or formality.68 The first category encompasses 
"[fJ ormal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organizations" 
while the second group contains "international regimes" defined as "institutions with 
explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in 
international relations."69 The third class incorporates "conventions" defined as 
63. Krasner, supra note 24, at 7. 
64. Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis in THE POLITICS OF 
GOVERNANCE 41, 48 (Paul F. Diehl ed. 1997). ' 
65. Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 17, at 132. 
66. See Burley, supra note 14, at 206. 
67. Robert Keohane, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 
(1989). ' 
68. Id. at 3-4. 
69. Id. at 4. 
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"informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the 
expectations of actors. ,,70 
To some scholars, it is an incontrovertible fact that institutions influence States' 
behavior, even independent of power calculations and self-interest. Scholars state that 
institutions play an important role in enhancing compliance, arguing that while 
members of the international system enjoy a latitude in making choices concerning 
compliance, the actions of institutions such as the United Nations certainly contribute 
to the choices they make with regard to compliance.7! A perplexing question, 
however, has centered on whether this should be taken as an article of faith or 
demonstrated empirically.72 As noted previously, ship design and construction 
standards represent one area in which it has been empirically and analytically shown 
that institutions induce or enhance compliance with international lawJ3 Regime 
theory in particular, and institutionalism in general, therefore, appear to represent 
more clearly what occurs in international politics, and seems to be steps ahead of the 
realist school of thought. 
It is pertinent to point out, however, that both theories tend to share some 
common ground when it comes to the notion of self-interest. To some 
70. !d. 
71. Oran Young, Compliance in the International System in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE 99, 106 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985). ' 
72. Oran Young states: 
[t]he ultimate justi.fication for devoting substantial time and energy 
to the study of regImes must be the proposition that we can account 
!or a g.ood deal of the variance in collective outcomes at the 
mtematlOnal level in terms of the impact of institutional 
arrangements. For the most part~ however, this proposition is 
relegated to the realm of ass.umptlons ra!~er t~an brought to the 
forefront as a focus for analytIcal and empmcal mvestigation. 
ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT 206-07 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1989). 
73. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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RESOURCES AND THE 
institutionalists, self-interest is pivotal to the existence of regimes.74 States are 
believed to build those structures essentially as a means of protecting their interests.75 
This is elaborately conveyed by political science scholar Arthur A. Stein, who posits 
"that the same forces of autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the root of 
the anarchic international system also lay the foundation for international regimes as a 
form of international order.,,76 Accordingly, "there are times when rational self-
interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in favor 
of joint decision making.,,77 
To these institutionalists, both self-interest and institutions are compatible and 
jointly influence international behavior. This is one of its major points of divergence 
with the realist school because, unlike the latter theory which harbors a disdain for 
international law and "[challenges international lawyers ] to establish the 'relevance' 
ofinternationallaw,,,78 institutionalism shares some similarities with international law 
in that it recognizes the place of principles and rules in shaping behavior.79 Indeed, 
one writer was prompted to observe that "[t]he similarities between institutionalism 
and international law are apparent. ,,80 
Close inspection of one institutional arrangement utilized in oil pollution control 
matters (namely, reporting requirements) clearly demonstrates the role of such 
74. Krasner, supra note 24, at 11. 
75. !d. "The prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic self-interest." Id. 
76. Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in 
REGIMES, supra note 24, at 115, 132. 
77. Id. 
78. Burley, supra note 14, at 208; see also William 1. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International 
Scholarship, 12 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 227 (1997); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on 
Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996). 
79. CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 2 n.3. "Regime theorists find it hard 
the 'L-word,' but 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures' are what international law is all 
!d. 
80. Michael Byers, Response: Taking the Law Out of International Law: A Critique of the 
Perspective," 38 HARV. INT'L L. 1. 201, 201 (1997). Burley, supra note 14, at 220, sees the work of the early 
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arrangements in influencing States' conduct and the place of self-interest in the whole 
scheme. The reporting requirement has been seen as one way of improving treaty 
effectiveness and at the beginning of the past decade, the Siena Forum on 
International Law of the Environment farsightedly suggested that the problem of non-
compliance should be addressed through the use of "reporting requirements, special 
non-compliance procedures and measures, liability provisions, and dispute settlement 
procedures. ,,81 
The importance of reporting requirements to the effectiveness of an international 
regulatory arrangement cannot be overemphasized. "Reporting on compliance, 
enforcement, and other activities related to environmental treaties is often described 
as essential to treaty success.,,82 Reporting requirements are believed to provide a 
vehicle for increasing transparency83 and transparency or openness is viewed as the 
"key to compliance.,,84 It provides a means for identifying States who are or are not 
fulfilling their obligations, evaluating the rate of compliance, and possibly improving 
the same.85 
Reporting requirements have come to characterize a number of international 
regulatory regimes including those on environmental protection. 86 International 
agreements on intentional oil pollution have all incorporated some form of reporting 
requirements.87 The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of 
theorists as a reinvention of "international law in rational-choice language." 
81. Conclusions of the Siena Forum on International Law of the Environment, Siena, Italy, Apr. 21 1990, ~ 
12(a), reprinted in 1 y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 704, 707 (1990). 
82. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 123. 
83. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions, supra note 48, at 176-78. 
84. CHA YES & CHA YES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154. 
85. !d. at 154-55. 
86. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 323. 
87. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 123. 
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the Sea by Oil88 required states to provide periodic infonnation to the treaty 
secretariat on the installation of adequate reception facilities. 89 The 1962 OILPOL 
convention did away with the periodic reporting requirement and then approved "a 
non-binding resolution mandating that the newly established Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) should obtain and publish infonnation 
'annually on the progress being made in providing [tanker reception] facilities.",90 
However, the 1954 self-reporting requirement regarding available reception facilities 
was reintroduced by the 1973 MARPOL.91 
Reporting requirements have also involved external reporting by which other 
States report on the non-availability of reception facilities in other countries.92 This 
was introduced in oil pollution control regulations at the 1962 conference following a 
u.S. proposa1.93 The object of the proposal was to shame countries into providing the 
needed facilities. 94 This was to be accomplished "by establishing a system for tanker 
captains, through their governments, to infonn IMCO and other governments of 
absent or inadequate facilities non-compliant nations."95 This was replicated III 
MARPOL.96 
States are required not only to report on the availability of reception facilities for 
oily wastes, but in the case of flag States, to report on actions taken with respect to 
88. 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 
OILPOL]. 
89. !d. art. VIII. 
90. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 125 (citing Resolution 6, Inter-governmental Maritime 
Organization, Resolutions Adopted by the International Conference on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
1962 (London: IMCO, 1962)). 
91. MARPOL, supra note 34, art. 11 (d). 
92. OILPOL 54/62, supra note 88, art. VIII. 
93. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 128. 
94. !d. 
95. !d. (footnote omitted). 
96. MARPOL, supra note 34, Annex 1, ch. II, Reg. 12(5). 
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alleged violations referred to them by coastal States.97 All States were to provide 
reports produced in connection with treaty compliance and enforcement. 98 Under 
MARPOL, parties are also required to provide an annual statistical report in 
concordance with requirements of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)99 
concerning penalties actually imposed for infringement of the Convention. loo 
Reporting requirements have also been instituted in regional arrangements for 
marine environmental protection and oil pollution control starting with the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding adopted by some European countries in 1982.101 
Under the Memorandum, member States are to inspect twenty-five percent of the 
foreign ships entering their ports and relay the infonnation regarding these 
inspections to a centralized computer base on a daily basis through direct 
computerized input. 102 
The level of compliance with all of these reporting requirements has not met the 
elaborate provisions mentioned thus far. With the exception of the Paris MOU 
system, which has enjoyed a considerable measure of co-operation by the members as 
reflected in "regular, high-quality reporting by all the states involved,,,103 compliance 
with the requirements of the international agreements has been less than satisfactory. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the number of national reports totals less than 
97. International Convention (with annexes) for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, May 12, 
1954, 1959 U.N.T.S. 3. supra note 69, art. X(2). 
98. !d. art. XII. (icppso) 
99. The IMO replaced the Inter-governmental Consultative Maritime Organization (IMCO) on Mar. 6, 1948. See 
http://www.imo.org/imo/50annlindex.htm(visitedApriI15. 2001). 
100. MARPOL, supra note 34, art. 11(1)(f). 
101. Paris Port State Control MOD, supra note 31. See generally KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL, supra 
note 31,142-82. 
102. Paris Port State Control MOD, supra note 31, § 4. 
103. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 137. 
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twenty per year. 104 A Friends of the Earth (FOE) Study in 1992 found that only six 
contracting parties had submitted reports for each year since MARPOL took effect, 
and more than thirty contracting parties had never submitted a report to IMO. I05 The 
other contracting parties had submitted reports, which were often incomplete, for one 
or a few years only.106 
One can easily identify at least one major reason for this state of affairs. The 
process of reporting (information gathering and dissemination) involves financial 
costs and adequately trained personnel hardly available in developing countries. 107 As 
a result, developing countries have not been living up to their obligations and this has 
affected the overall performance record. Based on available evidence, there is a nexus 
between a country's level of development and the likelihood that it will report. 108 It is 
believed that the "consistent disparity" between the rate of reporting, both 
numerically and proportionally found among developed countries vis-a-vis their 
developing counterparts, supports evidence from treaties on other issues that 
developing States often lack adequate financial and administrative capacities and 
domestic concern to report. 109 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 134. 
106. Id. 
107. CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154-57. This does not rule out 
contributing factors such as IMO Secretariat's ineffectiveness in facilitating reporting. Jd. at 155-57. 
108. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 137. 
109. Id. (citing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, supra note 21). The 
domestic concern in developing countries is traceable to the sorry state of environmental and human . 
who would serve as a watchdog and thus galvanise the governments into action. This, in tum, is syrnptomatic 
species of governance found in many parts of the developing world-a situation where governments are 
intolerant of opposition. Environmental activists have had experiences ranging from the unpalatable to the 
e.g., Paul Lewis, Nigerian Rulers Back Hanging of 9 Members of Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, 
Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 1. 
articles discussed a well-known environmental crusader, leader of the Ogoni people of Nigeria, and Nobel 
nominee, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed in 1995 following a trial, which was hardly satisfactory by . 
standards. Id. The focus here however, will not be on the problems occasioned by the absence of domestic 
but the implication of the lack of financial and administrative capacities in relation to implementation 
compliance. 
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This underscores the point that St\1tes are unlikely to perform their treaty 
obligations when the capacity to do so is nonexistent. llo In such a case, a State would 
be prepared to place its national interest at the forefront, regardless of the 
consequences that such action might entail. It is self-evident that in the absence of 
support, many developing countries will continue to lag behind in compliance and 
enforcement. Only a few States have large and sophisticated bureaucratic 
establishments sufficiently equipped to perform the functions of information 
collection, processing, and assimilation. I I I In view of that, it is imperative for treaty 
effectiveness and success to seriously consider providing extensive assistance to 
developing countries in these areas. 
Recent trends in treaty-making indicate a realization ofthe fact that the process of 
getting States to implement treaty provisions may involve some form of assistance to 
facilitate their action in the desired way. A salient example is what has corne to be 
known as "non-compliance procedures." Non-compliance procedures (NCP), which 
are instituted as a mechanism for facilitating compliance in a manner that is 
essentially unconventional, were first introduced as an aspect of the 1987 Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,112 done at Montreal, and has since been 
replicated in other international accords. l13 
110. International policy makers seem not to have grasped this point yet. "The incidence of reporting 
requirements is so high that they seem to be included almost pro forma in many agreements, with little concern about 
cost or implementing capacity." CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 154. 
111. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 324. 
112. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550. The 
procedure was adopted at the ~t~ Meeting of the Pa~es to the MOIl:treal Protocol in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
November 23-25, 1992. See DeCISIOn IV/5, Non-Comphance Procedure, ill Report of the 4th Meeting of the Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, Dec. IV/5, 
U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.ProAI15 (1992), U.N. Doc. UNEP/OZL. Pro. 4/15 (25 November 1992), available at 
http:www/upep.ch/ozone/ 4mop _ cph.shtml (last visited April 15, 2001) [hereinafter Non-Compliance Procedure]. 
113. See Gunther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations, 5 TuL. 
1. INT'L & COMPo L. 29, at 32-3 (1997) [hereinafter Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms]. 
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The objective of this procedure is to bring about total compliance. 114 The 
procedure is more interested in how to achieve compliance than being combative, as 
is typical of a traditional dispute settlement procedure,115 or in merely identifying the 
wrong done and punishing the party responsible. 116 
One of the NCP's strong points is that it realizes that non-compliance might be as 
much a product of a State's lack of capacity as it might be rooted in a deliberate or 
negligent disregard of its obligations. I 17 A State would thus be more comfortable with 
NCPs than with a procedure that castigates it and "takes it to court" for infractions 
without considering the possibility that the State may have desired to perform its 
obligations, but was legitimately unable to do so. Moreover, the knowledge that the 
cost of compliance is not placed entirely on its shoulders but that other States would 
be willing to assist is no doubt a refreshing tonic to any State and a strong attraction 
to compliance. In that connection, therefore, NCP is a recipe for eliciting States' 
assent to treaties. 
NCP can also facilitate compliance since it creates a congenial atmosphere and an 
environment that fosters cooperation and respect, as opposed to belligerency and a 
superior mentality. In such an atmosphere, States can continue to cooperate in 
ensuring that the treaty regime works instead of abandoning negotiation and resorting 
to less-friendly means at the conclusion of the convention. As some scholars opine, 
"negotiation does not end with the conclusion of the treaty, but is a continuous aspect 
114. See Non-Compliance Procedure, supra note 112, ~ 9. 
115. Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms, supra note 113, at 34. Traditional Dispute Settlement 
are indeed not a realistic option, legally or politically, in dealing with some issues of non-implementation 
compliance. However, NCP does not preclude resort to formal dispute resolution. Id. 
116. !d. at 33-35. 
117. See, e.g. id. at n.25 (citing Antonia Handler Chayes et aI., Active Compliance 
Environmental Treaties, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 75,80 (W. Lang ed.,l 
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of living under the agreement."IIS NCP presents a veritable opportunity to ensure 
successful negotiation. It "epitomize[s] an effort at continued consensus building 
which may reflect either the (relative) normative weakness of the obligation(s) in 
issue or the existence of different levels of normativity within the regime. In some 
respects, therefore, NCPs represent a process that straddles traditional law-making 
and law-enforcement functions."119 
Without necessarily suggesting the replication of the structure of this institutional 
arrangement per se, NCP's spirit of cooperation, non-belligerence, and assistance to 
less capable parties is strongly recommended for the international policy framework 
on the protection of the marine environment and prevention and control of operational 
discharges by ships. 
Building on the observation that the notion of national interest is ubiquitous, 
regardless of the optics of international relations from which it is viewed, the next 
part of this chapter will discuss the prevailing economic issues. The idea is, that 
which affects a State's economy obviously raises the issue of its national interest, and 
will playa significant part in its attitude toward a particular international arrangement 
accordingly. 
II. ECONOMIC ISSUES 
Economists tend to perceive and portray environmental pollution as an economic 
problem: "We are going to make little real progress in solving the problem of 
pollution until we recognize it for what, primarily, it is: an economic problem, which 
118. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note 12, at 313. 
119. Gunther Handl, Controlling Implementation of and Compliance With International Environmental 
Commitments: The Rocky Roadfrom Rio, 5 COLO. J. INT'LENVTL. L. & POL'y 305,329 (1994) (citations omitted). 
133 
must be understood in economic terms.,,120 This section will examine the contribution 
considered lightly. This work seeks to eliGit the assistance of economics in fashioning 
that economics can make in solving the problems of pollution and inefficient 
a system that incorporates the cost of treaty implementation and compliance by States 
management of the oceans. It should be reiterated, however, that the intention here is 
who are unable to do so. This will be approached under two subsections, namely, 
international economic cooperation and funding. 
not to promote economic models as alternatives to the extant regulatory scheme in 
international law. This work proceeds on the firm conviction that the law as it A. International Economic Cooperation 
currently stands can serve as a useful tool in oil pollution control. What is needed, as 
In virtually every consensual arrangement, which international conventional law 
this project has constantly and consistently emphasized, is for States to live up to their 
clearly represents,121 it is almost invariable that any rational being would hesitate to 
obligations under the law, and to include states that are not yet parties. This may not 
be involved in that which yields no benefit or which brings harm. States would 
be accomplished, however, unless States have an economic motivation to participate 
therefore continue to have an incentive not to obey the rules of international law or to 
or to jettison whatever benefits they are enjoying under the present scheme in order to 
refrain from bringing themselves under the control of any such arrangement. 
embrace the requirements of a new arrangement. 
With respect to a number of environmental issues of international significance, 
There is no doubt that this subject raises a number of important economic issues. 
developing countries insist that they would not be willing to endanger their 
To require States to be involved in the implementation of international regulations in 
economies for the common good by refraining from activities which other nations 
relation to pollution by oil tankers is to ask them to make an economic decision. This 
previously embraced to develop their own economies.122 Narrowing it down to oil 
involves a choice between environmental protection and economic development. In 
pollution by tankers, it is difficult to expect developing countries to be at the forefront 
the same vein, to demand that States forego revenue-generating practices that are 
of installing facilities that would promote cleaner seas in addition to undertaking the 
inimical to the environmental well being of the rest of humanity raises the issue of 
inspection of their ships to ensure maritime safety and environmental protection at 
opportunity cost. A price is being exacted by reason of that demand and the 
their own expense, or to their detriment. They would no doubt prefer to channel such 
responsibility for its payment has to be attached to someone. 
funds toward their own developmental projects and revisit the issue of environmental 
Further, if the States that are involved in the foregoing scenario are not interested 
protection decades later, after they have stabilized their economic position. 
in paying the price, other States may be enjoined or compelled to do so. In these days 
of global economic downturn, it is an important economic decision that should not be 
121. See generally G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 67 (1993). 
120. Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED ",r,,"UlJ,W·. 122. Jay D. Hair, A Foreword, in TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1,3 (1992). 
(Edwin Mansfield, ed. 1975). 
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This should not elicit condemnation though, as a similar posture had been 
adopted by the developed world at some point in time in their development. An 
illustration is the reaction several countries had to a reception facilities provision 
proposed at the 1954 OILPOL Convention. During ratification of the Convention, the 
United States disagreed with the provision "because the government did not want to 
assume 'any financial responsibility' for building and operating such facilities."123 
Britain ultimately proposed the deletion of the 1954 Article VIII reception facility 
requirement altogether, as several States were threatening not to sign because of its 
inclusion. 124 The same position and reasoning illustrated above are arguably available 
to developing countries today. 
Another example can be found in the case of flags-of-convenience States. 125 The 
current international legal approach is to make open registries less attractive,126 which 
will invariably rob flags-of-convenience States of much needed revenue. To expect 
them to join in such efforts is to urge them to self-destruct. They would insist on 
utilizing the practice as a tool for economic development. An acceptable regime 
should embrace their concerns out of necessity. One solution could be international 
123. MITCHELL,supra note 10, at 191 (citations omitted). In 1961, in the process of ratifying OILPOL 
United States entered a reservation stating: 
While it will urge port authorities, oil terminals and private 
constructors to provide disposal facilities, the United States shall 
not be obliged to construct, operate, or maintain shore facilities at 
places on U.S. coasts or waters where such facilities may be 
deemed inadequate, or to assume any financial obligation to assist 
in such activities. 
CHARLES ODIDI OKIDI, REGIONAL CONTROL OF OCEAN POLLUTION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
PROSPECTS 33 n.119 (Shigeru Oda ed. 1978) (quoting 12 U.S.T. 3024). 
124. MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 191 (construing SONIA ZAIDE PRITCHARD, OIL POLLUTION CONTROL 
(1987)). 
125. The term "flags of convenience" generally refers to "the flag of any country allowing the 
foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the reasons, are "nymp1n1m'. 
opportune for the persons who are registering the vessels." BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962). 
126. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, PolitiCS, 
Alternatives, 21 TuL. MAR. L.J. 139,168 (1996) [hereinafter Anderson, The Nationality of Ships]. 
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economic cooperation measures between .the countries of the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres. Developed countries should assume the responsibility for assisting their 
developing counterparts technically and financially in order to elicit their cooperation 
in the crusade against pollution from oil tankers. It would be naIve however, to 
assume that developed States would jump at this suggestion without any justification 
for doing so. Nevertheless, a good basis for the suggestion exists. 
The first flank of that basis is equity. International oil trade IS not a new 
development but one that has been a longstanding catalyst for the industrialization of 
the countries of the Northern Hemisphere. 127 The nationals of these countries also 
control the oil and shipping industries that invariably contribute to their national 
economic development. 128 The price the whole world has had to pay for such 
development however, has been the degradation of the marine and coastal 
environment and destruction of the resources of the cornmons. 129 Interestingly, the 
North is currently at the forefront of the crusade to stem the environmental impact of 
the international oil business. 130 
127. See generally Bill Shaw et al., The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution, 27 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 157 (1987). 
128. "[UNCTAD's] 'Review of Maritime Transport' [(1991)] listed the top three ship owning nations as Greece 
(81.97 million dwt), Japan (80.3 million dwt) and the United States (55.1 million dwt)." Anderson, The Nationality 
of Ships, supra note 126, at 156-57. 
Oil companies, mainly the 'seven majors' based in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, own almost one-third of all 
tankers and control even more through subsidiary corporations and 
long-term chartering arrangements. Independents, based mainly in 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, own the other two-thirds 
of the tanker fleet. 
MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 109. The nationals of the developed countries also control the bulk of the shipping 
fleets in developing countries. Id. 
129. David M. Dzidzornu & B. Martin Tsamenyi, Enhancing International Control of Vessel-Source Oil 
Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment, 10 UNIV. TASMANIA L.R. 269, 270 (1991). 
The authors state that "uninhibited liberty to transport oil and other goods over the common resource, the oceans," 
has led to "pollution from ballasting and deballasting, [ with] oil spills from collisions and stranding of ships 
[becoming] a liability to be borne by the international community as a whole." Id. 
130. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 104-06. 
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The crusade is not necessarily bad. The pertinent question is whether the battle 
should be pursued and won at the expense of the economic development of the 
countries on the other side of the world divide, or, the Southern Hemisphere. It hovers 
around the equity of the North, which fuels economies with oil, dictating to the South 
not only to refrain from doing that which the North has done and from which it has 
benefited, but to do so at the risk of economic stagnation. The interest of the South at 
this stage is to get to the level of development that the North has already attained. 
This may necessarily imply a sidetracking of environmental concerns, including the 
international measures on oil pollution from ships. If the North insists that the 
environment should be accorded priority or that Southern economic development 
should embrace environmental concerns, which is logical, equity demands that the 
North should bear much of the expense for that requirement. As one commentator has 
correctly pointed out: 
[T]he debate on the environment has been turned 
around to try and restrain developing countries, in the 
name of the common good, from now doing all those 
things which the developed countries did with such 
abandon in the past in their efforts to attain their present 
levels of production and consumption. It is as if a 
referee has suddenly appeared and decided that all 
countries should be deemed to be starting from scratch 
in the race to save the environment, no allowance being 
made for the head start that some countries had enjoyed 
and the distance they had already covered. . .. The 
logic therefore ... is that there is hardly room for 
newcomers, and that the poor must remain poor in order 
to save the planet! 131 
131. NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
05 (1993). 
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It is also consonant with equity that tbose who are responsible for damage should 
remedy that damage. The other side of the coin is that it offends every notion of 
fairness to impose a duty on others to redress that which they did not cause. This 
parallels the "fault principle," which requires that those who have damaged the 
environment should bear the responsibility for the damage their activities have 
caused.132 International oil trade has been undertaken by, and for, developed countries 
for many years. This means that environmental disasters are attributable to them. 133 
These countries should therefore, logically be prepared to pay an extra cost for 
correcting the state of affairs. It is a time-honored principle of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that the person that takes the benefit should also bear the burden. 134 
Further support for the proposition that the developed countries should bear the 
cost of measures expected of developing countries regarding marine pollution control 
can be found in the concept of opportunity cost in economics and the right to 
compensation in law. Active participation in international measures to control or 
prevent pollution from oil tankers will no doubt affect developing countries' 
development aspirations, as they would be required to divert badly needed funds to 
these measures and restrict or restructure their policies to align with the stipulations 
f · . 135 o mternatlOnallaw. It follows, therefore, that developing countries "could make a 
132. Ph!llip M. Saunders, Development Cooperation and Compliance with International Environmental LaW" 
Past Experience and Future Prospects, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES· FROM 
THEORY INT? ~RACTICE 8~, 97 (Thomas 1. Schoenbaum et al. eds.,1998). . 
133. This .IS th~ case m many eJ?-vironmental issues. See, e.g., Gunther Handl, Environmental Protection and 
Development In Thlr~ World Countries:. Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. 1. INT'L L. & POL. 
603, 627 (1~8~) [heremafter H.andl, EnVironmental Protection and Development]. 
134. ThIS IS encaps~lated .m the L~tin maxim "qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus et contra." 
135. One exaI?rle IS rl?-e mstallatIOn of ojly wa~t~ !ec~ption faci~ities where it has been estimated that it would 
ha,,:e cost $?60 rmlhon to mstall such reception facIhtIes m developmg countries during 1993-2000 See enerall 
Umted .NatIOns, Preparatory .Committee for the .united Nations Conference on Environment and· Devtto men{ 
Protect~on of <?ceans, all Kmds of Seas Includmg Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas Coastal Areas a~d th' 
n~~~)~IOn, RatIOnal Use and Development of Their Living Resources, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.l51IPC/100IAdd.2f 
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plausible argument for the right to be compensated to the extent that they incur 
opportunity costs by foregoing development options to preserve environmental 
resources that are of special interest to the world at large."136 The oceans and the 
resources in them are, doubtless, resources that are of special interest to the world 
community. 137 
A major objection to the points above is the apparent advantage it tends to confer 
on developing countries. A number of observers contend that developing countries 
simply raise these issues as a smokescreen or cloak to force the developed countries 
to pay for cleanup, which is the responsibility of the developing countries. 138 This is 
an unfair attack. In any case, their contention is suspect, as it represents a one-sided 
observation that questions the entitlement of developing countries to receive financial 
assistance without addressing the broader issue of the need for those who created a 
wrong to remedy it. It also fails to consider the fact that there is no moral authority 
behind any call to others to abstain from that which you wilfully participated in and 
gained from, without providing them with an alternative course of action. 139 Building 
an international system founded on notions of equity and fairness is a better solution 
for humanity overall. 140 
136. Handl, Environmental Protection and Development, supra note 133, at 608. 
137. See, e.g., Stephen A. Silard, The Global Environment Facility: A New Development in International 
and Organization, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EeoN. 607, 611 (1995). 
138. Saunders, supra note 132, at 97. 
139. The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case stated: 
Court finds it difficult to admit that the Netherlands are now warranted in complaining of the !:IIIIS""I:'; 
operation of a lock of which t~ey the~el.ves set ar;t example .in the past." (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 P.C.LJ. (Ser. 
No. 70, at 25 (June 28). A pertment prmcIple here IS the maXIm exceptio non adimpleti contractus where one 
c~n plead in its ~efense that it i~ entitled to withhold performance where the other party has not performed 
SIde of the bargam. In essence, smce the person that comes to equity must come with clean hands the party in 
is estopped from complaining about the other party's refusal to perform. ' 
140. On the role of equity in international law, see Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M. Sughrue The Int£~rncmO"l 
Role of Equity-As-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563 (1993). ' 
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The question of capacity also makes it imperative for developed countries to 
assist their developing counterparts in order to expect any meaningful progress in 
treaty implementation. It cannot be gainsaid that in the absence of capacity, there is 
practically little that a country can do vis-a-vis international treaty requirements. 141 
As discussed in part I, developed countries have not complied with their 
responsibility to install reception facilities or to meet reporting requirements primarily 
due to their lack of capacity.142 The failure of the richer nations to realize this and 
address it will continue to plague any efforts aimed at promoting safer ships and 
cleaner seas. 143 Scholars have observed it would be futile to design a strategy to 
address global environmental concerns that do not simultaneously "confront the 
issues of poverty and economic development, which often seem to make 
environmental protection a luxury that most nations cannot afford.,,144 While, "[u]ntil 
recently, these tandem concerns have been compartmentalized and considered 
separately by agenCIes and institutions," the emerging consensus is that the 
"recognition of the global nature of environmental problems necessarily entails 
recognition of the global nature of the problems of poverty and development.,,145 
Consequently, a formidable challenge confronting international cooperative efforts is 
to put this recognition into practice. 146 There can be no better way of "putting the 
recognition into practice" in international oil pollution control than for developed 
141. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions, supra note 48, at 183. 
142. CHAYES & CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 11, at 156-57. 
143. See W. Jackson Davis, The Need for a New Global Ocean Governance System, in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 147 (Jon Van Dyke et. al. eds.; 1993). The writer shares the view that one of the factors an 
effective ocean governance regime should incorporate is a "massive allocation of resoru::ces durin~ a period of 
increasing scarcity ... which will inevitably transfer wealth (and therefore power) from the nch countrIes to the poor 
[ones]." Id. at 166. Historically, however, "such a transfer has never taken place peacefully." !d. 
144. Catherine A. O'Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the Environment: Trading Debt and Technology 
for Nature, 17 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 93, 95 (1992). 
145. Id. at 95-96. . 
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countries to assume binding obligations to assist the developing world and thereby 
facilitate their accession to and implementation of the numerous international oil 
pollution control accords. 
Developed countries should bear the cost of bringing developing countries into 
compliance with the objectives of international agreements, as it is in their mutual 
interests to do so. Instead of expecting further profits in future sales of pollution 
control equipment, the focus should be on how to handle this issue symbiotically, 
even when it means reduced financial benefit to the developed world. The challenge 
before the global community in emphasizing mutual interests in support of global 
environmental issues at this time is to recognize the need for a paradigmatic shift. In 
order to move into a new day of international relations, it is essential to recognize that 
"security is no longer defined by the standoff of mutually assured destruction."147 
Due recognition should be placed on the fact that the future is greatly dependent on 
"securing mutual self-interest[s m order to protect] the planet's environmental 
integrity." 148 
No matter how vigorously marine environmental protection measures are pursued 
by some countries, their efforts will amount to little in the absence of global 
cooperation. For instance, there is a consensus of opinion that it is difficult to have a 
successful and effective oil pollution regime without the provision of adequate 
reception facilities in portS. 149 In the absence of these facilities, some tankers will 
146. !d. 
147. Hair, supra note 122, at 4. 
148. !d. 
149. In January [1996], the IMO Facilitation Committee recognized that illegal marine pollution may 
part, because of the high cost or unavailability of reception facilities. Additionally, the committee noted 
MARPOL states have inadequate reception facilities and requests IMO members to provide options for 
and operation of such facilities. See Lindy S. Johnson, Vessel Source Pollution 7 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 150, 
(1996). 
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continue to discharge oil into the seas thereby thwarting the efforts of those countries 
that have taken the laudable step of providing such facilities at their ports. Since oil is 
ambulatory, these discharges may eventually reach those countries, mainly in the 
developed world, who bear no responsibility for them. In order to protect their own 
interest, it behoves them to assist other countries to install such facilities for the 
benefit of all. 
The case of flags-of-convenience shipping that is accompanied by senous 
environmental problems is another example. ISO To safeguard their environment, some 
developed countries, notably Canada, the United States, and the Paris MOU States, 
initiated the practice of entrenching a strong Port State control regime aimed at 
preventing the entrance of substandard ships into their territory. lSI This practice has 
spread to other parts of the world. ls2 The vast majority of open registry states are in 
the developing world and are in the habit of registering some of these substandard 
ships.IS3 It is expected that strong Port State control will make open registry less 
attractive and eventually eliminate the operation of these ships. 
The logic behind the above proposition is, however, flawed as ships prohibited in 
the developed world can continue sailing and trading with other countries with less 
150. See generally Ademuni Odeke, Port State Control and UK Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657 (1997); L.F.E. 
Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience-Does the Present Law Pose Special Liability 
Issues?, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 63 (1991). See also Sturmey, supra note 46. 
151. KASOULIDES, supra note 31, at 151; see also Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era of International 
Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United States (Part III), 30 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 85, 119-20 (1999). 
152. McDorman, supra note 6, at 208-09. 
153. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in a 1984 report, identified five countries, 
mainly from the developing world, as having major open registry fleets: the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia, 
and Panama. See George C. Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of 
Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 543, 547 (1989). The table included in 
Kasoulides' article provides a list of open registry states from 1930-1986. Id. It is easier for substandard ships to be 
registered in flags of convenience States because they operate under extremely liberal laws. See also Edith A. Wittig, 
Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages, Problems, and Dangers, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 115, 119-21 
(1979); Goldie, supra note 150, at 89. Goldie argues that the registration of ships that might not meet international 
standards in flags of convenience states "is an inevitable consequence of tanker economics, [because], [a]s ships age 
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stringent requirements. 154 The problem, assumed to have been transferred to such 
States, could resurface. In the event of maritime casualty involving such ships, the 
effects would necessarily extend even to States far removed from the accident since 
the polluting agent, oil, can quickly spread over a large area, Fish poisoned as a result 
could be consumed by anyone, anywhere. Other marine resources and areas of 
international significance could also be damaged. The Global Environmental Facility, 
for instance, has identified such areas in West Africa, a region that is still prope to 
tanker pollution, especially from substandard vessels. 155 An actual experience of the 
MV Neamt, a ship that sailed from West Africa to South Africa for forth-eight days in 
1997 accurately depicts the situation: 
With no radar, no navigation lights and a useless 
compass, the crew found their way to Cape Town by 
asking passing vessels on their VHF radios where they 
were. On the way, the vessel's engines caught fire 
seven times, as the pistons have no rings and blowbacks 
caused small fires throughout the voyage. Of her three 
generators, only one worked sporadically. The Chief 
Engineer reported that all the carbon dioxide fire-
fighting cylinders were empty and the engine's cooling 
systems were completely broken down, as water supply 
pipes had rusted through from the inside. Inside the 
vessel is constantly dark because all the light bulbs 
have blown, and there are no spares. The vessel's crew 
have not been paid for four months, and there is no food 
h fi · k' 156 on board. T e re ngerators are not wor mg ... 
they tend to become the property of less scrupulous owners, who ... make cuts in their ship's maintenance and 
their environmental protection costs." !d. 
154. Anderson, The Nationality 0/ Ships, supra note 126, at 168. "If [a] vessel owner does not want to . 
infraction and is barred from a port state, it is likely that he may still trade amongst the developing countrIes 
have fewer resources to conduct port state inspections." Id (citation omitted). 
155. See generally Clara Nwachukwu, Nigeria to benefit from Global Environmental Project, POST 
Feb. 11, 1998, available 
http://www.postexpresswired.com/postexpress.nsf!b378fD445ed319398525691a0076c2c6/43f5636dcfc14c3 
a70066e7cd?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 10, 1998). 
156. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure A Sick Industry, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 
589 n.60 (1997) (quoting LLOYD'S LIST AFRICA WEEKLY, May 9, 1997). 
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One could analogize this issue to crime control. The solution to criminal activity 
IS not necessarily more jails, for example, but instead in addressing poverty, 
unemployment, and lack of opportunity, which arguably are the root of the problem. 
It is similarly preferable to solve the problem of ship-source pollution by dissuading 
open registries from registering such vessels in the first place. 
It is expected that open registry States will respond kindly to any measure that 
offsets the loss of revenue accruing from the registration of such vessels, especially if 
it is one that secures their economies. After all, although the current practice provides 
a measure of benefit to open registries, the overall receipts from ship registration has 
not been shown to significantly impact the economies of open registry States. 157 
Instead, the major beneficiaries are the big corporations that engineer the practice. 158 
As one writer observes, 
[T]he overall effect of open registries on the economies 
of developing countries is negative. Developing 
countries are unable to compete effectively and 
cultivate their own shipping industries, and vessel 
owners take advantage of the cheaper labor available in 
those countries. 159 
The implications of this from an economic standpoint are certainly enormous. 
There is no doubt that '''[t]he dependence for carriage of national trade in foreign 
flags involve [ s] not only a drain on the foreign exchange resources of the country, but 
vitally affect[ s] its ability to compete in trade freely with all nations of the world, the 
157. See generally I.M. Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags a/Convenience, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 95 (1984). "The 
relevance of [flags of convenience shipping or] open registry fleets for the developing countries has been only 
negative." See id. 
158. Anderson, The Nationality a/Ships, supra note 126, at 159-60. 
159. Id. at 161 (citations omitted); see also Sinan, supra note 157, at 107. 
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terms of trade and the costs of the country's imports and exports."'160 It is 
inconceivable that a State will insist on remaining in such an economic state instead 
of cooperating in some other arrangement that has a better likelihood of improving 
the State. The next subsection will discuss other ways of raising funds for improving 
compliance with and implementation of international obligations. 
B. Fundraising and Management 
The subject of economics is also relevant to the area of raising and managing 
funds for implementing measures aimed at treaty effectiveness. By applying sound 
economic principles of resource management, the oceans and their embedded 
resources can be harnessed to provide the needed funds. One option of funding is the 
idea of charging some fees for the use of facilities, otherwise known as a 'user pays' 
system. This work intends to discuss that briefly in the following subsection. 
1. User Fees 
The oceans and the resources within them are enjoyed by a plethora of enterprises 
free of charge. A useful economic device for remedying this state of affairs is the 
" ".. 1 (UPP) 161 Th' " 1 1 user pays pnnclp e . IS pnnclp e, a so known as resource pricing, is "a 
well-known and well-accepted economic principle."162 The UPP aims at ensuring that 
the user or polluter pays for the full cost of the resource and its related services. 163 
160. Anderson, The Nationality of Ships, supra note 126, at 161 n.145 (quoting NAGENDRA SINGH, 
FLAG A!'l? INTERNATIONAL ~AW (1978)). But see Gunnar K. Sletrno and Susanne Holste, Shipping and 
Competitive Advantage of Na!/~ns: Th.e R.0le of International Ship Registers, 20 MAR. POL'y MGMT. 243 (1993). 
161. Ferenc Juhasz, GUldmg Prmclples of Sustmnable Development in the Developing Countries in 
PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 33, 39 (Edward Dommen ed., 1993). ' 
162. [d. 
163. Gonzalo Biggs, Application of the Polluter-Pays PrinCiple in Latin America, in FAIR PRINCIPLES 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 93, 107 n.3. 
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"The idea behind [the UPP] is to internalize the economic costs of the external effects 
of production, consumption and disposal."164 
In advocating a user fee for ocean use, the intent here is not to present it as a 
pollution control device that could be applied in place of the existing regulatory 
scheme, but instead to utilize it as a tool for the generation of revenue. A "user pays" 
system is particularly attractive because it is grounded in equity, as "it is only fair that 
those who benefit from a good or service should pay for that benefit.,,165 It is hardly 
surprising that in today's world, the idea of paying for the use of common resources is 
gaining in popularity as fewer people believe that all services and facilities should be 
free. 166 Where concern exists at all, it has narrowed to the types of services and 
facilities for which fees should be levied, and what amount of money can be fairly 
charged. 167 "The guiding philosophy emerging in the arena of public services is that 
users should pay more than non-users for the services or facilities they enjoy.,,168 
Users may be categorized as either consumptive or amenity users.169 
Consumptive users are further differentiated as quantity and quality users. 170 Amenity 
users may be active or passive. 171 
[C]onsumptive users may either consume a certain 
quantity [of water, for example,] or they may reduce its 
quality by using its absorption capacity to dispose waste 
and by-products... by discharging effluents into a 
river. [On the other hand,] amenity users neither 
164. Kirit S. Parikh, The Polluter-Pays and User-Pays Principles for Developing Countries: Merits, Drawbacks 
and Feasibility, in FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 81. 
165. Edward Dommen, The Four Principles for Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development: an 
Overview, in FAIR PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 161, at 7,31. 
166. ROBERT AUKERMAN, USER PAYS FOR RECREATION RESOURCES 31 (1987). 
167. [d. 
168. [d. 




consume nor pollute the water. [For instance, a]ctive 
amenity users of a lake may swim or sail [in it while 
p ]assive users may simply admire its beauty. 172 
The primary focus here is on the consumptive users of the oceans and the 
resources contained in them. They include, among others, commercial fishermen, 
offshore oil explorers, and companies involved in international trade who use it as an 
avenue for transportation. 173 Considering the utility of the oceans to this group and 
the fact that their activities affect the oceans in some way or the other, it is suggested 
that they be made to pay a "user fee" for their use of the oceans. The fee should be 
"on fish caught, oil extracted, minerals produced, goods and persons shipped, water 
desalinated, recreation enjoyed, waste dumped, pipelines laid, and installations 
built.,,174 Non-commercial uses such as subsistence fishing and marine scientific 
research could be exempt. 175 
What could be realized from a levy on a small percentage of the profits of the 
enterprises currently utilizing the oceans without any charge is amazing. Available 
estimates suggest that about two hundred billion pounds of fish are harvested 
annually.176 Imposition of a one-half of one percent ocean use tax would raise $250 
million. l77 If the same rate were applied to offshore oil and gas, it would produce 
$375 million. 178 The dumping of more than 200 million metric tons of sewage sludge, 
industrial waste, and dredged material are officially reported yearly, as the ocean is, 
172. Id.at24-25. 
173. See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73178 an.d Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or Half 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (1994); see also ChrIstopher D. Stone Locale and Legitimacy in 
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1279, 1284-88 (1996). ' 
174. ELISABETH MANN BORGESE, OCEAN GOVERNANCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 90-91 (2d rev. ed. 1996). 
175. Id.at91. 
176. Christopher D. Stone, Mending the Seas through a Global Commons Trust Fund, in FREEDOM 




directly and indirectly through the territorial waters, used as the world's sewer.179 
Taxing such use at only $l per ton would raise another $200 million.180 Levies could 
also be imposed for "several non-polluting uses of common heritage assets, akin to 
fishing and oil.,,181 Further, "[ c ]onsider royalties for the minerals that will someday be 
taken from the seabed and fees for the uses of space."182 Instead of continuing with 
the current practice of allowing the "first grabbers" to utilize free of charge, "limited 
resources such as positions for geosynchronous and earth-orbiting satellites and 
frequencies on the radio spectrum," the world community can sell or lease them. 
Billions of dollars would at least be realized. 183 
The idea of charging for the use of the oceans has existed for years. In 1971, the 
International Ocean Institute proposed an Ocean Development Tax, a proposal that 
was favorably received. 184 Ambassador Castaneda of Mexico, who later became 
Mexico's Foreign Minister, "described it as 'an extremely important, interesting 
suggestion, and perhaps a very promising proposal [and added that] [i]f we act 
intelligently, it has a fair chance of becoming a reality in the near future. ",185 Alan 






Lawyers feel they must solve the problems they are 
facing now. We must ... try to solve problems we are 
going to face in the future. And if we think of the 
problems of the future, this very radical and 
revolutionary idea of an ocean development tax is not 
184. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 90-91. 
185. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted). 
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nearly as futuristic and academic as it now might seem 
to be. 186 
Silviu Brucan, who later played a key role in the anti-communist revolution in 
Romania in the late 1980s viewed it as "one of those new daring proposals that is 
bound to gain ground in international life because it is based on the progressive forces 
at work in world politics and rides the wave of the future.,,187 
With all of these favorable comments, one would think an ocean tax would 
already be in place. The truth is that not everybody is favorably disposed toward such 
a tax, for a variety of reasons. Proposals by Greece and France in 1962 for an 
international tax on oil imports were rejected. 188 Some other attempts, not necessarily 
limited to ocean matters, have also met with cold reception and have failed outright. 
In 1970, United States President Richard Nixon, while proposing an extension of 
coastal States' administration with respect to their adjacent seabeds, from the 200-
meter isobath to the edge of the continental slope, also attached a suggestion for a 
wealth redistribution fund as part of the package. 189 The proposal was that a 
percentage of the wealth generated from the extension would be set aside for the 
benefit of developing countries,190 which was based on considerations of fairness and 
as a means of quietening objections by landlocked States. 191 
In 1989 the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, proposed a "Planet , 
Protection Fund." If each nation were to contribute a thousandth of its gross national 
186. !d. 
187. !d. (citation omitted). 
188. PRITCHARD, supra note 124, at 129. . . . 
189. Announcement by President Nixon on United States Oceans Pohcy, May 23, 1970, repnnted In 9 
807,808 (1970). 
190. !d. 
19l. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 179. 
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product each year, it would amount to $1.8 billion U.S. dollars per year. 192 The fund 
would have been channelled toward helping developing countries adopt and develop 
environmentally friendly technologies at no cost to them. 193 This proposal was 
considered at the Commonwealth Summit in Malaysia in October 1989 but was 
opposed by Britain. In its stead, a resolution was passed at the meeting calling for the 
strengthening of existing institutions. 194 
The fee proposed here and the fund into which the proceeds would go, however, 
present a somewhat different arrangement from some of these failed efforts. It differs 
from Nixon's proposal in that "it would look to the commons both as the principal 
source and the principal beneficiary of funds.,,195 Unlike Gandhi's proposal, it does 
not call for the taxing of States per se but only those actually using the oceans, 
whether private persons, corporate entities, or public establishments. Moreover, even 
though it considers the developing countries as a beneficiary, it does so only in the 
sense of promoting the well being of the commons and the general marine 
environment. It is also different from the Greek and French proposals because it seeks 
to universalize the tax instead of restricting it to oil imports. In such a case, the oil 
importing States would not consider it a discriminatory measure but one that is 
applied to all for the benefit of all. More importantly, it does not suffer the fate of the 
others in the sense that they appear to have come before their time. 
It would be risky to underestimate the degree of opposition that a user fee may 
elicit, especially from countries that substantially benefit from the current practice of 
192. Ghandi Calls for $I8-Billion Fund to Fight Pollution of Atmosphere, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6,1989, pt. 1, at 8. 
193. [d. 
194. Britain Stands Pat Against Sanctions, CHI. TRlB., Oct. 22, 1989, at 27. 
195. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 179. 
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free use of ocean resources. A similar and recent proposal, but in deep sea mining, 
faced opposition as well, especially from States that had the technology for mining 
polymetallic nodules of the deep sea bed and who were not willing to share that 
technology with anyone else or utilize the resources for the common goOd. 196 While 
acknowledging the objections that followed the failed "common heritage of 
humanity" idea leading to the adoption of an Implementation Agreement by the 
General Assembly on 29 July 1994,197 it should be pointed out that the world cannot 
continue to countenance such brazen displays of egoism by some States. 
Of note is the impact the concept of a common heritage proposed in Part XI of 
the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 has had. It created a landmark in that it "sets a 
precedent in international law for the imposition of international taxation.,,198 The 
Agreement of 1994199 has not changed this, although the terms are varied, thus 
illustrating that the world is not entirely averse to the idea of international taxation on 
the use of common resources for the benefit of all, especially less endowed countries. 
The international community can now reflect that in more tangible and more refined 
terms. 
With the current state of the global economy, the value of the idea of an ocean 
use fee cannot be overemphasized. With nations complaining of the scarcity of funds 
and the strain on existing institutions to meet the myriad needs confronting the 
196. See generally SAID MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING 119-204 (1987)' see also J 
Charney, US,. Provisional Application a/the 1994 Deep Seabed Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1994). 
197. LOUIS B. Sohn, International Law Implications a/the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 696 (1 
also BORGESE, supra note 174, at 170. 
198. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 170. 
199. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1309. 
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international society,200 it is imperative that we look at alternative sources of funding. 
According to one commentator, "[i]f sustainable development is not to remain a 
chimera, new sources of funding must be mobilized... One of the obvious 
candidates is international taxation.,,201 Law Professor Christopher D. Stone's 
sentiments reverberates: "Why should a needy global community give away to the 
first grabber, rather than sell or lease at auction, limited resources .... The current 
practice is a multibillion-dollar give away."202 The global community should continue 
to use what it has to get what it wants while striving to preserve what it already has. 
The user fee this work proposes will be based on well-defined terms, such as the 
tonnage and value of goods transported, or fish and other resources removed or , 
sewage and other materials dumped. The proceeds will be channelled into an 
international fund, which will underwrite such things as "building and improving 
ocean services, [for example,] navigational aids, scientific infrastructure, 
environmental monitoring, search and rescue, and disaster relief. ,,203 The fund would 
also finance other measures such as a global environmental patrol force, with the 
capability to respond quickly to environmental disasters like major oil spills, 
promoting improved enforcement of treaties, and drafting and lobbying for new 
. t . I 204 
III ernatlOna agreements. The fund would also assume responsibility for 
"underwrit[ing] marine research[,] support[ing] forceful monitoring of ocean 
dumping," and generally combating pollution on the high seas.205 
200. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 90. 
201. /d. 
202. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 176. 
203. BORGESE, supra note 174, at 91. 
204. Stone, Mending the Seas, supra note 176, at 175. 
205. Id. 
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Furthermore, the fund should "also defer the costs of compliance with 
international regulations designed to remedy the ills of the commons."Z06 In that 
connection, the fund will arrange development assistance to developing countries to 
enable them to participate in the global efforts for safer ships and cleaner seas. It is 
important to stress at this juncture, however, that some of the activities of the Fund 
would overlap with measures currently being undertaken by other international 
institutions such as the International Maritime Organization. This would not result in 
conflict, as coordination of functions would eliminate overlapping of efforts in certain 
areas while ensuring all areas are addressed. 
The user pays system has already been successfully utilized as a management and 
economic tool in domestic systems with respect to some common resources that were 
initially freely enjoyed. An example is the park.Z07 There is no cogent reason why this 
success cannot be replicated in the international system. The next section will focus 
on a discussion of the nature and structure of management of the proceeds of the fee. 
2. Funds Management 
One approach to dealing with the situation of developing countries in relation to 
international environmental obligations is the creation of financial mechanisms Z08 , 
which are created "to oversee and facilitate the flow of funds related to 
implementation of an agreement."Z09 An example of a financial mechanism is the 
206. Id. 
207. AU~RMAN, supra not~ 166. Dr. Aukerman conducted an extensive study on the success of this' 
some ?ountnes notably, th~ Umted States and Canada. The author also observes on its use in Western 
countrIes and recommends It for New Zealand. 
208. Other methods include common, but differentiated, obligations and international cooperation 
c~mcentrated on the areas of technology transfer, scientific research and development and access to 
bIOtechnology research. See Saunders, supra note 132, at 98-100. 
209. [d. at 99 (citation omitted). 
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Montreal Protocol.ZlO The Montreal Protocol includes a Multilateral Fund and was 
established to provide financial and technical cooperation, and to meet all agreed 
incremental costs of developing country parties.Z11 Permanent financial mechanisms 
are also present in the Biological DiversityZ1Z and Climate Change Conventions.Z13 
Under the latter two conventions, an institutional arrangement-the Global 
Environment Facility-is designated as an interim mechanism for the realization of 
the objectives of the conventions.Z14 Additionally, this dissertation proposes that 
assistance to developing countries for oil pollution control take the form of a financial 
mechanism titled the Global Enforcement Fund. The proposed fund will operate 
under the Global Environment Facility (GEF).ZI5 
Originally, the GEF was established in 1991 as a pilot project of the World 
B nk Z16 I .. a. ts operatIOn IS now governed by an arrangement involving the World 
Bank,Z17 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEPfI8 and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).ZI9 The realization that no single 
210. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 112. 
211.. Jason M. Patlis, ~he Multilateral Fund o/the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype/or Financial Mechanisms in 
Protecting t~e GlobaJ Environment, 25 CORNELLINT'L1.J. 181 (1992). 
212. Umted NatIOns ~onference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity June 5 
1992, 31 I.1.M. 818 [heremafter Convention on Biological Diversity]. , , 
213. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, May 9, 1 ?92, 31 I..1.M .. 849 [~ere~after Convention on Climate Change]. 
214. ConventIOn on BIOlogIcal DivefSlty, supra note 212, art. 39; Convention on Climate Change, supra note 
213, art. 21. 
215. Instrument for the Establishment of Global Environment Facility, 33 I.1.M. 1273, 1273 (1994). 
216. Saunders, supra note 132, at 100 n.45. 
217. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Dec 27 1949 60 
Stat. 1440, T.~.A.S. No. 1502,2 U.N.T.S: 134, amende~ b¥ 1~ U .. S.T;, 1942, T.I.~.S. No. 5929 (Dec. 16, 1965). "The 
World Bank IS the first and largest multIlateral fmancial mshtuhon. Charles DILeva, International Environmental 
Law and Development, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. 1. REv. 501,504 (1998). 
" 218. G.A. Res. ,2997, l!.N. GAOR, pth Sess., Supp. ,~o. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. AJ8370 (1972). UNEP is 
ar~u~bly the world s most. lillportant envlfonmental agency. Matthew Heimer, The UN Environment Programme: 
Thinking Globally, Retreating Locally, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 1.J. 129, 129 (1998). For discussion regarding 
UNEP, see Karen Tyler FaIT, A New Global Environmental Organization, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo 1. 493,496-507 
a~~g~: and Mark Allan Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. 1. 291 
219. The UND~ is the central co-ordinating organization for [United Nations] development activities and the 
world's .largest multIlateral source of technical assistance for sustainable human development." Zama Coursen-Neff 
Preventive Measures Pertaining to Unconventional Threats to the Peace Such As Natural and Humanitaria~ 
155 
international agency commands all the skills and experience necessary to implement 
all the functions of GEF necessitated the tripartite structure.220 Under this new 
arrangement, established by representatives from seventy-three countries at a meeting 
in Geneva in 1994, GEF was transformed "from an experimental program into a 
permanent financial mechanism that will provide grants and concessional funds to 
developing countries for projects and other activities that protect the global 
environment.,,221 
The GEF has a mandate that covers four focal areas, namely climate change, 
biological diversity, international waters, and ozone depletion.222 It perseveres "to 
assist in the protection of the global environment and promote environmentally sound 
and sustainable economic development.,,223 With regard to the oceans and 
international river systems, the GEF "is designed to establish programs [intended] to 
protect both marine and freshwater environments, study and improve deballasting 
techniques, clean up toxic waste pollution and upgrade contingency planning for oil 
spills.,,224 This is intended as a continuation of the efforts of the signatories to 
MARPOL 73178. 225 
GEF is administered through a division of powers between the component 
institutions.226 In particular, the World Bank assumes responsibility for 
Disasters, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 652 (1998). 
220. World Barue Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment Facility, 30 
1735, 1741, pt. U(10) (1991) [hereinafter World Bank]. 
221. Nicholas Van Praag, Introductory Note to Instrument Establishing the Global Environment 
I.L.M. 1273 (1994). 
222. Instrument for the Establishment of Global Environment Facility, supra note 215, at 1273. 
223. Id. at 1281. 
224. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, at 771 nn.55-56. See also.Charles E. 
The World Bank and Environmental Law: A Post-Rio Summary of Activities, C883 ALI-ABA 525, 526-28 
1994). 
225. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, n.56. 
226. Alan S. Miller, The Global Environment Facility and the Search for Financial Strategies to 
Sustainable Development, 24 VT. L. REv. 1229, 1234-34 (2000). 
156 
administration, trusteeship, and primary implementation of investment projects.227 It 
also serves as a repository of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (GEF).228 
The World Bank's headquarters in Washington, D.C. houses the GEF Secretariat , 
which is in charge of the administration of the GEF's day to day operations.229 
Member States provide the funding for GEF in the form of grants and co-
financing arrangements, though by the Articles of Agreement, GEF expresses a 
preference for grant funding. 23o GEF funds are primarily utilized for "incremental 
costs." These costs are "defined as 'the difference between the 'domestic costs' a 
country would have to pay to achieve a global environmental benefit and the 
'domestic benefit' it would receive as a result.",231 GEF therefore does not normally 
gIve financial support to projects the host nations are capable of funding unless 
compelling reasons can be given to show that: (1) the particular operation would not 
proceed without the involvement of GEF; (2) the regular development aid financing 
mechanisms were not available; or (3) that GEF funding could provide for additional 
global environmental benefits which could not be achieved with existing national 
funding. 232 
Under the restructured GEF, funding is also expected from the private sector. It is 
submitted that a fee for use of the oceans and the resources contained in them will be 
a useful way of sourcing funds and ensuring private sector participation in the global 
~27. Royal c.. Gardner, Exporting American Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International 
Envlronme~tal ASSIstance, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1,42 n.227 (1998). See also Silard, supra note 137 at 634-35 
228 .. Sdard, supra note 137, at 635. See also Adam A. Walcoff, The Restructured Global Environm~nt Facili .. 
A PractIcal EvaluatIOn for f..!nleashing the Lending Power ofGEF, 3 WIDENERL. SVMP. J. 485, 488-89 (Fall 1998)' 
229. Anderson, Reformzng International Institutions, supra note 8, at 785. ' . 
230. World Bank, supra note 220, at 1749-50. 
231. Anderson, Reforming International Institutions, supra note 8, at 787 (citations omitted). 
232. World Bank, supra note 220, at 1742-43. 
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march for environmental security. The proceeds will be channelled into the proposed 
fund under GEF and be particularly designated for the projects listed above. 
GEF is especially attractive for this assignment because it would facilitate 
implementation and compliance with international law. First, GEF obviates the need 
for the creation of new institutions or bureaucracies, which members of the 
international community see as money-guzzling and an encroachment on sovereign 
powers. Indeed this vision was the basis of extensive discussions for the restructuring 
of GEF: "The lengthy negotiations on restructuring illustrate the determination of 
governments to avoid the creation of a new bureaucracy.,,233 Second, GEF is not just 
an existing institution, but is one equipped with the necessary experience and 
expertise to undertake the task without additional restructuring.234 Third, GEF is 
capable of discharging its responsibilities effectively without any major conflict with 
the notion of national sovereignty that has stood as an albatross to the proper 
implementation of international rules.235 Thus, without impinging on the sovereignty 
of States, it nevertheless presents an international oversight mechanism to monitor 
compliance with environmental treaties, which unfortunately is one of the major 
pitfalls of the present structure.236 Fourth, GEF is an enforcement mechanism in itself 
because of its involvement with the World Bank. States would want to keep their 
obligations under the facility to avoid foreclosing opportunities for future assistance 
by the Bank, a near inevitability in today's world.237 In other words, the concept of 
233. Van Praag, supra note 221, at 1273. 
234. Silard, supra note 137, at 645. 
235 .. See ge'}erally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil 
the Manne EnVironment by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 561 (1984). 
236. Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environment Treaties· An Analysis 5 
ENVTL. L. J. 261, 267 (1993). . , 
237. Ibrahim F. I. Shibata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance With International Em""r1Y1If"'" 
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enlightened self-interest will at least compel States to discharge their obligations and 
act in an environmentally desirable way. Fifth, and perhaps most significantly, GEF 
has a forward-looking posture. The permanent GEF has been described as an 
institution intended as more than a channel for project financing. It will also playa 
crucial role in supporting "global environmental security by integrating the global 
environment into national development, encouraging the transfer of environmentally 
sound technology and knowledge, and, crucially, strengthening the capacity of 
developing countries to play their full part in protecting the global environment.,,238 
The revised institutional framework signifies a change from the "old style assistance" 
to "new style cooperation.,,239 
In furtherance of its objectives, GEF has identified some projects in West Africa, 
among other places, as areas of international significance, and undertook to finance 
the preservation of their environmental quality.240 It is worth re-emphasizing, 
therefore, that the marine and coastal resources and environment will be better off 
under a system comprised of a fusion of legal rules supported by an ocean user fee. 
The proceeds from such a fee would be managed by the Global Environment Facility. 
These proceeds would go toward strengthening the capacity of developing countries. 
Such infusion of energy would in tum enable those States to play their part in global 
environmental protection measures. 
The responsibility for collecting the proposed fees should also be assumed by the 
GEF. The sheer vastness of the ocean and the volume of activity on the ocean, 
?f;$6rents-Practical Suggestions in Light of World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 37,48-50 
238. Van Praag, supra note 221, at 1275. 
239. Id. 
240. Nwachukwu, supra note 155. 
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however, pose problems in application. To ensure against those that will attempt to 
cheat the system and somehow shirk the responsibility, GEF should align with and 
seek the support of the various interest groups that exist in the business. Consider, for 
example, oil companies operating shipping lines (International Shippers Association 
(INS A)) and independent tanker owner organizations (International Tanker Owners 
Association (INTERTANKO)); a system could be arranged for the collection of the 
proposed fees at the same time as any annual membership fees that might be due from 
members. Additionally, it would behove the GEF to establish a relationship with the 
major maritime States to explore the possibility of collecting the fees at the time of 
ship registration, renewal of licensing fees or payment of "tax." Generally, 
establishing additional offices outside of its secretariat would also assist GEF. This 
would facilitate revenue collection as well as any other relevant activities. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Implementation and compliance with international agreements have not occurred 
m a desirable manner, as the members of the world community might prefer. 
Accordingly, this militates against the effectiveness of international agreements in 
relation to oil pollution from ships. National interest is believed to be the source of 
this state of affairs. Exploitation of this notion is therefore a sine qua non for the 
resolution of the problem. 
The intent of this chapter was to go beyond the extant international policy and 
legal framework for solving the problem, including the latest effort of Port State 
control. Realistically, the oceans, as a global commons, "can only be protected if the 
behaviour of the people (i.e. the behaviour of firms, governments, consumers ... ) 
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changes.,,241 Authoritative regulations alone will not effect this change, which 
requires identifying the reasons behind the behavior leading to pollution and tackling 
the problem at the root. 
The basic reason identified for the behavior is deference to national interest. 
Accordingly, this chapter is meant to advocate capacity-building in cases of 
financially incapacitated countries, and introduces alternatives to environmentally 
destructive activities. It thus subscribes to the view that "[ e ]ffective protection of 
global commons. . . is most likely to develop if capacities for substitution of the 
11 l' . . . ,,242 po u mg actIVIty exIst.... In that connection, it strengthens the regulatory 
structure by promoting the participation of States that otherwise would be outside the 
system by encouraging capacity building, which is a prerequisite for such 
participation. 
The concepts of global partnership, international cooperation, and symbiosis in 
international relations catering to the interests of every side of the world divide must 
be promoted, as opposed to a system that is partitioned into winners and losers. 
This work is intended to suggest an avenue for the productive use of resources 
commonly owned by the international community for the benefit of all. It also 
addresses the additional issue of the protection of the oceans and their resources as , 
well as remedial actions with regard to damage done to them. In that light, this article 
is intended as a voice for the oceans and marine environment; speaking for them and 
not just concentrating on pollution prevention and control for the benefit of States 
only. It does so by holding the corporate sector responsible for their actions and 
M 241. Volker Svon Prittwitz, Several Approaches to the Analysis of International Environmental Policy in 
AINTAINING A ATISFACTORY ENVIRONMENT: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY l' 23 , 
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demands that they play a more active and supportive role III international 
environmental protection efforts. 
Current with recent trends, this work is meant to elicit and enhance compliance 
with international law where some States essentially assume an obligation to defray 
the cost of compliance expected from other States. This is especially true when the 
former are responsible for the current state of affairs or where the latter are not in a 
financial position to be part of the international arrangement, as exemplified by the 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Laye~43 and Climate Change Conventions.244 The 
present state of affairs regarding oil pollution control must change. It is through new 
international programs as well as reform and enforcement of the current systems that 
this change can occur. 
The past three chapters, which constitute the first division of this dissertation, 
have discussed the environmental and economic costs associated with a particular 
segment of the oil industry: international oil trade and shipping. The next three 
chapters, constituting the second division, focus more on oil corporations engaged in 
oil exploration and extraction. One common thread that runs through all of the 
chapters is that the activities of oil corporations are accompanied by environmental 
and economic costs. The issue of corporate accountability thus features prominently 
in both divisions. The issues of implementation, compliance and enforcement, also 
feature in the second division, although they are not as pronounced as they are in the 
first division. A simple explanation for this is that while there has been an elaboration 
of international rules regarding the environmental aspects of oil trade and shipping, 
(Nordal Akennan ed., 1990). 
242. Id. at 22. 
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the same cannot be said of oil exploration and production. The different aspects of the 
oil industry represented in both divisions also have a tendency to impose socia1 costs 
on the society, but exploration and production activities are more likely to cause 
social disequilibrium through such things as human rights abuses. The next three 
chapters focus on these issues commencing with the existing regulatory system over 
multinational oil corporations engaged in oil development. 
243. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 112. 
244. See Convention on Climate Change, supra note 213. 
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DIVISION II 




CORPORATE ABUSES AND REGULATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the global scheme of things, the influence of the multinational corporation 
IS no longer infinitesimal. This species of corporate entities has steadily grown in 
size, power and influence.! With this phenomenal growth2 has also come an 
exponential rise in the social and economic costs of their operations on humanity. 
Thus while not glossing over the positive aspects of multinational corporate activity 
such as job creation3 and introduction of new technologies,4 concern has continued to 
mount as to the negative consequences of economic globalization. 
The activities of corporate officers that has had a negative impact on 
employees, stockholders and other segments of the society was brought to the 
IMICHELLE LEIGHTON, et al., BEYOND GOOD DEEDS: C;ASE s'n.JDlJ~S ANI) A NEW 
POLley ACiENDA FOR C()RPORAII; ACCOUNTABIIXIV (2002), See also, Shira Pridan-Frank, 
Human-Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law, 40 Colum. l Transnat'l 
L. 619, 661 (2002). "In recent decades, the power and influence of private commercial companies have 
grown, in light of the expansion ofintemational trade and globalization." Citation omitted. 
2 At present, there are about 65,000 multinational corporations, with about 850,000 foreign affiliates 
around the world. While in 1990, foreign affiliates accounted for about 24 million employees, that 
number rose dramatically to 54 million in 2001. They also recorded sales amounting to $19 trillion 
which was more than twice as high as world exports in 2001; in 1990, both were roughly equal. 
Further, over the same period, the stock of outward foreign direct investment increased from $1.7 
trillion to $6.6 trillion. Foreign affiliates of MNCs currently account for one-tenth of world GDP and 
one-third of world exports. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, Overview, at 1. 
3 Job creation internationally has added to the power and influence ofMNCs. See Scott Greathead, The 
Multinationals and the "New Stakeholder": Examining the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 Vand. 
l Transnat'l L. 719, 722 (2002) arguing that the leaders of the People's Republic of China are more 
likely to place a higher premium on the opinion of the CEOs of multinational corporations who have 
tens of thousands of Chinese workers in their employ, than the views of the President of the United 
States, from whom they may not expect much both from a political and practical standpoints. 
4 Thomas Donaldson, Can Multinationals Stage a Universal Morality Play? 29 Bus. I$l Soc. Rev. 51, 
52 (1992). "Third World representatives increasingly acknowledge the role multinationals playas a 
conduit of technological know-how to host cultures, and most have accepted a pr0111ultinational 
position .... " 
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forefront recently at the domestic level. The energy trading company, Enron and 
some other big commercial enterprises like Worldcom went into bankruptci, leaving 
a trail of casualties on the way.6 These events helped to re-ignite the debate on 
corporate accountability, culminating in the passage of legislation to address 
7 corporate abuses. 
Corporate accountability is also a disturbing issue at the international level. 
What is more disturbing is that while it has been relatively easier, at the national 
level, to introduce policy initiatives and instruments to deal with the operations of the 
corporate community that are inimical to the interests of the wider society,8 the 
international legal system still has a lot to do to ensure that business entities are held 
accountable for the social, economic and environmental costs of their operations. 
Multinational corporations operating in countries other than their home 
countries have been implicated in, or associated with human rights violations,9 
. 10 I· f d·t· 11 d environmental pollution and degradatIOn, esca ation 0 poverty con 1 IOns, an an 
increase in social vices in their host communities. 12 
5 See John Clemency & LeGrande Smith, Corporate Fraud: Where Should the Buck Really Stop? 
American Bankruptcy Institute Journal (November 2002). (2002 ABI JNL. LEXIS 172). 
6 See William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other 
Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuI. L. Rev. 1275 (2002). See also 
Alex Berenson, Oversight: The Biggest Casualty of Enron's Collapse: Confidence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
10,2002, at 1. 
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 116 Stat. 745 (Enacted July 30,2002). 
8 Jennifer Morris, Foreigners Forced to Play by US Rules, 33:402 EUROMONEY, October 2002, at 
42-45 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was hastily drafted and enacted.) . 
9 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbj0rn Eide, Helge Ole Bergesen and Pia 
Rudolfson Goyer eds, 2000). See also Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: 
Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 183 (2002). 
10 See for instance, JUDITH KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE (1991). 
II See Emeka Duruigbo, Oil Development in Nigeria: A Critical Investigation of Chevron 
Corporation's Performance in the Niger River Delta (Natural Heritage Institute, 2001). 
12 Such vices include prostitution and criminal activities by youths who could not find gainful 
employment. See Hemy Clark, et aI., Oil For Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental 
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These developments have led to outcry from various segments of the society. 
The business operations and activities of multinational corporations have come under 
intense scrutiny, and corporations engaged in oil exploration and production have 
been under the searchlight more than those in other industries. 13 Victims of corporate 
abuses and other concerned individuals and groups have seized every important 
opportunity to highlight the social and economic problems attendant on, or incidental 
to, the way business is being done, especially in developing countries. 14 Corporations 
have responded in large measure by deciding to police themselves through corporate 
codes of conduct and other voluntary initiatives. IS Policy makers in the national and 
international arenas have also begun to pay attention. For about three decades now, 
attempts have been made, nationally and internationally, to increase the 
accountability of corporations to communities, workers and the environment.16 
International policy makers, in the most part, seem to have bought the argument put 
Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta, January 25, 2000, available at 
http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/report/. Last visited September 12, 2002. 
13 See Scott Holwick, Transnational Corporate Behavior and its Disparate and Unjust Effects on the 
Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, A Case Study, 11 
Colo. J. Int'l EnvtI. L. & Pol'y 183, 194 (2000). 
14 See Why Global Codes of Conduct? available at 
http://www.multinationalguideiines.org/csr/why codes of conduct.htm Last visited July 232002. 
15See Eileen Rice, Note, Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human 
Rights Violations, 33 U.S.F.L. Rev. 153 170 (1998) (stating that public concern sparked corporate 
interest in codes of conduct.) See also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of 
Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443 446 (2001) (stating that the government was moved by public 
concern to endorse and oversee the creation of a voluntary code of conduct.) Today, there are 
thousands of codes ot variations thereof. On the environment, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) published a report in 1998 entitled Voluntary Industry Codes of Conduct for the 
Environment, which lists more than 40 codes covering 12 industry sectors. See International Chamber 
of Commerce, Business offers DIY kit for environmental management, April 22, 1998, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news archivesl1998/diy kit.asp. Last visited September 1,2002. 
16 See Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, The Corporate Accountability Movement: Lessons & 
Opportunities, 23 Fletcher F. World Aff. 151 (1999). 
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forth by corporations that self-regulation, especially through codes,17 is the panacea to 
the problems highlighted. 18 
This Chapter examines the concept of corporate codes, its historical 
development, and its effectiveness in promoting responsible business practices. The 
focus here will be on the use of codes of conduct in international business. While the 
concept of codes will receive a general discussion, especial attention will be paid to 
codes that pertain to the petroleum industry. It is also pertinent to mention that the 
tenns "codes," "codes of conduct," and "corporate codes of conduct" will be used 
interchangeably here and liberally employed to accommodate such other tenns as 
"corporate directives," "administrative practices," "standards of business conduct" , 
" d f b t . "19,, co e 0 es practIce, corporate compliance programs," "corporate compliance 
policies,,,20 "guiding principles," "code of worldwide business conduct," "code of 
ethics and business conduct.,,21 
The Chapter is divided into 5 major parts. Part II discusses conceptual issues 
including definitions and historical trips. Codes of conduct have been with us for a 
long time, playing a key role in corporate regulation. 
17 "Ad . 
optmg ,a code of conduct is tantamou~t to a commitment to engage in corporate self-regulation." 
Harvey L. PItt and Karl A. Groskaufmams, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability, A 
fsecond Lo~k at C:0rp~rate Codes of Conduct, 78 Geo, L.J. 1559, 1560 (1990). ' 
D se~ JUdIth ~lmerlmg" Rio + 1 0: Indigenous Peoples, Transnational Corporations and Sustainable 
ev~ opment ,m Amazoma, 27 Colum. 1. Envtl. L. 523, 526 (2002). [Hereinafter Kimerling (2002) 
The mtroductIOn of such voluntary initiatives as the Global Compact and OECD G' 'd l' ] 
buttress this fact. Ul e mes appears to 
19 
T~o~e four terms can be found in the Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics 114 
~~atncla H. Werhone & R. Edward Freeman eds. 1997), 
,Se~ ,Charles 1. Walsh and Alisa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal 
~labillty: Can A Corporation Save its Soul? 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605,643 (1995). 
(2~7)~n E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What's Missing?, 16 Lab, Law 349 
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Part III looks at the different kinds of codes including external and internal 
codes, public and private initiatives, and governmental and inter-governmental codes. 
The contents of specific codes are also examined. 
In Part IV, the work dabbles into the long-standing controversy about the 
validity, utility, and limits of corporate codes and other self-regulatory measures. 
Examining the strong points and weaknesses will help detennine whether these codes 
are indeed a panacea to the problem of corporate abuse. 
Part V suggests an alternative course that takes much of the focus away from 
corporate codes. The suggestion here is that a move toward regulation in international 
law would be more beneficial to all. Finally, appropriate conclusions are drawn from 
the foregoing emphasizing the need to check corporate excesses through meaningful 
and workable public policies. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF CODES OF CONDUCT 
Since the earliest days of the corporation, the idea of self-regulation has been in 
. 22 
eXIstence. Even before the emergence of the corporation as we know it today, its 
forerunners - merchant and craft guilds - provided a measure of regulation over the 
conduct of their members.23 Some modem corporations such as JC Penney had in 
~: Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 20, at 649-650. 
Se~ M~rk B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse? 24 
U. MiamI Inter-Am. L. Rev, 399,401 (1993). 
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place a set of principles to guide their conduct even in the early part of the 20th 
century.24 
The modem history of codes of conduct for corporations engaged in 
international business can be traced to the Sullivan Principlei5 that were introduced 
in the 1970s to tackle the unjust system of apartheid in South Africa.26 Most recently, 
the concept of corporate codes has been enlisted in the campaign to address certain 
issues of global importance, including the protection of human rights and preservation 
of the environment. The observation has been made that reminiscent of the 
acceptance of international human rights responsibilities by governments in the 
course of the past sixty years, "multinational corporations are beginning to accept 
international human rights responsibilities III the form of self-imposed codes of 
conduct and other private initiatives.',27 
A corporate code can simply be described as "a statement delineating a 
company's ethical policies.,,28 It could be defined to "include any written statement of 
ethics, law, or policy (or some combination thereof) delineating the obligations of one 
or more classes of corporate employees. ,,29 Another definition sees corporate codes as 
"sets of principles, ethics statements, credos, and other explicit, written statements 
24 The "Penney Idea" was introduced in 1913. See Patrick E. Murphy, Corporate Ethics Statements: 
An Update, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 295 
(Oliver F. Williams, ed., 2000). . 
25 Infra note 55. 
26 A . d na ne K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liable Under the Alien 
~ort Claims Actfor Human Rights Violations? 23 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 927, 935 (1998). 
Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution? 19 Fordham Int'l L J 
1963, 1964 (1996). . . 
28 John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out 2 U 
~a. !. Lab. & Emp. L. 463, 466 (2000). ' . 
Pltt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 17, at 1559, n.1. 
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through which one organization . . . or a group of organizations, specifies the 
relationship between values and behavior.',3o 
For the purposes of this work, a code of conduct is a catalog of principles, 
which ought to guide a company in its relations with other segments of the 
community including employees, contractors, stakeholders and the public. It is 
imperative, in order to meet the minimum requirements for effectiveness, that a 
corporate code not only proscribe unacceptable behavior, but also prescribe the kind 
of behavior that is desirable.3! 
Corporate codes can be categorized into public and private codes. Public 
codes are those concluded under the auspices of governments, nationally or 
internationally. Private codes are coordinated by non-governmental organizations, 
individuals or by the corporations themselves. By their very nature, public codes are 
always external. Private codes could be internal or external. External codes emanate 
from sources outside the corporation or by a group of corporations. An internal code 
has its origins in the particular corporation issuing it. Regardless of the source or 
nature, these codes share some common characteristics, such as voluntariness or non-
bindingness. They also have the over-arching and ubiquitous feature of making an 
effort to set boundaries which a company should not cross and guidelines which they 
should follow to avoid causing harm to others in the course of business. These 
include directives to act ethically and to embrace corporate social responsibility. 
30 ~o~ert ~in1och Massie, Effective Codes of Conduct: Lessons from the Sullivan and CERES 
Prlnclples, In GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 281 291 
{I (2000) (Oliver F. Williams, ed .. 2000). ' n. 
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 20, at 646. 
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The past few years have witnessed an explosion in the number of corporate 
codes concluded within a corporation, by an industry or from some other sources.32 In 
a nutshell, codes are "in vogue".33 Several reasons have been advanced in trying to 
provide an explanation for this proliferation of codes and other voluntary initiatives. 
It is said that corporations adopt codes of conduct as a reaction to, or in a bid to 
prevent, consumer backlash or adverse public opinion.34 Corporations also introduce 
codes ostensibly as a means of preempting governmental regulation.35 The necessity 
and appeal of codes today can also be traced to the rise or resurgence of capitalism 
across the globe, the growing power of the multinational corporation, and increasing 
complexity of the international business arena, the effect of international business 
transactions on different segments of the society and the limitations of existing 
institutions and structures to deal with these changes in circumstances.36 One writer 
notes: 
32 Judith Kimerling, Rio + 10: Indigenous Peoples, Transnational Corporations and Sustainable 
Development in Amazonia, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 523, 531 (2002); Keith Pezzoli, Environmental 
Management Systems (EMSS) and Regulatory Innovation, 36 Cal. W. L. Rev. 335, 343 (2000); John 
Wickham Toward a Green Multilateral Investment Framework: NAFTA and The Search For 
Models, 12 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev. 617,626 (2000); Anderson, supra note 28, at 499; Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional Organizations, and the ISO 14001Environmental 
Management Standard, 9 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev. 583, 585 (1997). 
33 Herrnstadt, supra note 21, at 349. 
34 See Elizabeth Macek, Note, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive 
to Define Human Rights, 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 101, 110 n.64 (2002) (stating that the formulation 
of codes is sometimes precipitated by consumer pressure.) 
35"In the world of politics, voluntary action can deter more onerous forms of regulation. That is an 
important incentive for industry to design codes of conduct with which member fIrms can live." James 
E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and Managers in Search ola Solution, in 
GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 103, 108 (Oliver F. 
Williams, ed., 2000). 
36 Id., at 105-108; S. Sethi, Gaps in Research in the Formulation, Implementation, and Effectiveness 
Measurement of International Codes of Conduct, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 24, 
at 117-118. See also Heidi S. BloomfIeld, Note, "Sweating" the International Garment Industry: A 
Critique of the Presidential Task Force's Workplace Codes of Conduct and Monitoring System, 22 
Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 567, 571 (1999) (stating that the proliferation of codes of conduct in 
international business operations can be linked to demands on companies to respect human and labor 
rights.) 
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Codes of conduct have nsen in popularity as a 
mechanism of accountability for multinational 
companies because changes in markets, technology, and 
social conditions have undermined the older methods of 
providing meaning and order.37 
The next part presents a more detailed discussion of codes and how they fare as 
corporate accountability tools. 
III: CONTENT OF CODES OF CONDUCT 
As earlier stated, the initiation of codes has involved various sources ranging from 
individuals to inter-governmental bodies. The discussion here will center on codes 
initiated by private forces external to the corporation, national governments, 
international organizations and through the internal processes of individual 
corporations. 
A. INTERNAL CODES 
Over the years, many corporations have undertaken the task of formulating 
business codes and ethical statements for their operations. Oil corporations are not an 
exception to this trend. A number of these codes incorporate existing international 
principles on human rights.38 Not too long ago, one would easily read an 
advertisement by Shell boldly proclaiming: "At Shell, we are committed to support 
37 Massie, supra note 30, at 281. 
38 For instance, BP Amoco, Shell and Statoil incorporate the UN Declaration of Human Rights in their 
codes of conduct. Karen Jochelson, The Big Business of Human Rights, The Independent (London), 
April 26, 2000, at 2. 
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fundamental human rights and have made this commitment III our published 
statement of General Business Principles. ,,39 
The corporate codes surveyed in the course of this investigation promote a strong 
desire to be on the side of responsible corporate practices. Chevron's code states that 
the company will conduct its business in " a socially responsible and ethical 
manner.,,40 It adds that the company is "committed to protecting the safety and health 
of people and the environment,,41 and states that its "goal is to be the industry leader 
in safety and health performance and to be recognized worldwide for environmental 
excellence.,,42 ChevronTexaco, through it code, pledges to embark on a continual 
improvement of its processes for the minimization of pollution and waste.43 The 
company would also engage in open communication with the public in relation to 
possible impact of its business on the public or the environment.44 In addition, 
ChevronTexaco declares its commitment to the support of universal human rights, 
and in particular, the human rights of its employees, the communities where they 
have operations and parties they do business with.4s 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation's code of conduct announces the company's 
intention to respect the rights of individuals and different cultures in places that they 
39 The advert appeared in the Economist. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, Rights: Big Business Out 
to Improve its Image, Inter press Service, October 18, 1999, available at Lexis-Nexis, Curnws File. 
The Statement of General Business Principles is available at http://www.sheIl.com. Last visited 
September 12,2002. 
4°http://www.chevrontexaco.com/social responsibility/human rights/; 







do business.46 The company states that it is "committed to abiding by and maintaining 
high standards of ethical conduct anq pursuing business operations with integrity, 
dignity and respect for people from many different cultures.,,47 In relation to health, 
environment and safety (HES), the corporate code proclaims: 
Protection of health, environment and safety is one of 
Occidental's highest priorities and the company strives 
for continual improvement in HES performance. The 
HES Policy recognizes [that] human life and health are 
precious and must be safeguarded; the world's natural 
resources are finite and should be conserved and 
developed wisely and environmental protection is good 
for the community and is good business.48 
Unocal's Guiding Principles state that the company will "develop natural 
resources and provide energy in an efficient and environmentally responsible 
manner.,,49 Unocal also declares its support for the Universal Declaration of Human 
RightsSO, adding that "[a]s a global corporation, we have a responsibility to promote 
and protect human rights in all our activities."sl The company not only undertakes to 
conduct its operations in accordance with "the highest ethical standards"s2 it goes on 
to say that it will expect the same from the company's partners, contractors and 
46 Code of Business Conduct - Summary, http://www.oxy.comIHTMLlsocialrespons.html. Last visited 
September 10, 2002. Full text of Code of Business Conduct IS available at 
http://www.oxy.com/HTMLlcode.pdf. Last visited September 10,2002. 
47Id. 
48 Summary of Occidental's Policy on Health, Environment & Safety, 
http://www.oxy.com/HTML/hes.html. Last visited September 10,2002. 
49 Unocal Guiding Principles, http://www.unocal.comlresponsibility/Olcrreport/principles.htm. Last 
visited September 10, 2002. 
50 Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper, at 
http://www.unocal.comlresponsibility/humanrights/hr2.htm. Last visited September 10, 2002. The 
complete paper is at http://www.unocal.comlresponsibility/humanrights/index.htm. Last visited 
September 10, 2002. 
51 Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper, at 
http://www.unoca1.com/responsibility/humanrights/hrl.htm. Last visited September 10,2002. 
52 Guiding Principles, supra note 49. 
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suppliers.53 Unocal, according to its code, is also interested in humanitarian measures 
aimed at promoting health, education and economic well being in communities where 
. 54 
they have operatIOns. 
A. EXTERNAL CODES 
Arguably, the most prominent ethical statements initiated by the private sector to 
address social and economic problems arising from international business operations 
are the Sullivan Principles.55 The Sullivan Principles introduced in 197756 are an 
exemplar of long-running private external efforts to influence corporate conduct. Its 
initiator, Rev. Leon Sullivan envisaged a situation in which corporations can use their 
influence and channel their resources toward eliminating social vices. 57 The apartheid 
system, which represented a dark spot in human history, had constituted itself into a 




55 Sullivan Principles For U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, Nov. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 1496 
[hereinafter Sullivan Principles]. 
56 See Maria Gillen, Note, The Apparel Industry Partnership's Free Labor Association: A Solution to 
the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor's New Clothes? 32 N.Y.U. 1. Int'l 1. & Pol. 1059, 
1077 (2000); Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa: The Lifting of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act Of 1986 and the Continuing Validity of State and Local Anti-
Apartheid Legislation, 6 Conn. J. Int'l 1. 7, 19 (1990). 
57 See Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and rare are the gems they war: holding De Beers accountable 
for trading conflict diamonds, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1402, 1469 (2001). 
58 For discussions on apartheid and its evil effects, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A "Benign" Apartheid: 
How Gender Apartheid As Been Rationalized, 5. UCLA J. Int'l & Foreign. Aff. 237, 241(2000-2001); 
Lennox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid Regime under International 
Law, 1 Rutgers Race & 1. Rev. 231 (1999); Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of 
Each Human Being: The.United Nations. NGOs. and Apartheid. 19 Fordham Int'l 1.1. 1464 (1996). 
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The Sullivan Principles were designed to encourage American compames 
doing business in South Africa to become actively involved in the struggle against the 
notorious and inhumane apartheid system. 59 Corporations that subscribed to the 
Principles were expected to ensure the absence of discrimination in the workplace.6o 
The intent was to provide a catalyst for the dismantling of discriminatory barriers in 
the larger society.61 At the peak of the code's popularity, up to 150 corporations had 
subscribed to it. 62 
B. GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
In December 2000, both the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign 
Office announced the conclusion and introduction of an agreement for the protection 
of human rights and provision of security in the international operations of certain 
59 See Lisa G. Baltazar, Government Sanctions and Private Initiatives: Striking a Balance for u.s. 
Enforcement of Internationally-Recognized Workers' Rights, 29 Colum. Human Rights 1. Rev. 687, 
716 (1998). 
60 See Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the Ethical 
Investor, 22. J. Corp. 1. 465 (1997); Richard T. De George, "Sullivan-Type" Principles For u.s. 
Multinationals In Emerging Economies, 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. 1. 1193, 1210 (1997). 
61 See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 Cornell Int'l LJ. 593, 616 (2000) (stating that the principles 
were introduced "to help promote racial equality in South Africa through the influence of large 
corporations. ") 
62 See Elisa Westfield, Note, Globalization, Governance, And Multinational Enterprise 
Responsibility: Corporate Codes Of Conduct In The 21st Century, 42 Va. 1. Int'l 1. 1075, 1092 
(2002). 
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businesses.63 Entitled the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, 64the 
pact was specifically designed for companies in the oil and mining sectors.65 
The crafting of the agreement involved the active participation of leading oil 
and mining companies as well as well- known human rights and labor organizations. 
They include five major oil companies namely Texaco Inc., Chevron Corp., (now 
jointly known as Chevron-Texaco), BP, Conoco Inc. (which has recently merged with 
Phillips Petroleum and now known as Conoco Phillips)66 and Royal Dutch/Shel1.67 
The mining companies are New Orleans-based Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold 
Inc. and Anglo-Australian mining conglomerate Rio Tinto.68 Representing the human 
rights angle were Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers' 
Committee for Human Rights, and International Alert, while the International 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and General Workers' Unions represented 
trade unions.69 Participating business organizations were the Prince of Wales 
Business Leaders Forum and Business for Social Responsibility.7o 
63 Albri~ht Announces Agreement on Principles For Security and Human Rights in Oil and Mining 
{~dust:les, WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, December 20, 2000, available at Lexis-Nexis, Curnws File. 
Ava~lableathttp://www.state.gov/www/global!humanrights/001220fsdrlprinciples.htm!. 
[Heremafter Voluntary Principles]. 
65 See Oil Meets Ethics, Weekly Petroleum Argus, January 15, 2001, at 6; Commission of the 
Europea~ . ~ommunities, Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Res~onslblhty, D~c. 01/9, July .19,2001; Testimony of Alan P. Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, 
Busmess and Agncultural AffaIrS, before the House International Relations Committee June 20 2002. 
"These principles are designed to provide practical guidance to strengthen human rights safegu~rds in 
company security in the extractive sector." 
66 Conoco merge~ with Phillips on August 30, 2002, creating the the third largest U.S. oil company 
(after Exxon MobIl and ChevronTexaco) and the 6th largest oil company in the world. David Ho $15.1 
~illi~n M~rg:r of Phillips Petroleum, Conoco Completed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 30, 2002. 
FIve 011 FIrms Agree to US-UK Human Rights Standard, OIL & GAS JOURNAL January 1 2001 
at 22. ' " 
68 Christian Bourge, Freeport, Rio Tinto Pledge Adherence to Rights Code, American Metal Market, 
December 27,2000, at 6. 
69 Human Rights Principles for Oil and Mining Companies Welcomed: u.s., u.K. Voluntary Principles 
"a Positive First Step," Human Rights Watch, press release, New York, December 21,2000; available 
at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000112/oil1221.htm. Last visited September 7 2002 
70 !d. ' . 
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The conclusion of the Voluntary Principles was informed by the problem of 
human rights abuses linked to those entrusted with the responsibility of providing 
security to company installations and facilities. In a bid to ensure that the operations 
of energy and mining companies went with minimum or no hindrance, security 
personnel were prone to overstepping their bounds as they sought to remove every 
'obstacle' on the way. Oil companies like Chevron in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria, Exxon Mobil in Aceh province in Indonesia and BP in Colombia came under 
incessant attacks for relationships they had forged with security forces, which had 
resulted in human rights abuses.71 In Niger Delta and Aceh, the problems stemmed 
from the use of company equipment by the security forces to perpetrate those abuses. 
In Colombia, BP hired security forces known for nefarious practices that were 
contrary or inimical to human rights.72 Besides, the Nigerian government, without due 
process, had executed a human rights and environmental campaigner, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, and eight others who had been complaining of the practices of Shell Petroleum 
Development Company, the Nigerian subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell.73 Shell was 
widely assailed for not using its influence with the Nigerian government to stop the 
executions.74 
, With all these incidents at the background, the governments of the United 
States and United Kingdom decided to be more proactive about the issues of security 
aI?-d human rights. This led to a series of meetings in the course of one year, 
71 
Be~ett Freeman, et aI, A New Approach to Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on 
~ecurzty and Hum~n Rights, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 423,427 (2001). 
Id. See also Juhette Benneth, The Role of the Private Sector in Preventing Funding Conflict 35 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 711, 715 (2002) , 
:3 See Paul ~ewis, Nigeria Rulers B~ck l!anging Of9 Members Of Opposition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 
995, at A9, Howard W. French, Nlgerza Executes Critic of Regime' Nations Protest NY T' 
Nov. 11, 1995, at 1. " . . rrnes, 
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culminating in the conclusion of the Voluntary Principles.75 The uniqueness of the 
Voluntary principles partly lies in the fact that it represents "the first time [that] a 
critical mass of extractive sector companies based in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom were willing to address [the] difficult issues [of security and human 
. ht ],,76 ng s. 
The Voluntary Principles have a two-sided objective: promoting human rights 
in the areas where the energy and mining companies operate, and at the same time, 
providing security for the companies so they can carryon their businesses effectively 
and in a peaceful environment.77Shedding light on the agreement and its intendment, 
then U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright said: 
The Principles address many of the hardest challenges 
facing oil and mining companies as they work to 
protect the safety and security of their people and 
operations, and they address as well many of the 
situations and practices for which companies in the 
extracting industry, rightly or wrongly, have been 
exposed to criticism on human rights grounds .... The 
agreement ... is a landmark for corporate responsibility 
and not just for U.S. and British companies in this one 
sector. It demonstrates that the best-run companies 
realize that they must pay attention not only to the 
particular needs of their communities, but also to 
universal standards of human rights, and that III 
addressing these needs and standards, there IS no 
necessary conflict between profit and principle.78 
74 See Paul Lewis, Rights Groups Say Shell Oil Shares Blame, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1995, at 6. 
75 Freeman, et aI., supra note 71 at 428. 
76 !d. 
77 According to Harold Koh, then Assistant Secretary of State whose Bureau of Democracy, Labor and 
Human Rights led U.S. efforts in crafting the agreement, the Principles set out with the objective of 
providing companies with "practical guidance on how to prevent human rights violations in dangerous 
environments, while meeting legitimate corporate security requirements." Harold Hongju Koh, A 
United States Human Rights Policy for the 21'1 Century, 46 St. Louis L.J. 293, 321 (2002). Citation 
omitted. See also Freeman, et aI., supra note 71 , at 427. 
78 Special State Department Briefmg With Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Federal News 
Service, December 20,2000; available at Lexis-Nexis, Curnws File. 
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The Voluntary Principles incorporate both existing standards, which the 
principles build on, and emerging best practices, which they crystallize.79 Indeed, the 
preamble to the accord clearly states that the agreement received guidance from the 
principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contained in 
international humanitarian law.8o 
Under the agreement, companies are expected to conduct a study of 
democratic and human rights conditions as part of their risk assessment.8 ! They 
should also ensure that the security measures they take in protection of their 
installations are in compliance with international law and not in violation of human 
rights. 82 The companies should also take the responsibility to monitor human rights 
violations by state security forces that protect their facilities and installations.83 
The agreement is an ambitious one that seeks to lay the foundation for global 
standards on these issues. 84Subscription to the code is expected to grow beyond the 
initial participants.85 As a matter of fact, the government of Netherlands has already 
signed on to the Voluntary Principles since December 2001.86 Corporations such as 
79 Freeman, et aI., supra note 71, at 435. 
80 Voluntary principles, supra note 64, Preamble. See also Sean D. Murphy, Voluntary Human Rights 
Principles for Extractive and Energy Companies, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 626 (2001). 
81 Voluntary Principles, supra note 64. 
82 !d. 
83 !d. 
84 According to Bennett Freeman, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who led the initiative to 
draft the agreement on behalf of the U.S. State Department, since announcing the principles, 
"agreement has been reached to invite into the process the half-dozen other governments and dozen 
other companies that have expressed an interest, laying the basis for a global standard." Bennett 
Freeman, Drillingfor Common Ground, FOREIGN POLICY, July 1, 2001. 
85 !d. 
86 Testimony of Lome W. Craner, Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau, Department of State, 
at a Hearing on the "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001," before the House 
International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, March 6, 2002. 
181 
Enbridge have also adopted or agreed to adopt the Principles.87 It should be noted 
however, that some major oil corporations elected not to participate. Even though it 
has large operations in one of the countries that are particularly targeted by the code 
(Colombia),88 U.S. oil company, Occidental refused to sign on to the accord. Exxon 
Mobil also decided to stay out of the pact, stating that its standards or practice already 
met the guidelines contained in the agreement. 89 
C. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CODES 
From the 1970s up till early 1990s, the international community spent a 
considerable length of time and expended enormous resources in trying to develop a 
"Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations." The United Nations sought to 
formulate a set of guidelines for corporate conduct, which, as to be expected, 
encompassed such issues as human rights and the environment. A resultant code 
would aim to be "an essential element in the strengthening of international economic 
and social cooperation,,90 and be an instrument "to maximize the contributions of 
transnational corporations to economic development and growth and to minimize the 
negative effects of the activities of these corporations.,,91 Unfortunately, 
87 Paul Taylor, Enbridge adopts rights policy, Financial Times (London) USA edition, February 27, 
2002, at 24. Enbridge, the energy transportation, distribution and retail energy group has operations in 
Colombia. !d. 
88 See Koh, supra note 77, at 321, (stating that Colombia is a key country with regard to this initiative.) 
89 The Discordant Accord: Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Agreement, 4:2 LatAm 
Energy, January 17, 2001, at 13. 
90 Baker, supra note 23, at 410 (citing Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, UN.E.C.O.S.O.c., 2d Sess., Annex, at pmbl., UN. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990)). 
91 !d. 
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notwithstanding the huge investment made into it, the process that commenced in 
1977 failed to produce an acceptable code. 92 
Efforts to draft the UN Code were discontinued in 1993.93 The latest draft code 
containing provisions relating to environmental protection is the 1988 version.94 The 
Draft Code contains a number of general and hortatory provisions relating to the 
environment, human rights and other issues. On the environment, the Draft Code 
states: 
Transnational corporations shall carry out their 
activities in accordance with national laws, regulations, 
established administrative practices and policies 
relating to the preservation of the environment of the 
countries in which they operate and with due regard to 
relevant international standards. Transnational 
corporations should, in performing their activities, take 
steps to protect the environment and where damaged to 
rehabilitate it and should make efforts to develop and 
apply adequate technologies for this purpose.95 
Taking aside the limitations of its generalized and recommendatory nature, it 
should further be noted that the above provision presupposes the existence of a strong 
regulatory framework III relation to the environment at both domestic and 
92Garth Meintjes, An International Human Rights Perspective on Corporate Codes, in GLOBAL 
CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 24, at 83, 91. Part of the reason for the failure was because many 
companies were opposed to the attempt by the UN to conclude a code of conduct for multinational 
corporations. David M. Schilling, Making Codes of Conduct Credible: The Role of Independent 
Monitoring, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 24, at 221, 222. The vehement 
opposition of Western governments also played a critical role in forestalling the adoption of the UN 
code of conduct. See Pia Z. Thadhani, Note, Regulating Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer? 
42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 619, 640 (2000). 
93 See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 
Envtl. L. 1,3 (1995). 
94 See Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation Of Transnational 
Corporations, and The Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 RU Int'l L.J. 261,272 (1997). 
95 U.N. Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, UN. ESCOR, Org. Sess. 1988, 
Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.l, (1988) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Code of 
Conduct] (emphasis added). 
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international levels. Where this is not the case, provisions such as this become of 
doubtful utility and may end up accomplishing nothing. 96 
With regard to human rights, the Draft Code provides: 
Transnational corporations shall respect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which 
they operate. In their social and industrial relations, 
transnational corporations shall not discriminate on the 
basis of race, colour, sex, language, social, national and 
ethnic origin or political or other opinion.97 
It is interesting to note that at the time the UN commenced the draft of the 
codes of conduct, its goals were primarily to regulate multinational corporations in 
order to prevent their interference with the internal politics oftheir host countries, and 
ensure that the negative impact of multinational corporate activities on national 
economic objectives were curtailed.98 Today, the tide has shifted. There is now a 
growing tendency to view corporations as being in a position to promote social 
changes in host countries. Thus, they are now expected, or obligated, some would 
argue, to interfere in the internal affairs of those countries when local political leaders 
h . h 99 launch an assault on uman ng ts. 
Obviously, the relationship between multinational corporations and host 
countries appeared to be quite cantankerous. Thus, the issue was approached from a 
96 Eaton, supra note 94, at 273. . 
97 Development and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Corporations, UN EconoIlllc 
and Social Commission, 2d Sess., Agenda item 7(d), at 1, UN Doc. Ell 990194 (1990). 
98 Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the 
Protection of International Human Rights, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade 153, 158 (1997). See also P.T. 
MUCHLINSKl MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5 -11, 457 (1995). 
99 This featured during negotiations on the Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights. See 
Freeman, et aI., supra note 71, at 437. Also, Shell Petroleum was heavily criticized for not using its 
leverage with the Nigerian government to prevent the denial of human rights of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 
other Ogoni leaders, who were eventually convicted alongside Mr. Wiwa and executed. 
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more adversarial perspective. loo However, the relationship seems to have gotten 
friendlier oflate, and corporations are now viewed with less suspicionlol and actually 
embraced by developing countries, which clamor for, and actively court, foreign 
investment. That being the case, if the Code of Conduct was being drafted today, 
there is greater likelihood that a different approach would be adopted. Instead of 
seeing MNCs and host countries as being in opposing camps, it can now be said that 
they are in the same camp, with the marginalized and disenfranchised peoples in the 
developing countries occupying the opposite arena. Those people are the ones that 
deserve protection and should be the focus of any future initiatives in that regard. 
The failure l02 of the UN efforts even at the early stages propelled the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to introduce a 
code of conduct known as Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 1976. 103 The 
1976 Guidelines were revised in 1991 104 have been further revised with the 
introduction of new guidelines in 2000. 105 
The Guidelines represent the firm expectations that the adhering countries 
have for the behavior of multinational corporations. 106 The scope of the Guidelines 
encompasses the various entities of a multinational enterprise, including parent 
100 See Frey supra note 98, at 165 - 166. 
101 Id., at 167. 
102 Joy C. Wigwe, Shell in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Case for Mandatory Codes of Conduct 
72 (Unpublished J.S.M. Thesis, 1997) (On file with the Standford University Library). 
103 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, Annex on 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 LL.M. 969. 
104 See Press Release, http://www1.oecd.org/media/release/nwOO-68a.htm. Last visited September 12, 
2002. 
105/d. 
106 OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Working Party on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: TEXT, 
185 
companies, local subsidiaries and intermediary levels of the organization, which are 
all expected to observe the Guidelines. 107 
Multinational Enterprises are encouraged to "take fully into account 
established policies in the countries in which they operate, and consider the views of 
other stakeholders."los Corporations should also obey national laws and policies and 
work toward the achievement of sustainable development by contributing to 
economic, social and environmental progress.109 Part V dedicated to the environment 
enjoins multinational enterprises: 
Within the framework of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices in the countries in which they 
operate, and in consideration of relevant international 
agreements, principles, objectives, and standards, take 
due account of the need to protect the environment, 
public health and safety, and generally to conduct their 
activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of 
sustainable development. I 10 
While the original Guidelines contained no direct mention of human rights, 
the current Guidelines specifically and expressly incorporate provisions on human 
rights. III Corporations should also accord respect to the human rights of those that 
live in areas where they operate. This should be consistent with the host government's 
obligations and commitments in internationallaw. 112 Supporting and upholding good 
COMMENTARY AND CLARIFICATIONS, Oct 31, 2001, at 9, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pdfIM000015000/M00015419.pdf. Last visited December 4,2002. 
I07Id. 
lOS OECD Guidelines, supra note 106. 
109 OECD Guidelines, para. 1. 
110 OECD Guidelines, Part V, preamble. 
III Glen Kelley, Note, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational 
Corporations, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'1 L. 483, 517 (2001). The original Guidelines contained, 
however, provisions addressing worker rights, non-discrimination in employment practices and social 
policies and development. Id. 
112 OECD Guidelines, para. 2. 
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principles of corporate governance and. developing and applying good corporate 
governance practices are also among the expectations on multinational enterprises. l13 
Disclosure of relevant company information is recommended. Companies are 
encouraged to communicate information regarding the social, ethical and 
environmental policies of the enterprise. 114 Corporations may also inform of other 
codes of conduct that they subscribe to, the date of adoption, the countries and entities 
that the codes apply to, and their performance in relation to those codes. 115 
Information relating to systems for risk management and compliance with laws may 
I b . d 116 a so e commumcate . 
One of the key elements of the new OECD Guidelines is the enhancement of 
procedures for implementing the code's provisions.117 Adhering countries are 
required to set up National Contact Points to undertake the implementation of the 
provisions of the Guidelines and to further their effectiveness. lIs The National 
Contact Points shall hold annual meetings to share experiences and report to the 
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise (CIME).119 The 
CIME is the OECD body charged with the responsibility for overseeing the 
~ .. f h G ·d 1· 120 lunctlonmg 0 t e Ul e meso 
1\3 OECD Guidelines, supra note 106. 
1I4 OECD Guidelines, part III, paras. 4 & 5. 
1I5 !d., para 5 (a). 
116 !d., para 5 (b). 
117 Press Release, supra note 104. 
lIS Decision of the OECD Council, June 2000, OECD, supra note 106, at 44, para 1 (1). See also 
OECD, id., at 46. 
119 Para 1 (3). 
120 OECD, supra note 106, at 49. 
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IV: CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CORPORATE CODES 
This part contains a general review of codes of conduct. It discusses both the 
strong points and the weaknesses of codes. It also makes suggestions in areas where 
improvements are needed. It concludes however that voluntary codes are not the 
panacea to the problem of corporate abuse in international business. A coordinated 
system of rights and responsibilities in international law to govern the activities of 
multinational corporations would be a better way forward. 
A. Utility of Codes 
In an atmosphere in which regulation of business is viewed unfavorably or with 
great suspicion, self-regulation gains much traction. It presents itself as a comfortable 
middle ground between the two sides of intrusive governmental regulation and an 
exclusive, laissez faire approach that leaves business alone. There is a strong belief 
that regulation, especially when done excessively, is harmful to business and the 
economy. 121 On the other hand, an equally strongly-held view claims that allowing 
businesses a free rein is a recipe for disaster, as it provides a breeding ground for 
I . 122 many unscrupu ous practlces. To avert the harm that could result, or curtail or 
121 For expressions of the conviction that regulation is harmful to business see Marta Russell 
Bac~/ash, the P?liti.cal Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & L~b. L. 335 (2000) 
~notmg t.he obJectIO~s of the CATO Institute, from the standpoint of free enterprise, that the 
mtroductIon of a partIcular piece of legislation, Americans With Disabilities Act amounted to "a re-
regulation of the economy that was harmful to business." Id;) Jeff Gimpel, Note, The Risk Assessment 
and Cost Benefit Act Of 1995: Regulatory Reform and the Legislation of Science 23 J. Legis. 61 72 
(1997). ' , 
122 See Michael Evan Stem & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stem, A Critical Overview of the Economic and 
Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power Industry 4 Envtl. L. 79 
106 (1997). ' , 
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eliminate it when it has already occured" the argument continues, the watchful eyes 
and intervention of public agencies are needed. 123 
Self-regulation provides a useful alternative to both viewpoints. Except for 
extremists on both sides, there is something to be said of corporate self-regulation. At 
least, it does not impose as much burden on corporations as governmental 
regulation. 124 Yet, it still gives room for business to be mindful of societal 
expectations to operate within certain acceptable parameters. This perhaps explains 
why some public interest groups that favor regulation and business groups that 
support a hands-free approach have been able to come together to craft some codes of 
conduct. 125 
There are certain situations where the utility of codes of conduct is apparent. 
One of such situations is where host country laws facilitate or fail to provide adequate 
guidance in relation to acts that are legally or morally prohibited in the corporation's 
123 Jeremy Lehrer, Trading P,:ofitsfor Change, 25 Hum. Rts. 21 (1998). "Everyone seems to agree that 
f2~vernm~nt-enforced regulatIOns are the best means of preventing industry abuses." Id., at 23. 
See PItt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 17. 
[S]elf-regulation, is preferable to government regulation, provided 
that self-re~~latIOn is subject to appropriate oversight and is 
pursue~ dI1I~ently.. Unavoidably, government regulation is 
exceSSIvely dIsruptIve to corporate enterprise. Corporate self-
regulation does not ,suffer ~o the same extent from this disability. 
Moreov~r, an e~fe~tIv~ regIme of corporate self-regulation (and a 
concormtant dIrmnutIon of government enforcement actions 
against c~rporate self-regulators) offers an opportunity to reduce 
the ~xorbItant costs currently added to the provision of goods and 
servIces .... 
!d., at 1561 - 62, Citation omitted, 
125 E V I p", I .g., 0 untary rm:Ip es whose c~afting involved a broad coalition of human rights and labor 
groups, large corporatIons and therr home governments. See Bennett Freeman C 
R 'b'I' d ' or po rate 
esponsl I lty an Human Rights, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 'I bl 
http'll IbId" . ' aval a e at 
. www.goalmensIOns.netiartlcles/cr/freeman.html. Last visited September 7,2002. 
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home country.126 In such circumstances, codes of conduct would seek to eliminate 
double standards or discourage corporations from engaging in acts that would be 
impermissible under the legal and moral standards prevailing in their home countries. 
In the presence of a weak legal system, codes have a propensity to shine. As the 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations observed a few years ago: "In 
some cases, self-regulation may be more effective than national regulations 
themselves, especially in those countries in which enforcement mechanisms are 
weak.,,127 
Corporate codes also serve a useful purpose in guiding128 the employees of a 
company in complying with the various laws that are binding on the company.129 
With the multifarious pieces of legislation and regulations that apply to corporations, 
a simple articulation of corporate obligations and responsibilities in a single 
document is a valuable resource. Employees would know the expectations on them, 
making it more difficult for them to explain away any breach of their legal duties or 
failure to comply with the requirements of applicable laws. 130 
126 Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 
24 Yale J. Int'l L. 257, 284 (1999). 
127 JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET: ECOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE 
OF GLOBALIZATION 48 (1997) (quoting UNTCMD, World Investment Report 1992: Transnational 
Corporations as Engines of Growth 90-91 (1992). 
128See. Michael S. Baram, Multinational Corporations, Private Codes, and Technology Transfer for 
Sustainable Development, 24 Envtl L. 33, 43 (1994) (stating that part of the reason corporations 
develop codes of conduct is to guide organizational behavior.) 
129 N' h I lC 0 s, supra note 126, at 284. See also Pitt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 17. 
130 See Cristina Baez, Michele Dearing, Margaret Delatour & Christine Dixon Multinational 
Enterprises and Human Rights, 8 U. Miami Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 183, 324 (1999/2000) (stating that 
codes ,~ould ser:e as a hedge against corporate misconduct. The authors also assert that corporate 
codes commumcate to management, employees, and the public that the corporation intends to obey 
both national and international law." ld., at 325.) 
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It should also be noted that the adoption of a corporate code could 
inadvertently impose legal constraints on a public company.l3l There is judicial 
authority for the position that where a company adopts a statement of policy, or an 
employee manual, it is bound to comply with its provisions. 132 Further, the adoption 
of a policy statement, without proper implementation or enforcement by the company 
adopting the code, could open the company to greater liability than it ordinarily 
would have been exposed to, if it did not adopt any code at all. 133 
The California Supreme Court recently held in Nike V. Kasky134that a company 
IS liable for untrue statements it puts out to the general public in relation to its 
workplace conduct. 135 A lawyer for the plaintiff in that case had earlier argued that 
"when companies create codes of conduct, those are more than words. Those 
commitments are legally enforceable.,,136 While this decision may be viewed as a 
bonus for corporate accountability, some commentators are of the opinion that it sets 
a dangerous precedent. 137 It could have the unwanted effect of forcing companies to 
::~ Pitt and Gro~kaufmanis, supra note 17, at 1560, n.8. 
See Toussaint v .. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 614 - 15, 292 N.W. 2d 
880, 892 (1980); Pltt and Groskaufmanis, supra note 17, at 1560, n.8. But see, The Quaker oats 
Company v. Dwayne Jewell, et aI., 27 Fla. Law Weekly D734 (Florida Court of Appeals March 28 
2002~ (holdin~ t~at in the absence of express language to that effect, an employee handbo~k does no~ 
conshtute a bmdmg ~on~ac.t of employment.) see also Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson and Greaves 
LLC, Handbook lsn t Binding Contract in Florida, But Don't Publish it Unless you mean it! 14'4 
FLORIDA EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER June 2002 . . 
133 ' • 
See Reese v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 360 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1978; Pitt and 
Groskaufmanis, supra note 17 at 1560 n 8 .. 
134 , .• 
119 CaI.Rptr.2d 296 CaI.,2002. 
135 Id. 
136 
Margery Gordon, Advan.tage ~eebok, CORPORATE COUNSEL, May 2001, at 86 (quoting Albert 
Meyer~o~f, Jr., a ?artner WIth Mtlberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, the law firm that represented 
the plamhff class m the suit against Nike ) 
137 • . 
See Bo~ Herbert, L.e~ Nike Stay in The Game, NY Times May 6, 2002, at A 21. 
(condemnm~ the decI~lOn as a limita~io~ on constitutional guarantees on free speech.) See also Free 
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restrict what they say or decide to say nothing at all and be hesitant about disclosing 
their policies and practices. 138 
Another benefit of corporate codes is that by promoting the fear of negative 
publicity, it could compel corporations to act right or refrain from doing wrong. 139 
While this may not be the case in a huge number of cases, it is hard to deny or ignore 
the enormous potential that this holds in ensuring responsible corporate behavior. 140 
Codes of conduct have proven themselves of tremendous utility as vehicles 
f:I . I h 141 . or SOCIa c ange m a number of concrete cases. The Sullivan Principles catalyzed 
the growth of a black trade union movement in South Africa and ultimately led to 
improved worker well being and major changes in industrial relations in that 
country.142 In the course of the seventeen years in which the Sullivan Principles were 
used, companies that subscribed to the code spent enormous sums of money - over 
$400 million - to provide support for black entrepreneurship and to improve the 
health, education and housing sectors. 143 A corporate code of conduct, the MacBride 
Principles, was instrumental to reducing employment discrimination based on 
religious grounds and in advancing equitable job opportunities in Northern Ireland. 144 
138 Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational 
Enterpri~e, 20 Wis. Int'l L. J. 89, 118 (2001). Baker argues that the response of multinational 
corporatIons could either be to eliminate their codes or make the provisions of those codes to be so 
g~neral in ~ature that the possibility of civil liability will practically be extinguished. He adds that 
smce there IS no legal requirement on MNCs to adopt corporate codes, lawsuits such as these would 
furt?er reduce or abrogate any incentive to articulate company policy in relation to human rights 
enVlronment and other related social issues. ' 
139 S ee Bloomfield, supra note 36 at 590. 
140 ' See generally, Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights Through 
~~sines~ Codes of Conduct, 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1,47 (1993). 
SantI~go A. Cu.eto, Note, Oil's Not Well in Latin America: Curing the Shortcomings of the Current 
Internatzonal EnVIronmental Law Regime in Dealing with Industrial Oil Pollution in Latin America 
~~rough Codes of Conduct, 11 Fla. J .. Int'l L. 585, 608 (1997). 
Perez-Lopez, supra note 140, at 44. See also Bloomfield supra note l36 at 589 
143 . " . 
Sethi, supra note 36, at 121. 
144p erez-Lopez, supra note 140, at 44-45. Bloomfield, supra note l36, at 590. 
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Through the introduction of codes of conduct, working conditions for workers at the 
Mandarin factory in EI Salvador were improved. 145 Workers who had lost their jobs 
were reinstated and were allowed to re-establish their union. 146 Similar results were 
also obtained at the Kimi garment factory in Honduras, where workers were allowed 
to unionize. 147 Codes have also ben instrumental in reducing the use of hazardous 
chemicals and improving ventilation and safety conditions at work places. 148 The part 
played by codes in contributing to the reduction of child labor has also been 
acknowledged. 149 
Arguably, the strongest point regarding the utility of corporate codes of 
conduct is that they could lay the foundation for future public initiatives at domestic 
and international levels. Where corporations follow the provisions of their code of 
conduct in foreign countries, not only can it galvanize local companies to improve 
their own behavior, it could also serve as a catalyst for legislative reform in those 
countries to improve social and economic conditions. 15o Internationally, codes could 
provide a basis upon which multinational corporate regulation in international law 
can be anchored. Thus, they have enormous potential to serve as a building block and 
a vital link in the whole process. 151 History has shown that is some instances where a 
social or economic problem had surfaced, corporate regulation was preceded by self-
145 Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, available at 
http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/publications.enldevelop.dossier/dd.07%20 (csr)/ Last visited 
December 4, 2002. 
146 Id. 
147 See !d. 
148 !d. 
149 Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It - and why the United States Shouldn't: The United States' 
International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 11 
DePaul Bus. L.J. 395,404 (1999). 
150 S ee Perez-Lopez, supra note 140 at 47 
151 ' • 
S.ee Donna Lee. Va~ C~tt, Regional Environmental Law in the Americas: Assessing the Contractual 
EnVIronment, 26 U. Mlalll Inter-Am. L. Rev. 489, 515 (1995). 
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regulation, which itself was an effort to fend off regulation. 152 As self-regulation 
. . d fi bl' I t' 153 faIled, the socIety clamore or pu IC regu a IOn. 
It is not far-fetched to think of a replication of this process in international 
law. If corporate codes continue to fall short in accomplishing their stated objectives, 
one outcome may be an "overwhelming demand for the promulgation of 
comprehensive national or international regulation for MNC operations in 
d I · . ,,154 Ind d d b b t th f If 1 t' b eve opmg natIOns. ee, ou ts a ou e success 0 se -regu a IOn y 
. 11 fi' . 1 . 155 multinational oil companies are already promptmg ca s or mternatIOna actIOn. 
There are a variety of ways in which codes can be utilized in developing an 
international regulatory system over the social, economic and environmental costs of 
international business transactions. One scholar has observed thus: 
Although corporate codes of conduct are ad hoc and 
arbitrary in nature ... it is possible to imagine a system 
of regulation that builds on the lessons of the corporate 
codes of conduct and yet brings them into the public 
domain. For example, U.S. common law courts could 
construe the codes of conduct as contracts and make 
them enforceable. Some state courts have taken this 
approach to company handbooks in the past two 
decades, thereby treating promises of job security 
contained in company handbooks as enforceable 
obligations. If this approach were transposed to the 
multinational arena, companies would be obligated to 
152 See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits 
and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30 Law & Pol'y 
Int'l Bus. 111, 157 (1998); Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International 
Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 663, 687 (1995). 
153 See Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: 
Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 327 
(1994) for an excellent discussion on the process of voluntary codes metamorphosizing into mandatory 
codes or legislation. 
154 Liubicic, supra note 152, at 157. 
ISS See Judith Kimerling, International Standards In Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: ThePrivatization 
Of Environmental Law, 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 289, 327 (2001): "Ironically, it is the failure of self-
regulation by international oil companies in remote areas and the abysmal track record of the oil 
industry generally that has led to growing agreement about the need for international oil field 
standards. " 
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comply with their own codes, and [those affected by 
their operations] would have standing to sue in U.S. 
courts if they did not comply. 156 
This work will develop this idea further in Part IV below. Suffice it to say, at 
this juncture, that it is clear that codes of conduct serve a useful purpose and should 
not necessarily be discarded. However, there are a host of limitations inherent in, or 
associated, with the current crop of codes. The next section looks at those limits and 
how far they go in undermining the efficacy and thus, utility, of corporate codes. 
B: Limits of Codes 
The Commentaries and Clarifications on the DECD Guideline/57 state that 
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises contain 
recommendations,,158 and emphatically declare that: 
The Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed 
by governments to multinational enterprises. They 
provide principles and standards of good practice 
consistent with applicable laws. Observance of the 
Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not legally 
enforceable; 159 
"non-binding 
156 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers In a Global Labor Market, 
3 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 93, 127 (1999). Citation omitted. 
157 Supra note 106. 
158Text, supra note, 106 Foreword, available at 
http://www.fifoost.org/allgemeinldivers/oecd multinat corp/index.php. Last visited September 7, 
2002. 
I 59Text, supra note 106 --, available at 
http://www.fifoost.org/aJlgemeinidivers/oecd multinat corp/node6.php. Last visited September 12, 
2002. 
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This is an ever-present feature in virtually every code of conduct and for this, codes 
have been widely excoriated. 160 
Voluntariness and non-bindingness are not inherently bad. A credible 
argument can be made that norms are more likely to be obeyed when those that are 
supposed to be subject to them participate in creatingl61 the norms and internalize 
them. 162 It is awfully hard to elicit corporate participation in the codes-creation 
process if there is a strong prospect that the emergent code would be binding. 163 
Corporations would rather lobby hard to see that those codes do not come into being 
than place their imprimatur on codes that purport to compel them to embrace social 
objectives. Consequently, initiators of codes are content to make a trade-off between 
participation and bindingness, in order not to lose out completely. 164 
The problem arises however, as it often does, when participation does not lead 
to internalization or compliance and recourse cannot be had to non-existent 
enforcement mechanisms. At that point, a major weakness of voluntary initiatives 
becomes glaring. 
160 See infra notes 179 - 182 and accompanying text. On the bindingness of codes, see Richard 
~~hwartz: Are the OECD an~ the UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding? 11 INT'L LAW. 529 (1977). 
See Pitt & Groskaufmams, supra note 17, at 1561, n.10. "[S]ome suggest that meaningful codes 
must be developed internally." 
162 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yale LJ. 2599, at 2645 - 2658 
(1997) \reviewing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
InternatIonal Regulatory Agreements (1995) and Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (1995)). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference? 111 
Yale L.J. 1935, at 1961 - 62 (2002). 
163.S.ee Irwin.Arieff, UN: One Year Later Global Compact Has Little to Show, Reuters, July 27,2001. 
(cItmg the VIews of U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Michael Doyle, who stated that corporations wre 
not desirous of accepting binding global corporate governace standards). See also JOHN M. KLINE 
INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS: SETTING GUIDELINES FOR 
INTE~ATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS 46 (1985). Writing about a particular international 
code, Klme states that "acceptance of the voluntary mode has been essential to secure participation ... 
?~ most Western governments as well as the acquiescence of many corporations." Id. 
Freeman et ~l, supra n~te :1, at 432-433; Freeman, supra note 125 (stating that corporations are not 
e.a~er . to negotIate for bmdmg or enforceable codes because of the (perceived or real) risks of 
htIgatlOn.) 
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It bears repeating that the fact that. codes are voluntarily does not necessarily 
translate to ineffectiveness, and that mandatory codes are not an automatically 
successful by reason of their obligatoriness. 165 A case can be made that voluntary 
codes are more likely to be effective. One scholar notes: "Paradoxically, because 
compliance with voluntary codes is optional, voluntary codes are potentially more 
powerful than [mandatory] codes.,,166 This is so because the "ultimate power of 
voluntary codes is a result of their encouragement of rigorous debate which ultimately 
improves the quality of the code.,,167 Voluntariness also carries with it a pragmatic 
advantage l68 in the sense that in order to gamer the initial support of those who may 
otherwise be skeptical about becoming part of the code, "the element of voluntary 
dh ,,169 b .. 170 a erence may e a necessary condItIOn. Moreover, making codes mandatory, 
instead of voluntary, could precipitate an economic quagmire, as discouraged foreign 
investors look to more favorable investment zones. 171 This is a huge price for many 
developing countries. 
However, the facts on the ground suggest that codes of conduct have generally 
been ineffective, and since most of these codes are voluntary, a correlation between 
ineffectiveness and voluntariness cannot be ruled out. In fact, it could be ~gued, 
instead, that since the voluntary approach has not fared very well, a change of 
methods is worth considering. 
165 For a discussio~ on the subtle distinction between effectiveness and success, especially in relation 
to codes, see MaSSIe, supra note 30 at 289 - 290 
166 ,.
Salbu, supra note 153" at 356. 
167 Id. 
168 Id., at 357. 
169 KI' me, supra note 163, at 46. 
17° Id. 
l7lW ' Igwe, supra note 102, at 108. See also Robert Grosse Codes of Conduct for Multinational 
Enterprises, J. World Trade L. 429 (1984). ' 
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Replacing the current regime of voluntary codes with mandatory codes could 
make a lot of difference. This is not a mere theoretical postulation. The present 
position finds substantiation in the fact that some corporations have already indicated 
their unwillingness to abide by the provisions or legitimate expectations of a code in 
the absence of a legal obligation to do so.172 
A mandatory code system also tackles the problem of free riding. At the 
moment, if a corporation decides to stay out of a particular code, thus taking 
advantage of some practices, which those who subscribe to the code are prohibited 
from engaging in, it faces no direct sanction. Perhaps, the greatest punishment it may 
face is negative reaction from consumers or the mere prospect of such a reaction. But 
the problem is that sometimes, sanctions of this nature have limitations and so do not 
always work. In the first place, consumers are not always well informed about what is 
going on in a particular industry.173 Also, where choices are limited, negative 
reactions are likely to cease or recede. People who live in a small town with only one 
gas station or those about to be stranded because their tanks are nearing empty, are 
not very likely to avoid filling their tanks at a station owned by a free-riding 
corporation. Besides, products such as crude oil are not usually sold to individuals 
who may be more discerning or discriminating,174 but to big purchasers including 
172 Studies conducted by two environmental groups, Friends of the Earth and Public Data Project, 
indicate that American multinational corporations involved in chemical manufacturing in Europe were 
not willing to release data on toxic emissions unless they were legally required to do so, 
notwithstanding that 12 of the companies are members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
which requires its members to subscribe to its Responsible Care Program. See Melissa S. Padgett, 
Environmental Health and Safety - International Standardization of Right-to-Know Legislation in 
Response to Refusal of United States Multinationals to Publish Toxic Emissions Data for the United 
Kingdom Facilities, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 701 (1992). 
173Macek, supra note 34, at 111, 114. 
174 See Danielle Everett, New Concern for Transnational Corporations: Potential Liability for Tortious 
Acts Committed by Foreign Partners, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 1123, 1150 (1998) (pointing out that oil 
198 
governments who may show greater concern for providing for their citizens' fuel 
needs and avoiding any social upheaval or political backlash that might result from 
fuel scarcity. 
Companies that are not part of the voluntary code arrangement may therefore 
escape any form of liability. At the same time, they are adequately positioned to enjoy 
any benefits afforded the industry, due to the responsible behavior of some in that 
industry. 175 If people viewed fossil fuels negatively and decided to work against them, 
an effort by the industry to introduce a code to improve its conduct may elicit a 
change in societal attitude. Deciding to continue to patronize that industry would 
likely be to the benefit of the entire industry, not just those that signed on to the code. 
A mandatory code will eliminate this injustice. It will terminate the competitive 
advantage l76 that non-participating companies may enjoy over those who submit to a 
code. l77 It is little wonder therefore, that transactions in which the potential for much 
and gas companies are not in the same position as retail manufacturers who sell directly to the public 
and thus bow to public opinion.) 
175 See Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal Liabilities for Violations of 
International Law, 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 401, 428 (2002). 
176 The companies who do not adopt codes are likely to have a competitive advantage over those who 
do. Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights Through 
Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 603, 617 (2000) See also Macek, supra note --, 
at 118. "The corporation that adopts a code of conduct will generally fmd itself at a competitive 
disadvantage." Citation omitted. See also JOEL MAKOWER, BEYOND THE BOTTOMLINE 30 
(1994) (quoting Milton Friedman's argument that "companies that did adopt responsible attitudes 
would be faced with more binding constraints than companies that did not, rendering them less 
competitive.") But see DAVID HUNTER, et al., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 1409 (2d ed. 2002) contending that notwithstanding that codes are not binding on 
signatory companies, in certain sectors, companies may need to be a part of a code in order to be 
competitive. 
177 See Anderson, supra note 28, at 490 (stating that the absence of uniformity and consistency could 
lead to a competitive advantage.) The converse argument could be made that that corporations, which 
decide to stay out of a particular code, may be the ones at a disadvantage, since they may suffer from 
negative publicity and any other available sanction. Assuming this is true, the fact still remains that if 
they perceive that they are at a disadvantageous position, they could join the code at any point, even 
with much fanfare and commendation form watchdog groups. On the other hand, a corporation that 
subscribed to the code, and later felt that being a part of the code was actually bad for business, may 
find that opting out of the code would not be so easy and would likely attract negative publicity, and in 
some cases, opprobrium. 
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opportunism exists are fertile grounds for the cultivation of binding mechanisms or 
. . . 178 mstltutIOns. In the case of a mandatory code, those who fail to live up to their 
obligations will attract stiffer sanctions through enforcement, which is not always the 
case with voluntary codes. 
Lack of enforcement is certainly a real impediment to the effectiveness of 
corporate codes. 179 The abandoned UN Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations has been adjudged weak by commentators because it does not provide 
for a formal enforcement process that would ensure compliance with the code's 
provisions. 18o Because of the absence of a legal enforcement mechanism in virtually 
every code of conduct, realizing their stated objectives has not met with much 
success. 181 What the voluntary and unenforceable nature of codes does is to provide a 
"shelter" for MNCs, enabling them to continue to operate in a system of de facto, if 
not de jure, unaccountability.182 
178 '<'"C -'- ----
Jeffrey L. :QjliIQff~ Joel P. Trachtrnan, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 
1,41 (1999). 
179 Bloomfield, supra note 36, at 571. "The most pressing problem with codes of conduct is 
enforcement." See also Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global 
Theater: Is Nike Just Doing It? 15 Ariz. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 905, 907 (1998). The prevalence of this 
criticism is widely acknowledged. See Baker, supra note 138, at 139. "Arguably the single-most point 
of contention concerning MNE internal codes of conduct revolves around the issue of enforcement." 
180M , . 2 emtjes, supra note 9 ,at 413. 
181 Ayoub, supra note 149, at 405. See also Post, supra note 35, at 111. "Enforcement is essential for 
an effective code of conduct. Failure to create a working enforcement mechanism can doom a code to 
failure ~ the world of practice." .There is actually a counter argument that enforcement instead of being 
benefiCIal would actually be an Impediment to a code's success. Some commentators see enforcement 
as disruptive of the corporate enterprise. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 11, at 1561, n.lO. The 
argument is that enforcement of a code's requirements could lead to a contentious adversarial 
environment. Id. If government agencies give enforcement an important place in the impl:mentation of 
public policies, it is further contended, the resulting "relationship between regulators and regulated is 
one of mutual suspicion, distrust, and in some cases, open hostility." Id. (Citing J. SIGLER AND 1. 
~URPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 116 (1988)). 
Sacharoff, supra note 26, at 937. 
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Not only are mechanisms for enforcement absent in many a code, monitoring 
mechanisms are also sorely missing. 183 Without monitoring, it becomes difficult to 
benchmark corporate performance and compliance with codes of conduct and 
national law. 184 Three types of monitoring are best known: internal monitoring, 
external monitoring, and independent monitoring. 185 The corporation itself conducts 
internal monitoring. 186 External monitoring involves an outside party hired by the 
. 187 h . corporatIOn. T e external momtor reports to the corporation that hired it. 188 In the 
case of independent monitoring, monitors are outsiders who enjoy financial 
independence from the company whose operations are being monitored. 189 
Independent monitors report to the company, but report also to consumer 
communities and other interested parties. 190 Of these three types of monitoring, 
183 Some commentators have noted: 
While some observers call the standards strict, the codes contain 
significant limitations. First, they usually do not contain 
mechanisms for enforcement. Further, they generally do not 
contain any provisions regarding monitoring of business partners. 
Eve~ w~len .a code requires or recommends such monitoring, the 
momtonng IS almost never conducted by an independent agency. 
As a result, they are standards without teeth and function primarily 
as a public relations gesture. 
Laura Ho, et aI., (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global 
Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 Harv. C.R. - C.L. L. 
Rev. 383,401 (1996). Citations omitted. 
184 Shill' c mg, supra note 92, at 227. 
185 R uth Rosenbaum, In Whose Interest? A Global Code of Conduct for Corporations in GLOBAL 
CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 24 at 211 215 ' 





190 Id .. ~ee also ~chilling, supra. note 92. In~epende~t monit?ring is also defined in the following 
:"or?s .. An effe~tI~e process of drrect observatIon and mformatIon-gathering by credible and respected 
mstItutlOns ~nd ~dlvlduals to e~sure compliance with corporate codes of conduct and applicable laws 
to pr~~ent ;,lOlatlOns, process ~nevances, and promote humane, harmonious and productive workplace 
condl~lOns. Id., at 228 (quoting the working defmition developed by the Independent Monitoring 
W orkmg Group.) 
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independent monitoring is preferred and is considered an important factor in the 
success and credibility of a code with the members of the public.
191 
However, in many cases where there is a system for monitoring in place, it is 
internal. l92 A credible contention could be made that a good and thorough internal 
monitoring process could produce real reforms if companies were willing to make it 
so. Problem is, however, that self-monitored results are hardly ever made public, 
therefore the outside world and in fact shareholders also, do not know whether 
company claims to follow codes are real claims or mere public relation gestures. It is 
in view of that that internal monitoring is criticized because it "smells of the fox 
minding the chicken coop, and serious questions arise regarding the extent to which 
code violations will be disclosed.,,193The validity of internal monitoring is suspect and 
their most remarkable service may be to provide MNCs with a useful public relations 
device, enabling them to divert attention from any existing gap between what they say 
and what they dO. 194 External monitoring also has problems. When sports goods 
manufacturer Nike hired an external monitor, the former U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations, Mr. Andrew Young, the mission did not meet with much success and 
attracted widespread criticism.195 Independent monitoring also has its limitations. 
Sullivan Principles that had one of the best systems of monitoringl96 still did not 
191 Schilling, supra note 92, at 227. 
192 See Leighton, et al., supra note 1, at 50 
193 Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1533 (1998) 
(reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Lance A. 
Compa & Stephen F. Diamond, eds., 1996). 
194 Liubicic, supra note 152, at 138. 
195 See Watching the Sweatshops, New York Times, Editorial, August 20, 1997. 
196 See William B.T. Mock, Corporate Transparency and Human Rights, 8 Tulsa J. Compo & Int'l L. 
15 (2000). The monitoring was done by an auditing fIrm, Arthur D. Little. For further dicussion on 
this, see Hess & Dunfee, supra note 61, at 617. 
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accomplish much, although one would not want to take away some of its successes 197. 
The initiator, Rev. Sullivan, was constrained to call it a failure l98 and withdrew his 
support. 199 Douglass Cassell comments thus, on the impact of the Sullivan Principles: 
Nevertheless, far-reaching as they were, the Sullivan 
Principles failed both in their ostensible goal, to bring 
down apartheid, and in their tactical goal, to offer a 
publicly palatable alternative to divestment from South 
Africa. By 1987, even Reverend Sullivan pronounced 
his principles a failure and disassociated himself from 
h . .c, 200 t elr luture use. 
As a matter of fact, the relative ineffectiveness of the Sullivan Principles led to their 
replacement by laws that prohibited most types of business relations with the 
apartheid government in South Africa.201 
Another problem with corporate codes is vagueness.202 It is not unusual to see 
a code referring to "standards" without a definition of what that word entails.203 The 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, realizing that this was a weak 
point in previous codes, set out to confront it from the onset and made sure that its 
197 See Sethi, supra note 36, at 117, 121 (acknowledging Sullivan Principles' success, but also noting 
their reduced impact. "Despite its apparent success in funneling badly needed funds to community-
related causes, it is doubtful that the Sullivan Principles contributed more than marginally to the 
abolition of apartheid, or left a lasting legacy in terms of improving black economic empowerment.") 
Sethi also states that the Sullivan Principles were "a signifIcant step forward" but further observes that 
the Principles were not successful in ending apartheid and were later rejected by Rev. Sullivan. Id., at 
90. 
198 See Richard T. De George, "Sullivan-Type" Principles For u.s. Multinationals In Emerging 
Economies, 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 1193 (1997). 
199 See J. Clay Smith, Jr, United States Foreign Policy and Galer Teal Butcher, 37 How. L.J. 139, 186 
(1994). 
200 Cassell, supra note 27, at 1971. Citation omitted. 
201 Nichols, supra note 126, at 285 n.15; Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note, at 666-
67; See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) 
(codifIed at 22 U.S.c. 5001 (1988 & Supp.1II 1991. The Act has been repealed. 
202 Toftoy, supra note 179, at 905 (1998). See also Kimerling (2002), supra note 18, at 531 (stating 
that "most corporate commitments are vague and inexplicit .... ") 
203 See Toftoy, supra note 179. But see Baker, supra note 138, at 138 (stating that some codes are 
"quite specifIc in the behavior that they do and do not tolerate.") 
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provisions go beyond general statements.204 Unlike many prevIOus efforts, the 
Voluntary Principles are "narrowly tailored to address substantive issues with a high 
level of detail.,,205 The vagueness of codes sharply contrasts with legal stipulations 
and regulations, which are usually more detailed and precise.206 The lack of clarity 
and specificity means that obligations supposedly assumed can easily be evaded.207 
The blurred lines between what is required and what is recommended, and between 
that which employees are prohibited from doing and that which is merely 
discouraged, portends a scenario in which everything is acceptable.208 In the absence 
of a clear definition of standards and obligations, compliance becomes difficult to 
measure. Lack of compliance becomes harder to spot and stop. Those who are under-
performing go scot-free. Such a system is simply not the best.209 
Corporate codes are also faulted because they generally do not afford any 
remedies to injured parties.2IO While it may be a commendable step to profess all the 
good things that a company would do, and all the not-so-good things that it would 
refrain from doing, one cannot but question the value of any code, if those injured in 
breach of its provisions get no redress or remedy. Therefore, for codes to accomplish 
their stated obj ectives, one writer notes, "[ m]eaningful remedies must also be 
available when corporations violate their own codes. Among other things, code 
204 Freeman, et aI., supra note 71, at 435. 
205Id. 
~06 See Isabelle Martin, The Limitations to the Implementation of a Uniform Environmental Policy 
m The European Union, 9 Conn. 1. Int'l L. 675 699 (1994 1 207 ' /. 
Anderson, supra note 28, at 490. 
208 See Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of Conduct 10 Am. U. 
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1275, 1286 (1995). ' 
209 F furth d' . or er IscusslOns on vagueness and lack of specificity of codes, especially in the international 
context, see Salbu, sunra note 153 at 341-42 
210 " 
Anderson, supra note 28 , at 490. 
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violations must be rectified swiftly and with enough force to act as deterrents of 
future violations.,,2II 
One additional observation to be made about the concept of voluntary codes 
of conduct is that it has garnered enemies from both sides of the ideological spectrum. 
While those on the left would prefer that codes are strengthened or discarded in favor 
of regulation, some on the right find problem with the whole idea of codes. These 
critics on the ideological right assail corporate codes, insisting that codes stifle 
innovation and divert the corporation's attention from its core mission, which is the 
maximization of profit for its shareholders.212 Nobel prize-winning economist, Milton 
Friedman, is noted as stating that "there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits 
so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud.,,213 
It should be noted however, with due respect to Professor Friedman, that his 
vlews on this subject does not enjoy wide acceptance, even from the corporate 
. 214 commumty. Indeed the notion that corporations should only focus on profits and be 
oblivious to social and economic problems arising from their operations will continue 
to receive strident opposition.215 It is hard to argue against the observation of a noted 
211 H ermstadt, supra note 21, at 363. 
~:: Se~ Pitt ~ Groskaufmanis, supra note 17, at 1630, 1633. 
Mllton Fned~an, The Social.Re.sponsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
13, 197~ [Magazme] , at 32. This IS a popular VIew from this ideological spectrum. For similar views 
see DaVId Henderson, The Harm in CSR, FINANCIAL POST February 2 2002 at FP 11' T ' 
C 
• ". 'd . '" , erence 
2srcoran, lVlISgul ed VIrtue, FINANCIAL POST, February 2, 2002, at FP 11. 
Freeman, supra note 71, at 429. 
215 S ee Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American Corporate 
Go~ernance, 55 SMU L. Rev. 493 (2002). "":allace states that to ensure the profitability of their 
busmess, even corpora~e. managers that subscnbe to the traditional model of corporate governance 
canno~ a~ford, at a mIDlmum, not to engage employees, consumers, suppliers, nongovernmental 
orgaruzatlOns, governments, governments and others, as this is essential to the shaping of the kind of 
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human rights scholar that as multinational corporations "become publicly linked to 
grave human rights abuses ... either through direct involvement or tacit support of 
governmental violations, the theoretical separation between maximizing profits and 
'bl .. 11 ,,216 responsl e corporate activIty co apses. 
Another unsavory feature of many of today' s codes is their conclusion without 
the participation and contribution of stakeholders and people that would directly be 
affected by the code's objectives.217 Involving international NGOs as some initiators 
of codes218 have chosen to do is a commendable move. But it is not adequate. 
Representatives of oil producing communities must be a part of the code formulation 
and implementation process for the code to enjoy high credibility and wide 
acceptance. When stakeholders are invited to be a part of the process, it evidences 
economic environment conducive to profit-making. In any case, it is doubtful that business will thrive 
for long in a chaotic environment. Neglect of human rights, environment and other social issues that 
are important to the community in which a corporation operates could be dangerous for business. It is 
in a company' interest therefore to promote and protect these rights and community wellbeing. As, 
Mark Moody-Stuart, Chairman of Royal Dutch/Shell aptly surmised: "the demands of economics, of 
the environment and of contributing to a just society are all important for global commercial enterprise 
to flourish." Mark Moody-Stuart, The Values of Sustainable Business in the Next Century, Lecture at 
st. Paul's Cathedral, London (July 12, 1999), available at 
http://www.wbcsd.ch/newscenter/speeches/sdvalues.pdf. 
216 Frey, supra note 98, at 157. 
217 Writing on the importance of involving stakeholders in the formulation and implementation 
process, one writer states: 
A stakeholder approach sorts out descriptively who in a particular 
context is affected and how, and, normatively, what 
responsibilities each party has to the other. Stakeholders are any 
persons, social groups, collectives, institutions, political/economic 
systems, or even the ecosystem that affects, participates in, or is 
affected by, a particular situation, dilemma or action." 
Post, supra note 35, at 113 (quoting Patricia H. Werhane, Commentary: The Business Ethics of Risk, 
Reasoning, and Decision-Making, in David M. Messick and Ann E. Tenbriensel, eds., CODES OF 
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 332-33 (1996)) Citation 
omitted. See also R.E. FREEMAN and D.R. GILBERT, CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE 
SEARCH FOR ETHICS (1988); Sethi, supra note 36, at 117,118. 
218 For Example, The U.S./UK Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, supra note 64. 
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trust, a critical element in any meaningful relationship, and an important factor in the 
eventual success or otherwise of that code.219 
Related to the above is the lack of communication that is associated with 
many codes. The supposed beneficiaries of a code often do not know of its existence. 
"Companies always distribute these documents to employees but often do not make a 
conscious effort to provide them to suppliers, customers and other interested 
stakeholders.,,22o During the investigator's research trips to Nigeria in 1999 and 2002, 
where he held meetings with a number of activists and community leaders in the oil 
producing areas, none of the people he met seemed to know anything about the 
corporate codes of any of the oil companies operating in Nigeria. An official of 
Chevron that was gracious enough to grant an interview to the investigator under 
anonymity did not extend his magnanimity to providing a copy of the code to him, 
even when when specifically requested.221 
Codes are clearly insufficient.222 The verdict in many quarters is that codes 
have not been a huge success.223 In short, codes are perceived to be of such limited 
utility that "critics have dismissed [them] as meaningless generalities, unreliable 
guidances, unenforceable promises, and inadequate substitutes for regulation.,,224 
219 See Hermstadt, supra note 21, at 360 - 61. 
220 Murphy, supra note 24, at 295, 298. Murphy found in a 1997 survey that only 47% of the 
companies surveyed communicated their statements to both internal and external stakeholders. !d., at 
300. 
221 This even contrasts with the position under Chevron's code that the company would communicate 
its policies to the communities where it operates. See Chevron Code, supra note 40. 
222 Anderson, supra note 28 , at 499. 
223See Douglas S. Morrin, Book Review, People Before Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability 
for Labor Rights Violations Abroad Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 427 
(2000). "[W]hile codes of conduct may seem impressive, they have been largely ineffective at realizing 
the goals they purport to pursue." Id., at 429. Citation omitted. See also RUSSELL MOKHIBER & 
ROBERT WEISSMAN, CORPORATE PREDATORS: THE HUNT FOR MEGA-PROFITS AND 
THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 84 (1999). 
224 Baram, supra note 128, at 42. Citation omitted. 
207 
The limitations of codes have prompted victims of corporate abuse to seek 
th f 11 ' t' 225 0 o er avenues 0 ca mg corpora IOns to account. ne of such avenues is 
international civil litigation.226 The next part will discuss that. Unfortunately, 
international litigation as it currently exists does not offer sufficient remedy or 
provide an adequate solution. Therefore, part N also examines ways of improving the 
situation mainly through international legal and policy reforms that would create 
definite rights and correlative duties in relation to multinational corporations. 
V: BEYOND VOLUNTARY CODES OF CONDUCT 
Corporate codes of conduct could prove a useful tool for corporate accountability. 
Unfortunately, they also have a number of limitations that militate against their 
effectiveness. Translating their dictates into reality is a big problem. Many codes 
"declare laudable goals that, if implemented as advertised, would indeed better 
protect people and their resources.,,227 Sadly, they are not. As a consequence, 
corporate abuses have continued, even where codes exist. Victims of such abuses, 
apparently unwilling to place their salvation in the hands of these codes, have called 
attention to their plight and sought solace through other devices and avenues. One of 
such avenues is the domestic judicial system in the United States. This part will 
briefly discuss that journey and how it may not be able to achieve the ultimate goal, 
225 d An erson, supra note 28, at 490. 
226 See ~d . '. at, 490; Br~d Kieserrnan, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate 
fz~spo.nslbllzty by Amendzng the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 881, 885 (1999). . 
LeIghton, et aI., supra note 1, at 50. 
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because it may be hamstrung by its own inadequacies. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
consider international policy changes, which this part also recommends. 
A. DOMESTIC JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
In 1996, victims of abuses emanating from a commercial relationship between an 
American oil company, Unocal, and the military government of Burma (Myanmar) 
resorted to litigation as a weapon to address and redress their grievances against the 
alleged perpetrators.228 The emergence of the transnational cases against Unocal is 
but another illustration of the difficulty in relying on codes as a panacea to the 
problem of corporate malfeasance. The lawsuits were brought under the Alien Tort 
CI . th alms Act, an 18 century statute that empowers United States district courts to hear 
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States. ,,229 A federal court in California held that 
Unocal could be held liable under. the ATCA.23o Although the court eventually 
granted Unocal's motion's for summary judgment and ruled that the case could not 
go ahead because the facts were not sufficient to hold Unocalliable, the finding that 
the court had subject matter jurisdiction was in itself a milestone.231 In September 
2002, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling that Unocal 
can be sued for forced labor, rape, and murder committed by the Burmese soldiers 
who were guarding a major ga~ pipeline project that Unocal was involved with?32 ill 
228 
See NCGUB v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 344 (CD. Cal. 1997). John Doe v. Unocal Corp 963 
F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). ., 
229 28 U.S.c. 1350. 
230 
231 See supra note 228. Both cases survived the motions Unocal brought to dismiss the suits. 
See Cadyn Carey, Unocal Corporation Can Be Liable for Human Rights Abuses in Burma 7 H 
Rts. Br. 9, 11 (1999). . ' urn. 
232 Jim Lobe, Oil Firm Liablefor Overseas Abuses by Agents, Inter Press Service, September 19,2002. 
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the court's reasoning, "because Unocal knew the acts of violence would probably be 
committed, it became liable as an aider and abettor when such acts of violence -
specifically, murder and rape - were in fact committed.,,233 
Similar cases have been brought against a number of corporations in a variety of 
. d t' . 1 d' '1 234 " 235 236 237 m us nes mc u mg 01 , mmmg, beverages and agriculture. In 2002, a state 
court in California, where the Unocal case was re-filed for state law claims, held that 
Unocal should stand trial for alleged abuses in Burma.238 This is a watershed decision 
as it is the first case to so hold.239 
Apart from international civil litigation arising from alleged corporate misconduct 
abroad, the domestic legal system has also proven a veritable vehicle for calling 
corporations to account when they misbehave. There have been numerous cases 
where oil companies have been subjected to sanctions under existing laws for some 
violation or the other. Faced with a lawsuit alleging that it had polluted Santa Monica 
Bay when it dumped thousands of pounds of oil, grease, ammonia, and some other 
pollutants in excess of discharge permits, Chevron agreed to settle the lawsuit in 
1988, the terms of which settlement required the company to pay a civil penalty of 
233 T • Jane Doe I v'. Unocal CorporatIOn, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263; 2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 
9585; 2002 Dally Journal DAR 10794 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
September 18,2002), at 63. ' 
234 S . ee John Doe v. Exxon Mobll, No. 1:0ICY01357 (D.D.C. filed June 20, 2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, 
Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Bowoto, 
et aI., v. Chevron Corporation, Case No. C 99-2506 CAL, United States District Court Northern 
District of California, San Francisco; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. 
at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 1998). . 
235 S 236 ee Beanal v. Freeport McMoran 969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997). 
237 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, No. 01-03208-CIY (S.D. Fla. filed July 21,2001). 
See Villeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, No. 01-3399-CIY (S.D. Fla. filed August 30 
2001). ' 
238 hn 239}O Roe III v.ynocal Corp.,.No ~C237679 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A., filed August 20,2001). 
For t~e firs~ tlIl~e, an Amencan Judge has ordered a U.S. corporation to stand trial for alleged 
human nghts VIOlatIOns corrnnitted by a joint-venture partner overseas." Peter Waldman Unocal to 
face Trial Over Link to Forced Labor, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 12,2002, at Bl, :83. 
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$1.5 million?40 Also with regard to water pollution, Chevron's President decided to 
personally plead guilty to more than sixty violations of the Clean Water Act, and in 
addition to that, paid fines of up to $8 million in lieu of tria1.241 Unocal's operations 
led to what has been described as California's 'largest and America's fourth largest oil 
spill.,242 Because of soil contamination, through the leak of 8.5 million gallons of 
clear, diesel-like fluid over a forty-year period, Unocal had to agree to a settlement 
with the Attorney General of California, under which the company would pay $43.8 
million, excluding clean-up costs, unarguably the largest civil action settlement in 
California's history.243 
The existence of corporate codes did not, or would not have been able to, stop any 
of the above punished acts of conduct. If there were no laws or legal structures and 
institutions to call them to account, the delinquent corporations would have escaped 
accountability. Unfortunately, this is the situation today both in some developing 
countries and in international law, where the extant system does not have much 
application to these major corporations.244 
A lucid illustration of this state of affairs is provided by the recent skirmish 
between some groups of Nigerian women and some major oil corporations operating 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In July 2002, Itshekiri women took scores of 
local and expatriate Chevron-Texaco oil workers hostage, threatening to pull their 
240S L'h ee elg ton, et aI., supra note 1, at 59. 
241Id. 
242 Id., at 64. 
243 Jd F U l' ... . or more on noca s corporate practIces m relatIon to human rights and environment see 
ROBERT BENSON, CHALLENGING CORPORATE RULE: THE PETITION TO REYOKE 
~OCAL'S C:~AR!ER.AS A GUIDE TO CITIZEN ACTION (2000). 
The prevaIlmg. VIew l~ that international law applies to States and that corporations of municipal 
law do not have mternatIonal legal personality. See, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (5 th ed., 1998). 
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clothes and expose their nakedness if their demands were not met.245 Shortly, 
thereafter, women from Ijaw and Ilaje ethnic groups followed suit, seizing production 
platforms of Shell Petroleum Development Company and Chevron-Texaco.246 They 
complained of various social and economic problems arising from oil production and 
the attendant devastation of the natural environment, and demanded that the 
b d· d 247 consequences e reme Ie . 
The women took this course of action apparently because they felt that neither the 
oil companies code of conduct nor the Nigerian legal structure afforded sufficient 
protection or inclination to prevent and remedy the situation.248 
There is the dire need for the establishment of strong governance structures in 
many States and a restructuring of international law to address the social and 
economic costs of multinational corporate activity. Reliance on codes and any other 
form of corporate self-regulation is not good enough and while codes have their use, 
they should not replace governmental efforts. As one scholar puts it: "Corporate 
ethics and self-regulation should play a role in raising levels of environmental 
245 For a report on the demonstrations, see Women Remain at Chevron Terminal; Nigerian women 
storm facility demanding amenities, 131:52 OIL DAILY, July 11, 2002 . See also Daphne Wysham, 
America IS SUVs and the women of the Niger Delta, Plain Dealer, August 11, 2002, at Fl. 
246 See Nigerian women expand Chevron takeover: Demands for jobs, improvements, spread to four 
more facilities of oil giant, Edmonton Journal, July 18,2002, at A5. 
247 See Michael Peel, Chevron near deal to end women IS sit-in, Financial Times (London), July 17, 
2002, at 5. 
248 See also petition launched in November 2002 by a Geneva-based NGO (World Organisation 
Against Torture) against Shell and Chevron. Case NGA 181102. VA W /ESCR: Violence Against 
WomenlViolations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Torture and III Treatment Against Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Chevron/Texaco Nigeria Ltd; available at 
http://www.omct.org. Last visited December 8, 2002. 
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protection in the oil fields, but they are not a panacea that can replace government 
regulation. ,,249 
A. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 
The approach favored by this work in addressing the social and economic costs of 
multinational business activity is international legal control of multinational 
corporations. This approach is anchored on two broad premises: that codes are 
inadequate and that the current wave of international lawsuits is not capable of 
sufficiently addressing these problems. 
Regarding the first premise, it can safely be asserted that the existing system of 
codes has not been as effective as required for societal well-being inasmuch as it 
simply expects corporations to do the right thing, because it is the right thing to do. 
Thus, it anchors participation and compliance on "grace", rather than "obligation.,,25o 
This is problematic. A transformation to a stronger system is necessary, if meaningful 
changes are expected. As Professor Mock has observed: 
In order for corporate support for human rights to 
become a routine of corporate commitment, it must 
cease to be a matter of corporate grace and rise to the 
level of corporate obligation. In other words, corporate 
support for human rights must operate on the level of 
social, political, and economic activity, however 
inspired such commitment may be from the moral level. 
The essential practical distinction between the social, 
political, and economic levels, on the one hand, and the 
moral level, on the other, is that accountability for one's 
249 Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: The Privatization of 
Environmental Law, 26 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 289, 396 (2001). 
250 William B.T. Mock, Corporate Transparency and Human Rights, 8 Tulsa 1. Compo & Int'l L. 15 
(2000). 
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actions arise temporally in the former spheres of action, 
whereas accountability or credit for moral actions must 
await another, less visible world. Corporations must, 
therefore, be made accountable in the coin of the 
temporal, workaday world for their actions or inactions 
. fh . ht 251 on Issues 0 uman ng s. 
One way of accomplishing this is to strengthen the extant system by making 
sure that the codes "create a common set of standards and reporting formats,,252 and 
mandate "external review and auditing of compliance.,,253 Without questioning that 
suggestion, this work believes that a coordinated system of rights and responsibilities 
for multinational corporations under international law will best accomplish the 
objective of obliging corporations to recognize the social and economic costs of their 
operations and take necessary measures to prevent their occurrence or ameliorate 
their effects when they occur.254 
The second premise, as earlier stated, is informed by the perceived inability of 
international civil litigation, in the way it is presently structured, to address the 
negative consequences of international business activities. It should be noted that 
transnational litigation, especially under the Alien Tort Claims Act, is a welcome 
251 !d., at 15. 
252 Id., at 24. 
253 !d. 
254 Some scholars believe that corporations may not be comfortable with the idea of giving them 
international rights because they do not want to be saddled with international duties, especially in the 
area of human rights. Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human Rights Standards 
to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 Am. J. Compo L. 531 (2002). 
Id., at 547 n.82 
Given the other sources of law available for protecting rights 
important to corporations, one suspects that most corporations 
would resist seeking the benefits of international human rights 
protections if the price is being held to a duty to protect and realize 
the human rights of others, especially given the broad, open-ended 
and aspiration nature of many human rights, especially the so-
called positive human rights, such as those contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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development. Without doubt, there are some advantages to employing this tool in the 
battle for corporate accountability.255 Commenting on the decision in Dae v. Unacal, 
one scholar notes: The consequences of this decision should be far-reaching . . .. 
Private companies subject to suit in the United States may be more cautious about 
entering into agreements with foreign governments that have a poor human rights 
record. ,,256 
Because such lawsuits have the potential to affect their pocket book or bottom 
line, corporations will have an added incentive to improve their environmental 
practices and to pressurize governments to refrain or desist from human rights 
abuses.257 
Successful cases would provide litigants with some needed relief including 
monetary compensation.258 Nevertheless, even when those cases do not succeed, it is 
not entirely a loss for corporate accountability. Some price may be exerted from 
companies facing such lawsuits, for instance through the stock markee59 and 
consumer backlash arising from the negative pUblicity that the lawsuits may 
255 There seems to be sufficient basis to proclaim that "the A TCA, while not yet a panacea for the ills 
of the global economy, has become an increasingly powerful tool in promoting corporate 
accountability abroad." Morrin, supra note 223, at 427. 
256 William J. Aceves, International Decisions: Doe v. Unocal, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 309, 314 (1998). 
257 See Eileen Rice, Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human Rights 
Violations, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 153, 163 (1998). 
258 See Craig Forcese, ATCA 's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 487, 515 (2001) (stating that the ATCA may yet prove a means for 
plaintiffs to seek compensation from companies practicing an unabashed form of militarized commerce 
in joint ventures with human rights abusing regimes.") 
259 Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: 
Implications and Policy Options, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 451 (2001). But see FT McCarthy, 
Doing Well by DOing Good: Anti-Globalisation Protesters see Companies as Unethical as well as 
Exploitative: firms demur, of course, But Face an Awkward Question: Does Virtue Pay? The 
Economist, April 22, 2000 (suggesting that, although there may be a brief decrease in market share, 
negative publicity does not always do lasting damage to the sales or share price of a corporation.) See 
also Hall, supra note 175, at 432. 
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engender,260 and this may deter corporations from engaging in nefarious business 
261 . ATCA·d· . activities or prompt them to change. Most Important, proVI es mternatIOnal 
law with much needed teeth, ensuring that its dictates are enforced, not left to the 
h· f· . I t 262 W lms 0 mternatIOna ac ors. 
However, litigating claims under the ATCA is also fraught with difficulties. 
There are enormous challenges that a litigant must stridently confront in the course of 
the legal action. The doctrine of forum non conveniens 263and other constraints 
impede the ability of plaintiffs to succeed in the courtS.264 
Moreover, the ATCA does not appear to apply to environmental claims.265 
Considering that a major charge leveled against multinational corporations operating 
260 See Patrick Smith, Globalism Takes A Turn As Unocal Heads for Court, Bloomberg News, July 22, 
2002 (stating that the circulation of allegations of misbehavior could reduce the reputation and stock 
value of affected companies); Eric Marcks, Avoiding Liability For Human Rights Violations In Project 
Finance, 22 Energy L. 1. 301,306 (2001). 
261 See Hall, supra note 175 , at 432. 
262 Inadequate enforcement is a big deficiency of international law. Through litigation under the 
A TCA, multinational corporations could be made to face legal sanctions where there conduct runs 
contrary to some norms of international law. Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why Unocal 
Should be Liable Under us. Law for Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 
35,36 (1998). 
263 "As it is used today, forum non conveniens is a significant legal barrier to transnational corporate 
accountability." Malcom J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global 
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, 
Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 Tex. Int'l L. 1. 299 (2001). See also Armin Rosencranz & Richard 
Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits Against Us. Corporations in Us. Courts, 
18 Stan. Envtt. L. J. 145 146 (1999). "[Forum non conveniens] and the doctrine of comity have a 
powerful hold on U.S. federal courts and have frequently been held to be sufficient grounds for 
dismissal of a foreigner's complaints." But see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.: A New Standard for the Enforcement of International Law in Us. Courts? 5 Yale H.R. 
& Dev. L.1. 241 (2002) (suggesting a softening of the hitherto applicable standards on forum non 
conveniens.). 
264 For a discussion of the obstacles to an ATCA suit, see DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS, (3d. ed) 794 - 818 (2001); 
Cyril Kormos, et at., Us. Participation in International Environmental Law and Policy, 13 Geo. Int'l 
Envtt. L. Rev. 661, 678-681 (2001). 
265 Kormos, et at., supra note 264 , at 661 (discussing two environmental cases brought under the 
ATCA namely, Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997) both of which decided that the ATCA did 
not apply to environmental claims.) 
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in developing countries is that of operating without respect for the environment,266 
this limitation of the ATCA is not one to be easily overlooked. It is imperative that 
egregious cases of environmental destruction be actionable in court.267 
Further, because the ATCA is a uniquely American piece of legislation, its use 
is limited to the United States. Those who lack the resources or for some reason are 
unable, to bring a claim before a U.S. court will not be availed of its benefits. On the 
other hand, as opposed to other countries, transnational cases are more likely to be 
brought in the United States. Other jurisdictions, especially in the developed world, 
may be available. However, the United States seems to be the destination of choice. 
One writer has made the observation that "as Canadian companies globalize their 
activities, there is every possibility that the shadow of Canadian law will globalize 
with them, thereby holding companies accountable in Canada for their overseas 
wrongs.,,268 Yet, when a lawsuit was filed against the Canadian oil company, 
Talisman, for human rights violations in the Sudan, it was not in Canadian court, but 
266 Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational 
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 359, 361 (1999); 
David Wheeler, et at., Paradoxes and Dilemmas for Stakeholder Responsive Firms in the Extractive 
Sector: Lessons from the Case of Shell and the Ogoni, 39:3 1. BUS. ETHICS 297 (2002). 
267 Some scholars hold some belief in the possibility of environmental claims succeeding under the 
ATCA. See Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A 
Practical Assessment, 40 Va. 1. Int'l L. 545 (2000) for an extensive and impressive discussion of 
A TCA environmental litigation. Herz, who served as counsel to plaintiffs in a number of ATCA cases 
including Doe v. Unocal and Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., argues that the ATCA "has the 
potential to provide redress to victims of environmental abuses abroad" but cautions that plaintiffs' 
claims should be crafted narrowly to avoid dismissals by the courts. Id., at 638. 
268 Craig Forcese, Deterring "Militarized Commerce": The Prospect of Liability for "Privatized" 
Human Rights Abuses, 31 Ottawa L. Rev. 171,211 (2000). 
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in federal court in New York.269 This trend stems from the advantages that the United 
States legal system provides?70 
The fact that the ATCA in particular, and the American legal system as a 
whole, holds out huge prospects for redressing wrongs done to a victim in a way that 
hardly any other country does,271 carries with a risk that American courts would be 
overwhelmed by the multiplicity of suits.272 This could lead to resentment and 
negative reactions internally and externally. American taxpayers might feel that their 
resources are being used to right the world's wrongs in a disproportionate manner. 
Foreign governments may view the United States as inching to take on the role of the 
World's judicial officer. American corporations may complain that they are being 
placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-a.-vis their counterparts from other countries 
who do no have to make difficult financial choices in order to avoid accountability in 
th . h 273 Th elr orne courts. e corporations could even move to have the ATCA repealed 
as being anti-business and if they have public opinion on their side, may very well 
succeed.274 Add to the above the fact that it is quite unfair and unjust to allow 
269 S Chr' ee IS Varcoe, et aI., Talisman can't make clean break from Sudan: Outstanding $1.2B lawsuit 
dogs company, Calgary Herald, November 1 2002 at C4 
270 . ' , • 
~ee generally Ugo MatteI a~d Jeffrey Lena, Us. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of the 
Umted States: Some Hegemo~lc !n:plications, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 381, 394 (2001); 
Beth. Stephens, Corporate Lzabllzty: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation 24 
Hastmgs Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 401,409 (2001). ' 
271/d. 
272 B . ut see, ~osencranz and Campbell, supra note 263 (arguing that due to in-built checks and balances 
m the Amencan system, many cases would be weeded out.) This argument, however, seems to ignore 
the fac.t that even the process of.,,:e~~ing out unmeritorious claims, in the face of a huge volume of 
cases, Imposes enormous responSIbIlItIes on the system and could heavily strain court personnel 
273 See Russell J. We~traub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 Tex. I~t'l L.1. 
321, ~52 (1994) (ar~umg that by entertaining suits by foreigners injured abroad, the courts are placing 
~:nencan C?rporatIOns at a world-wide competitive disadvantage). 
CorporatIOns adopted such stance in the aftermath of the Supreme Court of Texas' abolition of 
forum non conveniens doctrine in personal injury matters in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro 786 
S.W.2d ?74 (Tex. 1.990), p~titicin for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 2602 (Aug. 30, 1990), in order to e~able 
o~ pefilllt Costa Rican natIOnals to sue a Texas corporation in Texas for alleged violations in Costa 
Rica, ( See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 689 (Hightower, J., concurring). See Joseph H. Sommer, The 
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companies from other countries and their governments to avoid investing in practices 
and institutions that protect the society against multinational corporate abuse, while 
other companies and governments are not allowed such 'luxury.' 
In view of the foregoing, it is apposite to consider uniformalizing and 
internationalizing regulations and sanctions in relation to multinational corporations. 
International law holds the best prospect for accomplishing such a monumental task. 
What is needed is an international regulatory structure that addresses the deficiencies 
of tools currently in use, including codes and international litigation. With regard to 
codes, it will introduce uniformity, certainty, specificity and enforceability. In the 
case of international litigation, it will eliminate or streamline the use of existing 
impediments such as forum non conveniens. It will also fill in gaps, for instance, by 
making massive environmental damage that destroys the lives, livelihood and health 
of communities actionable. The difficulties that victims of egregious environmental 
abuse have faced in litigating their claims will be redressed under the regime being 
d h 275 Th' . propose ere. IS arrangement WIll also level the playing field economically, 
since all companies would need to comply and the laggards would have to improve 
their performance. 
This new structure will also draw from and strengthen the salutary qualities of 
existing tools. It will refine their good points and make them more efficient. Existing 
Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?59 Fordham L. Rev. 227, 252 n.94 (1990). Business groups 
were able to lobby and get the Texas legIslature to partially reinstate the doctrine in Texas. See Brooke 
Clagett, Forum !Ion Conveniens In International Environmental Tort Suits: Closing The Doors Of us. 
Courts To ForeIgn Plaintiffs, 9 TuI. EnvtI. L.1. 513, 524 (1996). 
275 S .. ee.Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utility of ATCA and the "Law of Nations " in Environmental Torts 




qualities under the U.S legal system that makes it more attractive to litigants will be a 
part of this arrangement, thus making the features available in other countries. 
International law could define corporate obligations and provide for their enforcement 
through national judicial systems as is currently done under the ATCA. 
Accordingly, this proposal would involve a restructuring of international law. 
While the State is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future,276 there is no doubt 
that corporate power has increasingly gained ascendancy, consequently weakening 
the power of States.277 Many States are too enfeebled to control the large corporations 
operating in their territory, thus necessitating the intervention of a supranational 
entity. International law should step in with a change in the present international legal 
and political structure. Instead of the current system which leaves the regulation of 
multinational corporations to States who are increasingly and unable to regulate them, 
or instead of proposing a fully direct regulation of these entities in a manner that 
places them at par with States, this work proposes a third layer or structure in 
international law.278 This structure will be a quasi-direct regulation that takes 
multinational corporations to a level higher than what they presently occupy, but a 
(2000) (stating that foreign plaintiffs have encountered enormous difficulties in their bid to seek 
remedies for environmental torts allegedly committed by multinational corporations.) 
276 Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 7, 22 (1997). 
277 Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 37 
(2000) (attributing the weakening of nation-states to the phenomenom of globalization.) 
278See Pridan-Frank, supra note 1, at 670, asking whether the time has come for the development of 
another tier to the international legal framework for the purposes of direct application of international 
norms to multinational corporations. Such a restructuring would recognize MNCs as international 
persons with attendant rights and correlative duties. Its major advantage is that, by neutralizing the 
influence of MNCs in countries where they operate, the new arrangement would facilitate the 
enforcement of those duties imposed on them, even where the host states do not evince any willingness 
or lack the ability to so do. The writer however seems to favor an "international forum" for the 
adjudication of claims arising under the proposed structure. See id., The position preferred in this work 
is enforcement through existing domestic institutions, but not necessarily in the host State of the. 
multinational in question. 
220 
notch or two below the arena in which States operate. Its hallmark will be the 
elaboration of international rules that are applicable to multinationals and enforceable 
against them anywhere. 
It is difficult to continue to argue against international regulation in favor of 
the existing system of unreliable national regulation and weak self-regulation.279 The 
absence of international regulation essentially guarantees. that MNCs will avoid 
accountability at both domestic and internationallevels.28o Because of the weakness 
of governance systems in the developing world, the need to eliminate unnecessary 
double standards between what is permissible in the MNCs' home countries and their 
actual operations in their host countries,281 and the propriety of ensuring that victims 
of environmental and human rights abuses get adequate redress, the importance of an 
accountability system in international law cannot be overemphasized.282 
Even some corporations already accept the fact that laws and regulations will 
improve the situation of things. 283 This is not surprising considering that corporations 
are aware of the fact that in the absence of structural constraints, requirements and 
stipulations, the possibility of doing the right thing is severely diminished.284 
279 See Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Corporate Responsibility Now: Profit at the Expense of Human 
Rights with Exemptionfrom Liability? 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 191,221 (1999) (making the case 
for mandatory, uniform and well regulated human rights codes of conduct as a vehicle for ensuring 
corporate compliance with intemationallaw.) 
280 Martin A. Geer, Foreigners In Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transnational Corporations _ 
Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 331,336 n.l3 (1998). 
281 Judith Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities: Environmental Protection Law in 
Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields, 2 Sw. J. of L. & Trade Am. 293, at 385, 388 (1995) (discussing various 
cases where corporations operate in a different legal climate and engage in practices that are not 
permissible under their home country laws.) 
282 Id., at 380. 
283 Macek, supra note 34, at 119; 
284 Studies conducted by two environmental groups, Friends of the Earth and Public Data Project, 
indicate that American multinational corporations involved in chemical manufacturing in Europe were 
not willing to release data on toxic emissions unless they were legally required to do so, 
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There is no gainsaying the fact that any effort to restructure international law 
in order to clearly define and prescribe a role for the multinational corporation would 
be beset with obstacles. Questions will continue to arise as to what form the 
suggested changes will take; that is, whether or not it should be in the form of 
treaty.285 The possibility of the proposed changes receiving the unqualified support of 
a broad spectrum of the international community is also not something that should be 
glossed over. This takes on added importance when considered in the light of the fact 
that sovereignty is a jealously guarded concept among States.286 To the extent that 
these changes might impinge on their sovereignty, whittle down their influence, 
negatively affect their citizens (corporations incorporated by them), or interfere with 
notwithstanding that 12 of the companies are members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
which requires its members to subscribe to its Responsible Care Program. See Melissa S. Padgett, 
Environmental Health and Safety - International Standardization of Right-to-Know Legislation in 
Response to Refusal of United States Multinationals to Publish Toxic Emissions Data for the United 
Kingdom Facilities, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 701 (1992). Some critics have argued that an 
independent incentive for observance of these codes is needed, otherwise the effectiveness of these 
codes will not be guaranteed, even if the codes are widespread. See Craig Forcese, Insuring Human 
Rights: Linking Human Rights to Commercial Activities at the Export Development Corporation, 
Brief Prepared for the EDC Legislative Review (Canada), December 22, 1998; available at 
http://www.web.netl~claihr/pubs/edc.html. Last visited, September 7,2002. 
285 A global environmental group, Friends of the Earth International, has proposed a Corporate 
Accountability Convention. Such a treaty will: 
• establish mechanisms for adversely affected stakeholders to obtain redress through exercising 
rights; 
• establish social and environmental duties for corporations; 
• establish rules for consistent high standards of behaviour of corporations; 
• create a market framework in which progressive companies can thrive, and governments 
respond fairly to the demands of their citizens rather than to the lobbying of corporations; 
• establish sanctions; 
• ensure the ecological debt owed by corporations to the South is repaid; and 
• secures environmental justice for communities threatened with or exposed to environmental 
injustice - north and south. 
See Friends of the Earth International, Towards Binding Corporate Accountability 
http://www.foei.org/publications/corporates/accountability.html. Last visited November 6,2002. 
286 Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Human Rights in the 1990s: Promise or Peril? 28 Cornell Int'l LJ. 229, 239 
(1995) (Reviewing INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS By Jack Donnelly, 1993). 
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their economic development through foreign investment and international trade, a 
strong resistance from States on both sides of the world divide cannot be ruled out. 
The recurring issue of legal personality in international law is also another 
impediment. Publicists and others that favor the traditional theory that international 
law should apply only to States might oppose any measure that seeks to imbue 
corporations with international legal personality.287 The traditional theory, however, 
needs to look more closely to the extant state of affairs and adapt itself to the new 
realities regarding corporate position, power and influence in world affairs. As some 
scholars have observed, some of the large multinational corporations have annual 
revenues that are larger than the economies of most Member States of the United 
Nations.288 Accordingly, since these corporations have acquired the kind of powers 
that was the exclusive preserve of States, it is only appropriate that they should attract 
the caliber of responsibilities that are imposed on States by internationallaw.289 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary conclusion drawn from this discussion on the utility and limits of codes 
of conduct is that corporate codes are of limited utility. The current practice of 
depending on corporate codes and voluntary initiatives to promote corporate 
accountability is clearly inadequate. It is time that the United Nations stepped up to 
the plate to address this issue in a more serious manner. A starting point would be to 
287 The traditional view is that corporations of municipal law are not subjects of international law. On 
this, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA TIONAL LAW 68 (5th ed., 1998). 





define and design an appropriate place or position for the multinational corporation in 
intemationallaw. Such an undertaking would be to the benefit of us all. 
The next chapter discusses the present activities of the United Nations in 




UNITED NATIONS AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the international system, a number of steps have been taken in recent times 
to confront the challenges posed by corporations in an era of globalization. Prominent 
in the list of such measures are the UN Global Compact initiative and the on-going 
work of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
This chapter discusses both efforts by the United Nations to provide a measure of 
control over corporate activity. The role of the United Nations in promoting the issue 
of corporate control as well as other important matters cannot be over-emphasized, 
more so as the relevance of the global organization to the modem society is gaining 
.. .. 1 
mcreasmg recogmtIOn. 
While the work of the United Nations is acknowledged, it needs to be emphasized 
that huge gaps still remain. The activities of the UN in this regard so far does not 
march the silent revolution currently sweeping through the domestic legal system of 
some countries. If domestic law can provide a forum for the enforcement of 
international rules and impose liability for breach of same, certainly the international 
system can consider streamlining such a system and using it to the advantage of all. 
Accordingly, this chapter contrasts the moves at both the international and municipal 
levels and indicates that a great need exists for international legal and policy reform. 
Part II below discusses the most recent efforts at the United Nations to 
improve international control over multinational corporations. In particular, the UN 
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Global Compact and the work of the UN Sub-Commission on thel Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights will be discussed. 
Part III looks at the growing movement toward corporate accountability 
through the agency of national courts. Cases brought in home country courts for 
activities that took place in other countries will be considered. Also pertinent is the 
use of international law principles to hold corporations accountable in the United 
States under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
In the concluding pages, the point is canvassed that there is the need to 
address the issue of corporate abuse through international legal mechanisms. 
However, this suggestion must first confront the perennial problem of international 
legal personality, as the status of multinational corporations in international law is 
still shrouded in controversy. 
II. RECENT INTERNATIONAL TRENDS ON CORPORATE CONTROL 
Over the years, a number of measures have been attempted or put in place in the 
international system to address the excesses of multinational corporate entities. 
International law and other instruments have been invoked to ensure that the 
operations of large corporations are brought within acceptable parameters. The major 
actors at the forefront of the campaign for international legal control of multinational 
corporations include States, international organizations and interested individuals. 
This study looks at the most recent efforts emanating from the United Nations, 




namely the UN Secretary General's Globa! Compact initiative and the activities of the 
UN Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
A. UN GLOBAL COMPACT 
Current trends in the international system indicate a growing interest in checking the 
activities of multinational corporations and to involve them in issues of global 
concern more than ever before. The United Nations Secretary-General at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, on January 31, 1999, challenged world business leaders 
to demonstrate good global citizenship. This would entail embracing and 
incorporating a number of universally-agreed values and principles in their individual 
corporate practices and by supporting appropriate public policies in that regard.2 
Drawing from leading international instruments on human rights, labor and 
environmental issues namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The 
Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work of the International Labor Organization 
(lLO) , and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development,3 the Secretary 
General in his Global Compact initiative asked world business to: 
support and respect the protection of international human rights within their 
sphere of influence; 
2 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 17 (1999). ' 
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• make sure that their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses 
• uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 
• uphold the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor; 
• uphold the effective abolition of child labor; 
• uphold the elimination of discrimination m respect of employment and 
occupation; 
• support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 
• undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 
• encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally-friendly 
technologies.4 
July 2000 saw the creation by the United Nations of the Global Compact as a 
voluntary coalition for the promotion of human rights and environmental standards in 
business.5 The Global Compact recognizes that there are negative social and economic 
consequences stemming from economic globalization and sets out to address and correct 
the resulting disequilibrium. The fundamental objective of this initiative therefore, is to 
3 See http://www.ungloba1compact.org/unigc/unweb.nsf/content/whatitis.htm. 
4 United Nations, The Global Compact, http://www.ungloba1compact.org. 
5 See Nicole Winfield, UN Launches Partnerships, Associated Press, July 26,2000, available in 2000 
WL 24550705. 
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bridge the imbalance between the two c<;>mpeting sides of international business 
transactions and the costs or concerns arising from them. 6 
Underlying the Compact is a "spirit of partnership and solidarity,,7 in which different 
segments of the global community are expected to come together and work harmoniously 
for the good of our world. 
At its inception, nearly fifty corporations made a commitment to the Global 
Compact, pledging themselves to the nine key principles outlined above.8 The 
number has since increased.9 Corporations will be expected to post each year, 
progress they have made in implementing the nine principles. lO These examples will 
be posted on a United Nations website, with an opportunity provided for citizens' 
groups to offer responses. I I 
Issues that have received closer attention from the initiative include corporate 
social responsibility generally, domestic litigation against corporations for human 
rights abuses in countries where they have operations and the impact of such 
litigation on corporate liability, diamond trade in conflict zones, the inclusion of 
6 Shira Pridan-Frank, Human-Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law, 
40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 619, 669 (2002). 
7 Mark A. Drumbl, Northern Economic Obligation, Southern Moral Entitlement, and International 
Environmental Governance, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 363, 369 n20 (2002). 
8 !d. 
9 At present, over 500 companies have submitted letters of intent to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
pledging their support for the Global Compact and its nine principles. See Global Compact Publishes 
List of Participating Companies, November 20, 2002, available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/irj/servlet/prtiportal/prtroot/com.sapportals.km.xrn1formpreview? 
Last visited November 26, 2002. 
10 See Nicole Winfield, UN Announces Business Initiatives, Associated Press, July 20, 2000, available 
in 2000 WL 24002700. 
11 !d. 
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corporate behavior in studies conducted by UN. special rapporteurs, and the work of 
international financial institutions and regional organizations.12 
The Compact may be considered as an important step in the march toward 
addressing the social and economic costs of corporate activities. It is yet one more 
brick in the building process and has the potential to do some good. For instance, it 
may prove valuable in rewarding those corporations that exhibit an appreciable level 
of responsibility in relation to human rights and environmental protection. 13 At the 
same time, it could serve as a useful tool for improving corporate behavior by 
shaming those corporations whose performance is not adequate, and thereby set them 
on course for better practices. 14 Indeed, the Global Compact has already been utilized 
as a basis for a Framework Agreement that Statoil entered into with the International 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (lCEM).15 
Nevertheless, complaints remam. The complaints stem mainly from the 
Compact's weakness, which is rooted in its voluntary nature. The decision to couch 
the Compact in soft terms and make it voluntary is a reflection of the power and 
influence that big corporations hold in the international scheme of things. 16 The UN 
12 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights: An Update (June 
26, 2000), at http://www.unhchr.chlbusinessupdate.htm. See also Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human 
Rights in A Globalized World, 25 B.C. Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 273, 318 (2002). 
13 William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global 
Governance, 34 Cornell Int'l LJ. 501, 504 (2001). 
14Id. 
15 Peter Utting, Regulating Business via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Preliminary Assessment, Paper 
prepared in late 2001 under the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 
research project "Promoting Corporate Environmental and Social Responsibility in Developing 
Countries: The Potential and Limits of Voluntary Initiatives," available at 
http://www . unsystem. orglngls/ documents/pub lications.enl develop. dossier/ dd. 07%20( csr)/ Last visited 
December 4, 2002. 
16 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 
Berkeley J. Int'l Law 45,81 (2002). 
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realized that the corporate world did not ,evince any desire or willingness to accept 
global standards of a binding nature on corporate governance. 17 
This approach has doubtless opened a crevice for critics to assail the Compact. 
The above position of the UN, which it can defend as being grounded in reality, is 
seen as a capitulation to the interests of western companies, enabling them to have 
access to new markets without a corresponding set of regulations believed to be the 
only effective means of holding the corporations to account.18 This is interpreted as 
taking sides with the powerful corporations in a contest with the powerless victimsl9 
of multinational corporate activity, a role the United Nations obviously should not be 
expected to play. 
The Global Compact has also been dismissed by critics from the human rights 
and environmental community as inadequate. Some groups have therefore called on 
the UN Secretary General to gear his efforts toward the creation and implementation 
of a binding legal framework to oversee the conduct of multinational corporations.2o 
Hopefully, this will only be a beginning step in the march to address the complex 
issue of corporate regulation in internationallaw.21 
17 Irwin Arieff, UN: One Year Later Global Compact Has Little to Show, Reuters, July 27, 2001. 
(citing the views of U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Michael Doyle). 
18 George Monbiot, The United Nations is Trying to Regain its Credibility by Fawning to Big Business, 
The Guardian, Aug. 31, 2000. 
19 !d. 
20 See Meaghan Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate About 
the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 159, 
161. 
21 For more discussions on the Global Compact, see Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private 
Sector's Role, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 102 (2001); Isabella D. Bunn, The Right To Development: 
Implications for International Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1425 (2000); Ben Saul, In the 
Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations and Responsibilities, 32 Colum. Human Rights 
L. Rev. 565 (2001). 
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• 
B. UN SUB-COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
currently occupies a center stage on the issue of corporate accountability. The Sub-
Commission, the main subsidiary body of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, started out in 1947 as the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities.22 It is composed of 26 experts, acting in their personal 
capacity and elected from different regions of the world.23 It has six working groups, 
the most relevant of which, for the purposes of this study, is the Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations.24 The Sub-Commission in 1998, pursuant to resolution 
1998/8, decided to establish a working group to examine the effects of the working 
methods and activities of multinational corporations on human rights and to make 
recommendations in that regard.25 
After the working group's first meeting in August 1999, it made a number of 
recommendations including: 
Developing a code of conduct for transnational corporations based on 
international human rights standards; 
22 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm. Last visited July 6 2002 
23 Id. ' , . 
24 The ~orkin~ gr~~ps are t~o.se o~ Communications, Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Indigenous 
is0pulatIons, MmO~ltIes, A~illlmstratIon of Justice, and Transnational Corporations. !d. 
Office of the Umted NatIons High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights: A· 




Drafting and adopting mechanisms though which host and home governments 
would be obliged to elaborate internal legal monitoring standards with respect to the 
activities of transnational corporations; 
Analyzing the possible liability of States and transnational corporations, which 
fail to fulfill their obligations.26 
The Sub-Commission has set in motion a process to develop a set of principles 
that would guide and hopefully constrain the operation of companies in relation to 
human rights. Under its authority, a declaration entitled the Human Rights Principles 
and Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
has been prepared.27 It is expected that the Sub-Commission will endorse it in the 
near future, after which they may receive the consideration and endorsement of the 
governments who constitute the UN Commission on Human Rights.28 The aim of the 
Human Rights Principles is "both to supplement existing international law, and help 
to clarify the scope oflegal obligations on companies.,,29 
The Principles cover a number of topics including the Right to Equal 
Opportunity and Non-Discriminatory Treatment, Right to Security of Persons, Rights 
of Workers, Respect for National Sovereignty and Local Communities, Obligations 
26 Id. 
27 Draft for Discussion, Draft Fundamental Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises, 
Addendum 1, UN Doc. E/CNA/sub.212002/xx/, E/CNA/Sub.212002/WG.2!WP.l (February 2002) See 
http://www 1. unm.edulhumanrts/principles W -OutCommentary5 final.html for this version. Last visited 
July 11, 2002. 
28 IN TERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
COMPANIES 154 (2002). 
29 !d., at 155. 
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with regard to Consumer Protection, and Obligations with regard to Environmental 
Protection. 30 
The current draft recognizes that the primary responsibility for the promotion 
and protection of human rights resides in governments, but, drawing from the 
language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3! adds that "transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible 
for promoting and securing ... human rights.,,32 Corporate officers, company workers 
and the corporations themselves have a distinct obligation "directly or indirectly to 
respect international human rights and other international legal standards.,,33 
In its first article, the declaration states that "transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises also have the obligation to respect, ensure respect for, 
prevent abuses of, and promote international human rights within their respective 
h f ·· d' fl ,,34 sp eres 0 actIVIty an III uence. 
The Declaration on Human Rights Principles contains some general 
provisions on implementation. Responsibility for implementing the principles rests on 
corporations and business enterprises. There is also a role for national, international, 
governmental, or nongovernmental mechanisms in the monitoring of corporate 
compliance with the principles.35 
30 Draft Principles, supra note 27. 
31 Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No.3, at 71, 
U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948). 
32 Draft Principles, supra note 27, Preamble. 
33 !d. 
34 Id., Article 1. 
35 Id., Articles 15 - 18. 
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The Principles when adopted will·prove to be a valuable tool for promoting 
corporate accountability. As the International Council on Human Rights Policy has 
observed, the Principles 
... provide the foundation for an authoritative and 
comprehensive statement of the scope of companies' 
obligations in relation to human rights. The principles 
offer the best chance to clarify, at least in a soft law 
instrument, that international law can impose direct 
bl ' . . 36 o IgatlOns on compames. 
It is pertinent to mention that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has also expressed the Office's resolve in this area, stating that while mindful 
of the fact that it is governments that are primarily responsible for the protection of 
human rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights "is exploring 
the question of international accountability for alleged corporate violations of human 
rights.,,37 The High Commissioner in furtherance of this objective has asked the six 
human rights treaty bodies and the special rapporteurs and working groups appointed 
by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to study how they could best 
promote within their mandates such accountability.38 More recently, the High 
Commissioner emphasized that while the Global Compact is relevant, it is not enough 
as there is still the need for a " ... legal regime [to] help to underpin the values of 
ethical globalization.,,39 Her position is that there should be a "next phase" in this 
36 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 28, at 160. 
37 Supra note 25. 
38 Id. 
39 Mary Robinson, address, Second Global Ethic Lecture, University of Tubingen, Germany, January 
21,2002, reprinted in Globalization has to take human rights into account, Irish Times, Jan. 22, 2002. 
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journey, a phase that would be "less aspirational, less theoretical and abstract, and 
. 1 . d ,,40 more about keepmg so ernn promIses rna e. 
The High Commissioner's statements are strong evidence that while the current 
developments are certainly welcome, a lot more needs to be done, as it will not be 
sufficient to rely entirely on self-regulation or any form of regulatory structure that is 
not binding and enforceable. To ensure that harmful business activities are 
eliminated, limited or punished, a strong regulatory and enforcement network under 
international law is called for. It is interesting to note that there is a growing 
movement to use international law to address some of the contemporary problems 
facing humanity through the agency of domestic courts. Obviously, aggrieved parties 
are beginning to fill the vacuum left by international policy makers. The next part will 
discuss such creative use of international law in the United States under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act. The discussion also includes a closer look at the new wave of 
international civil litigation that is not necessarily based on a breach of principles of 
international law. An examination of their limitations and implications for 
international law reform is also included. 
III. NATIONAL COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE. 
CONTROL 
Simultaneously with efforts by international organizations to address the 
social and economic costs of multinational corporate activity, individuals and private 
groups have taken it upon themselves to fight the harmful effects of business. These 
40 !d. 
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persons are usually victims of corporate. environmental and human rights abuses, 
pUblic-spirited people and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the public 
interest. The vehicle they have chosen is the domestic court system with international 
law as a major tool for vindicating their rights. 
These cases that have been brought in several countries have been viewed as 
"the flip side of foreign direct investment" and aptly referred to as "foreign direct 
liability.,,41 The beauty of foreign direct liability is that it "potentially offers a way to 
apportion responsibility among private actors, rather than between governments on 
the basis of their international legal responsibilities.,,42 
Notably, two particular types of international cases are currently making the 
rounds in the domestic courts of certain countries. In one category, cases are brought 
in one country, usually in the developed world, by people affected by the activities of 
some corporations that took place in another country, usually in the developing world. 
A distinguishing feature of this species of cases is that while they have international 
character, the cause of action is not necessarily anchored in international law. In the 
second category, civil litigation addresses the breach of international law by 
corporations. The discussion on this second aspect focuses on the use of the courts of 
the United States to pursue this objective under a domestic statute, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. The two types of cases will be discussed, leading to suggestions for 
international law reform. 
41 Halina Ward, Securing Transnational _Corporate Accountability Through National Courts: 
Implications and Policy Options, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 451,454 (2001). 
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A. HOME COUNTRY LITIGATION 
In recent years, there has been a growing movement in the direction of instituting 
court actions in developed countries against parent companies of multinational corporate 
groups. These lawsuits stem from the activities of corporations that have had 
environmental, social and human rights effects in developing countries.43 A striking 
feature of this type of cases is that while the litigation is transnational in the sense that 
the parties, place of the alleged wrong, causes of action, and forums cut across a number 
of countries, not all the cases allege a breach of a principle of international law. Instead, a 
good number of them are based on violations of standards in developed countries, which 
the MNCs were expected to follow in their operations in the developing world.44 
In the Thor Chems Holdings Ltd Cases,45 workers in South Africa who had suffered 
injuries while working in a South African company engaged in manufacturing and 
reprocessing mercury-based chemicals instituted action in England. The suits were 
against the parent company, which had relocated and opened the South African 
subsidiary because of health and safety concerns in England. The plaintiffs contended 
that liability should attach to the defendant parent company and its chairman because 
they knew or ought to have known that operating the factories in South Africa would 
expose their workers to conditions hazardous to their health and safety. A number of the 
actions brought against the Thor company were eventually settled with the company 
agreeing to pay millions of dollars to the plaintiffs.46 
42 Id. 
43 !d., at 451. 
44 d /, ., at451, 456. 
45 See id. 
46 The comp~ny paid 1.3 million pounds sterling to settle the first and second law suits and 270 000 
pounds sterhng for the third. See Ward, supra note 41, at 458. See also Richard Meera~ at 
www.laboumet.netiworldlOl0Ithor2.html 
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In the landmark case47 of Lubbe v: Cape Plc,48 plaintiffs who said they were 
exposed to asbestos in the course of their employment or as a result of living in an 
area contaminated by asbestos brought a civil action in England. The exposure 
allegedly took place in South Africa. The defendant was the parent company of the 
South African company whose operations, according to the plaintiffs' claim, led to 
the exposure and contamination. The gravamen of the plaintiffs' case was that the 
defendant owed - and breached - a duty of care to those employed by its subsidiaries 
or living in the area where they operated, to ensure that adequate steps and 
precautionary measures were taken to avoid exposing them to asbestos, which the 
defendant knew was gravely injurious to health. The defendant applied to stay the 
action, inter alia, on the grounds of forum non conveniens, contending that South 
Africa was a more appropriate forum. The House of Lords refused to stay the 
Plaintiffs' proceedings.49 Lord Bingham of Cornhill based his lead decision, in part, 
on "the absence, as yet, of developed procedures for handling group actions in South 
Africa,,,5o a factor, which could make it much more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain 
adequate legal representation.51 
47 See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of 
Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 Berkeley J. 
Int'l Law 91, n7 (2002). 
48 
~ubbe v. Cape PIc, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545. For an internet version, see http://www.parliamentthe-
statlOnery-office.co.uk/palld199900/1djudgmt/jdOOOnO/lubbe-I.htm. Last visited July 10, 2002. 
49 For an extensive and excellent discussion of this case, see C.GJ. Morse, Not in the Public Interest? 
Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 37 Tex. Int'l LJ. 541 (2002). 
50 Lubbe, supra note 48. 
51 !d. 
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A solicitor for the claimants in the Lubbe Case reported in January 2002 that a 
settlement has been reached between some 7,500 claimants and Cape PLC for 21 
million pounds sterling. 52 
Similar home country lawsuits have also been brought in such other 
jurisdictions as Canada53 and Australia.54 Most recently, a lawsuit was launched by 
two Burmese nationals in French court against the French multinational, Total Fina 
Elf for alleged human rights abuses in Burma.55 The utility and efficacy of this form 
of transnational litigation will be discussed generally in section C below. 
A. LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
In April 2000, a United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California issued a preliminary ruling dismissing an objection by Chevron Oil 
Corporation to the court's jurisdiction. 56 Chevron had contended, in this particular 
instance, that considerations of international comity and forum non conveniens 
necessitated that the case should not be tried in the United States but in Nigeria where 
the incidents were alleged to have taken place. The plaintiffs in this case are alleging 
52 Richard Meeran, Cape Pays the Price as Justice Prevails, Times (London), Jan. 15,2002,2, at 5. 
53 See Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] QJ No.2334 (Quebec Superior 
Court, 14 August 1998). For discussions of this case, see Sara L. Seck, Environmental Harm in 
Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining Corporations: The Interface of 
Public and Private International Law, 37 Can. y.B. Int'l L. 139 (1999); Winston Anderson, Forum Non 
Conveniens Checkmated? - The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 183 
(2001). 
54 See BHP Mining Company Case, which centered on environmentally-disruptive and destructive 
activities in Papua New Guinea. It was eventually settled out of court. See also Fiona Gill, 
Transnational Litigation: Claims Against UK Based Multinationals, 
http://www.risksocietv.com/uploads/papers/Transnational%20Litigation.ppt. Last visited July 4,2002. 
55 See Total, objet d'une plainte en France pour travail force en Birmanie, (Agence France Presse, 
August 29, 2002). 
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that the Nigerian government, with the. collaboration of Chevron, violated their 
human rights and committed torts actionable under United States law.57 
More recently, a lawsuit was filed against the giant oil corporation, Exxon 
Mobi1.58 The basis of the lawsuit is a panoply of alleged human rights abuses in the 
Aceh Province of Indonesia where ExxonMobil is said to be complicit in the 
measures undertaken by a unit of the Indonesian military against residents of the 
Aceh area where the company has a gas extraction and liquification project.59 
These cases bring afresh to the forefront, questions regarding the desirability 
(or otherwise) of multinational corporations doing business with repressive and brutal 
regimes. They raise once again the issue of holding multinational corporations 
accountable for their actions that arise outside of contractual obligations. In essence, 
while a corporation is bound by terms agreed to in a contract, and can be held 
accountable thereunder, human rights abuses and some other harms of a tortious 
nature occurring in connection to, or incidental to, their business operations often go 
without any remedy to the victims.60 This is especially the case with multinational 
56 Bowoto, et aI., v. Chevron Corporation, Case No. C 99-2506 CAL, United States District Court, 
Northern District of California, San Francisco, Transcript of Proceedings, April 7, 2000 (on file with 
author). 
57Bowoto, et aI., v. Chevron Corporation & MOES 1-50, No. c99-2506 CAL, Second Amended 
Complaint (on file with author). 
58 John Doe v. Exxon Mobil, No.1 :0ICV01357 (D. D.C. filed June 20,2001). 
59 !d. 
60 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit, supra note 16, at 82. 
A great deal of effort has been spent developing enforceable rules 
to govern the economic behavior of multinational corporations: 
trade, patents, investment, fmancing are all the subject of existing 
international regulation or ongoing efforts to draft rules. These 
economic regulatory systems include well-elaborated enforcement 
mechanisms. Ironically, the human rights consequences of 
multinational corporate operations have received much less 
international attention, despite the fact that transnationals have an 
ongoing, and at times devastating, impact on human rights around 
the world. 
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corporations whose economic and political influence make it virtually impossible for 
them to be held accountable under the domestic courts of their host states. At the 
same time, international law does not really apply to these entities under the belief 
strongly held in some quarters that States primarily or exclusively are the subjects of 
international law . 
In order to ensure that these corporations do not totally escape accountability, 
litigants have resorted to the courts of the United States where these corporations are 
based or have operations.61 The primary weapon they have used is the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, an 18th century piece oflegislation, which frowns at a breach of the law 
of the nations. 
1. The Problem: Corporate practices and absence of accountability 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) in the pursuit of their legitimate 
businesses have extended their operations to virtually every nook and cranny of the 
Id., Citation omitted. 
61 The Chevron case joins a long list of cases brought under this remedy. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 1998) (plaintiffs alleged 
that Royal Dutch Shell Corporation collaborated with the Nigerian Government to execute 
environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and perpetrate other violent acts against the Ogoni ethnic 
group); National Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (alleged Unocal's collaboration with the military government of Burma in torturing and 
enslaving Burmese citizens); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(defendant Freeport-McMoRan Corporation was alleged to have been complicit with the Indonesian 
government in the perpetration of genocidal, environmentally harmful, and violent acts on an 
indigenous tribe); John Doe I v. Unocal Corporation, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Unocal was 
alleged to have collaborated with the military government of Burma in the perpetration of torture, 
forced labor, and slavery); Alomang v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc., No. 96 CIV. A. 96-2139, 1996 WL 
601431 (involving an allegation of complicity between Freeport-McMoRan Corporation and the 
Indonesian Government in the perpetration of genocide, environmental harms, and violent acts on 
indigenous workers); Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 945 F.Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Aguinda v. Texaco, 
Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (alleging 
that Texaco's oil operations in Ecuador and Peru polluted the rain forests and rivers in those countries. 
The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rendered the final decision, affIrming its dismissal onfarum non 
conveniens on August 16, 2002. See, Decision of the day, New York Law Journal, August 22, 2002.) 
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world.62 There is no doubt that this has been good for the world's economy.63 The 
only question is whether it has been good for the world's society. Some of the fall-
outs of multinational corporate activity include environmental harms64, human rights 
abuses65 and labor rights violations.66 While every sector of business is susceptible to 
any or all of this, multinational corporations in the oil sector have gained a lot of 
spotlight in recent times.67 
Chevron's case arose out of a series of abuses of rights of Nigerians in the oil 
producing communities in which the company operates. Chevron is alleged to have 
assisted, aided or abetted the perpetration of these assaults on those Nigerians.68 
Although it has not been in as much spotlight as another major oil company operating 
in Nigeria, RoyallDutch Shell,69 Chevron has not had an entirely smooth operation. In 
May 1994, members of the Opuekebo community (Delta State of Nigeria) in which 
Chevron had its oil producing operations protested the company's activities in their 
62 Thousands of multinational corporations litter the business landscape, with tremendous influence on 
the global economy. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
THE WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TNCS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS 
See also UNCTAD, Press Release, Are Transnationals Bigger Than Countries? TADIINFIPR47, 12 
August 2002, available at http://rO.unctad.org/en/press/pr0247en.htm. Last visited November 26,2002. 
63 I d. 
64 See Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits 
Against Us. Corporations in Us. Courts, 18 Stan. Envtl. L. 1. 145 (1999). 
65 See Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why Unocal Should be Liable Under us. Law for 
Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 35 (1998); Eileen Rice, Note, Doe v. 
Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 33 U.S.F.L. Rev. 
153 (1998). 
66 See Ryan P. Toftoy, Note, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater: Is Nike 
Just Doing It? 15 Ariz. 1. Int'l & Compo Law 905 (1998); Laura Ho, et aI., (Dis)Assembling Rights of 
Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 383 (1996). 
67 See PETER SCHWARTZ & BLAIR GIBB, WHEN GOOD COMPANIES DO BAD THINGS: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND RISK IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1999). 
68 Specific allegations against Chevron include summary execution, crimes against humanity, torture, 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of person and 
peaceful assembly and association, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, among others. 
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 57. 
69See, e.g., Joshua P. Eaton, Note, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational 
Corporations and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, B.U. Int'l L. J. 261 (1997). 
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area.70 They tied 16 boats together to block access to Chevron's installation s. 
Chevron invited the Nigerian police to handle the skirmish. The Police sent in a se1f-
propelled barge that rammed the blockade and sank all 16 boats. Three people died 
(by drowning) and many more were injured.71 
No sanctions were imposed on the company as a result of this incident. Not 
surprisingly therefore, when a few years later, further violations of rights occurred, 
consequent on the company's operations, the members of the affected communities 
decided to take action. The people of Ilaje who resided near Chevron's offshore 
operations in Ondo State had occupied the Parabe oil platform in protesting against 
some of the company's activities. The community members were asking the company 
to be more socially responsible, employ the indigenes of the area, and provide 
portable drinking water as their sources of drinking water had been polluted by the 
company's oil production.72 
Chevron allegedly responded by bringing, early morning on May 28 1998, 
choppers carrying military, naval, and mobile police personnel who, even before 
landing, started shooting indiscriminately at the protestors who were still at the 
p1atform.73 A lot of people were injured while two of the protestors were killed as a 
result of this armed attack. This incident formed the basis of the lawsuit currently 
pending in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco.74 
There was another event in this catalog of human rights violations and abuses 
that needs to be mentioned. According to data contained in the lawsuit against 
70 . Scott Pegg, The Cost of DOIng Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria 30 
SECURITY DIALOGUE 473,477 (1999). ' 
71Id. 
72 Id., at 478. 
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Chevron, protesting villagers at Opia and. Ikeyan in Delta State were on January 4, 
1999 attacked by Nigerian military/or police personnel. The attack was launched 
following Chevron's provision of helicopters and sea trucks (large boats) with pilots 
and other crewmembers to transport Chevron's security and other personnel, along 
with the Nigerian military officials. Four people were confirmed dead as a result of 
this incident while more than 60 persons were missing and presumed dead.75 
As has always been the case, corporations usually have one form of defense or 
another to present in the face of grave allegations.76 Thus, while the company 
admitted that it requested for and transported military troops, along with the 
company's Head of security to the platform, and conceded that the Parabe platform 
deaths were "regrettab1e,,,n an official of the company with whom the present 
researcher spoke in Nigeria disclaimed any liability. He argued that the protestors 
were hostage takers and as such the company had to act to counter their illegal 
activity.78 The company also states that it "insists on exercising reasonable control 
over those deployed to assist, ensuring that no more than minimum force required to 
bring a situation under control is app1ied.,,79 
73Id. 
74 Supra notes 56 and 57. 
75 Id. 
76 E.g: Unocal said that what ?appene~ in BUrI?a was not their fault and that they had no option in 
choosmg ~here to operate smce theIr operatIOns depend on where oil exists. According to the 
~~mpany, It follows geography and geology, not geopolitics. 
Pegg, supra note 70, at 478. 
78 Th' . e mt~rvI~w ,,:as !?"a~ted on the grounds of anonymity and strict confidentiality since Chevron's 
rece~t pohcy m Nigena IS not to grant interviews except the interviewer applies to the office of the 
presIdent. Th~ a~thor was made to understand that this was sequel to an interview granted by a 
Chevron officIal m the Delta area .to peo~le he thought were casual visitors (as they had introduced 
themsel~es!. They. tu~ed out.to be Journahsts and the interview was published in the New York Times. 
See Nonrmtsu O~ShI, Deep zn the Republic o/Chevron, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1999, Section 6' Pa e 26' 
Column 1; Magazme Desk. ' g , 
79 B .. 
. r~,;nen. Manby,. The Pnce ~~ 011: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in 
Nlgena sOIl Producmg Commurutles, Human Rights Watch Report on Nigeria 119 (1999). 
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The kind of allegations leveled against Chevron is a replication and reflection 
of adverse corporate practices in different sectors ranging from oil8oand apparel8! to 
agriculture. 82 The common thread that runs through all of them, when it comes to the 
law, is that often times nothing is done to the companies. In other words, they literally 
walk scot-free, without any form of legal accountability. A number of reasons 
account for this ugly scenario. 
Most of these corporations get away with activities which were it to be in their 
home countries, they would not think of getting involved in. They are quite aware that 
where their host country is in the developing world, it is unlikely to demand any level 
of accountability from them, regardless of the existence of a regulatory structure for 
80 See Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation and Private Enterprise 
Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C.J. Int'l Law & Com. Reg. 1 (1998) 
(detailing and discussing the catalog of human rights abuses associated with the California oil 
corporation, Unocal, in its operations regarding a gas pipeline construction in Burma). 
81 One of the corporations that have come under searchlight here is Nike. A lawsuit was filed against 
the company in San Francisco in 1998. See Kasky v. Nike Inc, (Complaint for Statutory, Equitable, 
and Injunctive Relief); No. 99-4446 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco, filed Apr. 20, 1998). The 
California Supreme Court held that Nike could be held liable for untrue statements. Nike v. Kasky, 119 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 Cal., 2002. See also, Toftoy, supra note 66, at 905: 
'International labor abuse by multinational corporations (MNCs) 
manufacturing in economically developing regions such as 
Southeast Asia, China, South Korea, the Caribbean, and Latin 
America, is a significant problem facing the international 
community. The apparel and garment industry has recently 
undergone severe criticism, as companies like Nike Inc. (Nike) 
encounter allegations and reports of sweatshop labor practices, 
unfair and unlivable wages, unreasonable hours, unsafe working 
conditions, and physical and mental abuse by supervisors. For 
example, in Ho Chi Min City, Vietnam, Nike factory workers are 
paid the United States equivalent of $1.50 a day, which is not 
enough to cover the cost of such basic needs as food, shelter, and 
transportation ... "Nike pays Vietnamese workers $1.60 a day, the 
minimum wage in Vietnam, but three basic meals there cost 
$2.10." , Citations omitted. 
82See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits and 
Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30 Law & Pol'y 
Int'l Bus. 111 (1998). "In 1994, a coalition of consumer and human rights groups began to pressure 
Seattle-based coffee retailer Starbucks to adopt standards requiring improved wages and conditions for 
workers on the Guatemalan plantations from which it sources beans." Id., 115. 
246 
such operations. For instance, in Nigeria,83 there are prOVlSlons III environmental 
laws, but they are rarely enforced. Human rights also take a back seat among 
dictatorial governments,84 even where, as in Nigeria, there are constitutional 
provisions respecting human rightS.85 International law, as earlier stated, does not 
playa very active role in the battle to rein in these corporations. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that aggrieved persons have taken it upon 
themselves to seek their own destiny. One of the places to which their search for 
justice has led them is the United States through the use of a hitherto obscure 
enactment - the Alien Tort Claims Act, discussed below. 
2. The Alien Tort Claims Act 
The history of the Alien Tort Claims Act 178986 is shrouded in mystery.87 This work 
does not dabble into the controversy surrounding its origins and the original intent of 
the lawmaker, as such are considered unnecessary for the purposes of this study. 88 
83See Emeka Duruigbo, Oil Development in Nigeria: A Critical Investigation of Chevron Corporation's 
Performance in the Niger River Delta (Natural Heritage Institute, 2001), available at http://www.n-h-
i.orglPublications/Publications.html. Last visited November 5, 2002. See also Chris N. Okeke, Africa 
and the Environment, 3 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Compo L. 37, 46 n.24 (1996) (stating that "successive 
Nigerian governments (military and civilian alike) since Nigeria's political independence in 1960, have 
utterly failed, even in the face of an existing environmental legal framework, to adequately deal with 
the nation's environmental problems."); Liubicic, supra note 82, at 122. "Government enforcement of 
labor laws in developing nations is often lax." 
84 Examples are the dictatorships in Burma and Nigeria. Nigeria has since reverted to a democratic 
government in May 1999. 
85 Chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979; Similar provisions in Chapter 
4 of the 1989 Constitution (now replaced by the 1999 Constitution). 
86 Created as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789; ch. 20, 9,1 Stat. 73, 77 (current version at 28 U. S. C. 
1350 (1994) ). 
87 "The ATCA has no explicit history." Brad 1. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: 
Promoting Multinational Corporate Responsibility By Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 Cath. 
U.L. Rev. 881, 887023 (1999). See also Donald 1. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on 
the Scope of the "law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 Cornell In1'l L.J. 153, 161, n47 
(1998). 
88 For a debate on what the Act is meant to accomplish, see Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in 
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 445, 446-47 (1995) (contending 
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Suffice it to say that the enactment has seen better days, although it had hardly been 
utilized, more so in corporate litigation, until recentll9. 
The ATCA provides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.,,90 Under it, "a foreigner who suffers an 
environmental or human rights injury outside the United States at the hands of an 
American corporation or a multinational corporation with business operations in the 
United States ... may sue the corporation and its foreign business partners in U.S. 
courtS.,,91 
Using the Act, a number of cases has been brought in the United States courts 
dealing with a broad range of issues.92 While in the past, it was mainly used against 
individuals who had perpetrated human rights abuses while in government,93 there is 
a perceptible shift toward using it against multinational corporations operating 
business joint ventures with repressive regimes.94 This reached a milestone in the 
Unocal Case,95 in which, for the first time, a federal district court (in California) held 
that the ATCA provided subject matter jurisdiction in a human rights case involving a 
multinational corporation which had not been alleged to have participated directly in 
the perpetration of the wrongs.96 
that the in~ention of Congr~ss was that the ATCA would provide jurisdiction only over prize cases); 
Anne-Mane Burley, The Alzen Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor 83 Am. 
J. Int'l .L. ~61, 49~ (1989) (favoring a more liberal interpretation to accommodate the United States' 
~:p~ndmg mtematlOnallegal and moral obligations). 
Kleserrnan, supra note 87. 
9°28 U.S.C. 1350. 
91 Rosencranz & Campbell supra note 64 at 146 
92 " . 
See note 61, supra. 
::See e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
95 E.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell, supra note 61. 
96 J~hn Doe I, et aI., v. Unocal Corp., et aI., 963 F. Supp. 880; 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5094. 
Kleserrnan, supra note 87 at 919. 
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In that case, plaintiffs farmers from the Tenasserim region of Burma brought a 
class action against Unocal and other defendants seeking injunctive, declaratory, and 
compensatory relief for alleged international human rights violations perpetrated by 
the Burmese junta in furtherance of a joint venture with Unocal. The joint venture 
was for the building of offshore drilling stations to extract natural gas from the 
Andaman Sea and a port and pipeline to transport the gas through the Tenasserim 
region of Burma and into Thailand. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants , 
through the Burmese military, intelligence or police forces, had used and continued to 
use violence and intimidation to relocate whole villages, enslave farmers living in the 
area of the proposed pipeline, and steal farmers' property for the benefit of the 
pipeline. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants' conduct had caused 
plaintiffs to suffer death of family members, assault, rape and other torture, forced 
labor, and the loss of their homes and property, in violation of state law and 
customary international law. The court held that the allegations were sufficient to 
support subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.97 
The Unocal case was eventually dismissed,98 but the decision to grant 
jurisdiction is a very significant one. In that case, the court took the position that 
international norms that have been recognized by the United States provide the 
standards of conduct for assessing the activities of American corporations doing 
business overseas.99 Acts by corporations or their business partners that contravene 
jus cogens norms are clear grounds for liability, while the possibility also exists that 
97 Doe v. Unocal, supra note 101. The case was eventually dismissed in 2000 
~M . 
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even international norms that have not attained jus cogens status may be relied on to 
determine the acceptability of corporate conduct. IOO It is incumbent on United States 
corporations, therefore, to conduct themselves in a way that is in concord with 
American-recognized international norms, and it IS immaterial for purposes of 
liability, whether they act jointly with governments or perpetrate the wrongful acts 
alone. IOI 
More recently, a state court in California in which the Unocal case was refiled 
decided that Unocal should stand trial. 102 This is yet another landmark as it is the first 
case of its kind (under the ATCA) to go to trial. I03 Further, in September 2002, the 
United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the earlier decision of the 
district court in the Unocal Case, indicating that Unocal could also face trial in federal 
court for the alleged abuses in Burma. 
The foregoing suggests that the utility of the ATCA should not be 
underestimated. It holds potential for addressing harmful business practices by filling 
a lacuna that has been there for ages. Nevertheless, the statute is saddled with 
limitations. A handful of those dark spots will be discussed as part of a general 
discussion on the limitations of transnational litigation .. 
99 h . ~. ooge, ~~pra note 8~, at 49 - 51. ~h~se international norms are contained in treaties, customs, 
j~IdiCal wntmgs on pubhc law, and decIsIOns of courts that recognize and enforce international law. 
100 Id. 
101 [d. 
102 J hn 103'~ Roe III v. ~nocal Corp., ~o B~237679 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A., filed August 20,2001). 
For .the frr~t tI~e, an Amencan Judge has ordered a U.S. corporation to stand trial for alleged 
human nghts vIOlatIOns committed by a joint-venture partner overseas." Peter Waldman Unocal to 
face Trial Over Link to Forced Labor, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 12, 2002, at B 1, 133. 
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The next section takes a more in-depth look at international civil litigation, 
examining what propels people to resort to this alternative, what it portends for the 
global community and how far it can go as a tool for corporate accountability. 
A. ATTRACTION, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CNIL LITIGATION 
1. Attraction 
The attraction of international civil litigation lies in its perceived ability to fill a 
vacuum existing both in public international law and in the national legal systems of 
most countries. While international law has had an age-old problem of enforcement, 
the capacity to hold corporations accountable for human rights violations and 
environmental abuses is simply non-existent in many parts of the globe. International 
civil litigation seeks to confront and address these problems under one rubric: 
enforcing international rules by using international and municipal laws to hold 
corporations accountable for wrongs that otherwise would have gone unremedied. lo4 
Certainly, the increasing trend toward litigation in developed countries over 
activities that took place in developing countries suggest that there must be some 
cognizable basis for its attractiveness to the litigants. Obviously, there are some 
perceived benefits, which serve as a magnet that attracts them. Conversely, there must 
104 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Boo.k Review, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 Tex. 
L. Rev. 15~3, 1~63 (1998~ (s~atI~g that the ATCA "stands as a unique transnational public law vehicle 
fO.r the artIculatIOn and :rmdicatIon of fundamental international rights." Citation omitted.) See also 
Richard Meeran & DaVId McIntosh, When is There a Duty of Care, THE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000 
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be some deficiencies in the systems that the plaintiffs abandoned in order to seek 
remedies from foreign courts. Transnational litigation therefore provides, or has the 
potential to provide, a number of benefits, which make it attractive to those Who 
resort to it. 
Some of the benefits may be intangible in some cases, and in other cases, material 
or physical rewards are within the range of expectations, if not the primary motivating 
factor. Public interest law firms, civil society groups and public-spirited individuals 
may be supportive of international litigation for reasons that bear direct relation to 
principle. Protecting, promoting, projecting or advancing such principles as equality 
before the law, 105 the existence of remedies where rights have been breached (ubi ius 
ibi remedium), 106 and protection of the weak among us from the tyranny or 
oppression of the strong and mighty could be a driving force. Seeing these principles 
vindicated by demanding corporate accountability is therefore a solid philosophical 
motivation to be on the side of transnational civil litigation. 107 
For victims of corporate abuse, there will always be an even closer, personal 
reason for seeking redress. Ordinarily, the forums in which that should be done are 
the courts of the victim's country, where the abuses in question took place. 
(noting that the absence of home country litigation leads to MNCs escaping responsibility and victims 
going without redress.) 
105 The notion of equality before the law is a component of the doctrine of rule of law. A. DICEY, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 198 (7th ed. 1907). 
(This particular text is the last that Dicey himself revised.) 
106 For discussions of this maxim, see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending - The Role of Legal 
and Equitable Principles, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2001); Reinhard Zimmermann, Relationships Among 
Roman Law, Common Law, And Modern Civil Law: Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence And Its Contribution 
To European Private Law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1685, 1696 (1992). 
107 This is a strong motivation for many social justice activities. See James E. Post, Global Codes of 
Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and Managers in Search of a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF 
CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 103 (Oliver F. Williams, ed., 2000) : "We have 
sought to make a difference in our organizations, our communities, and our professions. Our 
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Unfortunately, such a forum is often a luxury, unavailable to many a victim. Some 
solicitors involved in some of the transnational claims in England put it succinctly: 
The plain truth of the matter is that claimants want to 
sue in England because they cannot get justice overseas 
and MNCs want to stay the claims for precisely the 
108 same reason. 
Legal and institutional structures are lacking, weak or antiquated in some of the 
countries in the developing world. In some cases, the (natural) resource at the center 
of the controversy is the economic mainstay of the country, thus provoking reluctance 
on the part of the organs of the government to disrupt the operations of the 
. d 109 
III ustry. 
Related to the above is that corporations and governments have learnt to forge a 
siamese, symbiotic relationship that makes them eager to protect each other's 
interests against any "third party." Some victims thus face an awkward situation in 
which their own governments are unwilling to help them get justice. In worse cases, 
the government is a co-perpetrator of the injustice and therefore has every incentive 
to work against the emergence of a functional justice system or its smooth 
operation. 110 
Moreover, even when the forums are available and remedies provided, they 
amount to little, especially when compared with what is potentially available in the 
commitments may have stemmed from frustrations, recognition of an injustice, or issues so 
fundamental to our beliefs and values as human beings that we felt compelled to act." Id. 
108 Meeran & McIntosh, supra note 104. 
109 Scott Dolezal, The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Is There a public Emergency in Nigeria? 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1163, 1191 -
1193 (2000). 
liD See id. 
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judicial havens where the action is brought. 1 1 1 That kind of compensation is a 
disincentive to plaintiffs and is unlikely to deter corporations from continuing with 
the stated abuse. One writer summarizes the raison d'etre as follows: 
Governance deficits in host countries, substantive 
differences between legal systems, the possibility of 
higher damages awards being awarded in home rather 
than host countries, and innovative strategies on the 
part of plaintiffs' lawyers all play a role in the 
emergence of foreign direct liability cases. 112 
The implication is that this trend will continue unless there is a sharp reversal 
in the benefits offered or the burdens imposed. We will briefly look at the principal 
petroleum and environmental enactments in a developing country (Nigeria) and what 
it provides for victims of corporate excesses. This will be contrasted with some 
features of the American legal system that are germane to this discussion. 
a) Nigerian Law 
The importance of oil in the economIC life of any nation cannot be 
overemphasized. Since the discovery of oil in Nigeria in commercial quantity forty 
years ago, oil's influence in Nigeria's socio-economic calculations has steadily risen 
to the point of dominance. 1 13 Nigeria, however, has not completely closed its eyes to 
1\1 Bhopal plaintiffs were attracted to the U.S. partly because of the availability of higher damages. For 
an extensive discussion of the Bhopal cases and issues relating thereto, see Sudhir K. Chopra, 
Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehensive Global 
Regime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 235 (1994). 
112 Ward, supra note 41, at 462. 
113 See Briony Hale, Nigeria's Economy Dominated by Oil, BBC News, January 16, 2002, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oillnigeria/2002/0116strike.htm; 
Antony Goldman, et aI., SURVEY - NIGERIA: Hold on economy is ever-stronger: Oil, FINANCIAL 
TIMES; Apr 9, 2002. "The oil industry has dominated the country's economy since the start of large-
scale exploitation in the 1960s and 1970s of its substantial reserves of high-quality crude. Oil exports 
in 2000 reached Dollars 19.1bn, or more than 90 per cent of the value of total exports, according to 
International Energy Authority data." Id. 
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the negative impact of the pervasive use, .production, and marketing of oil and its 
derivatives, the most prominent of which is environmental degradation.
114 
Thus, a 
number of laws have been enacted to deal with the issue. 1 IS This work examines some 
of this legislation. At the end, appropriate conclusions will be drawn suggesting that 
Nigeria at the moment has an array of petroleum and environmental legislation that 
can at best be described as obsolete and inadequate. 
i) Petroleum Law 
The principal enactment under this head is the Petroleum Act of 1969.
116 
The 
Act provided for delegated legislation 117 upon which the state authority then 
responsible for such matters, the Federal Commissioner for Mines and Power, 
promulgated the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969.
118 
The most 
prominent provision of the regulations bearing on environmental protection is 
114 The environmental pollution that has accompanied oil production in Nigeria has been on a large 
scale. Thousands of oil spills involving millions of gallons of oil have been recorded by the Nigerian 
government. The incidence of gas flaring and its deleterious effect on the environment is also worthy 
of mention. On the foregoing, see Eno Okoko, Women and Environmental Change in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria: Evidence from Ibeno, 6:4 GENDER PLACE AND CULTURE: A Journal of Feminist 
Geography 373 (1999). 
115 However, Nigeria still lacks a National Energy Policy. Also, no pollution control policy in relation 
to air and marine pollution, has been put in place. This lacuna in the policy framework is a real 
impediment to accomplishing the goals of a clean environment or sustainable development. A senior 
official of the Department of petroleum Resources, Dr. C.N. Ifeadi (now retired) with whom the author 
spoke in Nigeria in September 2000 said that a National Energy Policy had been prepared and was 
awaiting enactment or implementation. See also U.S. Energy Information Administration, Nigeria: 
Environmental Issues, April 2000, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/nigenvhtm. Last visited 
June 27,2002. 
116 Petroleum Act 1969 (Nigeria), 1990, c.350. This statute repealed and replaced the Petroleum Act of 
1916. However, the Regulations of 1967 made under the 1916 Act (some of which dealt with pollution 
matters) were saved, pending such a time that there would be other provisions covering matters dealt in 
the regulations. See s. 13 (2), Sch. 3 and Sch. 4 para. 4 of Petroleum Act 1969. 
Il7 Id.,S. 8. 
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contained in regulation 25. Under it, the licensee or lessee of an oil exploration or 
prospecting licence or a mining lease: 
shall adopt all practicable precautions, including the 
provision of up-to-date equipment approved by the 
Chief Petroleum Engineer, to prevent the pollution of 
inland waters, rivers, water courses, the territorial 
waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil, mud or other 
fluids or substances which might contaminate the water, 
banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or 
destruction to fresh water or marine life, and where any 
such pollution occurs or has occurred, shall take prompt 
steps to control and, if possible, end it.
ll9 
The possibility of the above provision accomplishing the objectives of 
environmental protection and pollution control is remote, since the provisions lack 
any real teeth and expect to elicit compliance by mere adjuration. Moreover, it speaks 
in generalized terms without any conscious effort to specify or prescribe ways of 
ffi 
... 120 
e ectuatmg Its mtent. 
The Regulations contain other provisions, which could be construed as having 
an inclination toward preservation and protection of the environment. For instance, 
compensation is required in the case of an unreasonable disturbance of fishing 
rights. 121 All waste oil, brine and sludge or refuse from all storage vessels, boreholes, 
and wells are also required to be drained into proper receptacles constructed in 
compliance with safety regulations made under the ACt.
122 
118 L.N. 69 of 1969. 
119Id. 
120 OLUWOLE AKANLE, POLLUTION CONTROL REGULATION IN THE NIGERIAN OIL 
INDUSTRY 11 (1991). 
121 Petroleum Drilling Regulations, supra note, Regulation 23. 
122 Id., Regulation 40 
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It is also necessary to make ment.ion of the Oil Pipelines Act enacted in 
1956.123 The Act provides that the Governor General (now the President) may by 
regulation prescribe "measures in respect of public safety, the avoidance of 
interference with works of public utility in, over and under any land and the 
prevention of pollution of any land or water.,,124 
The foregoing clearly reveals that Nigeria's petroleum legislation does not 
necessarily champion the cause of environmental well-being. This could be traced to 
the fact that the environment is a relatively recent topic, especially in developing 
countries, and therefore could secure nothing more than a passing glance from the 
country's legislators. More importantly, the focus of Nigeria's petroleum policy 
makers has not essentially been on using petroleum legislation to enhance or secure 
environmental protection, but to use such laws as instruments for promoting 
economic development through petroleum exploration and production. 125 
This is rather unfortunate and it is expected that policies in the future would 
seek to promote economic prosperity without necessarily neglecting or compromising 
environmental quality. Indeed, a lot has happened in the global community since 
these laws were passed and the modem thinking is sustainable development,126 which 
emphasizes that "environment and development are not only interrelated but 
123 C.145 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1958 [enacted as Ordinance 31 of 1956]. 
124Id ., S 31 (c). 
125 See Akanle, supra note 120, at 11. 
126 The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development simply as "development that meets the 
needs for the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OUR COMMON 
FUTURE 43 (1987). ' 
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inseparable.,,127 It is therefore expected that the Nigerian legal framework on the 
subject should be updated to incorporate environmentally sustainable and 
economically viable operations in the oil industry. 
ii). Maritime Law 
Nigeria's most significant legislation on oil pollution of the manne 
environment by ships is the Oil in Navigable Waters Act
128 
which is the implementing 
legislation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil 1954129 and its 1962 amendment. 130 
The Act makes it an offence for any Nigerian ship to discharge oil (defined to 
include crude oil, fuel oil, lubricating oil and heavy diesel oil) into the "prohibited sea 
area."l3l Prohibited sea areas, following the lead in the above-mentioned international 
convention, include areas within 50 miles from land and outside the territorial waters 
of Nigeria and some listed seas.132 This accords with the notion of flag State 
jurisdiction by which discharge violations in areas outside another State's territorial 
or internal waters are punishable by the State of the ship's registry and under its 
law. 133 
127 K . M' k I an~ IC e son,. Carrots, Sticks or Stepping stones: Differing Perspectives on Compliance with 
InternatIOnal Law, III TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES' 
FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE 35, 42 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum,et aI, eds., 1998). . 
:~: Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 (Nigeria), 1990 c.337 
327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL]. 
::~ Oil in Navigable Waters Act, supra note 128, Preamble 
Id., S.l. 
132 Id., Parts 1 and 2 of the Schedule to the Act. 
133 S ee G. ETIKERENTSE, NIGERIAN PETROLEUM LAW 72 (1985). 
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Discharge of oil into Nigerian navigable waters by any vessel or from a place 
or land adjoining such waters, or from an apparatus transferring oil, is an offence for 
which the owner or master of the ship, the occupier of the land or the operator of the 
apparatus in question respectively, may be culpable.
134 
Navigable waters of Nigeria 
refer to all navigable inland waters and the whole of the sea within the seaward limits 
of the country's territorial waters.
135 
The Act empowers the Minister of Transport to make regulations requiring 
Nigerian vessels to be fitted with prescribed equipment and vests the surveyor of 
ships with authority to carry out tests with a view to ascertaining whether such fittings 
comply with the regulations. 136 The penalty for oil discharge violations is a fine 
which should not exceed two thousand Naira in the case of trial by a magistrate 
court.137 Accordingly, where the case is tried by a high court, the court has unlimited 
powers concerning the extent of fine to be imposed. 
The Minister of Transport may also make regulations requiring masters of 
Nigerian ships of a gross tonnage of 80 tons and above to keep records in a prescribed 
form regarding oil discharges, oil spills and ballasting activities.
138 
The responsible 
harbor authority, that is, the Nigeria Ports Authority, is also required to provide oil 
reception facilities for the disposal of oil residues. 139 
134 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, supra note 121, s. 3 (1). 
\35 Id., S 3 (2). 
136 Id.,S. 5. 
137 Id., S. 6. That is, approximately twenty dollars. 
138 Id., S. 7 (1). . 
139 Id., S 8. 
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The Act provides a number of defenses to the offences created by it and this 
has been criticized for substantially whittling down the efficacy of the provisions:140 
"Surely, by the time all these defences are pleaded, it is hardly feasible to convict 
anybody under the provisions of the enactment.,,141 
Some of these criticisms however, either are misplaced or are of questionable 
import. For instance a number of commentators criticize the defense available to a 
person who discharges oil in order to save lives, viewing it as alarming.
142 
There is 
nothing inherently or patently wrong with excusing ship masters who discharge oil 
into the sea in the event of a maritime casualty or real likelihood of it, if such 
discharge will lighten the ship and save lives. It must be conceded that it opens an 
avenue for unscrupulous ship masters to discharge oil in other cases and claim that it 
was necessary for the safety of lives, but that does not afford enough ground to deny 
other persons the opportunity to do so legitimately. 
The critics also create the impression that the Nigerian enactment is weakened 
by the fact of "the myriad of very liberal defences it allows.,,143 The point is that it is 
not the enactment that allows them; the legislature was in general, simply complying 
with the provisions of the international law upon which the Nigerian law was 
140 See David Iyalomhe, Environmental Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: Lessons 
from Alberta's Experience 60 (Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, 1998) (On file with the University of 
Alberta Library). 
141 Akanle, supra note 120, at 9. 
142 See Akin Ibidapo-Obe, Criminal Liability for Damages Caused by Oil Pollution, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA 231,239-240 (J.A. Omotola, ed., 1990); Ambrose 0.0. 
Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the Law and Policy in the 
United States and Nigeria, 24 Denv. J. In1'l L. & Pol'y 55,83 (1995). 
143 Ek pu, supra note 142, at 83. 
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based. 144 That being the case, what ought 1.0 have been pointed out is the fact that the 
law is based on an international arrangement that deserves criticism. 
The real problem therefore with the Oil in Navigable Waters Act is that it is 
based on an obsolescent and inadequate arrangement which has been overtaken by 
later events. 145 The 1954 convention and its 1962 amendment have undergone further 
d· 146 . amen ments In 1969 and 1971 WhICh are not reflected in the legislation. The 
gravity of the lack of the incorporation of the amendments into Nigerian law pales 
into insignificance when juxtaposed with the fact that the 1954 OILPOL and its 
amendments are hardly considered as law by many countries in these present times. 
This is because the convention has been replaced, in the case of a number of the 
parties, by the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships.147 This latter convention has in tum undergone changes including the 1978 
Protocol relating thereto148 and the 1992 amendments introducing the double hull 
arrangement for oil tankers. 149 That Nigeria should be relying on the 1954 convention 
144 S 
145 ee OILPOL, supra note 129, art. IV. 
See R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
TANKERS AT SEA 219 (1979); R.B. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act· New 
Stresses on the Law o/the Sea, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1,34 (1970). . 
146 See D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1002 Vol II (IA Sh 
ed., 1984). ' . .. earer 
147 I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP 35 (Nov. 2, 1973) reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319. The Convention is 
mea~t to supersede. the 1954 .conventi~n for those States who are parties to the two treaties. See also 
Rob~ R. Churchill & Gelr Ulfstem, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
EnVironmental ~greements: A Little-Not~ced ~henomenon in International Law, 94 Am. J. In1'l L. 623, 
at 6~1 (2000), Jam~s ~arlson, PreSidential Proclamation 7219: Extending the United States 
Contiguous Zone - Dldn t Someone Say This Had Something to do with Pollution? 55 U Mia . L 
Rev. 487, 504 (2001). . lTIl. 
148.The Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, I.M.C.O. Doc. TSPP/CONF/ll (Feb. 16, 1978) reprinted in 17 I L M 546 [h . JOt MARPOL 73/78]. . . . eremall er 
149 MARPOL 73178 Amendedfor New and Existing Tankers, [1992] 2 IMO NEWS 3. 
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and its 1962 amendment in this day and age is comparable to using a printing press of 
the industrial revolution era in this computer epoch. 
The case for an updating of Nigerian law on oil pollution of the marine 
environment by ships therefore cannot be overemphasized. The time has therefore 
come to move with the times. Thus, Nigeria should become a party to MARPOL 
73/78 and reflect its provisions in domestic legislation. 15o 
iii). Environmental Law 
Under this heading, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act 1988 
'11 b d' d 151 h WI e Iscusse. T e FEPA Act was the response of the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria to "the growing tide of global demands for legislative and 
non-legislative efforts at protecting and preserving the environment.,,152 Under 
section 1 of the Act, a Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) is 
established as a body corporate consisting of a chairman, distinguished scientists, 
representatives of certain federal ministries and the Director of the Agency.153 The 
Agency was initially placed under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Housing 
and the Environment, but by an amendment to the original enactment, FEP A was 
150 Treaty s~atus information provided by IUCN on MARPOL 73/78 and last updated as of March 1 
1997 mdlc~te.s that Nigeria has neither signed nor ratified the treaty. Se~ 
http:// sedac .CIesm. org/prodl charlotte. 
151 Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act 1988 (Nigeria), 1990 c. 131 [hereinafter FEP A Act]. 
152 Ameze Guobadia, The Nigerian Federal Environment Protection Agency Decree No. 58 of 1988: 
An Appraisal,S J. Afr. & Compo L. (RADlC) 408, 409 (1993). 
153 See also S. 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the FEPA Act for a full composition of the membership of the 
agency. 
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moved to the Presidency. 154 The present civilian government of Nigeria has created a 
full- fledged Ministry of Environment under which FEP A now operates. 155 
FEP A is assigned with the "responsibility for the protection and development 
of the environment in general and environmental technology, including initiation of 
policy in relation to environmental research and technology.,,156 FEPA's general 
mandate and the scope of the enactment extend to the territorial waters of Nigeria and 
the Exclusive Economic Zone. 157 However, by section 9 of the FEP A Act, the 
Director of the Agency, working within the policy framework put in place by FEP A, 
is empowered to "establish programmes for the prevention, reduction and elimination 
of pollution of the nation's air, land and interstate waters, as well as national 
programmes for the restoration and enhancement of the nation's environment." This 
section is silent on international waters and could be a salient indication of the 
intention of the Federal Government to concentrate FEPA's activities on domestic 
issues relating to marine pollution, notwithstanding the general reference to 
international waters in the Act. This leaves a lacuna in Nigeria's legal framework for 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the prevention and 
control of oil pollution of Nigeria's coastlines, which extend beyond the interstate 
154 Federal Environment Protection Agency (Amendment) Decree (Nigeria) 1992 c.59. 
155 See Muhammad Kabir Sa'id, I:I0nourable Minister of Environment, Protec;ing Our Environment 
and. Natural Reso~rces for. Su~tamable D.e~elo~ment, ~inisterial Media Summit, May 23, 2002, 
a~~Ilable at http.! Iwww.ntgeJ:la.gov.ng/mmlstrymformatlOIl/mediasummit/Environment.htm. Last 
VISIted November 5., 2(~02. (statmg t.hat "the Federal Ministry of Environment was created in 1999 with 
the fun~amental obJ.ectIves of se.curmg a quality environment adequate for good health and well-being, 
conserv.mg and usmg the enVIronment's natural resources for the benefit of present and future 
generatlOns.") 
156 FEPA Act, supra note 151, S.4 







waters. A panacea would lie in the creation of an additional agency on marine 
environmental issues, thereby also reducing the load on FEP A. 
Part II of the legislation pertains to National Environmental Standards. Under 
it, the Agency is required to make recommendations establishing water quality 
standards. 158 Such standards are for the purposes of protecting the public health and 
enhancing the quality of water. 159 
The discharge of hazardous substances into the air, land, waters and shorelines 
is prohibited except for cases permitted by law. 16o Hazardous substances are not 
defined, but acting under powers vested on it by section 20(5) of the FEPA Act, 
FEP A has defined those substances (even though oil is not specifically mentioned) to 
include some waste from the refining process such as slop oil, emulsion solids and 
leaded tank bottoms. 161 Any breach of the above provision is punishable and attracts a 
fi f ·· 162 me or a term 0 Impnsonment or both. A person accused of an offence under this 
head could plead that the offence was committed without his or her knowledge or that 
he or she exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. 163 
The above however, does not exonerate the owner or operator of any vessel or 
facility that causes such discharge of hazardous substances from bearing the cost of 
removing such substances, or the "restoration or replacement" of natural resources 
damaged therebyl64 or the responsibility for cleaning up the affected areas and 
158 d I ., S. 5(1) & S. 15 (1). 
159 Id.,S.15(1). 
160 d I ., S. 20 (1). 
::~ FEPA, Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Pollution Control in Nigeria (1991). 
FEPA Act, supra note 151, S. 20 (2). 
163 d I ., S. 20 (4). 
164 Id., S. 21. 
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. th b 165 . removmg e su stances. There IS also a duty on the "spiller" to promptly inform 
the Agency and other relevant bodies in the event of a discharge. 166 
In the pursuance of the powers vested on it by the FEP A Act, FEP A has 
issued a number of regulations relating to oil pollution issues one of which is the 
National Environmental Protection (Effluent Limitation) Regulations. 167 The 
Regulations allow an oil and grease content in brine and other production wastes of 
not more than 10 mg/litre for discharge into Nigeria's inland waters. The second of 
the statutory instruments issued by FEP A is the National Environmental Protection 
(Pollution Abatement in Industries Generating Wastes) Regulations.168 Under these 
regulations, the release of hazardous or toxic substances into the air, water or land of 
Nigeria's ecosystems beyond the approved limits is prohibited. In more specific 
terms, there is a prohibition on the discharge of oil, in any form, into public drains, 
rivers, lakes, sea, or underground injection without a permit issued by FEP A or any 
organization designated by it. 169 
The FEPA Act is without doubt an improvement on Nigeria's preVIOUS 
attempts to address environmental questions through legislation. For instance, unlike 
previous regimes, it realizes that its provisions could be mere postulations and hollow 
admonitions in the absence of an enforcement scheme and proceeds to prevent that 
165 d I ., S. 21 (2) (b). 
166 d I ., S. 21 (2) (a). 
167 S.l. 8 of 1991. 
168 S.l. 9 of 1991 
169 Id., regulation 15 (2). 
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from the onset by providing for an arrangement for the enforcement of its 
provisions. 170 
Nevertheless gaps exist and there is still room for further improvement in the 
nation's march toward a better environment. The Act places an emphasis on pollution 
arising from industrial activities including voluntary discharge of hazardous 
substances into the air, on land, and the waters of Nigeria. This is a restrictive 
approach as environmental degradation also arises from those economic activities that 
are considered "normal" and with which we are confronted from day to day.171 
In addition, the legislation creates unnecessary problems for the enforcement 
agency. For instance, under section 20, the discharge of hazardous substances must be 
in "harmful quantities," thus requiring a case by case determination before liability 
can be established. 172 A similar language was used in the United States Clean Water 
ActJ73 and this was interpreted to impose a requirement to show that a discharge 
caused actual harm before liability could attach to that discharge. 174 The section 
underwent amendment thereafter and the new provision prohibits discharge of oil or 
hazardous substances in such quantities "as may be harmful" as determined by 
regulations made under the legislation. 175 
170 Guobadia, supra note 152, at 416. See Akanle, supra note 120, at 15 on this pitfall of previous 
legislation. 
171 Guobadia, supra note 152, at 414. 
172 Ekpu, supra note 142, at 85. 
173 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.c. 1251 - 1387 (1988). The Act was originally 
enacted in 1948. 
174 United States v. Chevron Oil Company, 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Ekpu supra note 
142. ' 
175 33 U.S.c. 1321 (b) (3). 
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The effect of the amendment, from judicial reasoning, is that actual harm to 
the environment is not a relevant factor in the determination of the question of the 
violation of the discharge prohibition in the relevant section. 176 The added advantage 
is that it removes the administrative burden of case-by-case proceedings. l77 It is 
submitted that this latter legislative approach is better for Nigeria since FEP A might 
find it nearly impossible to cope with the demands of the present position, 
considering the volume of spills and its other constraints. 178 
Further, the provisions of the Act on the clean up of spills are unlikely to have 
any significant effect as it can at best only serve a minimal purpose to either deter 
such occurrence or provide an incentive to undertake a clean up where hazardous 
substances are discharged. Corporations would certainly prefer the payment of the 
paltry penalty of one thousand Naira (about 20 dollars) for every day the offence 
persists to mapping out huge sums of money for clean up or to take precautionary 
measures. 179 
In general, one could conveniently conclude that "in its present form the [Act] 
is only a beginning. Further legislation and policy decisions will have to be initiated 
by government and other bodies to bring the desired changes.,,180 At the time of 
writing, the Nigerian government announced the introduction of some new guidelines 
176 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Yost, 919 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Ekpu, supra note 142. 
177 
Id., See also Orgulf Transport Co. v United States, 711 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Ky. 1989). See 1 
Ekpu, supra note 142. a so 
178 k E pu, supra note 142, at 85. These constraints include budget facilities, personnel competencies 
and the role of the government in the oil industry. Id., at 98 - 99. ' 
179 
Joshua P. Eato~, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations 
and the Human Rzght to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.u. Int'l L. J. 261, 288 (1997). ' 
267 
h . 181 I . on t e enVIronment. t IS only expected that they would be a considerable 
improvement on previous efforts, both in content and implementation. 182 
Ordinarily, some of the alleged human rights abuses would have been avoided 
if the people had a strong reason to believe that they could proceed judicially against 
companies engaging in environmental pollution and corporate irresponsibility. In 
place of some of the protests and demonstrations that eventually turned ugly and 
deadly, resort to litigation would have been a viable option. 183 However, it is clear 
from the above foray into Nigerian legislative landscape that the laws that are 
supposed to cater for the Nigerian people are weak, inadequate and obsolete. 
The greater outrage is that they are hardly enforced by the government 
officials charged with that responsibility.184 With the exception of a limited provision 
180 Guobadia, supra note 152, at 415. 
181 NIGERIA: New Environmental Guidelines for Oil Industry, UNITED NATIONS, Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Integrated Regional Information Network (lRIN), 
August 1, 2002. The Special Adviser to the Nigerian president on Petroleum Matters, Dr. Rilwan 
Lukman, stated that the Guidelines are the outcome of a review of old rules with a view to bringing 
them in line with global trends while at the same time setting high performance standards for the 
country's oil industry. According to the report: 
!d. 
[Dr.]Lukman acknowledged that the environmental practices of oil 
transnationals in Nigeria had been found to be below 
internationally acceptable standards. He said the government had 
information that oil companies had stockpiled about 35,000 metric 
tonnes of drilling waste in various parts of the Niger Delta, and had 
planned to dump them in remote locations. 
182 "Senior officials said the 300-page guidelines provided rules to reduce pollution, procedures for 
environmental monitoring and analytical parameters. The government, through its Department of 
Petroleum Resources, will also conduct regular health, safety and environment audits on the oil 
companies." !d. 
183 For a discussion of the protests and attendant human rights abuses in oil producing communities in 
Nigeria, see Brownen Manby, The Role and Responsibility of Oil Multinationals in Nigeria, 53:1 J. 
Int'!. Aff. 281 (1999). 
184 See Emeka Duruigbo, Oil Development in Nigeria: A Critical Investigation of Chevron 
Corporation's Performance in the Niger River Delta (Natural Heritage Institute, 2001), available at 
http://www.n-h-i.orglPublications/Publications.html. Last visited November 5, 2002. 
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m the Oil Pipelines Act,185 the right to citizen suits does not exist. 186 Victims of 
environmental abuse and oil company excesses are left with little option. 
In the few cases that aggrieved citizens decided to go to court, the results have 
not been encouraging. 187 The oil companies fight with superior resources to deprive 
the victims of justice. The attitude of the courts seems to be pro-corporate or at least 
in favor of continued oil production at the expense of virtually every other thing. In a 
particular case, the court stated that nothing should be done to disrupt a trade, which 
was the country's main source of revenue. 188 The judiciary is not immune from the 
corruption evident in different aspects of the society, especially in government 
. I 189 h· cIrc es. W Ile there may not be any strong evidence to that effect, the perception 
that oil companies buy justice or buy themselves out of punishment is strong. 
Military rule also worsened matters for both the court system and the 
. . 190· . . 
CItIzens. The dIctators who seIzed the rems of office used different measures to 
emasculate the judiciary. These include suspending the supremacy clause of the 
185 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Cap. 338 (1990) 
186 ,.
See Ekpu, supra note 142. 
187!d. 
188 Allar I~ou :. Shell-BP, Suit No. ,!,,/89/71, Warri HC 26/11/73 [Umeported] cited in M.A. Aj orno , 
An Exammatzon of Federal EnVironmental Laws in Nigeria, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
SU~T~INABLE ~E~ELOPMEN~ .11, ~2 (M.A. Ajomo & O. Adewale, eds., 1994). In that case, the 
plamtIffs apphcatlOn for an mJunctIon to restram the defendant from polluting its land, fish pond, and 
cre~k was refused. The court contended that nothing should be done to disturb the operations of a trade 
WhICh serves as the country's main source of revenue. 
189 A Committee hea~ed by ~ retired Supreme Court Justice, Kayode Eso, found many judges wanting 
and came down heavIly agamst them for corruption. The committee's report or recommendations still 
hav~ n~t been made public, but the Nigerian Government recommended the removal from office of a 
semor Judge recently on the basis of that report. See Eddy Odivwri and Lilian Okenwa Six Judges 
ftoay Be Sacked, As FG ~"!plements Kayode Esho panel report, THISDA Y, September 26, 2002. 
On the effect of ~htary rule .on h~rnan rights in Nigeria, see U.S. State Department Country 
Reports on Hu~n Rights Prac~Ices m the past few years. Interestingly, even with a civilian 
go~ernment that IS generally beheved to more amenable to human rights protection than military 
r~gImes, the Country Report released in March 2002, still states that the "[t]he Government's human 
nghts record was poor," and that notwithstanding some improvements, "serious problems remain." 
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constitution and subjecting constitutional provisions to military decrees, intimidating 
judges, and forcing the judiciary to conform by denying them financial 
independence. 191 The weakening of the court system stunted judicial development.192 
All of this has had a demoralizing effect on those who would be expected to bring 
lawsuits against the corporations. Citizens have grown increasingly weary of the 
courts and see them as institutions that have little meaning and of minimal help in 
their plight193 Transnational litigation and resort to international judicial or quasi-
judicial forums became, and remain, highly attractive options. 
Recently, the social, economic and environmental problems that have attended 
oil production in Nigeria were agam brought to the forefront when the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights reviewed a complaint against the 
government of Nigeria. The complaint principally alleged that oil production under 
the joint venture between the State-owned oil corporation (NNPC) and Shell 
Petroleum has had huge social, economic, health and environmental impacts on the 
people of Ogoniland, in the Niger Delta. 194 In a decision communicated on May 2002, 
the Commission held the Nigerian government in violation of several articles of the 
u.s. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001, Released by the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 4, 2002. 
191 On the state of the judiciary in Nigeria under military rule, see Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating 
Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 
573,601-609 (2000). 
192 See Ambrose O. o. Ekpu, Judicial Response to Coup D'etat: A Reply to Tayyab Mahmud (From a 
Nigerian Perspective), 13 Ariz. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 1 (1996) (discussing the dilemma that the judicial 
branch confronts in the event of a military incursion into politics.) 
193 People in the oil producing communities that the researcher spoke to in Nigeria in 1999 did not 
have much confidence in litigation as a tool for social, economic and environmental justice. See 
Duruigbo (Natural Heritage Institute), supra note184. 
194 For a discussion on what needs to be done through international law to address issues pertaining to 
the Ogonis and other indegenous groups, see Sompong Sucharitkul, The Inter-temporal Character of 
International and Comparative Law Regarding the Rights of the Indigenous Populations of the World, 
50 Am. J. Compo L. 3 (2002). 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1 95. The Commission appealed to the 
Nigerian government to ensure the protection of the environment, health and 
livelihood of the Ogoni people, ensure adequate compensation to the victims of 
human rights violations, provide information to oil communities and grant them 
access to participate in the making and implementation of decisions that affect 
them. 196 
b) American Legal System 
Most of the transnational cases, especially those that border on human rights and 
international law violations, will likely be filed in the United States. 197 This is 
because while the domestic courts of some other developed countries are available, 
the U.S. legal system arguably holds the greatest attraction. 198 Accounting for this 
state of attraction are some peculiar features of American law. Because many of these 
factors in the context of international litigation are primarily based on procedural 
advantages, this work will not be discussing the details of American petroleum or 
195 African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, Re Communication 155/96, May 27,2002. 
Decision reached at the 30th Ordinary Session held in Banjul, The Gambia, from October 13 - 27, 
2001. 
196 This is consistent with some scholarly submissions on the plight of the oil producing communities 
in Nigeria. See Okechukwu Ibeanu, Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the 
Niger Delta, Nigeria, 6: ENVIRONMENAL CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REPORT 19,31 
(2000). In addition to the right to participation in the formulation and implementation of environmental 
and developmental decisions, Dr. Ibeanu also recommends the institution of trust funds to build the 
economic capacity of oil communities. !d., at 31 - 32. 
197 The point has been canvassed that ATCA-like cases can be brought in Canada. Craig Forcese, 
Deterring "Militarized Commerce": The Prospect of Liability for "Privatized" Human Rights Abuses, 
31 Ottawa L. Rev. 171,211 (2000). This remains to be shown. As a matter of fact, an ATCA case was 
brought against a Canadian oil company,Talsiman, based on its operations in Sudan. The case was 
brought not in Canada, but in a U.S. federal court, Southern District of New York. See Jon Dougherty, 
Company suedfor abetting Sudan genocide Anti-slavery group files $1 billion suit against Canadian 
firm, November 9, 2001, available at http://,,,'ww.worldnetdaily.com/news! printer-
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· I I . I' 199 envIronmenta egIs atlOn. Instead, focus will be on the procedural aspects of 
American law that litigants consider beneficial or important for successful litigation. 
A plethora of reasons have been advanced by scholars for the continued interest in 
American courts by foreign claimants. In the first place, "[n]o other country has a 
statute that creates a specific statutory claim for human rights violations.,,200 
Further, the United States have rules of personal jurisdiction that make it possible 
to proceed against defendants who are temporarily present in the country. Also, 
foreign corporations whose business contacts with the United States represent only a 
minor fraction of their worldwide operations could still be sued in the US. Besides, 
no connection needs exist between the events at issue and the United States.201 It 
should be noted that other countries have jurisdiction rules that may be as expansive 
as, or even much more expansive than, U.S. jurisdictional rules. However, the US. 
rules are better streamlined and much more suited for litigation of human rights 
claims by aliens for events that took place in another country. 202 
Some practical litigation rules also make the US. a more attractive forum for 
foreign litigants. The "loser pays" system of attorney fees is one such example. The 
requirement in most jurisdictions that the loser in a law suit pays the attorney fees of 
the prevailing party would have inhibited the numerous human rights cases brought in 
198 See .Beth Ste~hens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of 
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int'I. L. 1 (2002), 
[Hereinafter Stephens (2002)]. 
199 For discussions on American law pertaining to oil and the environment, see Judith Kimerling 
International Standards in Ecuador's ~mazon Oil Fields: The Privatization of Environmental Law, 26 
Colum. J .. EnvtI. L. 289 (2001); SantIago Cueto, Note, Oil's Not Well In Latin America: Curing The 
Shortcommgs Of The Current International Environmental Law Regime In Dealing With Industrial Oil 
Pollution In Latin America Through Codes Of Conduct, 11 Fla. 1. Int'l L. 585, 595 - 598 (1997). 
200 ~eth Ste?hens, Corporate Liability: EnforCing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 
Hastmgs Int 1 & Compo L. Rev, 401,409 (2001). [Hereinafter Stephens (2001)]. 
201Id. 
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the US., considering that the plaintiffs generally are people with minimal resources 
and the cases are novel. 203 Court filing costs and pre-paid attorney fees could also 
serve as impediments to environmental and human rights claims. In the United States , 
law suits are facilitated by "a broad network of public interest law firms, supported by 
pro bono assistance from private firms,,,204 a feature that is hardly existent in most of 
the world.205 Lawyers and litigants enter into attractive contingency fee arrangements 
that are unavailable in other jurisdictions.206 
The notice pleading system and liberal discovery rules that make it easier to bring 
an action with little facts while leaving room to flesh it out later, are also to a 
plaintiff s advantage. Plaintiffs are thereby enabled to proceed with the sparse factual 
material they have against defendants who are then placed in the more onerous 
position of furnishing every relevant piece of information in their possession or 
control.207 
Other benefits include the vehicle of the class action, the availability of punitive 
damages and the use of jurors who tend to be sympathetic to the "little victims" of the 
"gargantuan corporations" to determine liability and damages.208 
Finally, the United States has had a long tradition of usmg "public law 
litigation,,209 to promote social reform.210 This legal culture is well suited for the role 
202 !d., at 410 - 411. 
203 !d., at 411. 
204 !d., at 411. 
205 !d. 
206 Ugo Mattei and Jeffrey Lena, Us. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising Outside of the United States: 
~~me Hegemonic Implications, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp, L. Rev. 381, 394 (2001). 
Stephens, supra note 200, at 412. 
208 M 'd attel an Lena, supra note 206, at 394 - 395, 
209 The expression "public law litigation" was coined almost thirty years ago by Professor Abram 
C~~yes. to describe this kind of litigation. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
LitigatIOn, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) 
210 • 
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of demanding corporate reform and accountability through litigation.zll In fact, the 
United States is considered a "plaintiff s paradise" because it confers enormous 
advantages on the plaintiff without risk, while imposing huge costs - financial and 
otherwise - on the defendant.z12 
2. Implications 
The question about whether international civil litigation has enormous 
implications for multinational corporations, national legal systems and public 
international law can easily be answered in the affirmative. 
The principal implication for corporations with regard to the vibrant use of the 
ATCA is that it holds them accountable for actions that otherwise would have gone 
unremedied. Thus, the ATCA "provides one possible solution to the present day 
inability to hold an MNC accountable for human rights violations."z13 Home country 
litigation is reversing the previous position in which corporations that had strong 
connections with, and extensive financial, managerial and technical control over, their 
delinquent subsidiaries in developing countries were able to escape accountability, 
where those subsidiaries could not be called to account, due to bankruptcies and other 
reasons. "Notwithstanding those control mechanisms, there was no significant fear of 
legal accountability on the part ofMNCs until fairly recently."Z14 
Even when cases do not succeed, the very prospect of success at the initial 
stage or the mere fact of litigation could have some adverse effect on the company. 
2\1 Id. 
212 Mattei and Lena, supra note 206, at 393. 
213 Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liable Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Actfor Human Rights Violations?, 23 Brook J. Int'l L. 927, 937 (1998). 
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Resources will be invested to fight the lawsuit. More important, other economic 
consequences are likely to arise. A company's shares may trade lower at the stock 
marketsZ15 as it grapples with the pitfalls of negative publicity. On the positive side, 
bowing to public opinion that is more likely to be shaped by the lawsuit, a company 
may choose to mend its ways and become more responsible in the conduct of its 
international business operations.z16 
For national governments, it suggests to countries from which the suits 
originate that there is a clear rejection of their extant legal system. At least it will be a. 
loud and clear statement that all is not well with their judicial system. Indeed, a court 
is unlikely to accept jurisdiction if an adequate alternative forum exists.Z17 
Transnational litigation that proceeds, therefore, will likely propel them to overhaul 
their judicial machinery and accordingly ensure justice for their citizens.z18 
214 Meeran & McIntosh, supra note 104. 
215 See Ward, supra note 4l. 
216 Talisman Energy, a Canadian oil company, recently sold its assets and withdrew its operations from 
the Sudan. A lawsuit launched against the company 11 months earlier, in federal court in New York, 
while not the sole cause of the company's decision, may have played a role. See Talisman to Sell Its 
Stake in Company in Sudan, N. Y. TIMES, October 31, 2002, available at 
http://www.nytimes.comJ2002110/311business/31TALI.html. Last visited November 5,2002. 
217 Wiwa v. Shell, supra note 61, was dismissed because Shell successfully argued that an adequate 
alternative forum - England - exists. The appellate court reinstated the case. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F. 3d 88 (2d-Cir. 2000). The United States Supreme Court on March 26, 2002, 
denied certiorari and thus declined to review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd 
Circuit, thus paving the way for the lawsuit to proceed against Shell. See Andrew Buncombe, US 
Supreme Court Clears Way for Relatives to Sue Shell over Saro-Wiwa's Death, INDEPENDENT 
(UK) March 27, 200l. 
218 It should be noted that some States may be willing, yet unable, to carry out any meaningful or 
extensive judicial reforms. There have been cases when some countries supported lawsuits abroad by 
their citizens, suggesting that they are not necessarily opposed to holding those corporations 
accountable. Examples are Ecuador's support for the lawsuit against Texaco and South Africa's 




In the case of public international law, it helps in addressing a perennial 
problem of international law - enforcement.219 It is a known fact that international 
law is chronically weak on enforcement. 220 Because of this weakness, where there 
have been breaches of international laws on human rights and the environment, in 
some places, not much has been done to redress the wrong. Under the ATCA, we now 
see at least the potential of international law being enforced. The fact that it is sought 
to be enforced against entities considered as non-subjects of international law -
corporations - does not minimize its importance. If corporations are forced to behave, 
the State governments with whom they have been collaborating will be compelled to 
rethink their practices, thus giving international law the kind of strength it had lacked, 
by effectuating its intent. 
Another implication for public international law is that it points the direction 
toward some future reform of the nature, structure, and object of the international 
system. This type of litigation takes international law from the level of seeking 
enforcement of its dictates against States to actual enforcement of international rules 
against multinational corporations. This in itself is a substantial restructuring of the 
international legal system that has hitherto adopted a States-centric paradigm.221 From 
219 "[T]he problems of implementation, compliance, and enforcement ... [hang] like an albatross 
around the neck of international law generally." Emeka Duruigbo, Reforming the International Law 
and Policy on Marine Oil Pollution, 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 65, 79 (2000). Citation omitted. 
220 Elli Louka, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not Only About the 
Protection of the Environment, 10 Temp. Int'l & Compo L. J. 79 (1996). 
221 Sacharoff, supra note 213. 
By starting with the most egregious acts - human rights violations 
- the international community can slowly adapt to holding MNCs 
responsible for their activities in host countries. If the ATCA finds 
an MNC liable, it not only will be providing a civil remedy for 
victims of human rights violations, but the A TCA will be 
promoting a restructuring of the statist paradigm of international 
law. 
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that standpoint, these lawsuits may serve. as instruments for improving or shaping 
public policy and vehicles of social change. From international civil litigation222 
could emerge far-reaching policies that protect people all over the world from 
corporate excesses.223 Notwithstanding the above benefits and implications, several 
limitations exist. 
2. Limitations 
There is no doubt that international litigation as a tool for holding corporations 
accountable has some merit. There is also every indication that this trend of launching 
lawsuits by foreign litigants will continue in the days and years ahead. Nevertheless, 
as is presently employed, the use of the courts to enforce international law or redress 
wrongs has a number of limitations. 
First, instituting a case under the ATCA requires a certain level of readiness on 
the part ofthe plaintiff to confront a host of hurdles that surround the statute.224 These 
obstacles include meeting standing requirements and achieving personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant,Jorum non convenieni25 and the doctrine of comity.226 "[Forum 
Id., at 937. 
222 These cases, especially those with an international law component, has been referred to as 
transnational public law litigation. See Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2347(1991). "Transnational public law litigation ... seeks redress for individual victims at the 
same time as articulating a norm of international law that can be applied to other violators of 
international law." Id., at 2395. See also Lyndsy Rutherford, Note, Redressing u.s. Corporate 
Environmental Harms Abroad through Transnational Public Law Litigation: Generating a Global 
Discourse on the International Definition of Environmental Justice, 14 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 807 
(2002). 
223 For a discussion of the ability and limitations of litigation to shape public policy or orchestrate 
social change, see Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or 
Reality, 30:2 J. Law, Medicine & Ethics, 224 (June 22, 2002). 
224 For an extensive discussion pf these obstacles, see DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS, (3d. ed) 794 - 818 (2001). 
225 It should be noted, however, that while the doctrine of forum non conveniens can be a major 
obstacle to a plaintiff, "any defendant seeking dismissal in favor of a foreign forum bears a substantial 
burden of proof" which may be difficult to satisfy in order to justify the dismissal of a suit. Cleveland, 
supra note 104, at 1577. 
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non conveniens] and the doctrine of comity have a powerful hold on U.S. federal 
courts and have frequently been held to be sufficient grounds for dismissal of a 
foreigner's complaints.,,227 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is also a a major 
limitation on plaintiffs bringing transnational cases in home countries. According to 
Professor C.G.J. Morse, "the doctrine generates litigation about where to litigate,,,228 
and leads to arguments as to its real value in the English legal system.
229 
Moreover, the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, which the Act provides for, 
does not cover all human rights and environmental abuses. 230 As a matter of fact, the 
courts are hesitant to extend it to environmental harms.231 Therefore, foreign 
claimants are constrained to seek other bases for subject matter jurisdiction, even 
when human rights and environmental abuses are involved.
232 
In Beanal v. Freeport McMoran,233 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit rejected an ATCA claim that was based on a human right to a minimally 
adequate environment under international law.z34 Since a good portion of corporate 
misdeeds in developing countries are of an environmental nature, this poses a big 
problem for victims of corporate abuse. It should be noted that there is a strong belief 
in some scholarly circles that such a right exists in internationallaw.
235 
Accordingly, 
226 Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 64, at 146. 
227 Id. 
228 Morse, supra note 49, at 557. 
229Id. 
230 Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 64, at 146. 
231 S K' ee leserman, supra note 87. 
232 See Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 64, at 146. 
233 197 F. 3d 161 (5 th Cir. 1999) 
234 Richard Herz, Text of Remarks on Panel: Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Torts and Cultural 
f1~mocid:, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 503, 505 (2001). 
MartIll Wagner, The International Legal Rights of Indigenous Peoples Affected by Natural 
Resource Exploitation: A BriefCase Study, 24 Hastings Int'! & Compo L. Rev. 491(2001). 
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some scholars contend, courts presented with ATCA claims premised on this right 
should recognize its existence.236 
The fact that international civil litigation remedies are more readily available 
in some countries imposes a cost on those countries which other countries are able to 
avoid. These costs could be direct financial, physical and infrastructural burdens on 
the statutory institutions involved and the indirect costs of lost business opportunities 
and the benefits that flow therefrom. As earlier stated, American courts are the most 
attractive forums at the moment for international litigation. This leaves the possibility 
that "the United States may be transformed into a forum for the world's 
. ,,237 S h . gnevances. uc a scenano would be overwhelming for the domestic courts , 
which were not created for that purpose. The strain put on the system may create a 
backlash from taxpayers who would consider it a drain on much needed resources.238 
Opposition may also come from people and governments in other countries who 
would view the United States as inching toward becoming the global judicial officer. 
The situation in which litigation only thrives in a few jurisdictions also comes 
with a competitive disadvantage for certain corporations. Those companies whose 
home countries provide an easily accessible platform for court actions find 
themselves in a situation in which their actions, but not those of their competitors, are 
more likely to be called into question. Thus, some corporations could have a 
236 Herz, sunra note 234, at 503 - 506 n7 . r . 
MatteI and Lena, sunra note 206 at 385 
238 ,·
A contrary argument is that lawsuits in a foreign forum is to the advantage of that forum and th 
country may even benefit economically. Some scholars have reasoned that "[w]hen Ii' l't' e , E 1 d . orelgners lIgate 
III ng ,~n ,this forms valuable invisible export, and COnfIrms judicial pride in the English Ie al 
system. Srr PETER NORTH & J.J, FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVA~E 
INTERNATIO~AL LAW 346~47 (13~ ed, 1999), This may be true when what are being considered 
are a few cases III a year, but Wlt~ a myriad lawsuits, the argument may be difficult to sustain, 
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competitive advantage, not because their practices are better, but because they come 
from a country that shields its own corporate citizens, or otherwise provides them 
with greater protection by deliberately deciding to provide an atmosphere that is less 
international litigation-friendly. Of course, such insulation could come by default, in 
the sense that the action of the protecting State was not a result of a conscious 
decision. Either way, corporations from those countries are rewarded with a higher 
sense of security.239 
This could lead to relocations by major corporations to areas that are more 
protective, and thus more favorable to their business operations.24o Indeed, in 
England, the Lord Chancellor's Department has already made its fears known in this 
regard, arguing that exposure to lawsuits in English courts could deter multinational 
corporations from having a presence in England.241 
The point could be made that while a disproportionate number of the lawsuits 
may be launched in American courts, the United States is still the world's largest 
economJ42 and corporations may not be too quick to abandon their operations for 
more favorable climes. Still, they might react strongly and the threat of a loss of tax 
revenue and jobs, no matter how remote, may serve to shift public opinion and 
galvanize interests against transnational corporate accountability. Besides, concerned 
239 See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and 
Fragmentation, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 257, 288 (1999) (discussing the issue of competitiveness in the 
context of more stringent regulations on corporations from a particular countries vis-a-vis their 
counterparts from other countries with less onerous demands) 
240 . • 
When Unocal faced mountmg pressure, the company announced that it was becoming a global oil 
company and opened a second headquarters outside the United States (i.e., additional to the corporate 
headquarters at E1 Segundo, California). 
241 Ward, supra note 41, at 466 (citing Letter from M. Kron, Lord Chancellor's Department 
(September 15, 1998)). 
242 'h r. e challenge of world poverty:Developing countries, ECONOMIST, March 14,2002. 
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corporations may decide to lobby heavily. for the repeal of the ATCA, following in 
the footsteps of a similar battle fought in the state of Texas, when the legal climate 
seemed to favor international civillitigation.243 
In any case, it raises issues of equity that needs to be addressed. 
Universalizing the jurisdiction provided by American courts and internationalizing 
those principles that make American courts attractive would be a veritable step in that 
direction. This calls for some reform at the international level. However any reform 
that seeks to impose direct obligations on corporations in international law or attach 
rights and privileges to them would have to confront the perennial issue of subjects of 
international law. This issue is fundamental and must be disposed of before credible 
proposals for reform can be made. In view of that, the next chapter discusses the topic 
of international legal personality. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations has recently responded to the problem of corporate activities that 
are detrimental to the health and well being of humanity through the Global Compact 
Initiative. At the moment, the UN Human Rights Commission through its 
SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights have been busily 
working on Principles to guide and circumscribe corporate behavior in relation to 
243 C . d orporatlOns a. opted su.ch ~tance in the aftermath of the Supreme Court of Texas' abolition of 
forum non convemens doctrme m personal injury matters in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro 786 
S.W.2d ~74 CTex.1?90), p:tition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 2602 (Aug. 30, 1990), in order to e~able 
o~ perrmt Costa Rican natlonals to sue a Texas corporation in Texas for alleged violations in Costa 
Rica,. (. See Alfar?, 78~ S.W.2d at 689 (Hightower, J., concurring). See Joseph H. Sommer, The 
Subsldzary: Doctrme Wlthout a Cause? 59 Fordham L Rev 227 252 n 94 (1990) B . bl . ' . , . . usmess groups 
were a e to lobby and get t~e Texas legIslature to partially reinstate the doctrine in Texas. See Brooke 
Clagett, Forum Non C~nvemens In International Environmental Tort Suits: Closing The DOO1~ Of us 
Courts To Foreign Plaintiffs, 9 Tul. Envtl. LJ. 513,524 (1996). s .. 
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such issues as human rights and the environment. Unless binding mechanisms are 
introduced, these measures clearly will fall short of the initiators' objectives. A useful 
model for holding corporations accountable that can be introduced into the 
international system is that being used at the municipal level. Through the use of 
international law and some other principles of municipal law, multinational 
corporations are legally being called to account for their harmful activities, even 
when the harm occurred thousands of miles away from their host countries. While the 
whole idea of enforcing international law through domestic courts is welcome, the 
nagging question remains the legal basis for seeking to hold corporations accountable 





INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATION 
INTRODUCTION: 
The international legal and political system is States-centric. It is primarily concerned 
with, and concentrates attention on, nation-States. Four decades ago, J.L. Brierly 
defined international law as "the body of rules and principles of actions which are 
binding upon civilized States in their relations with one another." 1 This overwhelming 
focus on States has led to the conclusion by many scholars that international law is 
law pertaining to States only and that only States are the subjects of international law. 
The above is not a mere theoretical position, with little practical 
consequences. The implications are overwhelming. It suggests that where other 
entities and actors in the global commuIiity breach rules of international law, it will 
not be within the province of the international legal system to directly address their 
misdeeds. 
In the course of time, noticeable changes have. begun to occur in the 
perception of non-State actors on the international stage. The structure of 
international law has begun to undergo some transformation with a recognition that in 
certain situations and under a range of circumstances, some other entities, besides the 
State, come within the direct protection of international law and owe some 
corresponding duties to uphold the dictates of that law. This is particularly evident in 
human rights and humanitarian issues. 
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There is a perceptible lacuna in this movement toward change. While the 
international rights and duties of international organizations and, to a lesser extent , 
individuals have received some recognition under the international legal system, the 
same cannot completely be said of the multinational corporation.2 There is little doubt 
that the status of the corporation in the international sphere has appreciated. 
Corporations play key roles in the global marketplace and participate vibrantly in the 
shaping of international law, albeit indirectly. Their rights, especially regarding 
investment issues, have also been recognized in a number of international 
instruments. Yet, they clearly remain outside the mainstream of international law. A 
pertinent question is whether the change going on in the international system would 
be wide enough to accommodate the multinational corporation. This change is 
imperative in view of the place that corporations hold today in the daily lives of 
people all over the world. Put in simple terms, there is the need to revisit the issue of 
who is a legal person in the international system. 
The controversy surrounding legal personality in international law is an age-
old one. There is an entrenched view that only States are the subjects of international 
law. Individuals, multinational corporations, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations all interact with the international system but are not 
necessarily subjects. This view has come under intense scrutiny and increasing 
criticism as not reflecting both the original state of affairs in international law and 
modem trends in the global community. 
1 J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1963). 
2 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 55 (1994)' I 
SEDL-HOHENVEVELDERN, THE CORPORATION IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1987). 
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Today, the issue acquires greater importance considering the growing 
significance of the multinational corporation. This species of corporation, in this era 
of globalization and liberalization of trade and investment barriers, now dominates 
the headlines. Analysts posit that international law cannot continue to play the ostrich 
and pretend that these corporations are like their smaller counterparts, subject only, 
and amenable, to the control of individual States. As multinational corporations 
continue to impact our lives on a daily basis, it is no longer realistic to expect them to 
remain under the current arrangement, which subordinates them in virtually all 
respects to the nation-States, most of whom are smaller and less influential. At the 
same time, those who have experienced the negative aspects of multinational 
corporate activity, are acutely aware that many national governments are unable or 
unwilling to regulate the multinational corporations operating in their territory and 
that perhaps, only the international system can remedy this situation. Some of the 
victims have resorted to transnational litigation, using international law as an 
instrument, to seek redress for wrongs allegedly done by corporations operating in 
their area. The principal instrument used in this regard is piece of domestic legislation 
in the United States known as the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
The crucial question being asked is why international law will continue to remain 
aloof to these developments. In fairness to the international system, a number of steps 
have been taken in recent times to confront the challenges posed by corporations in an 
era of globalization. Prominent in the list of such measures are the UN Global 
Compact initiative, the on-going work of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion 






Multinational Enterprises. All of these efforts are commendable, but one cannot gloss 
over gaps that still remain. When compared with what is going on at the domestic 
level, it is apparent that a lot of work still needs to be done at the international level. 
If domestic law can provide a forum for the enforcement of international rules and 
impose liability for breach of same, certainly the international system can consider 
streamlining such a system and using it to the advantage of all. 
The answer lies in the fact that international law has not shown much interest in 
directly controlling multinational corporations. This disposition of international law 
cannot be entirely divorced from the question of whether multinational corporations 
are subjects of international law. If they are subjects, why is international action 
scanty? If they are not, can they be brought under direct international control through 
the conferment of personality on them? This work, exasperated by the iniquities, 
, 
inequities and inadequacies characterizing the prevailing position, will seek to 
address these issues with a view to clarifying the legal position and making 
suggestions for a more just world in which the role of corporations is recognized and 
appropriate responsibility attached to them. 
Part II below tackles the perennial problem of international legal personality. 
The predominant theories on legal personality will be examined and the question 
answered as to whether corporations are subjects of international law. The issue of 
whether corporations are entities capable of possessing rights and duties in 
international law is most relevant to the current debate as to whether the international 
system should intervene in reining in the excesses of multinational corporate groups. 
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Part III makes the case for an enhanced status for multinational corporations 
in international law. The arguments in favor of elevating the position of multinational 
corporations are considered alongside those in opposition to it. 
Part IV deals with the way forward in the bid to address the multifarious 
problems associated with multinational corporations. This will entail detailed 
international legal reforms and restructuring. The change in structure being 
contemplated here does not place corporations at an equal footing with States. 
However, it also does not subscribe to their being placed on the same level as 
individuals. This work therefore advocates a hybrid arrangement that defines the 
rights and obligations of corporations in international law while permitting the 
enforcement of those laws against them at the domestic level. At the end, appropriate 
conclusions are drawn from the foregoing discussion, essentially reiterating the need 
for corporate regulation in international law. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
The terms "international legal person" or "legal personality,,3 are usually 
employed in reference to entities that are "capable of possessing international rights 
and duties and endowed with the capacity to take certain types of action on the 
international plane.,,4 Such entities are also known as subjects of internationallaw.5 
This part discusses some theoretical issues relating to international legal personality. 
3 For. a. discussion of the conce.pt of legal personality in the domestic and international systems, see Esa 
PaaslVrrta, The European Umon: From An Aggregate of States to a Legal Person? 2 Hofstra L & 
Pol'y Symp. 37, 38-45 (1997). . 
:~~~IS HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 241 (3d. ed 
5 !d. 
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A. THEORIES OF LEGAL PERSONALITY 
Various theories exist regarding the notion of legal personality in the international 
system. The question has been posed countless times, and answers attempted that 
much often, concerning who falls within the definition of a subject of international 
law. This in itself reveals the difficult and controversial nature of the subj ect. One of 
the leading theories is the traditional or orthodox theory that emphasizes the position 
and capacity of States. "According to that theory, the only subjects of international 
law are nation-states. All other entities, particularly individuals and business 
organizations, interact with international law indirectly through their national 
governments. ,,6 
Providing a rationale for this position, L. Oppenheim reasoned that "[ s ]ince 
the Law of Nations is primarily a law between States, States, are to that extent, the 
only subjects of the Law ofNations.,,7 
This traditional theory finds sanctuary in the hallowed domain of those who 
subscribe to the classic dualist theory in international law. Dualism is well-known for 
its association with "positivist theories and with the notion that States, not 
individuals, are the primary subjects of international law.,,8 Professor John Starke, 
6 Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, 1983 
Duke L.J. 748, 753. Citations omitted. See also Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of 
International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 
165 (1988). "Under orthodox theory, only nation-states can be the subject of international law." !d., at 
193 n. 145; M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (5th ed. 
1984); Tirnberg, An International Trade Tribunal, 33 GEO. L. J. 373, 394-8 (1945). 
7 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 
8 J.G. Collier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England? 38 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 924, 
925 (1989). It has been observed thus: 
A strictly dualistic view denies a meaningful role to both 
individuals and domestic courts in the making of international law. 
In a dualistic system, individuals injured by foreign states would 
have no right to pursue claims directly against those states in either 
domestic or international fora. Instead, their states would pursue 
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while discussing the work of a noted dualist, the German scholar Heinrich Triepel, 
adverts his mind to the issue, noting that Triepel "contends ... that ... state law deals 
with individuals, international law regulates the relations between states, who alone 
are subject to it.,,9 
Over the years, this traditional view has been vigorously challenged. Some 
scholars question the correctness of the view in the first place, seeing it as 
inconsistent with the history of international law. lO It was on that basis that two 
scholars described the proposition that public international law deals with relations 
among States as a "nineteenth century canard."ll The emphasis on relations between 
States, to the exclusion of individuals, is viewed as a derogation, a practice that only 
came into being more recently as a product of nineteenth century positivism.12 
those claims for them on a discretionary basis in international fora, 
and subsequently determine the rights of those injured individuals 
to redress as a matter of domestic law." 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 1 00 YALE LJ. 2347, 
2349 nl0 (1991). 
9 lG. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66, 
70 (Citing HEINRICH TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (Liepzig, c.L. 
Hirschfeld 1899). For more discussions on dualism and monism, see Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values 
in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 185 (1993); Fitzmaurice, The General 
Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law 92 Hague Recueil, 
70-80 (1957 -II) (cited in DJ. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
55-57 (1983). 
10 See Charney, supra note 1, at 753. 
II McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusion Versus 
Rational Action, 59 YALE L. J. 60, 74 (1949). 
12 See Charney, supra note 1, at 753 n9; D. 0' CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-11 (2d ed. 
1970); CHRISTIAN OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE NEW ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY-
MAKING CAPACITY 68-69 (1974); Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in 
International Humanitarian Law, 34 Stan. J. Int'l L. 347 (1998). "Mark Janis argues that "the law of 
nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [was] a law common to individuals as well as to 
states," which developed into an international law of narrower scope in the era of nineteenth century 
positivism." Id., at 406 (quoting MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 





Tremendous boost for this position can be found in the fact that a non-State entity, the 
Catholic Church has long played an important role in the international legal system. 13 
Diametrically opposed to the traditional theory that States are the only 
subjects of international law is another theory that assigns that preeminent position to 
individuals. Early in the twentieth century, a French scholar, George Scelle, argued 
that individuals are the only subjects of international law, anchoring that view on the 
contention that the State is a fiction. I4 Critics assail this view as abandoning legal 
analysis and taking an excursion into philosophy. 15 
Another approach to the issue is one that does not dismiss the traditional view, 
but holds that the notion of States as the only subjects of international law is not cast 
in concrete. The point being made is that modem developments in the international 
system have had a huge effect on legal attitudes toward non-State entities. Thus, 
international organizations, individuals, multinational corporations and a host of other 
entities almost undeniably have acquired an enhanced status in international law. In 
Reparations for Injuries in the U.N Service/6 the International Court of Justice, in an 
advisory opinion, stated that international organizations such as the United Nations 
are subjects of international law. 17 
Regarding individuals, Jessup recognizes that States traditionally were the 
subjects of international law and that in international legal relations, the individual 
\3 Charney, supra note 1, at 753 n9; 1. LAD OR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES 29 (1963). 
14 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 
(1964) (Citing GEORGE SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT, DES GENS 42 - 44 (1932). 
15 See Friedmann, supra note 10, at 233; Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International 
Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 192 (1962). See also Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the 
Individual in International Law, 31:2 CAL. W. INT'L L. 1. 241 (2001). 
16 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) 
(Advisory Opinion). 
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had to rely on the State, but adds that over the years this has substantially changed 
and that such change in direction is not likely to be truncated soon. I8 Hersch 
Lauterpacht, in his revision of Oppenheim's seminal work, attributes the recognition 
of, and justification for, the international legal personality of the individual to the 
development of human rights and humanitarian values. As a consequence, he 
contends, the traditional view has become moribund: 
The various developments since two World Wars no 
longer countenance the view that, as a matter of 
positive law, States are the only subjects of 
international law. In proportion as the realisation of that 
fact gains ground, there must be an increasing 
disposition to treat individuals, within a limited sphere, 
as subjects ofinternationallaw. I9 
At a different forum, Lauterpacht also argued that by reason of the fact that 
international law has witnessed an expansion beyond the issues of war, a similar 
expansion has trailed the definition of international legal personality to include 
international organizations and individuals.2o Lauterpacht also adds another 
interesting dimension to the debate: that international law is flexible enough to allow 
for the admission of new entities into the revered club of subj ects of international law: 
17 !d., at 178-79. 
Gradually, a consensus of opinion is evolving to the 
effect that although it is States which are the normal 
subjects of international law, there is nothing in 
international law which is fundamentally opposed to 
individuals and other legal persons becoming subjects 
18 P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15-16 (1968); Friedmann, supra note 9, at 162; 
Okeke, supra note 7, at 2-3; Charney, supra note 1, at 753 nlO. 
19 Oppenheim, supra note 2., at 639. 
20 Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 LAW Q. REV. 97,117-19 (1948). 
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of international rights and duties, 1.e., subjects of 
internationallaw.21 
The legal position or status of the multinational corporation and the arguments 
surrounding that are somewhat similar. The next part will particularly focus on that. 
CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
The question on whether multinational corporations are legal persons m 
international law would have been easier to answer if there was a clear agreement 
among scholars on what constitutes legal personality under the international legal 
system. "Unfortunately, there is little agreement among scholars on the essential 
elements of legal personality.,,22 This part will navigate the murky waters of the 
controversy surrounding this issue with a view to exploring the possibility of 
presenting a clearer picture of the status of the multinational corporation m 
international law. 
In his epic work on the subject, Controversial Subjects of Contemporary 
International Law: An Examination of the New Entities of International Law and 
Their Treaty-Making Capacity, Professor Christian Okeke outlines three essential 
elements that should be considered conditio sine qua non before an entity can 
properly be regarded as a subject of a legal system. Such an entity must (1) possess 
duties as well as responsibility for violating those duties, (2) have the capacity to 
benefit from legal rights as a direct claimant and not as a mere beneficiary, and (3) in 
21 H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 79 (1927). See also E. NWOGUGU, LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR INVESTMENTS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 30, 249-50 (1965). 
22 Charney, supra note 1, at 774. 
292 
some capacity, be able to enter into contractual or other legal relations with other 
subjects of the system.23 
Looking at Okeke's criteria, a credible case could be made that multinational 
corporations, at least to a certain extent, are subjects of international law. Professor 
Jonathan Charney does not seem to consider it far-fetched to posit that MNCs possess 
international legal personality.24 He draws from previous and present activities 
involving these business enterprises to bolster his point: 
There is evidence that [multinational corporations] have 
had international legal personality and have participated 
in the international legal system for some time. 
Examples of such participation include application of 
public international law to contracts with state entities 
and participation in dispute settlement forums 
established either by treaty or intergovernmental 
organizations. Some principles of public international 
law have become so widely accepted that they have 
been viewed as binding on the [MNCs'] international 
activities. Finally, [MNCs] advise international 
organizations when their interests are at stake and it is 
clear that they playa direct role in influencing national 
behavior on relevant international matters.,,25 
Professor David Ijalaye holds a similar VIew. He advances the claim that 
multinational corporations could now be regarded as selective subjects of public 
international law and that contracts they enter into (especially with States) are subject 
23 Okeke, supra note 7, at 19. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
~TE~ATI~NAL LAW .57 (5 th ed: 1998). "A subject of law is an entity capable of possessing 
mt:rna~!onal nghts ~~d dutIes and havmg the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
clanflS. Id., at 58 (CItIng Reparations for Injuries case, 1949I.C.J. Reports 174, 179). 
24 Charney, supra note 1. Ascription of international legal personality to the multinational corporation 
has ~:en anchored on the volume, transboundary nature, international effect of multinational corporate 
actvltIty and access to international legal processes. See CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE LEGAL 
~ONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 1 (1983). ' 
Charney, supra note 1, at 762-64. Citations omitted. 
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to that law.26 Professor Ijalaye's position can be supported to an extent by 
international arbitral practice. For instance, in the Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration 27 , 
the arbitrator, Umpire Dupuy, was emphatic in holding that international law would 
be the applicable law in a dispute between a State and a private oil company, viewing 
international law as part of the governing law of the contract (in addition to Libyan 
law).28 
Elihu Lauterpacht, looking at the dispute settlement mechanisms contained in 
modem investment treaties as well as earlier developments in investor-State 
arbitration, reasons that these developments have "put an end to the myth, so 
prevalent until the end of the Second World War, that only States are subjects of 
international law and that individuals cannot possess rights or bear duties directly 
d . t . 1 1 ,,29 h un er III ernationa aw. T e scholar thus contends that corporations, by virtue of 
these agreements and other modem developments in the international system, have 
been shown to possess international legal personality. 30 
Michael Reiterer, in a book review, 'challenges the proposition that "States 
alone are the subject of international law" ,31 and believes that NGOs, transnational 
corporations and the individual are "new (at least partly) subjects of international 
law.,,32 Reiterer reiterates that traditional international law concerned itself principally 
26 D. IJALAYE, THE EXTENSION OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 221-23 (1978). 
27 Rudolf Dolzer, Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
215,216 (Rudolph Berhardt et aI., eds., 1997). . 
28 !d. 
29 Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal. Stud. 
259,274 (1997). 
30 Id., at 272 -276. 
31 Michael Reiterer, (reviewing Ruth Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law) 81 
Am. J. Int'l L. 970 (1987). 
32 !d. 
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with relations between sovereign entities and recognized them as the sole subjects of 
international law, but notes that things have moved to a situation in which nation-
states, while still the main actors in international law and international relations, have 
had to give up their claim to being the sole subjects of international law.33 This 
accords with the observation of another scholar that "[t]he modem trend is to 
recognize that there are other subjects of international law, including certain 
corporations. ,,34 
The above views are by no means conclusive on this issue. In their work 
entitled International Law: Cases and Materials, Professors Louis Henkin, Richard 
Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, after discussing the point that multinational 
corporations have become the subject of considerable controversy stemming from the 
power they wield economically and politically, the complexity that surround their 
operations, and the difficulties associated with exercising legal authority over them 
whether by home or host States, add: "Such corporations are "private," 
nongovernmental entities, they are subject to applicable national law, and they are not 
international legal persons in the technical sense.,,35 
Professor Ian Brownlie, while noting that "jurists have argued that the 
relations of states and foreign corporations as such should be treated on the 
international plane and not as an aspect of the normal rules governing the position of 
33 Id. 
34 h C ow, supra note 1, at 165. See also Jonathan Fried, Globalization and International Law - Some 
Th.oughts for States and Citize~s, 23 Qu~en's ~.J. 259,.266 (1997). "Over twenty years ago, Wolfgang 
Fnedmann already pres~ged thIS ~XpanSI?n of mtematlOnal regulation in highlighting the new subject-
~atters . and new . sU~Jects of mternatlonal law. These included corporations, individuals and 
mternatlOnal orgamzatlOns - a so-called "vertical" expansion of international law beyond the ~ation 
state to reach other actors within." 
35 Henkin, et aI., supra note 3, at 368-369. 
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aliens and their assets on the territory of a state,,,36 minces no words however, in 
rejecting that argument. Instead, he makes the contrary assertion that "[i]n principle, 
corporations of municipal law do not have international legal personality. Thus, a 
concession or contract between a state and a foreign corporation is not governed by 
the law oftreaties.,,37 
Peter Malanczuk, in a recent study of the multinational corporation, adopts a 
similar position, rejecting outright the notion that special "internalized contracts" with 
a sovereign State is capable of making a corporation a subject of international law , 
even in a partial or limited sense.38 
The views immediately expressed above finds support in the jurisprudence of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU) and its successor, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Serbian Loans Case39, the PCU held that 
the governing law for an agreement not concluded between subjects of international 
law should be the municipal law of the State concerned with the dispute. In the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case40 involving the government of Iran (then Persia) 
and a British oil company, the ICJ adopted a line of reasoning that suggested that an 
oil corporation was not a subject of international law. Accordingly, it refused to 
exercise jurisdiction when Iran declined to consent to the Court's jurisdiction. The 
36 Brownlie, supra note 23, at 67. Citation omitted. 
37 !d., at 68. Citation omitted. 
38 R~cent Publications:. The New Public Order, 26 Yale J. Int'! L. 527, 547 (2001) (reviewing 
Multllateral Treaty-Makmg: The Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the Internal 
~egislative Proces~, Vera G?wlland-Debbas ed., 2000). 
Payment of Varz~us Serbzan Loan~ Issued in France (Fr. V. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A). No.20, at 
41 (July 12); SerbIan Loans Case, m 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 256-57 (Rudolph 
Berhardt et aI., eds., 1992). 
40 (Rudolf Dolzer, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
167-68 (Rudolph Berhardt et aI., eds., 1992). 
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ICJ was of the opinion that the contract was not an international treaty and therefore 
should not invite the intervention of the Court.4! 
Moreover, it has also been argued that because of the decentralized nature of 
the international legal order, where no centralized law-making and law-enforcing 
authorities exist, possession of rights and duties are not sufficient to confer legal 
personality.42 An international person therefore, the argument continues, should also 
be capable of making43 and enforcing international law. In essence, there has to be a 
public component in which the role of the subject transcends private interests and 
includes some functions of public character.44 
On the issue of contracts between corporations and States, a credible, 
converse argument could be made. One could review the relevant cases from which 
the conclusion had been drawn that international law governed such contracts and 
arrive at a different conclusion. The Serbian Loans case,45 the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company case,46 the Aramco arbitration,47 the Abu-Dhabi Oil Arbitration,48 the Ruler 
of Qatar arbitration,49 the Sapphire arbitration,50 the Lena Goldfield decision,5! the 
41 Id. 
42 Orakhelashvili, supra note 28, at 256. 
43 ~o:iet. jur~sts al~o held. the view that an important aspect of legal personality is an active 
partIcIpatIOn m the mternattonallaw-creating process. See Okeke, supra note 7, at 12-13 (citing G. 
TUNKIN, OSNOVY SOVREMENOGO MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRA V A (1956) ) 
44 Orakhelashvili, supra note 28. at 256 . 
45 ' • 
Supra note 31. 
46 Supra note 32. 
47 Rudolf Dolzer, Aramco Arbitration, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 207 (Rudol h 
~erhardt et aI., eds., 1992). Id. at 208-09. p 
Rudolf Dolzer, Abu-Dhabi Oil Arbitration, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1-2 
(Rudolph Berhardt et aI., eds., 1992). 
49 M~~air, The General Principles ~f Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 1957 Brit. y.B. Int'l L. 1, 
I
0
4 (cItmg Ru~er ofqata~ v. InternatIOnal Marine Oil Co., 20 I.L.R. 534 (1953) (Award of June 1953)). 
51 The S~pphITe ArbItratIon, 351.L.R. 136 (1967). ' 
McNaIr, supra note 41, at 11 (citing Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. Russia (Judgment of Sept. 3, 1930). 
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Libya-Oil Companies arbitration52 and the BP v. Libya arbitration,53 may not be used 
in a definitive way to show that corporations have an international legal personality. 54 
With a singular exception, the references to international law in those decisions do 
not automatically import an intention to place those contracts at the same level as 
international treaties.55 The fact that there was an unwillingness to apply domestic 
law in one particular case is not conclusive either, as certain exceptional 
circumstances peculiar to that case justified that course of action.56 
The point may be canvassed that the views above, while forceful, nevertheless 
adopts a very restricted approach to the definition of subjects of international law. A 
more helpful approach would be to recognize, first, that States are the primary and 
predominant subjects of international law.57 But that this recognition is not 
exclusionary: other legal entities are not necessarily non-subjects nor are they 
precluded from gaining international legal personality at some point in time. 
Secondly, a subject of international law does not need to possess all the attributes of a 
State to fit into the definition of a subject. In other words, there are degrees of legal 
personality. 58 As Okeke puts it, "any subject oflaw must be capable of having certain 
52 S upra note 23. 
53 Rudolf Dolzer, British Petroleum v. Libya Arbitration, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International 
~aw 505 (Rudolph Berhardt et aI., eds., 1992). See Orakhelashvili, supra note 15, at 257 - 261. 
Id., at 261. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See ~ppenheim's ~nte~ational Law, Pea~e, at 16 (Sir Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.) (9th ed. 
~ 9~2~. States are pnmanly, but not exclusIvely, the subjects of international law ... States may treat 
mdIvIduals and other persons as endowed directly with international rights and duties and constitute 
them to that extent subjects of international law." 
58 "[M].any scholars recognize varying degrees of legal personality." Charney, supra note 1, at 775. 
Regardmg the ~ersonality of international organizations, Friedmann favors the opinion that entities 
could po~ses.s ~Ifferen~ degrees of personality in internationalla~. Friedmann, supra note 7, at 218-
~19 (st~tmg. ~ere IS no reaso~ why there should not be dIfferent degrees of subjectivity in 
mternatIOnallaw. ) See also, Henkin, et aI., supra note 2, at 242 (stating that "[a]s in any legal system, 
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rights and duties under the gIven legal. system, any differences in the degree of 
capacity notwithstanding.,,59 When it is viewed that way, one can safely conclude that 
multinational corporations to an extent have, or at least have the potential to possess, 
international legal personality. 
If multinational corporations are assumed to be subjects of international law , 
the question arises as to what role international law has played in providing them a 
forum to function as active participants in the system as well as hold them responsible 
for a number of international wrongs to which they have been linked. The answer 
probably resides in the fact that international law has not allowed them to assert some 
rights (for instance to participate in law-making) or emphasized the obligations, 
duties and responsibilities that attach to them. If they are not subjects, one wonders 
what would explain or justify the fact that a specific norm for their legal personality 
has not been created by the international community both to clarify the issue and to 
relate with them in a manner commensurate with their real status. All of this 
inactivity has led to an unpalatable state of affairs. The next part discusses the need to 
make some changes in the structure of the international legal system by providing an 
enhanced legal status for multinational corporations in international law. 
not all subjects of in~e~ationallaw are identical in their nature or their rights and one must constantly 
~ge aware of the relatIVIty of the concept of international legal person.") 
Okek~, supra note 7, at. 1-2. The emphasis is mine. See also, Joanna Balaskas, Note, The 
InternatIOnal Leg~l Personalzty of the Eastern ~;thodox Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constatinople, 2 
~ofstra.L. & Pol y Symp .. 135'.157 (1997). A non-state entity may indeed have a limited scope of 
mte.~atIOnal .legal p~rsonahty eI~he~ for a specific purpose or event, or for a temporary period of time. 
IndIVIduals,. mternatIonal ?rgamzatIOns, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational 
(or transnatIo~al) corporatIOns all have been acknowledged to possess a limited degree of international 
legal personahty." 
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III. NEED FOR AN ENHANCED LEGAL STATUS FOR MNCs 
Thirty years ago, a "Group of Eminent Persons" reported that "[ m ]ultinational 
corporations are important actors on the world stage.,,60 If there are any changes in 
their position since then, it is that this type of corporations have grown even stronger 
and have become more important actors. A number of developments in recent years 
have strengthened the case for an increased role and responsibility for multinational 
corporations in international law. Multinationals have continued to grow in size, 
economic power and political influence. It is becoming much more unrealistic to keep 
them at the periphery. 
On the other hand, with expansion in corporate power has come an enormous 
potential for abuse. Large corporations have been implicated in or associated with 
violations of international law covering such areas as human rights and the 
environment. In many instances, it has not been possible to hold them liable for these 
violations. This is partly attributable to the fact that sometimes the States that should 
hold them accountable are complicit in these wrongful actions. Moreover, developing 
countries, because of their quest and scramble for economic investments of 
multinational corporations, end up being too enfeebled to regulate or control the 
MNCs. In any case, MNCs are more likely to demonstrate a preference for those 
countries with lax regulations over the business or industrial activities of 
multinational companies.61 The absence in developing countries of the technical 
expertise and legal development that are essential for monitoring or regulating 
60 UNITED NATIONS: THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE 
DEYELOPMENT PROCESS AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Report of the "Group of 
Emment Persons," U.N. Doc. E/5500lAdd 1 (1974). 
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complex activities such as environmental pollution also serve as an impediment 
against any measures by these countries to bring multinational corporations under 
contro1.62 
Political considerations also playa role. The leaders of government in some of 
these places are also aware of the enormous influence of these corporations who 
could engineer their removal if their policies work against them.63 They are cognizant 
of the fact that falling out of favor with the powerful corporations could translate into 
a loss of power. They therefore succumb or go along with the politically expedient 
thing, which is to play along with these corporations or close their eyes to the 
corporate excesses. This does not impeach the fact though, that some of these leaders 
do not have the interests of their citizens at heart and use these giant corporations to 
consolidate their hold on power. 
To exacerbate matters, the international system has not been very active in 
defending its rules and stipulations against corporate infringers. There is hardly any 
doubt that these large corporations have gotten beyond the sphere of influence of 
national governments, conducting their operations in a legal and moral vacuum where 
individualism is the cardinal rule. 64 One writer sums it up this way: 
Even though the global community is aware of the 
tremendous power of MNCs, private corporate entities 
61 Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and repressive regimes: The Ethical Dilemma 15 
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 542,545 (1985). ' 
62 Id. 
63Th~ ~nited Fruit ~ompany (UFC) (later known as Chiquita Corporation), a United States 
~ultmatlOnal corporatlO~, ~earing that land reforms then going on in Guatemala would jeopardize its 
mterests through expropnatlOn, orchestrated a coup in that country in 1954. See Ariadne K. Sacharoff 
Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act fo; 
Human RifS,hts ~iolations? 23 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 927 (1998). The same UFC had earlier engineered 
an armed mvaSlOn of Honduras, run by its hired mercenary, Machine Gun Maloney. THOMAS 
EONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9 (1989). 
See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations 25 
ENVTL. L. 1,2 (1995). ' 
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bear almost no obligations under public international 
law ... Furthermore, even in areas where international 
law has something to say about corporate behavior (for 
example, basic human rights and environmental 
protection) its dictates are difficult, if not impossible, to 
enforce. The transnational activity of corporations 
implicates a home country and a host country, each 
with their own interests. These interests, and the legal 
control of each country over a corporation, are not 
perfectly aligned, so at times the countries' jurisdictions 
overlap and there is a jurisdictional lacuna where the 
corporation is not subject to any law. In the case of 
many resource-extraction firms, the host government 
will not upbraid the foreign MNC for actions that the 
government is involved in, while the MNC's home 
courts are unlikely to engage in extraterritorial control. 
In other words, in many instances where a developing 
host country is eager to attract corporate capital and 
expertise and, for various reasons, does not (or cannot) 
subject corporate conduct to judicial scrutiny, a 
corporation acts without any legal control, domestic or 
. . 165 mternatIona . 
To continue to countenance this state of affairs is clearly unconscionable. 
There is something wrong with a system that closes its eyes or sits on the sidelines 
while States shirk their responsibility and multinational corporations escape 
accountability. It is imperative therefore to erect a fortress to fortify the international 
legal system and re-orient it to proactively address some of the serious problems 
plaguing humanity. 
However, there are strong arguments against enhancing the status of MNCs in 
international law. First, opponents argue that granting MNCs "direct participation in 
the international legal system could create a void if it resulted in a weakening of state 
regulation of MNCs without a corresponding strengthening of international 
65 Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations In The u.s. For Violating International Law, 4 
UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 81, at 84, 86. (1999). Citations omitted. See also Henkin, et aI., supra 
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regulation.,,66 With such a void, MNCs would be freer and in a better position to 
pursue the expansion of their economic and political influence world-wide. This may 
work some great hardship on other actors who hold contrary or competing interests 
such as national governments, labor, and, arguably, the general public.67 
A second objection to an expansion of the corporate role is premised on the 
belief that international law lacks the capability to resolve the most difficult political, 
military, and economic issues that confront international communitl8 and that "only 
the nation-state and its domestic legal system has been able to do so successfully." 
Implicit in this argument is the recognition that at present, the nation-State is the only 
possible juridical entity with enough power to keep the activities of multinational 
corporations from prejudicing other human interests.69 It stands to reason therefore 
that, if MNCs are endowed with significant international legal personality and by 
reason of that become free from State control, this could lead to a shift in the 
distribution of world power in ways that many consider to be undesirable.7o 
Finally, there is some reason to believe that if the predominant position that 
the State holds in the international system is exchanged for the participation of 
multinational corporations, the effect could be a crippling of international law and 
relations.71 Anarchy will follow suit if we go by the verdict of historians: "Historians 
note 2, at 369; Barcelona Traction Case [1970] I.C.J. 3. 







attribute the anarchy of Western Europe's dark and early middle ages to its surfeit of 
sovereigns and semi-sovereigns."n 
These are formidable arguments that should not be dismissed with a wave of 
hand. Nevertheless, a number of valid reasons exist for re-examining the place of 
MNCs in international law. First, as earlier stated, multinational corporations, with 
the exception of a handful of States, are the most powerful and influential actors in 
the world today. It would be unrealistic therefore not to accord adequate recognition 
to that fact. 73 Without the operations of multinational corporations and the services 
that these companies provide, it would be hard to even speak of an international 
economy.74 
Moreover, they enjoy a much greater influence than many intergovernmental 
organizations whose influence depends on the continued financial and political 
support of nation-state sponsors.75 Yet, the latter enjoy better recognition in the 
international scheme of things and are indisputably recognized as subjects of 
international law. Certainly, the "argument for increased [MNC] participation is 
further supported by the conclusion . . . that the continued viability of the 
international system depends upon the close conformity of public international law to 
international realities.,,76 International realities demand that corporations be given 
more attention 
72 [d. 




IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The practice of invoking domestic judicial remedies to enforce international 
rules and demand corporate accountability suggests that forces outside the 
international system are working really hard to ensure the reform of international law. 
The time is ripe for policy makers in the international arena to take heed and adapt 
international law to the realities of the modem day. In the case of multinational 
corporations, this could commence not only through a clear effort to provide clarity as 
to their real status, but also to proceed to create a new status for them, if it is assumed 
that they are not international legal persons at the moment. 
There is no doubt that corporations deserve an enhanced status. A number of 
factors also suggest that they require more direct oversight than is currently the case. 
It will be a worthwhile effort to consider using the model provided by the Alien Tort 
Claims Act to restructure the international system and re-define the position of the 
multinational corporation in international law. This will make the remedy available 
under the ATCA more widely available. 
This work proposes some concrete changes in the international legal system to 
accommodate the growing importance of the multinational corporation and the 
implication of this for the social and economic well being of humanity. Precisely, 
corporations should unequivocally be recognized as subjects of international law. 
Accordingly, their rights under the international system should be spelt out with a 




This would mean the creation of another layer in the international 
arrangement which will place multinational corporations at a level below States but 
higher than the position they currently occupy.77 
In relation to the social and economic impact of multinational corporate 
operations, an international agreement should be concluded to outline the legal 
consequences of such conduct. This work recognizes that some other options include 
a non-binding multilateral instrument and an international charter
78 
to regulate 
corporations under an international companies law.79 However, especially considering 
77 Shira Pridan-Frank, Human-Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law, 
40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 619, 670 (2002). 
Citations omitted. 
The question is whether it is time for international law to develop 
another tier to the existing international human rights framework, 
which bypasses state regulation and enforces direct human rights 
obligations on multinational companies. Such a framework would 
change quite dramatically the traditional structure of the 
international community. It would recognize multinational 
companies as international persons, bearing rights and duties under 
the international legal system. It would further create horizontal 
human rights obligations, and in fact, horizontal relationships 
among different entities comprising the private sector. The main 
advantage of placing obligations directly on multinational 
companies is that it would neutralize the influence of multinational 
companies on their host states, and enable enforcement of the 
duties irrespective of the host states' willingness or ability. 
78 See Sigmund Tirnberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns: A Study in Conflict of 
Laws and Mechanisms, 95 U. Penn. L. Rev. 575 (1947). Timberg outlines the objective of such 
charter: 
In addition to imposing obligations, norms, and negative 
restrictions on corporations, the grant of a charter could serve to 
confer on the combine legal standing and specific positive rights 
under international law. This has been suggested in the past, but, it 
is submitted, to the exclusion of a balancing emphasis on 
enforcing the correlative duties of corporations. Here, what is 
needed is a more functional handling of the corporate concept, so 
that the multi-national corporaation can act out in society its 
excellent philosophic status as a "right -and-duty bearing unit." 
!d., at 611. Citation omitted. 
79 Ball, Proposalfor an International Charter, in GLOBAL COMPANIES 171 - 172 (Ball, ed. 1975) 
(proposing the establishment of by treaty of an international companies' law. Under which companies 
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the problems identified with voluntary initiatives so far80 and the fact that "[a]n 
"international companies law" of his kind does not seem likely to be realized in the 
foreseeable future,,,81 this dissertation expresses a preference for an international 
agreement. The agreement will not be a soft law document but a binding treaty. The 
possibility that this far-reaching reform proposal will meet with strong opposition 
from different quarters is not being glossed over. However, while not discounting any 
likely objections, more emphasis should be placed on the merit of the suggestion. 
Accordingly, this work concurs with the International Council for Human Rights 
when the council states: 
Although there are advantages to soft law standards, a 
new international treaty would be the surest way to 
ensure a clear and solid foundation for legal 
accountability. Even if not widely ratified initially, it 
would affect the development of customary 
international law and would likely have an impact in 
. 1 d' 82 natlOna court procee mgs. 
The treaty being proposed herein will define the type of conduct that are not 
permissible and for which a corporation would be held accountable in the event of a 
breach. A lack of clear definition is an impediment under the ATCA system.83 It will 
also obviate the current situation where disparate standards exist among States with 
corporations racing to the bottom in their bid to maximize profit. The idea that it is 
sufficient for corporations to follow the laws of their host States is not meaningful, 
that meet certain criteria would be chartered. The charter will create rights and duties as well as 
provide protection and benefits for States and corporations.) 
80 The limitations associated with intergovernmental and other codes are extensively discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
81 Henkin, supra note 2, at 370. 
82 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
COMPANIES 157 (2002). 
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" 
where there are low or inadequate standards. A clearly defined set of standards would 
be a giant step forward. 
Obviously, human rights abuses will form a significant component of these 
standards. Egregious environmental misdeeds, not actionable presently under the 
ATeA will also be included. Where, for instance, a corporation willfully or without 
adequate consideration for public health and welfare, pollutes the water sources of a 
community thereby endangering the lives and livelihood of the community members, 
international law should not continue to tum a blind eye. Such corporation should not 
leave unscathed. 
The treaty will not only define the range of proscribed behavior, it will also 
make provisions for a mechanism by which the treaty's dictates will be enforced. A 
foremost authority on corporate groups and corporate accountability, Professor Phillip 
Blumberg, has observed that "[t]he creation or recognition of legal obligations of 
multinational corporations, whether under national or international law, is only the 
first step. Where contested, such obligations must be enforced through the courtS.,,84 
Implementation should not be left in the hands of corporations and home or host 
States alone. Other interested parties and stakeholders should be empowered to 
vindicate their rights and demand accountability. 
One option for enforcement would be through the establishment of an 
international court system for that purpose. This is not very attractive as it would 
amount to exploring some new ground, creating new bureaucracies, and raising 
83 For discussions on this, see Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope 
~[the. "~aw of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 153 (1998). 
PhIlhp I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by 
Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 297 (2001). 
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questions of accessibility for millions of victims of corporate abuse scattered all over 
the world. The fact that some of these victims are quite poor folk who cannot afford 
the costs of traveling to wherever the court would be situated makes the option even 
less attractive. Even if the court is decentralized, the problems of new bureaucracy 
and related matters would still militate against this option. A better option would be 
to consider what is being used at the moment. 
In the same manner that aggrieved parties are allowed under the current wave 
of international civil litigation to approach a court of law to state their grievances and 
seek redress, the treaty will ensure the availability of national courts for the 
enforcement of corporate obligations. However, unlike the current system under 
which the remedies are only available in a few countries, legal enforcement should be 
mandated on the national courts of every State party.85 For instance, it could be 
stipulated that corporations engaged in human rights breaches and egregious 
environmental violations, among others, should be liable in any jurisdiction in which 
their operations extend. It would be up to aggrieved parties to choose the best location 
for the adjUdication of their complaints. This will reduce the burden being borne by 
the courts of the few countries that are currently the points of action in international 
corporate accountability litigation. 
Some procedural problems inherent in or attendant to the current regime on 
transnational litigation should also be removed. The doctrine of forum non conveniens 
and other encumbrances encountered by many a plaintiff would either be abolished or 
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~s Professor Beth. ~tephens has o?served: "A coordinated international effort to provide access to 
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nghts o~hgatlOns of .transnational corporations." Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: 




streamlined. There are arguments from both angles on the utility or irrelevance of 
forum non conveniens, for example. 86 Under this proposal, the debate will be moot as 
factors that make a particular forum attractive over others would have been 
eliminated or severely diminished. In the Wiwa Case, the district court initially 
dismissed the action, yielding to the defendant's contention that England presented a 
more appropriate forum for adjudication.87 The plaintiffs appealed, and after spending 
a lot of time, resources and energy in court, they prevailed at the appellate level. 88 All 
86 One advantage of forum non conveniens and the battle it brews, is that it could have the 
consequence, albeit mostly unintended, of facilitating the ultimate resolution of the matter in a speedy 
manner. See ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2002). 
!d., at 95. 
A brisk preliminary skirmish on jurisdiction may well allow each 
side to gauge the strength of the other's case and the stomach each 
has for the fight. After the issue has been decided, the case may 
well settle, and if it does, settle on better informed terms than 
would otherwise have been the case. If this is so, the doctrine of 
forum non* conveniens also justifies itself as a species of 
alternative dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it is viewed as an obstacle to plaintiffs and a shield (if not a sword) 
for corporations. Thus plaintiffs, especially who have limited resources that are better devoted to the 
substantive matter, would be happy to see its removal. Exhausting your resources at the preliminary 
stage could translate into abandoning the case altogether, which is probably what is at the back of the 
mind of some defendants when they invoke the doctrine. The relevance of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in modem times has also been seriously questioned. 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is obsolete in a world in 
which markets are global and in which ecology have documented 
the delicate balance of all life on this planet . . . . [It] enables 
corporations to evade legal control merely because they are 
transnational .... In the absence of meaningful tort liability in the 
United States for their actions, some multinational corporations 
will continue to operate without adequate regard for the human and 
.environmental costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed 
to repeat itself for decades to come. As a matter of law and public 
policy, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be abolished. 
Per Judge Lloyd Dogget in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d 674, 
689 (Tex. 1990). 
87 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 1998). 
88 The case was dismissed because Shell successfully argued that an adequate alternative forum -
England - exists. The appellate court reinstated the case. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 
F. 3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). The United States Supreme Court on March 26, 2002, denied certiorari and 
thus declined to review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, thus paving the 
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the time and expense that went into the fight over forum would have been saved, if 
the plaintiffs believed that England would afford them the same protection and 
remedies as the United States. The defendant would also have been deprived of 
another objection, perhaps intended to buy time, and possibly delay, if not derail, the 
plaintiffs' march toward justice. Moreover, since the defendants obviously indicated 
that they were amenable to responding to the complaints against them in England, the 
appearance of fairness would have been heightened. 
Universalizing the ATCA remedy through the proposed treaty will also 
remove the competitive advantage that corporations from other countries would have 
over those headquartered in, or associated with, the United States. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The lack of a clear definition and articulation of the position of the multinational 
corporation in international law is at the root of some of the difficulty surrounding 
corporate regulation in international law . 
Multinational corporations continue to benefit from this state of affairs. They 
wield a lot of influence, which hardly makes them amenable to the control of most 
national governments. At the same time, international law keeps them at an arms 
length. The result has been that injuries to a lot of victims of human rights violations 
and environmental abuse go unremedied or inadequately addressed. Clarifying the 
role of corporations in international law would certainly help. It is also imperative to 
create an enhanced status for them with attendant rights and responsibilities. A useful 
way for the lawsuit to proceed against Shell. See Andrew Buncombe, US Supreme Court Clears Way 





model could be that currently in use in the United States under which corporations 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
could be held liable in domestic courts for violations of international law. An 
adaptation of this model, mutatis mutandis, will help in creating a more just world. 
There is a general perception and widespread belief that the international legal 
Changing the structure of international law to reflect new realities is a task that 
system is characterized by considerable, if not chronic, weakness in its structure. 
deserves greater attention. 
With no police force, strong military or a mandatory judicial system to ensure the 
observance of its dictates comparable to what obtains in the domestic setting, this 
view cannot honestly be charged with an unhealthy detachment from reality. To 
ensure that its provisions are translated into reality, the international legal system 
relies extensively on States, the primary subjects of international law. States are 
expected to implement international rules in domestic legislation, comply with them 
and ensure that they are enforced. Unfortunately, this has not always worked and the 
practice does not seem to augur very well for the strength of the international legal 
system. 
In the real world, while States have the obligation to follow international legal 
provisions, many of the stipulations of international law are more relevant to business 
enterprises. Unarguably, multinational corporations are major players in the domestic 
and global economic systems. The activities of these corporations have a huge impact 
on a vast portion of the society and when international policyrnakers have established 
rules to control some harmful effects of human activity, corporations have been the 
intended, indirect targets. 
Perhaps, there are fewer areas where the foregoing observations are truer than 
m the petroleum industry. Thus, when international regulations relating to oil 
operations are left unimplemented, the role and responsibility of oil corporations 
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cannot seriously be ignored. Sadly, the approach of international law till date has 
been not to get involved in directly holding them accountable. The situation is even 
worse in cases where there has not been an elaboration of international rules to guide 
or circumscribe corporate behavior, even when such behavior has or exhibits a 
tendency to injure many. Such cases foster a regime of de facto unaccountability in 
which the operations of large corporations are hardly scrutinized and their harmful 
activities sanctioned by any legal or political authority. 
This work has examined the operations of multinational corporations in the 
different aspects of the petroleum industry including exploration and production, 
refining, distribution and marketing, the various international regulations that have 
been introduced to minimize their social, economic and environmental impact, and 
the vacuum that still exists, leading to a weakening of the international system and 
permitting untold hardship to continue to be visited on powerless and defenceless 
people, especially in developing countries. 
In discussing the prevailing international rules on the environmental aspects of 
international oil trade and shipping, this dissertation has proceeded on the 
understanding that in the absence of a strong and effective international legal 
framework, any attempt at controlling oil pollution nationally will be fraught with 
problems and may come to nought. In that connection, the researcher has suggested 
ways of making the existing international law work better. 
It is expected that this thesis will accomplish three major objectives. First, the 
ideas are put forward to facilitate the implementation, compliance, and enforcement 
of international oil pollution conventions, and enhance their effectiveness by 
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promoting an all-hands-on-deck approach involving the developed and developing 
countries, flags of convenience states, and the multinational corporations involved in 
international oil transactions. Secondly, it encourages the definition and clarification 
of the role of the multinational corporation in international law. Thirdly, it seeks to 
promote corporate accountability in the petroleum industry and galvanize those who 
are committed to addressing the social, economic and environmental costs of 
transnational business activity. 
In the light of the foregoing, a number of recommendations are made in the 
following pages with a view to ensuring a better world for us all. The 
recommendations, are considered as a modest contribution toward the improvement 
of the existing state of affairs. 
The nature of maritime oil pollution makes it quite difficult to control it from 
one place. Accordingly, environmental regulation of oil trade and shipping has been 
principally undertaken from the international plane. A number of rules therefore exist 
in international law to deal with the problem. The international rules, though properly 
crafted and drafted, have not been optimally effective because of the problems of 
implementation, compliance and enforcement. It is imperative therefore to have an 
effective international system for the control of oil pollution, because it forms the 
basis for the success of any state action in that area. 
The environmental issues that arise from the international oil trade are such 
that they require concerted efforts by all and sundry. The cooperation of every 
segment of the international community is needed, as the eradication of the problem 
in one area will be a mere mirage if other areas are still prone to oil pollution. It is 
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imperative therefore that the members of the international community embrace an 
attitude of cooperation and a recognition of the concept of a global family in the 
formulation of policy and the conduct of international affairs, instead of an 
atmosphere that fosters indifference and engenders strife. 
The realization of the above point should also galvanize the international 
community into shifting its emphasis, in the area of marine environmental protection, 
from treaty-making to treaty implementation. This fundamental shift in focus, which 
exists to a certain degree at present, will enable key players on the international scene 
to dedicate considerable energy and resources to making existing laws more effective. 
In order to make the current legal framework more productive, international 
policy should be streamlined to enable States who are willing, but unable, to 
participate in global efforts against oil pollution to come on board. Accordingly, 
adequate resources should be made available to developing port States to undertake 
pollution prevention and control measures, such as the installation of port reception 
facilities, monitoring equipment, inspection services, and manpower training and 
development. 
It is doubtful that the international legal framework will achieve its full 
potential if the practice of flags of convenience shipping continues to thrive. While 
some States still enjoy the economic benefits such shipping brings, the environment 
continues to suffer. The flags of convenience States who depend on proceeds from 
ship registration should be assisted economically in exchange for their refusing to 
register substandard vessels and foregoing the revenue accruing therefrom. The 
assistance may take the form of grants, loan facilities, development projects, andjoint 
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investment partnerships with developed countries, given that some of the foregone 
revenue would ordinarily have been channelled into these areas. Accordingly, open 
registries should not necessarily be abolished, but their services should be restricted 
to seaworthy vessels whose owners are interested in operating in an atmosphere free 
from a lot of State control. 
Funding the cost of compliance by developing States and "buying out" open 
registry States require a huge financial commitment. To raise the needed funds the , 
international community should impose a user fee for the use of its common 
resources in the oceans, including ocean transportation, dumping, and fishing. The fee 
should be paid by every enterprise involved in such use, including private 
corporations and government agencies. 
Additional funding or resources should come from developed countries. These 
nations should undertake greater responsibility in resisting further damage to the 
marine environment, not only through stringent measures such as port State control, 
but also through financial contribution in reparation for the negative impact of their 
past activities. It is also imperative for them to help fund marine environmental 
projects, including those to be undertaken by developing countries, as a form of 
compensation to the developing world for foregoing the activities their developed 
counterparts partook of in developing their economies. 
Funds raised from the above measures should be managed by an international 
funding facility. This does not necessarily need to be a new agency as existing 





The unethical practices of the business community, founded upon an 
inordinate desire for profit maximization, are at the root of the compliance problem. 
States are propelled to bow to the wishes of corporations in their disposition toward 
treaty negotiation, accession, and implementation because of their deference to the 
interests of the corporations. The industry also ensures the sustenance of open 
registries, a practice engineered by it without regard to the environmental 
implications. Corporations involved in international operations, especially oil 
transactions, therefore should be made to embrace ethical business practices in their 
dealings. They should also be required to commit a certain percentage of their annual 
profits as charitable gifts for the enhancement of the environment. This would be 
done through the creation of a binding and enforceable international code of behavior. 
With this in place, the burden on States to enforce international rules will be lessened , 
as the corporate sector will be forced to behave responsibly. 
The structure of the international system itself has stood as a senous 
impediment to the effectiveness of international law . Because of the principle of State 
sovereignty, a flag State's jurisdiction over its ships is viewed as being of the utmost 
importance. But flag States have not been keen to their responsibilities and this has 
hamstrung international efforts. It is therefore recommended that Flag State 
jurisdiction should be redefined or de-emphasized. Thus, actions for violations of 
international rules should be allowed against vessels and corporations in States other 
than the State of the ship's registry. 
Port State control has been immensely important in preventing and controlling 
oil pollution. Its effectiveness has been most evident through regional arrangements. 
318 
The IMO and other relevant agencies should therefore intensify efforts toward the 
extension of the existing port state regime to involve the rest of the world. This 
should be done along regional lines following closely the model established by the 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 
The issue of "ports of convenience," that is, situations where shipowners 
redirect their operations to ports with less stringent requirements, also must be 
addressed. It is critical that the advantage other States' ports currently enjoy over 
ports in states like Canada, the United States, Japan, and Paris MOU countries be 
rectified. 
The West African region is an oil tanker route as well as an offshore oil 
exploration area. However, until recently, when a memorandum on port State control 
was signed in Nigeria, the countries in the area had not been able to jointly work 
against the oil pollution problems that may arise from these facilities. West African 
countries should pay more serious attention to marine environmental issues as they 
currently lack the resources to deal with a huge oil casualty from ships that transit 
through their territory. Moreover, a number of the countries depend on the rich 
marine resources in the area and it would be in their own interest to ensure that they 
are protected. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) should not relent in their efforts to ensure 
that pollution in West Africa is kept under control. 
It is expected that the newly-introduced regional port State arrangement in the 
West African region will avoid the incidence of "ports of convenience" and also save 
costs through a centralization and coordination of information and other services. The 
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costs of repeat inspection on ships that had recently been inspected by a neighboring 
country will also be avoided. This will also curtail or obviate any opposition that 
numerous inspections may generate from the maritime industry who might retaliate 
by avoiding West African ports, a situation the region can ill afford at the moment. 
In relation to oil exploration and extraction and the social, economic and 
environmental costs arising therefrom, this work acknowledges the importance of 
existing measures and instruments. Corporate codes of conduct and other voluntary 
initiatives serve some useful purpose as corporate accountability tools. However, they 
are inadequate and largely ineffective and therefore should not be considered a 
panacea. Public initiatives should be introduced to strengthen or replace self-
regulation. 
The United Nations should go beyond the Global Compact and ensure the 
introduction of binding initiatives that place an obligation on multinational 
corporations to act responsibly toward the society and environment. The UN 
Commission on Human Rights or its SubCommission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights should ensure that its current work results in a mandatory 
code, binding on all multinational corporations doing business around the globe. 
The domestic judicial systems of some countries, notably the United States, 
Great Britain and France have proven an invaluable resource and provided enormous 
opportunities for those seeking remedies for corporate abuses. They remain 
inadequate, nevertheless, and come with enormous disadvantages for those countries 
and their corporations vis-a.-vis companies from countries that do not take corporate 
accountability with the same level of seriousness. Globalizing the advantages that 
320 
these national legal systems offer through an international treaty would be a step in 
the right direction. 
The legal personality of the multinational corporation in international law has 
been shrouded in controversy. Clarification of the international legal position and 
status of these corporate entities is imperative, if the goal of addressing the social, 
economic and environmental costs of international business remains on the radar 
screen of wellmeaning people all over the world. Multinational corporations should 
be invested with appropriate rights, with corresponding duties attaching to them in 
international law. 
It is not enough to hold multinational corporations accountable in international 
law for environmental abuses and human rights violations. Reforms geared toward 
such, while helpful, would still not address the multifarious needs of people in oil 
producing communities. Indeed, environmental pollution, degradation and 
devastation affect the economic wellbeing of some of these communities that are 
heavily dependent on fishing and farming. Some of the human rights abuses also stem 
from agitation for better treatment from oil companies, a cessation of economically 
(as well as ecologically-) harmful activities, and a desire to have a stake in resources 
that belong to them. Therefore, other social and economic costs of oil operations also 
need to be addressed. 
Some useful measures are hereby recommended. First, where such does not 
exist, people in the oil producing communities should be given the right to 
information about facilities sited in their area, the chemicals and other materials used 
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in their operation and the level of hazard they pose to the community. This should be 
enshrined in the national laws and also at the international level. 
Oil producing States should also ensure that they enunciate and incorporate in 
their legal framework, the oil producing communities and peoples' right to 
participation in the fonnulation and implementation of developmental and 
environmental decisions that have an impact on them. 
There is a great need for communities to be allowed unfettered access to 
domestic judicial remedies. The right to citizen suits should be entrenched. That way, 
aggrieved persons would be able to go to court to vindicate their rights and would no 
longer need to depend on government officials - who may be corrupt or colluding 
with corporate executives, and thus unreliable. 
Since their traditional economies suffer the adverse consequences of oil 
production, people in oil producing communities should have an alternative economic 
base fashioned for them. The use of development and conservation trust funds to 
preserve their resources and build their capacities would be a welcome development. 
In particular, relevant industries should be sited in their area, while reasonable grants 
should be made to community members to establish micro-enterprises that would 
benefit them as well as provide needed jobs for the budding anny of jobless youths 
and others in their areas. Most important, the system of depriving people in the oil 
producing communities of their property rights in their resources is quite unfair. A 
system that confers some fonn of ownership (where outright transfer of control is 
infeasible) is highly recommended. 
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This work has taken the innovative and pioneering step of linking the 
compliance problem in international law with the corporate accountability question. 
Addressing the latter is tantamount to removing some of the obstacles that impede the 
achievement of the fonner, necessitating an approach that takes this linkage as an 
important issue. This dissertation has also sought to enhance the effectiveness of 
international rules and supply needed strength to the international legal system by 
advocating a fuller incorporation of multinational corporations in the international 
scheme of things. 
It is fervently hoped and earnestly expected that the conclusions reached and 
recommendations made herein would capture the attention of international policy 
makers and viewed as a modest contribution toward a much needed refonn of 
international law and policy. 
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